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THE

LIFE

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR THOMAS MUNRO, BART.

AND K.C.B.

LATE GOVERNOR OF MADRAS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE

AND PRIVATE PAPERS.

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BY THE REV. G. R. GLEIG,

M.A. M.R.S.L. &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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On the 24th of January, 1819, General and Mrs. Munro took their passage on board the Warren Hastings. The voyage was, upon the whole, a pleasant one, for the ship touched both at Ceylon and St. Helena; and some delay taking place at the latter island, Gen. Munro was enabled to gratify a wish which he had long entertained. He traversed the rock from end to end, visiting every spot to which the presence of Napoleon had given an interest; and he left it more than ever impressed with mingled admiration and pity for that great, misguided, and ill-fated man. This, however, was not the only occurrence which rendered his present homeward passage memorable. On the 30th of May, the ship being then in the latitude of the Azores, Mrs. Munro was delivered of a boy, who received the name, and has since, too soon, succeeded to the title of his father.

Towards the end of June, the Warren Hastings came to an anchor in the Downs, and General and Mrs. Munro landing at Deal, proceeded without delay to London. Their sojourn here was not, however, protracted; indeed they appear to have made no pause beyond what was absolutely necessary for refreshment; but pushing directly for Scotland, Mrs. Munro took up her abode with her father, whilst the General amused himself for a brief space, in travelling through the Highlands. But General Munro's merits were too justly appreciated to encourage any expectation that he would be permitted long to enjoy the calm of private life. He

had scarcely reached the shores of Kent, ere intelligence was communicated that there was a design in agitation of again employing him in a high station in India; and he was recalled from the North, within a few weeks after his arrival, by a formal announcement of his promotion.

So early as the month of August, 1818, it was found necessary to appoint a successor to the Honourable Hugh Elliot, in the Government of Madras; and from several names submitted to him, as well qualified for the office, the minister thought fit to select that of General Munro. Almost at the same time, the rank of Major-General had been conferred upon him; and he was invested, in reward of his distinguished services, with the insignia of K.C.B. But though the latter honours were fully estimated and gladly received by the subject of this memoir, it is very doubtful how far the former distinction was welcomed; for Sir Thomas harboured no wish to return to India in any capacity. Not that he disliked either the climate or the country, to both of which, on the contrary, he was extremely partial; but he had already spent so large a portion of his life in a species of honourable exile, that to his kindred and native land he was become, in some degree, an alien. Besides, there were around him now other and closer ties than had existence in former days; whilst his anxiety to become acquainted with the manners and customs of European nations, continued as strong as ever. On

these accounts, and on many others, there is reason to believe, that had his private feelings only been consulted, he would have declined the proffered appointment, doubly gratifying as it was, from the circumstance that it came totally unsolicited. But Sir Thomas Munro was not in the habit of obeying his own inclinations, when a sense of duty stood opposed to them; and finding that his acceptance of office was looked to with anxiety by men of all parties, he did not refuse it.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that previous to the departure from England of a high Indian functionary, the Honourable the Court of Directors are in the habit of testifying their respect to him in person, by inviting him to a magnificent entertainment. The good custom was not, as may be supposed, neglected on the present occasion; and the assemblage of great and able men who attended at the City of London Tavern, was even more strikingly numerous than usually takes place at such meetings. Among these may be enumerated the Duke of Wellington and Lord Powis, both intimate personal friends of Sir Thomas Munro; Mr. Canning, the Earl of Eldon, with the rest of His Majesty's ministers; whilst numbers, whom business or other accidents kept at a distance, failed not to testify by letter their satisfaction at the elevation of the new Governor. Some of these friendly communications are subjoined, as well as an extract from an eloquent speech, in which Mr. Canning

congratulated the East India Company on the prospects before them; because they furnish the best possible evidence of the kind of feeling which prevailed in all quarters, as to the wisdom of the selection just made.

"We bewilder ourselves in this part of the world," said one of the greatest orators whom England has ever produced, "with opinions respecting the sources from which power is derived. Some suppose it to arise with the people themselves, while others entertain a different view; all however are agreed, that it should be exercised *for* the people. If ever an appointment took place to which *this* might be ascribed as the distinguishing motive, it was *that* which we have now come together to celebrate; and I have no doubt that the meritorious officer who has been appointed to the Government of Madras, will, in the execution of his duty, ever keep in view those measures which will best conduce to the happiness of twelve millions of people."

Lord William Bentinck again, to whom the appointment had first been offered, but whom circumstances induced to decline it, no sooner heard of Sir Thomas's elevation, than he addressed him in the following terms:—

"Mr. Canning has communicated to me your appointment to the Government at Madras, and I have answered, that this nomination did *him* great honour, and gives *me* infinite satisfaction; and that whatever feeling of regret, upon public grounds, I may have felt on refusing to return to India, was now completely removed, by my conviction, that a much better substitute had been found. All this is my real true opinion; and I will only add, that it gives me great pleasure, that your great and noble services have at last toiled through to their just distinction."

In like manner, the Right Honourable John Sullivan; who was for many years an efficient member of the Board of Control, said—

"I am so much alive to the sincere and warm feeling of joy upon your nomination to the Government of Madras, that I cannot mix any thing with my congratulations. I write to offer my humble tribute to Mr. Canning upon a selection that does him so much honour."

Whilst Mr. Cumming, not the least qualified of all Sir Thomas's friends to judge of his fitness for office, expressed himself thus strongly on the occasion:—

"I shall take an early opportunity of calling upon you to express my unfeigned joy in the prospect of an event which appears to me more calculated than any that has occurred for years, to gladden the hearts of those who feel an interest in the welfare of the people of India, and in the reputation of the British Government in that part of the world."

So many congratulatory addresses could not fail to make a deep impression upon a man of Sir Thomas Munro's mental conformation. He was peculiarly gratified by them, and wrote to his friend Mr. Cumming on the subject of the public meeting, in the eloquent and forcible language of nature.

"I am sorry," says he, "that the change in the destination of the ship from Portsmouth to the Downs obliged me to leave town so suddenly, that I was prevented from thanking Mr. Canning for what he said of me at the London Tavern. I do not know that I shall derive so much enjoyment from the whole course of my government, as from

what passed that evening. It is worth while to be a Governor, to be spoken of in such a manner, by such a man."

The letter from which the preceding extract has been taken was despatched from Deal, whither Sir Thomas and Lady Munro proceeded early in December. They had committed their boy in charge to Lady Munro's father some months previously, and hence they prepared to set out upon their long voyage, as little encumbered as when first they quitted England together. The following, addressed to his sister from the same place, will however serve to show how varied were Sir Thomas's feelings and anticipations on the occasion.

Deal, 12th December, 1819.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

WE are here ready to embark the moment the wind becomes a little more favourable. I wish it were so now, for the weather is fine and clear, and it is tiresome waiting at an inn when one is going to leave one's country. I had no wish to leave it again; but as I must return to India, I am impatient to be there. My attachment to both countries is so nearly equal, that a very little turns the scale. I like the Indian climate and country much better than our own; and had we all our friends there, I would hardly think of coming home; but this country is the country of all our relations and of early life, and of all the associations connected with it. It is also the country of all the arts,—of peace, and war, and of all the interesting struggles among statesmen for political power, and among radicals for the same object. It is near France and Italy, and all the countries of the Continent, which I have ear-

nestly wished to visit ever since I first read about them. The only objection I feel to going again to India is my age. I might now, perhaps, find employment in this country, and I have health enough to travel over Europe, and visit whatever is remarkable for having been the scene of great actions in ancient times; but when I return from India, it will be too late to attempt to enter upon a new career in this country; and my eyes will probably be too old, if I am not so, in other respects, to permit me to derive any pleasure from visiting the countries of the Continent. I may deceive myself, and fancy, like many other old Indians, that I am still fit for what may be far beyond my power. There is no help for it now: I must make the experiment of the effects of another visit to India upon my constitution and mind.

I hope you will visit Craigie sometimes, and see that my son is not spoiled, but brought up hardily as we were in Glasgow.

In the beginning of May, 1820, Sir Thomas and Lady Munro arrived at Bombay, where they were hospitably received, and magnificently entertained by the Governor, Mr. Elphinstone. After spending about a fortnight here, they again took shipping, and on the 8th of June reached Madras. Sir Thomas was received with all the state due to his high station; and being conducted to the Government House, entered without delay upon the execution of his arduous duties. Into these, as they occurred in detail, it is not my intention to enter much at length, because the best record which could be given of the manner in which they were performed, is to be found both in the archives of the East India Company, and in the

sentiments of the people. But of the principles which guided him in all his public proceedings, as well as of the manner in which his time was spent, it is necessary that the reader should be made generally acquainted.

With respect to the grand leading principle of Sir Thomas Munro's public conduct, enough has been said already, to place it distinctly before the eye of an ordinarily attentive observer. A just, but not a prejudiced, judge of the Indian character, he ever felt and taught, that no point was to be gained of benefit either to the ruler or the subject, except by functionaries capable of speaking and understanding the Hindostanee and others of the vernacular languages. He considered, too, that it was the indispensable duty of every European, holding a situation of trust, to be thoroughly acquainted with the customs, habits, prejudices, and feelings of the people; and he invariably laid the blame of such petty disturbances as broke out from time to time in the provinces, on the want of due knowledge, or becoming attention in the resident British authorities. His own career indeed had fully established the soundness of this theory; for to no man were more turbulent districts committed; yet he not only reduced them to order, in the ordinary sense of that term, but rendered the inhabitants at once willing subjects of the Company, and personally attached to himself. His great object therefore was, to impress those in authority

with the policy and absolute necessity of studying both the dialects and feelings of the people; and he applied that principle to all classes, to the military not less than to the civil servants.

With this statesman-like and philanthropic notion uppermost in his mind, one of his first public acts was to be present at an examination of the students,* in the College of Fort St. George, to whom he addressed, in a very impressive manner, the following characteristic speech :—

"The junior civil servants of the Company have a noble field before them. No men in the world have more powerful motives for studying with diligence, for there are none who have a prospect of a greater reward, and whose success depends so entirely upon themselves. The object of all your studies here is one of the most important that can be imagined. It is that you may become qualified to execute, with benefit to the state, the part which may hereafter fall to your lot in the administration of the affairs of the country,—language is but the means, the good government of the people is the great end; and in promoting the attainment of this end, every civil servant has a share more or less considerable; for there is no office, however subordinate, in which the conduct of the person holding it has not some influence on the comfort of the people, and the reputation of the Government.

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* The reader is doubtless aware, that at Madras a sort of college or public school exists, through which every candidate for employment in the civil service must pass, ere he be admitted to fill the office of assistant either to a judge and magistrate, or to a collector.

"The advantage of knowing the country languages is not merely that it will enable you to carry on the public business with greater facility, but that by rendering you more intimately acquainted with the people, it will dispose you to think more favourably of them, to relinquish some of those prejudices which we are all at first too apt to entertain against them, to take a deeper interest in their welfare; and thus to render yourselves more respected among them. The more you feel an anxious concern in their prosperity, the more likely you will be to discharge your duty towards them with zeal and efficiency, and the more likely they will be to return the benefit with gratitude and attachment.

"In every situation it is best to think well of the people placed under our authority. There is no danger that this feeling will be carried too far; and even if it should, error on this side is safer than on the other. It is a strong argument in favour of the general good qualities of the natives, that those who have lived longest amongst them, have usually thought the most highly of them. I trust that you will all hereafter see the justice of this opinion, and the propriety of acting upon it; for in almost every country, but more particularly in this, the good-will of the people is the strongest support of the Government."

The following fragment of a memorandum found among Sir Thomas's papers, seems too valuable to be omitted.

MEMORANDUM.

THE importance of public officers being free from debt. No excuses for being encumbered with it. The causes of it—dissipation, thoughtlessness, or want of firmness.

2. It is a great drawback on every man in office. Some

men may do their duty with it; but never so well as without it.

3. There are few qualities in a public servant more really valuable than order and economy in his private affairs. They make him independent, and enable him to devote, without disturbance, his whole time to his public duty.

4. It is very essential, both to your own future advancement, as well as to the good of the service, that you should leave the College fully prepared, by your knowledge of the native languages, to enter upon its duties with advantage to the people, and that they should not have cause to lament that they are placed under the authority of men, who, not being qualified to execute the duties of their situation, are incapable of protecting them.

5. Many have left the College perfectly qualified for commencing their public career. Some have left it with a very imperfect knowledge of the languages, who have afterwards, by persevering study, completely retrieved their lost time. It is much safer, however, to leave the College already provided with the necessary qualifications for public business, than to trust to the chances of acquiring it in the provinces; for though some may acquire it in this manner, others will fail, and never become useful or distinguished members of the service.

Referring, in some degree, to the same subject, is the following admirable Minute, which I insert, because it will explain more perfectly than could be done by any language of mine, as well the view which Sir Thomas Munro took of the character of the people of India, as his notions of the system of political instruction which ought to be pursued, after candidates for office quitted College.

MINUTE.

8th of August, 1820.

THE Court of Directors has, in its letter of the 1st of March, 1820, proposed certain rules for our guidance in the selection of persons to fill the offices of provincial and zillah judges, and of secretaries to Government, and the Board of Revenue, and of members of that Board, and of register and members of the Sudder Adawlut. The Court has desired us to take this subject into our particular consideration, and to furnish it with our sentiments thereupon.

The reasons which render it desirable that the offices in question should, as far as may be practicable, be filled with men possessing a considerable share of revenue experience acquired in the provinces, are so fully explained in the Honourable Court's Letter to Bengal, of the 8th April, 1819, that it is not easy to add any thing to them; and it therefore appears to me that all that remains for us to do is, to endeavour, without delay, to carry into effect the intentions of the Honourable Court to as great an extent as may be found possible, in the present state of the service. It is obvious, however, that from the great want of regularly-trained servants, we must proceed gradually, and that many years must elapse before full operation can be given to the plan. Until within the last twenty or thirty years, we had little territory in our own hands, and, consequently, hardly any means of forming revenue servants. We have been more fortunate than could have been expected under such disadvantages; for most of the principal offices at the Presidency have generally been filled by a succession of able servants, and some of the most distinguished of them have been men who never were employed, or only for a very short time, any where else but at the seat of government; such men, however, would undoubtedly have been much fitter for their station if they had

served some years in the revenue line in the provinces. We have now, in our widely-extended territory, an ample field for the training of the junior servants in revenue affairs, and we ought to avail ourselves of it for that purpose. A knowledge of revenue business will be useful in whatever department they may be afterwards employed; but a knowledge of the natives is still more essential, and this knowledge is only to be acquired by an early and free intercourse with them, for which the revenue presents infinitely more facilities than any other line. It ought to be our aim to give to the younger servants the best opinion of the natives, in order that they may be the better qualified to govern them hereafter. We can never be qualified to govern men against whom we are prejudiced. If we entertain a prejudice at all, it ought rather to be in their favour than against them. We ought to know their character, but especially the favourable side of it; for if we know only the unfavourable, it will beget contempt and harshness on the one part, and discontent on the other. The custom of appointing young men, as soon as they leave College, to be registers to zillah courts, is calculated rather to produce than to obviate this evil. The most likely way of preventing it, and of fulfilling the desire of the Court of Directors to improve the efficiency of the Civil Service, would be, to make every civil servant begin his career in the revenue line. The slightest reflection will satisfy us, that it is much more probable that he will become an useful public servant by beginning in the revenue than in the judicial departments.

There are some men who overcome all difficulties, and become valuable public officers in whatever line they are placed, and whatever may have been that in which they were first employed: but in making rules, we must look to men such as they generally are.

When a young man is transferred from College to the

office of a zillah register, he finds himself all at once invested with judicial functions. He learns forms before he learns things. He becomes full of the respect due to the Court, but knows nothing of the people. He is placed too high above them to have any general intercourse with them. He has little opportunity of seeing them except in court. He sees only the worst part of them, and under the worst shapes—he sees them as plaintiff and defendant, exasperated against each other, or as criminals; and the unfavourable opinion with which he too often, at first, enters among them, in place of being removed by experience, is every day strengthened and increased. He acquires, it is true, habits of cautious examination, and of precision and regularity; but they are limited to a particular object, and are frequently attended with dilatoriness, too little regard for the value of time, and an inaptitude for general affairs, which require a man to pass readily from one subject to another.

In the revenue line he has an almost boundless field, from whence he may draw at pleasure his knowledge of the people. As he has it in his power, at some time or other, to show kindness to them all, in settling their differences, in occasional indulgence in their rents, in facilitating the performance of their ceremonies, and many other ways; and as he sees them without official form or restraint, they come to him freely, not only on the public, but often on their private concerns. His communications with them are not limited to one subject, but extend to every thing connected with the welfare of the country. He sees them engaged in the pursuits of trade and agriculture, and promoting by their labours the increase of its resources, the object to which his own are directed. He sees that among them there is, as in other nations, a mixture of good and bad; that though many are selfish,

many likewise, especially among the agricultural class, are liberal and friendly to their poorer neighbours and tenants; and he gradually learns to take an interest in their welfare, which adheres to him in every future situation.

If a young man be sent at once from College to the revenue line, the usual effect will be to render him attached to the natives. If to the judicial, to increase the dislike towards them with which he too often sets out. The main object, therefore, in beginning with the revenue, is not to teach him to collect the kists, which is a very secondary consideration, but to afford him an opportunity of gaining a knowledge of the inhabitants and their usages, which is indispensable to the due discharge of his duty in the judicial as well as in the revenue line.

An acquaintance with the customs of the inhabitants, but particularly of the rayets, the various tenures under which they hold their lands, the agreements usual among them regarding cultivation, and between them and soucars respecting loans or advances for their rents, and the different modes of assignment, is essential to a judge; for questions concerning these points form the chief part of his business. A judge who is ignorant of them, must often be at a loss on the most simple points; but as a knowledge of them can hardly be attained excepting in the revenue line, it may be said that no man can be a good judge who has not served in it. If this kind of knowledge be indispensable in a zillah judge, it is equally so in the judges of the higher courts and the secretaries to Government. It is on the right administration of the revenue that the prosperity of the country chiefly depends. If it be too heavy or very unequally distributed, the effects are felt in every department. Trade is depressed as well as agriculture; numbers of the lower orders of the people are driven by their necessity to seek a subsistence in theft and robbery:

the better sort become dissatisfied, and give no help in checking the disorder. The roads become unsafe, and the prisons crowded; and we impute to the depravity of the people the mischief which has probably been occasioned by injudicious taxation, or the hasty abolition or resumption of long established rights and privileges. It is of importance that the higher officers of Government should always be able to trace the good or bad state of the country to its true cause, and that with this view they should, in the early part of their service, be employed in the revenue line in the provinces, because it is only there that they can completely see and understand its internal structure and administration.

As the business of a judge is much facilitated by his having been previously trained in the revenue line, so is that of a collector, by his having served in the judicial; but not in the same degree, because he may become tolerably well acquainted with judicial proceedings in the practice of his own duties in the settlement of boundary and other disputes respecting the occupation of land. In framing, therefore, the few rules for giving effect to the instructions from the Court of Directors, which I now submit to the Board, I have not thought it necessary to require that a collector should previously have been employed in the judicial line. It might, at first sight, seem to be desirable that a collector should before have served as a register, and that the civil servants, in rising in the judicial and revenue lines indiscriminately, and in passing from one to the other, should proceed regularly through every gradation in each; but this would be extremely embarrassing and injurious to the service, and would, in fact, be discovered on trial to be nearly impracticable. The conveniency of the service does not always enable us to make interchanges when servants are ready to be transferred from one branch to the other;

but we can always secure a few years of revenue instruction, by sending all servants to that line at first. We have then the advantage of the early and first impression; and two years are of more value then, than double the number would be at any after period. After serving two years as an assistant collector, he may either be transferred to the judicial or any other line, or remain in the revenue, and the matter might be determined either by his own option or the exigency of the service. In rising afterwards to the highest offices, it will not be necessary that he should pass regularly through every subordinate one, or that he should serve longer in any of them than such a time as may enable him, with tolerable application, to acquire a practical knowledge of its duties. It may be thought that two years are too short a time for any person to learn much of revenue; but as he may remain in that line as much longer as he pleases, though he cannot be less than two years, there can be little doubt but that a large portion of the junior servants will remain in it; that many of those who leave it, on the expiration of the two years, will have imbibed a partiality for it, and seek to return to it, and that we shall thus always have a sufficient number of servants possessing such a knowledge of revenue as to qualify them to fill efficiently any office whatever.

The rule of sending all young men directly from the College to the provinces, will in future prevent them from thinking of establishing themselves at the Presidency, and will prove beneficial both to them and the public; but as it might be attended with inconvenience to those who have been fixed here since 1816, were they to be removed, and more particularly as some of them owed their detention to their superior merits having fitted them to fill situations of greater emolument than they could have obtained in the provinces, I would therefore recommend that, in order to

prevent their suffering by the operation of a new arrangement, they should be permitted to have the option of remaining at the Presidency, or going into the provinces.*

Another fundamental doctrine, if I may so express myself, in the political code of Sir Thomas Munro, was, that the pay of every public servant, especially in India, ought to be ample, an adequate remuneration furnishing the best preventative against those mean and dishonest dealings of which too many, whether justly or otherwise, have been accused. From the fragment given a few pages ago, it will be seen, that for the practice of incurring debts he made no excuse, because he regarded it as injurious not merely to the personal respectability, but to the national character of Englishmen: yet his abhorrence of the practice was tempered by a benevolence and kindness of heart which never, under any circumstances, seem to have forsaken him. It may be necessary to state, that when a public servant, on this or any other account, suffered suspension, it was the practice to deprive him of all his salaries, and to leave him to make his way home, not unfrequently by means of charitable contributions raised among the inhabitants of the Presidency. Sir Thomas Munro at once interfered to obtain a modification

* The reader will find in the APPENDIX a valuable Minute, in which the principle of paying due attention to the native languages is shown to be as essential among military as among civil officers; and the question as to the adequacy of certain measures to act as inducements to their study is ably discussed.

of this somewhat harsh, as well as injudicious, regulation. He conceived that greater injury was done by thus degrading the national character in the eyes of the natives, than the benefits arising from example were likely to compensate; and he obtained a law to be passed, by which such unfortunate or imprudent individuals were supplied with funds adequate to cover the expenses of their passage, provided they departed within a specified period.*

Whilst he was thus attentive to the comforts and respectability of European servants, it is not to be supposed that he forgot for a moment what was due to the natives. From what has been said in many of his letters, particularly in those written during the existence of the judicial Commission, it will be discovered, that to the necessity of behaving with liberality to the people of India he was peculiarly alive, and the whole tenor of his government shows that he never lost sight of that commendable object. He early directed his attention to the re-establishment of native schools, wherever they had fallen into decay, and to the erection of new seminaries in places where none before existed; and he embodied a Committee of Public Instruction at Fort St. George, for the exclusive purpose of training up Hindoos and Mohammedans to offices of greater or less impor-

* There is a most judicious Minute to this effect inserted by him, 1st December, 1820, among the Judicial Consultations of Fort St. George, which nothing but the want of space hinders me from transcribing.

tance under the Government. For the support of this useful institution and the maintenance of native schoolmasters, he allotted fifty thousand rupees annually, a sum certainly the reverse of inordinate when the benefits to be derived from its expenditure are considered.*

But it was not for the instruction of the natives only that Sir Thomas Munro was a strenuous and persevering advocate; he was anxious to see them rewarded for their services in such a manner as would induce them to give up the energies both of their minds and bodies to the advancement of the public welfare: and, above all, he was desirous that an adequate provision against old age should be made for such as particularly distinguished themselves by their usefulness. The following Minute, on this head, is at once so judicious and so brief, that I cannot refuse to insert it.

EXTRACT MINUTE.

Dated 20th January, 1821.

In providing for distinguished public servants, both for the sake of doing justice to them, and of encouraging others to follow their example, we ought to take care that while we are liberal we are not profuse; for extravagant grants not only diminish our means of rewarding when necessary, but render the gifts of Government less honourable, and make them to be received with less gratitude. There are, it is true, some rare instances of extraordinary services, which cannot be regulated by any standard, or be too highly rewarded: but, in general, the

* In the Appendix will be found a Minute on this subject.

reward should be measured by the nature of the service performed, and the pay, the rank, or the situation in life of the person on whom it is to be bestowed.*

Every person acquainted with the political history of India must be aware, that one of the consequences of our regulations, which empowered the collector to distrain, in the event of a defalcation of revenue, and to sell by public auction the land from which such revenue was due, led, wherever it prevailed, to consequences the most mischievous. Among other effects arising out of it, the Native revenue officers, whose eagerness to possess land was, like that of Asiatics in general, excessive, devised every expedient to cause embarrassments among the proprietors with whom they maintained dealings, in order that they might themselves purchase the estates as soon as they came into the market. Nor did the evil rest here. The possession of landed property gives to its owner in India a degree of influence which a similar contingency gives in no other quarter of the globe; and this, the ill-paid, and generally ill-

* The method originally adopted for supporting superannuated and disabled Native servants was, by means of a pension fund, collected from the salaries of persons in office, somewhat after the fashion of the Widows' Fund in our army. The measure was found not to answer, and had been abolished; but the Court of Directors, taking a different view of the subject, ordered it to be renewed. There is, among the records in the India House, a Minute or statement from the pen of Sir Thomas Munro, so able and so just, that its length alone has deterred me from inserting it in the body of the present work.

conditioned, servants of our public courts were too much in the habit of turning to the worst purposes. Sir Thomas Munro had all along seen the evil of the system, and repeatedly, in his correspondence with the higher powers, argued against it. He now took the matter up with the earnestness which it deserved, and caused a regulation to be passed, positively prohibiting all revenue officers from holding or possessing land in the several districts within which the compass of their duties lay.*

But his anxiety to increase the happiness, and add to the respectability of the natives, was far from ending here. It is probably needless to observe, that under the British Government in India a variety of monopolies exist, all of them more or less hurtful to the interests of the people, though some perhaps, under the existing state of affairs, indispensable. To these Sir Thomas Munro was so far hostile, that he adopted every rational expedient, if not to diminish their number, at all events to hinder their growth: indeed, he looked upon an absolute freedom of cultivation to be the natural right of the rayet; and against every enactment which had the smallest tendency to counteract it, he decidedly set his face. I have inserted in the APPENDIX a long and able Minute on this subject, called forth in consequence of a proposition to secure to the Government a mono-

* I am again compelled to refer the reader to the APPENDIX for his valuable Minute on this subject.

poly in the valuable timber which grows in the forests of Malabar.

Again, there was no point which Sir Thomas Munro was more anxious to press upon the attention of the collectors and zillah magistrates, than the impolicy of interfering, unless in very gross cases, with the disputes of the natives originating in questions of caste. It happened that on the 29th of May, 1820, the usual squabble between the right and left-hand castes occurred at Masulipatam. The collector, more zealous perhaps than prudent, interposed to quell the disturbance, employing for this purpose a party of sepoys; and the consequence was, that not only were several lives lost, but a good deal of angry feeling was excited. Sir Thomas Munro took advantage of the circumstance to record his opinion of all such proceedings, and to point out, in a sound and sensible manner, their extreme impropriety. He states in the paper which the reader will find in the APPENDIX, that such squabbles have occurred from time immemorial, and will occur again, without leading to any results dangerous to the Government; and that nothing can be more injudicious than for the civil magistrate to mix himself up in differences of a purely religious character. Above all, he deprecates the practice of employing upon such services the native troops of the Company, by far the greater proportion of whom partake in all the prejudices of the disputants; not only because of the hazard incurred by

their refusing to act, but because to require them to act was a demand too severe upon their loyalty and sense of military discipline. This is one out of a thousand instances of his sensitive regard to the feelings of the people, and of his great anxiety that these should be outraged as rarely and to as slight an extent as possible.

Intimately connected with his opinions on these heads were the views which he took of the two most important points connected with our Indian administration—I allude to the questions whether or not the press in India ought to be free and unrestricted; and how far it were judicious to apply the influence of Government for their furtherance of the work of conversion. On the first head, Sir Thomas's sentiments are as correct as they are clearly given. He holds that the freedom of the press is not only unnecessary, but absolutely incompatible with the continuance of our authority in India. But as the subject has of late come in a variety of shapes before the public, I consider it right to insert here the entire Minute in which these sentiments are conveyed.

MINUTE IN CONSULTATION, 12th APRIL, 1822.

A GREAT deal has of late been said, both in England and in this country, regarding the liberty of the Indian press; and although nothing has occurred to bring the question regularly before the Board, yet as I think it one on which, according to the decision which may be

given, the preservation of our dominions in India may depend; and as it appears to me desirable that the Honourable the Court of Directors should be in possession of the sentiments of this Government at as early a period as possible, I deem it my duty to call the attention of the Board to the subject.

2. I cannot view the question of a free press in this country, without feeling that the tenure by which we hold our power never has been, and never can be, the liberties of the people; I therefore consider it as essential to the tranquillity of the country, and the maintenance of our government, that all the present restrictions should be continued. Were the people all our countrymen, I would prefer the utmost freedom of the press; but as they are, nothing could be more dangerous than such freedom. In place of spreading useful knowledge among the people, and tending to their better government, it would generate insubordination, insurrection, and anarchy.

3. Those who speak of the press being free in this country, have looked at only one part of the subject; they have looked no farther than to Englishmen, and to the press as a monopoly in their hands for the amusement or benefit of their countrymen; they have not looked to its freedom among the natives, to be by them employed for whatever they also may consider to be for their own benefit, and that of their countrymen.

4. A free press and the dominion of strangers are things which are quite incompatible, and which cannot long exist together; for what is the first duty of a free press? it is to deliver the country from a foreign yoke, and to sacrifice to this one great object every measure and consideration; and if we make the press really free to the natives as well as to Europeans, it must inevitably lead to this result. We might wish that the press might be used

to convey moral and religious instruction to the natives, and that its effects should go no farther; they might be satisfied with this for a time, but would soon learn to apply it to political purposes—to compare their own situations and ours, and to overthrow our power.

5. The advocates of a free press seek, they say, the improvement of our system of Indian government, and of the minds and conditions of the people; but these desirable ends are, I am convinced, quite unattainable by the means they propose. There are two important points which should always be kept in view, in our administration of affairs here. The first is, that our sovereignty should be prolonged to the remotest possible period. The second is, that whenever we are obliged to resign it, we should leave the natives so far improved from their connection with us, as to be capable of maintaining a free, or at least a regular government amongst themselves. If these objects can ever be accomplished, it can only be by a restricted press. A free one, so far from facilitating, would render their attainment utterly impracticable; for, by attempting to *precipitate* improvement, it would frustrate all the benefit which might have been derived from more cautious and temperate proceedings.

6. In the present state of India, the good to be expected from a free press is trifling and uncertain, but the mischief is incalculable; and as to the proprietors of newspapers, as mischief is the more profitable of the two, it will generally have the preference. There is no public in India to be guided and instructed by a free press; the whole of the European society is composed of civil and military officers, belonging to the King's and Honourable Company's services, with a small proportion of merchants and shopkeepers; there are but few among them who have not access to the newspapers and periodical publications of

Europe, or who require the aid of political information from an Indian newspaper.

7. The restraint on the press is very limited; it extends only to attacks on the character of Government and its officers, and on the religion of the natives; on all other points it is free. The removal of these restrictions could be of advantage to none but the proprietors of newspapers; it is their business to sell their papers, and they must fill them with such articles as are most likely to answer this purpose; nothing in a newspaper excites so much interest as strictures on the conduct of Government, or its officers; but this is more peculiarly the case in India, where, from the smallness of the European society, almost all the individuals composing it are known to each other, and almost every European may be said to be a public officer. The newspaper which censures most freely public men and measures, and which is most personal in its attacks, will have the greatest sale.

8. The laws, it may be supposed, would be able to correct any violent abuse of the liberty of the press; but this would not be the case. The petty jury are shopkeepers and mechanics, a class not holding in this country the same station as in England,—a class by themselves, not mixing with the merchants, or the civil and military servants, insignificant in number, and having no weight in the community. They will never, however differently the judge may think, find a libel in a newspaper against a public servant. Even if the jury could act without bias, the agitation arising from such trials in a small society, would far outweigh any advantage they could produce. The editors of newspapers therefore, if only restricted by the law of libel, might foully calumniate the character of public officers, and misrepresent the conduct of Government. They would be urged by the powerful incentive of

self-interest to follow this course, and they would be the only part of the European population which would derive any advantage from a free press.

9. Every military officer who was dissatisfied with his immediate superior, with the Commander-in-chief, or with the decision of a court-martial, would traduce them in a newspaper. Every civil servant who thought his services neglected, or not sufficiently acknowledged by the head of the department in which he was employed, or by Government, would libel them. Every attempt to restrain them by recourse to a jury would end in defeat, ridicule, and disgrace, and all proper respect for the authority of Government would be gradually destroyed. The evil of the decline of authority would be sufficiently great, even if it went no farther than the European community; but it will not stop there, it will extend to the natives; and whenever this happens, the question will not be, whether or not a few proprietors of newspapers are to be enriched, and the European community to be amused by the liberty of the press, but whether our dominion in India is to stand or fall. We cannot have a monopoly of the freedom of the press; we cannot confine it to Europeans only; there is no device or contrivance by which this is to be done; and if it be made really free, it must in time produce nearly the same consequences here, which it does every where else. It must spread among the people the principles of liberty, and stimulate them to expel the strangers who rule over them, and to establish a national Government.

10. Were we sure that the press would act only through the medium of the people, after the great body of them should have imbibed the spirit of freedom, the danger would be seen at a distance, and there would be ample time to guard against it; but from our peculiar situation in this country, this is not what would take place,

for the danger would come upon us from our native army, not from the people. In countries not under a foreign government, the spirit of freedom usually grows up with the gradual progress of early education and knowledge among the body of the people. This is its natural origin; and were it to rise in this way in this country while under our rule, its course would be quiet and uniform, unattended by any sudden commotion, and the change in the character and opinions of the people might be met by suitable changes in the form of government. But we cannot with any reason expect this silent and tranquil renovation; for, owing to the unnatural situation in which India will be placed under a foreign government with a free press and a native army, the spirit of independence will spring up in this army long before it is ever thought of among the people. The army will not wait for the slow operation of the instruction of the people, and the growth of liberty among them, but will hasten to execute their own measures for the overthrow of the Government, and the recovery of their national independence, which they will soon learn from the press it is their duty to accomplish.

11. The high opinion entertained of us by the natives, and the deference and respect for authority, which have hitherto prevailed among ourselves, have been the main cause of our success in this country; but when these principles shall be shaken or swept away by a free press, encouraged by our juries to become a licentious one, the change will soon reach and pervade the whole native army. The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will therefore be the first to learn the doctrines circulated among them by the newspapers; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subjects of discussion among the European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. Those men will probably not trouble

themselves much about distinction, regarding the rights of the people, and form of government; but they will learn from what they hear to consider what immediately concerns themselves, and for which they require but little prompting. They will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank, with those of their European officers,—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests,—to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. If the press be free, they must immediately learn all this, and much more. Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no great difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospect of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous; but when the contest was for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempts, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation. The military insubordination which is occasioned by some partial or temporary cause, may be removed; but that which arises from a change in the character of the troops, urging them to a systematic opposition, cannot be subdued; we should never again recover our present ascendency; all confidence in them would be destroyed; they would persevere in their designs until they were finally successful; and after a sanguinary civil war, or rather passing through a series of insurrections and massacres, we should be compelled to abandon the country.

12. We might endeavour to secure ourselves by augmenting our European establishment. This might, at a great additional expense, avert the evil for a time, but no increase of Europeans could long protract the existence of our dominion. In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people: the native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue: the great mass of the people would remain quiet. The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade, which they never before experienced, might wish us success, but they would do no more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion; but this feeling arose from temporary causes,—the immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our Government, and found, that though they are protected in their persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and have also lost much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European magistrates and collectors. The hopes of recovering their former rank and influence would therefore render a great part of them well disposed to favour any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild Government, would

induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army.

13. I do not apprehend any immediate danger from the press; it would require many years before it could produce much effect on our native army; but though the danger be distant, it is not the less certain, and will ultimately overtake us if the press become free. The liberty of the press and a foreign yoke are, as already stated, quite incompatible. We cannot leave it free with any regard to our own safety; we cannot restrain it by trial by a jury; because, from the nature of juries in this country, public officers can never be tried by their peers. No jury will ever give a verdict against the publisher of a libel upon them, however gross it may be. The press must be restrained either by a censor or by the power of sending home at once the publisher of any libellous or inflammatory paper, at the responsibility of Government, without the Supreme Court having the authority, on any plea whatever, to detain him for a single day.

14. Such restrictions as those proposed will not hinder the progress of knowledge among the natives, but rather insure it by leaving it to follow its natural course, and protecting it against military violence and anarchy. Its natural course is not the circulation of newspapers and pamphlets among the natives immediately connected with Europeans, but education gradually spreading among the body of the people, and diffusing moral and religious instruction through every part of the community. The desire of independence and of governing themselves, which in every country follows the progress of knowledge, ought to spring up and become general among the people before it reaches the army; and there can be no doubt that it will become general in India, if we do not prevent it by ill-judged precipitation, in seeking to effect, in a few years, changes which must be the work of generations. By mild and

equitable government; by promoting the dissemination of useful books among the natives, without attacking their religion; by protecting their own numerous schools; by encouraging, by honorary or pecuniary marks of distinction, those where the best system of education prevails; by occasional allowances from the public revenue to such as stand in need of this aid; and, above all, by making it worth the while of the natives to cultivate their minds, by giving them a greater share in the civil administration of the country, and holding out the prospect of filling places of rank and emolument, as inducements to the attainment of knowledge, we shall, by degrees, banish superstition, and introduce among the natives of India all the enlightened opinions and doctrines which prevail in our own country.

15. If we take a contrary course; if we, for the sole benefit of a few European editors of newspapers, permit a licentious press to undermine among the natives all respect for the European character and authority, we shall scatter the seeds of discontent among our native troops, and never be secure from insurrection. It is not necessary for this purpose that they should be more intelligent than they are at present, or should have acquired any knowledge of the rights of men or nations; all that is necessary is, that they should have lost all their present high respect for their officers and the European character; and whenever this happens, they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder.

16. We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world; maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army, and teaching that army, through a free press, that they ought to expel us, and deliver their country. As far as Europeans only, whether in or out of the service, are concerned, the freedom or restriction of the press could do little good or harm, and would hardly deserve any

serious attention. It is only as regards the natives, that the press can be viewed with apprehension; and it is only when it comes to agitate our native army, that its terrible effects will be felt. Many people, both in this country and England, will probably go on admiring the efforts of the Indian press, and fondly anticipating the rapid extension of knowledge among the natives, while a tremendous revolution, originating in this very press, is preparing, which will, by the premature and violent overthrow of our power, disappoint all those hopes, and throw India back into a state more hopeless of improvement than when we first found her.

17. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief has brought to the notice of the Board an anonymous letter, in the Hindostanee language, thrown into the lines of the cavalry cantonment at Arcot, on the night of the ———, urging the troops to murder their European officers, and promising them double pay. This letter was brought in the morning by the Soubadar Major of the regiment of native cavalry, to Lieutenant-Colonel Fowlis, the senior officer present in the cantonment. I received a Hindostanee letter by the post some weeks ago, addressed to myself, complaining of the condition of the Native army, their depressed situation and low allowances, and exhorting me to do something for their relief. Such letters have been occasionally circulated since our first conquests from Mysore in 1792. I do not notice them now from any belief that they are likely at present to shake the fidelity of our sepoys, but in order to show the motives by which they will probably be instigated to sedition, whenever their characters shall be changed. But though I consider that the danger is still very distant, I think that we cannot be too early in taking measures to avoid it; and I trust that the Honourable the Court of Directors will view the question of the press in India as one of the most important that ever came

before them, and the establishment of such an engine, unless under the most absolute control of their Government, as dangerous in the highest degree to the existence of the British power in this country.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

(The same motive which guided me to insert in the body of the work the preceding paper, induces me to give, equally at length, the following on the subject of conversion.) It will be read by all parties with the deepest interest; and I am greatly mistaken if, to the minds of the moderate, it carry not absolute conviction. It is to be observed, that to the work of conversion, however zealously carried on, Sir Thomas Munro was no enemy; to the interference of official persons he alone objected, for reasons which he has himself stated at too much length to render any observations on my part necessary.

MINUTE.

15th November, 1822.

(HAD I been at the Presidency when the correspondence between the collector and sub-collector of Bellary, regarding the conversion of the natives, was received, I should have lost no time in recording my sentiments upon it.) I perused the papers when on my late circuit; and having again carefully examined them since my return, I am sorry to say that I think it will be advisable to employ Mr. —— in some other way than his present situation.

Mr. —— transmitted a report, dated the 15th of June, upon the settlement of his district, to Mr. Campbell the collector. Every thing in this report is highly commendable, excepting those passages in which he speaks of

the character of the natives, and of his having distributed books among them. He evinces strong prejudice against them, and deplores the ignorance of the rayets, and their uncouth speech, which he observes must for ever prevent much direct communication between them and the European authorities. He speaks as if these defects were peculiar to India, and as if all the farmers and labourers of England were well educated, and spoke a pure dialect. He says that the natives received readily the books which he had brought for distribution; from which he infers that they are not insensible to the advantages of knowledge. He observes, that a public schoolmaster is nowhere a corporate village officer, and that this must have arisen from priestcraft, being jealous of the propagation of knowledge among the people. I see no reason to impute the schoolmaster's not being a corporate officer to priestcraft. There is no restriction upon schools; they are left to the fancy of the people, and every village may have as many as it pleases.

Mr. Campbell was directed to acquaint Mr. ——, that he was not to interfere with native schools, and to call upon him to state what were the books which he had distributed. Mr. Campbell, in forwarding Mr. ——'s reply to this communication, observes, that he has not confined himself to the information required, but has indulged "himself in a formal and most unprovoked attack upon the religion of the people;" and "has placed upon record, within the reach of many of them, sentiments highly offensive to their tenderest prejudices."

Mr. —— says, that the books distributed were Canarese versions of parts of the New Testament, and of tracts in the same language, on moral and religious subjects. They were distributed to the reddies (potails), curnums, merchants, and rayets with whom he had intercourse; a few were also distributed among the servants of his own and

the district cutcherries ;, sometimes, he observes, they were sought with a degree of eagerness. " They were never pressed on those who received them." His own cutcherry certainly promoted rather than discouraged the distribution of them. He then proceeds to state with seriousness his former doubts on certain points of faith, his subsequent conversion, and his exposition of various texts. He ought to know that these are matters which do not belong to a cutcherry, and that they concern only himself, and ought not to enter into the official correspondence of revenue officers. He says, it did not appear to him that the circulation of books, in the mode which he adopted, militated, in the smallest degree, either against the letter or the spirit of the orders of the Government; that he employed no official influence, no coercive, no compulsory measures; that he usually explained, in a few words, the general nature of the contents of the books; that he left the acceptance of them to the people themselves, and that they were sometimes sought with eagerness. He requests to know " how far the Government wish that public servants should contribute their endeavours to the diffusion of general, moral, and religious instruction among the natives." He says, " That in any thing affecting his situation, he would not deliberately do what the collector disapproved; that he thought himself at liberty to use his discretion in distributing books; and that he has not yet seen any thing to lead him to suppose, that so long as obnoxious interference with the religious opinions and practices of the natives is carefully avoided, the Government would wish to restrict him in its exercise;" and he concludes by earnestly desiring that his observations, together with the appendix containing the passages in Scripture to which they refer, may be recorded.

It is sufficiently manifest from Mr. ——'s own plain and candid statement, that his zeal disqualifies him from

judging calmly either of the nature of his own interference or of its probable consequences. I agree entirely with the collector, "that he cannot, while he holds his appointment, divest himself of strong official influence;" and that to obtrude his opinions on "his public servants, or on the reddies, curnums, merchants, and rayets assembled around him on official business, was manifestly converting his official character into that of a missionary."

Mr. ——, in fact, did all that a missionary could have done: he employed his own and the district cutcherries in the work; and he himself both distributed and explained. If he had been a missionary, what more could he have done? He could not have done so much. He could not have assembled the inhabitants, or employed the cutcherries in distributing moral and religious tracts. No person could have done this but a civil servant, and in Harpenhilly and Bellary, none could have done it but him; yet he cannot in this discover official interference. He did not, it is true, use any direct compulsion; that would most probably have caused an explosion, which would instantly have roused him from his delusion. But he did, and will continue to use, unknown to himself, something very like compulsion,—open interference, official agency, the hope of favours, the fear of displeasure. The people, he says, "could have no difficulty in distinguishing between a matter of authority and of option." There can be no real freedom of choice, where official authority is interested deeply and exerted openly. A very few of the people might possibly have distinguished between authority and option; but the great body of them would have been more likely to believe that he acted by authority, and that what he was then doing was only preparatory to some general measure of conversion.

Mr. —— promises to be guided by the orders of Government, in his conduct to the natives; but I fear that he

is too much under the dominion of his own fancies to be controlled by any legitimate authority. He has already shown, by his declining compliance with the directions of his immediate superior, Mr. Campbell, how little he regards subordination, when opposed to what he believes to be his higher duties. He appeals to Government; and while he professes his readiness to conform to their decision, he desires that his opinions regarding the natives may stand or fall, "according as they are supported or contradicted by the Word of God," as contained in certain passages of Scripture forming the appendix to his letter. This is an extraordinary kind of appeal. He employs his official authority for missionary purposes; and when he is told by his superior that he is wrong, he justifies his acts by quotations from Scripture, and by election, a doctrine which has occasioned so much controversy; and he leaves it to be inferred, that Government must either adopt his views, or act contrary to divine authority. A person who can, as a sub-collector and magistrate, bring forward such matters for discussion, and seriously desire that they may be placed on record, and examined by Government, is not in a frame of mind to be restrained within the proper limits of his duty, by any official rules.

It was never intended to employ collectors and magistrates as teachers of morality and religion; and of course no rules have been framed for their guidance in such pursuits. Every man who has common sense, knows that they are contrary to his duty, and that no safe rule can be laid down but by absolute prohibition. We cannot allow Mr. ——, or any other public officer, to act as a missionary, merely because he supposes that he abstains from "obnoxious interference." Every man has a different opinion regarding the obnoxious limits, and each would fix them differently, according to the standard of his own zeal.

It is the declared intention both of the Legislature and

of the Honourable the Court of Directors, that the people of India should be permitted to enjoy their ancient laws and institutions, and should be protected against the interference of public officers with their religion.) This system is the wisest that could be adopted, whether with regard to the tranquillity of the country, the security of the revenue, or the improvement or conversion of the natives. Mr. ——'s is the worst. It is dangerous to the peace of the country and the prosperity of the revenue, and is even, as a measure of conversion, calculated to defeat his own designs. If I were asked, if there would be any danger from leaving him at Bellary, I could not positively affirm that there would —there might or might not; but if any mischief arose, it would be no excuse for us to say, that it was so unlikely that it could not have been expected; for we had ample warning, and ought to have provided against it.

(In every country, but especially in this, where the rulers are so few, and of a different race from the people, it is the most dangerous of all things to tamper with religious feelings: they may be apparently dormant; and when we are in unsuspecting security, they may burst forth in the most tremendous manner as at Vellore: they may be set in motion by the slightest casual incident, and do more mischief in one year, than all the labours of missionary collectors would repair in a hundred.) Should they produce only a partial disturbance, which is quickly put down, even in this case the evil would be lasting; distrust would be raised between the people and the Government, which would never entirely subside, and the district in which it happened would never be so safe as before. The agency of collectors and magistrates, as religious instructors, can effect no possible good. It may for a moment raise the hopes of a few sanguine men; but it will end in disturbance and failure, and, instead of forwarding, will greatly retard, every chance of ultimate success.

But besides these evils, it would also tend to produce an injurious effect on the administration of the revenue. Designing men of bad characters would soon surround the collector, and would, by encouraging his hopes, and appearing to enter warmly into his views, soon supplant the more able and less pliant servants of his cutcherry. They would gradually contrive to fill up every subordinate office with their adherents, whom they reported to be favourable to the cause of conversion; and the revenue, between the incapacity and dishonesty of such men, would be diminished both by mismanagement and embezzlement.

The employment by the collector of men as his confidential servants, merely on account of their supporting his plans of conversion, would create suspicion and discontent among the inhabitants; and this spirit might easily be excited to acts of outrage, either by men who were alarmed for their religion, or by men who had no fears for it, but were actuated solely by the hope of forcing the revenue servants out of office, and succeeding them.

It is evident enough from Mr. ——'s own statement of the eagerness with which the books were sought by the rayets and other inhabitants, how ready he is to believe what he wishes, and how well prepared to be deceived by designing natives. He considers the acceptance of the books by the natives, who probably took them merely to flatter him, or to avoid giving him offence, as signs of an impression made on their minds. He never seems to have asked himself why he should have been so much more successful than the regular missionaries: had he been a private individual, his eyes would have been opened.

If we authorize one sub-collector to act as a missionary, or in aid of conversion, we must authorize all. If we find it difficult to keep them within the line of their civil duties, how could we possibly in those of a religious nature restrain them by any rule? How could we control them

in distant provinces? The remoteness of their situations, and their solitude among the natives, would naturally tend to increase their enthusiasm, and every one would have a different opinion, and act differently from another, according as his imagination was more or less heated.

The best way for a collector to instruct the natives, is to set them an example in his own conduct; to try to settle their disputes with each other, and to prevent their going to law; to bear patiently all their complaints against himself and his servants, and bad seasons, and to afford them all the relief in his power; and if he can do nothing more, to give them at least good words.

Whatever change it may be desirable to produce upon the character of the natives, may be effected by much safer and surer means than official interference with their religion. Regular missionaries are sent out by the Honourable the Court of Directors, and by different European Governments. These men visit every part of the country, and pursue their labours without the smallest hindrance; and as they have no power, they are well received every where. In order to dispose the natives to receive our instruction and to adopt our opinions, we must first gain their attachment and confidence, and this can only be accomplished by a pure administration of justice, by moderate assessment, respect for their customs, and general good government.

I have said more on this subject than it may at first sight appear to require; but though it has been brought forward by the conduct of a single individual, it is a question of the most important concern to the welfare of the people and security of the state, and deserves the most serious consideration. I am fully convinced that official interference with the religion of the natives will deteriorate the revenue, and excite discontent and disturbance, and that it will eventually defeat the attainment of the very

object for which it is designed.'" I am also satisfied, that to permit the continuance of such interference would be to hazard the safety of our dominions, for the sake of supporting the experiments of a few visionary men. I recommend that it be prohibited.

I regret extremely that it should be necessary to pass any censure upon Mr. ——. I selected him for his present situation from having had an opportunity of seeing, when he was employed here, that his assiduity and knowledge of the native languages rendered him well qualified for the office of sub-collector. I trust that he may still be usefully employed in the public service, in other quarters; but he has put it out of the power of Government to let him remain at Bellary. He was not satisfied with confining his attack upon the religion of the natives to a private communication to the collector, but he has, by placing it upon record, made it public. To continue him now would be to sanction his conduct, and to proclaim the design of Government to support it. No declaration,—nothing but his removal, can effectually do away this impression among the people.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Whilst thus keenly alive to the prosperity of the civil part of the community, Sir Thomas Munro was not less attentive to the true interests and permanent welfare of the Indian army. It was his firm opinion, that such a force ought always to be maintained, as should not only suffice for the preservation of order within our own territories, but enable the Government to keep constantly on the frontier an organized, and as it were a disposable corps. Thither, every batta-

lion in the service ought, in its turn, to be sent, by which means all would acquire a knowledge of field-duty; whilst the utmost attention should be shown to the establishment of bazaars, without which an Indian army is at all times inefficient. To the absence of these, indeed, he attributed the extreme length of our early campaigns, and the meagre results to which they led; and he showed that, in exact proportion as the bazaars increased in efficiency, our wars became less tedious and more successful.

Again, an idea had long prevailed, and it was expressed in Council soon after his arrival, that the Native battalions in general, but more especially the artillery and golandauze corps, stood in need of an increased proportion of European officers to render them efficient. Sir Thomas Munro strongly objected to the measure; first, because he was confident that it would not add to the value of the Native troops; and, secondly, because whilst it greatly increased the expense to Government, it must necessarily interfere, in a serious degree, with the promotion of officers themselves. He held that one European officer present with each company, was all that could be required; inasmuch as the interior details are carried on far more accurately by Native officers, than they could be by Englishmen. As to the fact that some regiments were commanded by majors and captains, he looked upon it as no real evil, because a captain of fifteen or twenty years'

standing must have served to very little purpose, if he be not adequate to a higher charge than that of a company.*

It was customary then, and may perhaps be customary now, so far to distrust the fidelity of the sepoys that there was an indisposition to keep together in cantonments two or more native battalions, without intermixing with them a corps of Europeans. Sir Thomas Munro utterly condemned the notion: he contended that the plan had totally failed at Vellore, the only point where its effects were ever put to the test, and that it must fail again under similar circumstances. Nay more, he justly argued that the measure had a tendency to lead to the very result which it was the object of such as acted upon it to prevent; because, by exciting in the minds of the natives a suspicion that confidence was not reposed in them, it led them to inquire somewhat too freely into the probable reasons of distrust. His principle therefore was, that no more effectual plan of securing the fidelity of the sepoys could be devised, than by leading them to believe, that it could not for a moment be doubted; and by teaching them that their own interests were intimately connected with the continuance of the Government under which they served. With this view, he advised that the soldiers be well paid and well treated; that no battalion be per-

* On this subject, also, a Minute will be found in the APPENDIX.

mitted to remain too long in one place; but that all be periodically brought back to the provinces or districts from which they had been respectively recruited. By this means, time would not be given for the formation of dangerous connexions abroad; and a constant renewal of domestic ties would cause them to shrink from the idea of a convulsion by which they must inevitably be broken.

The same care which extended itself to the wants of the soldiers themselves, was applied to the remedy of evils arising out of the imprudent marriages which that class of men are too apt to contract. There was an old regulation, which granted to the wife of every European, brought by him to India, a certain allowance for her maintenance whilst her husband was employed in the field. It was either found not to be sufficient, or the example of the other Presidency induced the Commander-in-chief at Madras to apply for an increase of such allowance, and an extension of the benefit to soldiers' children. Though disapproving totally of the principle from which the arrangement proceeded, Sir Thomas Munro was too just and too sagacious not to perceive, that the troops in the different Presidencies should, as far as practicable, be placed on the same footing; he therefore gave his sanction to the proposed increase; but against every attempt to extend the benefit of the practice to native women and half-caste children, he resolutely

opposed himself. This he did on the fair and legitimate ground, that such a regulation would entail an incalculable expense upon the Company, whilst it acted as an encouragement to the increase of a race already too numerous. Towards the half-castes themselves he was by no means disposed to behave with harshness; on the contrary, he considered them entitled to such treatment as their peculiar circumstances called for; but he esteemed it both an unwise and an extravagant notion, that they ought to be taken in any manner under the protection of the State.*

Such is a summary, if I may so speak, of the grand leading principles of Sir Thomas Munro's government; by which, whilst he strove zealously to advance the interests of those for whom he acted, he laboured with no less earnestness to promote the happiness and increase the prosperity of all classes of their subjects. With respect to the system of internal administration carried on in the provinces, it corresponded, as nearly as circumstances would permit, with the plan drawn up at the suggestion of the Commission of which he had formerly been at the head. Whatever his own wishes might have been, he did not consider himself authorized to depart, in the slighest degree, from the rules there laid down; and hence he continued both the revenue and judicial systems of his predecessors, modified

* There is given in the APPENDIX an extract from one of his Minutes on these subjects.

as these were by the sanction of the Court of Directors. His conduct, moreover, was on every occasion marked by the very extreme of good feeling and correct judgment. Firm and inflexible in the pursuit of what he felt to be right, he nevertheless contrived, by the suavity of his manner and the conciliatory tone of his language, to gratify even those whose sentiments differed from his own; till, strange to say, the jealousy which had attended him in every inferior station disappeared on his attaining to the highest.

I subjoin a few private letters, addressed by him at this period to certain illustrious individuals at home; chiefly because they speak in plain terms the same language of which I have just made use.

TO THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE CANNING.

Bombay, 15th May, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

EVERY thing is quiet under the Bengal and Madras Government, and under the Bombay Government, with the exception of some slight disturbance, occasioned by an incursion of a few banditti on the Cutch frontier, which has led to some preparation on both sides, but will, I hope, terminate without hostilities.

Mr. Elphinstone retains the general superintendence of the late Peishwah's dominions; but Mr. Chaplin acts as commissioner. This is just as it should be, for it keeps the Mahratta territories together, till they can be brought into some kind of order, and it places them under the immediate management of the man who, of all the Madras civil servants, is the best qualified for the purpose. Sir John

Malcolm means to go home in December:—I am sorry for it; for I think his continuance in Malwa is of great importance to the preservation of tranquillity, and I do not see how his place is to be supplied. He ought undoubtedly to be kept in Malwa for some years, to look after the turbulent chiefs and conflicting interests in that province. The future prosperity of all recent conquests depends on the measures adopted during the few first years, in bringing them into form, and consolidating our power. If we are too impatient to get rid of some trifling expense, and to persuade ourselves that all is right, and that matters will go on smoothly, without the necessity of employing persons capable of controlling every hostile movement, we shall have the centre of India in a state of confusion from which it may be difficult to extricate it hereafter.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 14th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I SEE no reason to expect disturbances from any of the Native states now surrounded by our territory. They are all too weak to give us any uneasiness. The death of a chief may occasionally produce some dispute among the claimants to the succession; but our preponderating force, wherever its interposition is required, will always easily decide the contest. The Bheels and other plundering tribes, of whom so much has been said, are a miserable race, poor and few in number: they are plunderers, because they have themselves been plundered and oppressed; and if they are well treated, they will in a few years become as quiet as any of our other Indian subjects living among woods and hills.

In this country we always are, and always ought to be, prepared for war. But this very circumstance gives us the best security for the long enjoyment of peace, and we ought to avail ourselves of this favourable state of things in order to improve our own territories, and to establish, as far as possible, some degree of regularity in those of the Native powers dependent upon us. The first step for this purpose should be to assign limits to the different Presidencies within which they are respectively to exercise immediate authority, leaving to Bengal the general control over the whole. The limits which I would recommend for Madras are the Mahanuddy and the Nerbuddah to the north; to the west, the boundary between the Nizam's and the Peishwah's country, as it stood in 1792; and to the north-west a line drawn from the Kistna to the Ghauts, including within it the southern Mahratta states.

Within all this range I am confident that the immediate jurisdiction of Madras could be exercised with greater advantage to the empire than that of Bengal. The whole of this tract belongs either to the Carnatic or the Deccan, and its inhabitants are different both in language and character from those of Hindostan and Bengal, and can on this account, as well as from their local situation, be more easily managed by the Madras than the Supreme Government. When Hyderabad and Nagpoor were great foreign and independent states, and more likely to act against us than with us, the immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did not affect the authority of the Madras Government over its army, of which only two battalions were for several years at Hyderabad. But both Hyderabad and Nagpoor are now as completely dependent upon us as Mysore; they must, at some period or other, fall entirely into our hands, and the internal administration

must in the mean time be chiefly directed by our resident. No skill can make a country prosper under such a system; but still it may be preserved in a much better state under the Madras than the Bengal Government, because it lies more within our reach, its inhabitants are better known to us, and the country is occupied by our troops. At present the discipline of our army is much injured by our having about twenty thousand men beyond our frontiers, and removed in a great measure from our control. They are under the Bengal Government, or rather the residents, by whom all commands, even of the most subordinate kind, are distributed. When complaints are received respecting supplies, or any other matter, we find it difficult to interfere in a satisfactory manner; and from the absence of a complete and direct control in either government much confusion and abuse arises, and the national character suffers. This might easily be remedied by placing Nagpoor and Hyderabad with their residents under Madras. We could then through our own residents exercise direct authority over our troops; and by having both residents and troops under our orders, we should have better means than the Bengal Government have, of seeing that both did their duty. The Supreme Government would of course, in peace and war, and other great political questions, still direct the affairs of Nagpoor and Hyderabad; and if we add to this the direction of our relations with all independent states, and with all the tributaries immediately on Bengal, we shall find that, after leaving to Madras the countries south of the Nerbuddah, it will have as much to do as it can well attend to.

I am, with great esteem, dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. JOHN SULLIVAN.

Madras, 12th October, 1820.

DEAR SIR,

I HAD the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 31st January from Paris, some time after my arrival in this country.

I should expect more benefit from the circulation of short tracts by the natives, or of translations of short European tracts by natives, than from translations precipitately made of the Bible, or any great work, by the missionaries. I have no faith in the power of any missionary to acquire, in four or five years, such a knowledge of any Indian language as to enable him to make a respectable translation of the Bible. I fear that such translations are not calculated to inspire becoming reverence for the book. In place of translating the Bible into ten or twelve languages in a few years, I would rather see twenty years devoted to its translation into one. If we hope for success, we must proceed gradually, and adopt the means by which we may be likely to attain it. The dissemination of knowledge is, I think, the surest way; and if we can prevail upon the Native princes to give it the support you propose, it will be a good beginning. I shall communicate with the Resident of Tanjore on the subject; and if the Rajah, who is now near Conjeveram on his way to Cassi, calls here, I will mention it to him. There is such a mass of mere routine reading here, that I have scarcely been able to give my attention to general questions since my return. I have lately been for many days engaged in reading the papers connected with the single case of ——; and unless we contrive some means of reducing the quantity of reading, the members of government will have no time for giving due consideration to matters of general importance.

The points of improvement in our general system, which I wish to carry into effect soonest, are the regulations proposed in 1816 by the Board of Revenue, for the prevention and punishment of extra collections and embezzlements, and the drafts of regulations proposed by the Commissioners in 1817, upon pattahs, distraints, &c. in consequence of the orders of the Directors. I have always thought that rayets ought never to have been imprisoned for arrears of revenue, and I wish to abolish the practice. I think that it may be done entirely without any risk of loss of revenue. But as the Board of Revenue and some of the collectors think it would be a dangerous experiment, I shall yield to their alarms, so far probably as to confine the exemption to rayets holding immediately of the sirkar, and even among them to permit imprisonment only in special cases of contumacy. I am satisfied however, from my own experience, that with regard to the rayets, the exemption might safely be made complete. The power of distraint is quite sufficient to protect the revenue: it harasses the rayet, without disgracing him; and if he can pay, will be more likely, than throwing him into gaol, to make him discharge his debt. The same privilege cannot safely be granted to zemindars and farmers of revenue, because it might tempt them to withhold and secrete large balances from their actual collections. There is another point which I have long established in my own mind, as one requiring correction—I mean the destruction of all the ancient landholders, by introducing among them the Hindoo law of division among all the brothers, instead of that of descent to the eldest. The written law among all private persons is division; but usage, or the common law, among the ancient rajahs and poligars, is undivided descent to the eldest son, who makes a suitable provision for the rest of the family. The consequence of introducing the rule of joint or equal inheritance among them is, that

many of them have been ruined by lawsuits, and that every one of them must inevitably suffer the same fate.

Law adventurers get into every family, and excite some member of it to bring his claim into a court of justice. It is of little importance to the vackeels how the suit ends, as they get their fees. These suits are generally very expensive, and the ignorance of the zemindars in all matters of business makes them doubly expensive by the impositions of their own agents; and if the property is divided, as generally happens, among two, three, or more claimants, the whole are reduced to distress, and the Government is rendered unpopular. I am now endeavouring to bring forward a regulation to restore to all ancient zemindars the law of primogeniture, who formerly enjoyed it. The privilege will be confined to the families in which it prevailed until it was abolished by our levelling code. I meant, after disposing of some more pressing matters, to extend the operations of some of the regulations of 1816, by increasing the jurisdiction of the Native commissioners or moonsifs. I have heard three hundred rupees proposed as the limit of the district moonsifs' cognizance; but I imagine that it may, with advantage to the community, be extended to a thousand. The young writers have all been sent up the country, in order to learn a little revenue, and as much as they can of the people; but this is doing nothing, unless we raise the revenue to the level of the judicial line; if we do not, every man who has friends or talents will run into the judicial.

With great esteem,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING.

Madras, 30th June, 1821.

MY DEAR SIR,

YOU judge right in thinking that your resignation of the office of President of the Board of Control is an event in which I must take "some little interest," for no event could have happened in which I could have taken more. I lament it deeply, both on public and private grounds. I should, even if I had not seen your letter to your constituents, have concluded without hesitation, that your motives for resigning were just, but I should not the less have regretted the loss to the nation.

I trust that we shall soon again see you filling some high office; but I confess I would rather see you in your former one than any other, for my own situation becomes doubly valuable, when it is held under a man whose name communicates some show of reputation to all his subordinates.

I always dread changes at the head of the India Board, for I fear some downright Englishman may at last get there, who will insist on making Anglo-Saxons of the Hindoos. I believe there are men in England who think that this desirable change has been already effected in some degree; and that it would long since have been completed, had it not been opposed by the Company's servants. I have no faith in the modern doctrine of the rapid improvement of the Hindoos, or of any other people. The character of the Hindoos is probably much the same as when Vasco de Gama first visited India, and it is not likely that it will be much better a century hence. The strength of our government will, no doubt, in that period, by preventing the wars so frequent in former times, increase the wealth and population of the country. We shall also, by the establishment of schools, extend among the Hindoos the knowledge of their own literature, and of the language

and literature of England. But all this will not improve their character; we shall make them more pliant and servile, more industrious, and perhaps more skilful in the arts,—and we shall have fewer banditti; but we shall not raise their moral character. Our present system of government, by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more efficacious in depressing, than all our laws and school-books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, and a powerful one to deteriorate. The improvement of the character of a people, and the keeping them, at the same time, in the lowest state of dependence on foreign rulers to which they can be reduced by conquest, are matters quite incompatible with each other.

There can be no hope of any great zeal for improvement, when the highest acquirements can lead to nothing beyond some petty office, and can confer neither wealth nor honour. While the prospects of the natives are so bounded, every project for bettering their characters must fail; and no such projects can have the smallest chance of success, unless some of those objects are placed within their reach, for the sake of which, men are urged to exertion in other countries. This work of improvement, in whatever way it may be attempted, must be very slow, but it will be in proportion to the degree of confidence which we repose in them, and in the share which we give them in the administration of public affairs. All that we can give them, without endangering our own ascendency, should be given. All real military power must be kept in our own hands; but they might, with advantage hereafter, be made eligible to every civil office under that of a member of the Government. The change should be gradual, because they are not yet fit to discharge properly the duties of a high

civil employment, according to our rules and ideas; but the sphere of their employment should be extended in proportion as we find that they become capable of filling properly higher situations.

We shall never have much accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, or of the causes by which they are raised or depressed. We shall always assess it very unequally, and often too high, until we learn to treat the higher class of natives as gentlemen, and to make them assist us accordingly in doing what is done by the House of Commons in England, in estimating and apportioning the amount of taxation. I am, with great regard and esteem, Your faithful Servant,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. C. B. BATHURST.

Bangalore, 28th September, 1821.

SIR,

MR. CANNING has informed me that he has mentioned me to you. The office which you now hold at the head of Indian affairs would have been a sufficient inducement for me to address you, but this circumstance will make me do it with more confidence.

In a time of peace, a subordinate government like Madras can have no very important political or military transactions, and must be chiefly occupied in the improvement of its resources, and the preservation of its internal tranquillity. Of the two, the preservation of tranquillity is the most immediately necessary, because without it no improvement in the revenue can take place. The insurrections of petty chiefs, which so often disturbed the peace of our provinces, but more particularly of the northern circars, have too often been occasioned by the misconduct of our own civil and military officers, in acting precipitately,

and often upon wrong information, and involving Government in hostilities which might entirely have been avoided. I am endeavouring to prevent a recurrence of such disorders, by prohibiting the local authorities from summoning those chiefs before them, or using force against them, without the previous orders of Government, and by rendering the chiefs themselves more attached to us, by showing more confidence in them, and assisting them to recover their zemindaries when they have been lost in consequence of our measures, or even of their own imprudence.

The task of improving our resources is one of much greater difficulty than that of maintaining the peace of the country; and this difficulty arises principally from the assessment being in general too high with respect to the condition of the people; so that in many districts, in order to have a further increase, we must begin by making a present reduction of our revenue, because the extension of cultivation, from which the increase of revenue must result, cannot possibly be expected under the present assessment. The Presidencies of Bengal and Madras acquired their respective territories under very different circumstances, which have ever since continued to influence their revenue systems. Bengal acquired at once the dominion of rich and fertile provinces, yielding a revenue much beyond its wants; it had therefore no occasion to enter into any minute examination of the assessment; it was satisfied with what it got from the zemindars, and left them in possession of the lands on very easy terms. Madras, on the contrary, rose amidst poverty and many struggles for existence. It never was able to pay its establishments: it acquired its territories by slow degrees, partly from the Nizam, but chiefly from Mysore; and though the assessment had already been raised too high by those Governments, its own pressing necessities did not permit it to lower the demand, but forced it to enter into the most

rigid scrutiny of the sources of the revenue, in order to keep it up, and there has, in consequence, always been a pressure upon the rayets, which nothing but necessity could justify.

The present secure state of India will, I hope, enable us to lower the assessment gradually in all those districts in which it is too high. This may be done without materially affecting the general amount of the revenue, by taking the districts in succession, two or three at a time, and letting them make up by additional cultivation the reduction of their assessment before it is extended to others. We shall, by this means, ultimately increase the land-rent, and in a much greater degree the customs and every other source of revenue; and we shall render the payment of them much lighter to the inhabitants, because they will be enabled to augment the stock from which they are paid. I expect, from a reduction in the assessment, that land will, in time, be every where regarded as an hereditary private property by the rayets; that their circumstances will be so much improved as to enable them to pay the revenue in all seasons, good or bad; and that the country will be able, when war happens, to bear a temporary additional assessment as a war-tax, and save us from a great part of the heavy expense which we have already been obliegd to incur on account of loans.

I imagine that the requisite reduction of assessment may be made without the revenue falling below the average of the last ten years; but to make this reduction judiciously, so as to render it a benefit to the country, requires the aid of men conversant in the revenue detail and customs of the country; and of these we have very few. The great exaltation of the judicial above the revenue line, for the last twenty years, has been extremely unfavourable to their production; but we may undoubtedly have them, by raising the revenue line, and making it an object of ambition

to men of talents. Its great depression below the judicial, in point of emolument, has been very injurious to the service: it has been very gradually creating a distinction between first and second-rate men; those who have talent or interest being employed in the judicial, and those who have but little of either, in the revenue. The distinction, though not avowed, is notorious, and it must be removed by bringing them to the same level.

However important the duties of a judge may be, they are, in this country, certainly not more important than those of a collector, who, with the exception of the judicial functions, exercises the whole of the internal administration of the province, and has occasion for much more various qualifications.

His designation is an unfortunate one, and ought to be changed, as it leads to the belief that the collection of the revenue is his sole duty, and that he is a mere tax-gatherer. The collection of the revenue is a very subordinate part of his duty: its distribution is a much more important one. His duty extends to every branch of the finance, and its influence is felt in the prosperity of the inhabitants. He watches the operation of the different existing taxes, and points out such as are oppressive, that they may be lowered, or altogether abolished; and also such as may be augmented without inconvenience. In every country, the amount and distribution of taxation are perhaps the most important concerns of public authority; there are no others on which, as on them, the universal comfort and prosperity of the people depend. In this country, the management of taxation rests almost entirely with the Collector, for he is the only channel through which Government can obtain any tolerably correct information on the subject, and it is chiefly from his opinions that their own must be formed. An officer from whom so much is required, must not be looked for in a class which is not at least equal in rank

and emolument to any other in the service. In order to secure a succession of men qualified to discharge properly so important a trust, we must place the revenue on an equal footing with the judicial line.

In countries where the assessment is very light, the ignorance or misconduct of a collector does not seriously injure the revenue; but in the greater part of the Madras territories, where the revenue presses closely upon the utmost means of the people, the misconduct of a collector is often very prejudicial both to the revenue and to the people; because the country has not the means of speedily repairing the losses which it may have sustained from his ignorance, in too rigidly exacting the full assessment in a bad season, or from his indolence in permitting the native revenue servants to levy unauthorized sums from the people. On this establishment therefore it is essential to the welfare of the country, as well as to the security of the revenue, that we should have skilful collectors; and we find from experience, that they are only to be formed in districts where the rayetwar system prevails. Collectors who have been employed only in districts permanently settled, are not qualified for any revenue duties beyond those of the most ordinary routine. When the revenue of a district has fallen into disorder, they are unable to ascertain the cause, and still less to point out the remedy. On such occasions, recourse must always be had to a collector from a rayetwar district; and when investigations become frequent, the withdrawing of these collectors from their own districts, to conduct inquiries into the state of others at a great distance, is frequently productive of great embarrassment to the public service. One main object therefore in raising the revenue to a level with the judicial department is, that we may always have a supply of men calculated to carry on investigations into the revenue, and into all the details of the local civil administration; and as it is only in the

rayetwar districts that the requisite knowledge can be acquired, an extra number of revenue servants will be trained in those districts.

I am in great hopes that, before the end of 1822, we shall be able, without any aid from Bengal, to make our income adequate to all our disbursements. But it is not enough that we should be enabled to meet our ordinary expenditure: we should have a surplus to enable us to meet contingencies, and it ought not to be less than from thirty to forty lacs of rupees. We ought not to depend on Bengal for any pecuniary aid. When a Government has nothing to trust to but its own resources, its affairs will always be managed with more order and economy. But the resources of Madras are not in a condition to enable her to meet unexpected demands; and the only way in which they can be made so is, by transferring to her authority a considerable portion of the southern Mahratta provinces. She has not acquired a single acre of territory either by the Mahratta war of 1803 and 1804, or the late one; so that she has been stationary, while Bengal and Bombay have been rapidly increasing in power and extent of dominion. And as the greater part of her army has during both of these wars been employed in the field, her military charges will consequently appear to have increased during that period in a greater proportion to her revenue than those of the other Presidencies. The annexation of the southern Mahratta provinces to Madras is not only desirable for the sake of rendering this Presidency able to provide for all its expenses without assistance from Bengal, but also for the sake of their local administration. Their situation, and the language and character of the inhabitants, seem to adapt them better for being under Madras than Bengal or Bombay.

The similarity of character among the people of the different provinces of the Deccan will always render it easier

to maintain our authority over that country by means of the Madras than of the Bengal army, which is composed of natives of Hindoostan, differing in language and usages from those of the Deccan. With the exception of the western part of the Deccan, composed of Mahratta districts now under Bombay, all the rest of the Deccan south of the valley of the Nerbuddah is occupied by Madras troops, while Bengal and Hindoostan are left to those of Bengal. This arrangement is the most simple that can be adopted. It will give the most satisfaction both to the troops and the inhabitants, and will therefore be most likely to insure tranquillity. It will be the most efficient and economical, and ought never to be abandoned for any temporary benefit. I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE RIGHT HON. G. CANNING.

Madras, 1st May, 1823.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WOULD have written to you sooner, had I not been prevented by the expectation of seeing you in India. That hope is now at an end; and as I can have no claim to intrude upon your time in your new duties, I write merely for the purpose of taking leave of you as Chief Director of Indian affairs. Your not coming to India has been a great disappointment to me; but I do not regret it. I rather, for the sake of the country, rejoice that you have remained at home. Every man, who feels for its honour, must be proud to see that there are public men who prefer fame, founded on the exertion of great and useful talents, to wealth and splendour.

Though no longer Indian Minister, you can still be of great service to India, by supporting measures calculated for its advantage, and by giving India the same freedom of trade as England. Our power in this country is now very great, and, I think, is in no danger of being shaken, if the local governments are enabled to keep the press and the missionaries within proper bounds, and if the legislature will, by limiting with more distinctness and precision the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, effectually prevent it from extending its cognizance, by fictions of law, to matters with which it ought to have no concern.

By not coming to India, you have escaped the irksome task of toiling daily through heaps of heavy, long-drawn papers. I never had a very high opinion of our records; but it was not until my last return that I knew that they contained such a mass of useless trash. Every man writes as much as he can, and quotes Montesquieu, and Hume, and Adam Smith, and speaks as if we were living in a country where people were free and governed themselves. Most of their papers might have been written by men who were never out of England, and their projects are nearly as applicable to that country as to India.

The Bombay Government have had the benefit of the experience of Bengal and Madras, and their arrangements will, in consequence, be better adapted to the state of this country than those of either of these Presidencies. Their settlements will, in general, be rayetwar, which is no new system, but an old one of the Deccan, and of most other countries, and of England itself. In a rayetwar settlement of England, every landowner, whether his rent were 5*l.* or 50,000*l.* a-year, would be called a rayet, and the agreement would be made with him. But in a zemindar settlement of England, we should consider the Lord Lieutenants of counties, and other public officers, as zemindars and

landlords, and make our agreement with them, and leave them to settle with the actual proprietors, whom we should regard as mere tenants. These are matters in which I have long taken a deep interest; but for the last twelve months I have felt a much deeper one in the affairs of Greece. Europe is more indebted to that country than has ever yet been acknowledged. I have seen no book which gives to Greece all that is due to her. Even the constitution of our own country would, without her, probably not have been what it is, notwithstanding the boasted wisdom of our ancestors. We have always, I think, been more solicitous about the preservation of the Ottoman Empire than was necessary. If the Turks were driven out of Europe, there would be no cause to apprehend any danger from their territories being occupied by other powers, unless Constantinople fell into the hands of the Russians. England could lose nothing by other states becoming stronger and richer. It is for the advantage of a great and enlightened nation to have powerful rivals. By the emancipation of the Greeks we should, in one year, make more Christians than all our Eastern missionaries will convert in a hundred. If the Greeks, without foreign aid, could emancipate themselves, it would be better that they should do so, as the toils and exploits by which they accomplished it would give them a national character, and a spirit to defend their liberty.

I cannot conclude without thanking you for all your kindness to me while you held the office of Indian Minister.

I have the honour to be,
With great regard and esteem,
Your most obedient and faithful servant,
(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Thomas Munro, 19th July, 1824; in reply to a query if there was any Report or Minute reviewing the measures of his Government..

" No report has gone home on the measures of Government since I came out; our proceedings are, as usual, reported from time to time, and, when necessary, are accompanied by minutes explaining the grounds of them. The measure which has given me the most satisfaction, is the abolition of the forest and timber monopoly in Malabar and Canara, under the Bombay conservators. I have introduced no new system either in the revenue or judicial department. I have reduced some judicial appointments, and created some revenue ones, in order to keep up emulation, to keep both more efficient, and to prevent the whole body of revenue servants from being degraded to a second chop-caste. I have never wished to introduce any new system of revenue, but I wish in all cases to have no renters, but to collect directly from the occupants or owners, whether they are small or great. Renters are no necessary part of any revenue system: they are a mere temporary machinery employed or set aside as suits the convenience or caprice of Government. I wish to see the usages of each country or province adopted as the basis of our revenue system; to protect landed property as we find it, whether in small portions or large masses; not to vex the people by regulations; neither to subdivide what is great, nor consolidate what is small; and to lower the assessment generally wherever it is too high;—to leave the rest to Providence and their industry. I shall never review my own proceedings, because they can have no sensible effect in my time, or for many years after; for it is the nature of measures calculated for improvement, to be slow in their operation. When I read, as I sometimes do, of a measure

by which a large province has been suddenly improved, or a race of semi-barbarians civilized almost to quakerism, I throw away the book. But, even if my reviewing my own remedies could be of any use, I could not possibly find time. We have such a mass of reading from all quarters, that we have no time to think, and far less to write. The judicial system has converted one-half of the service into village lawyers, who write without mercy, like so many law stationers, sheet after sheet, without end."

CHAPTER II.

Mode of spending time.—Private Letters.

WHILST he thus laboured to establish, upon sound principles, a general system of administration, Sir Thomas Munro was indefatigable in watching the results of such measures as were from time to time pursued by the civil and military authorities under him. It was one of his favourite maxims, that the superintending influence of a governor ought to be felt in every corner of his province; and hence he not only gave up the whole of his time to business during the periods of his residence at Fort St. George, but made frequent and toilsome journeys into the interior and more remote districts. In these he was sometimes accompanied by Lady Munro, though more usually he left her behind; but, whether alone or in a crowd, in a tent or at the Government-house, the distribution of his time was uniformly the same.

Sir Thomas Munro rose early, generally at dawn, or a few minutes after, and was in the habit of spending the first two or three hours of

the day in the open air. When at the capital, or his country-seat of Gundy, he rode on horseback for a couple of hours four mornings in the week; the remaining three he gave up to the natives, by walking constantly in the same path, and entering freely into conversation with such as threw themselves in his way. On these occasions he was wholly unattended, except by a couple of peons, or a few of his old revenue servants; and the people, aware of this, as well as of the extreme affability of the Governor, met him at a particular point in crowds. To every one he listened with patience, receiving their petitions with his own hands, and promising to examine and reply to them; and in no single instance is he known to have neglected an engagement thus voluntarily contracted. After spending some time thus, he returned home, dressed, and devoted a brief space to reading and writing, when he adjourned to breakfast, which was served up punctually at the hour of eight.

As the interval between sunrise and the ringing of the breakfast-bell was given up to receiving the personal applications of the natives, so was the period of breakfast itself, and about an hour after its conclusion, devoted to a similar intercourse with Europeans. The table was always spread for thirty persons; and such as had business to transact, or personal applications to make to the Governor, were expected to partake in the meal. By adhering to this arrangement, and steadily refusing to waste so much as a minute in

useless chit-chat, Sir Thomas Munro was enabled to withdraw to his own room usually about half-past nine, where till four o'clock he remained employed in public business, and inaccessible, except under very peculiar circumstances, to all intruders.

Four was his hour of dinner, except twice a month, when large parties were invited to the Government-house, at eight o'clock; yet even these were not permitted to interfere in any respect with the earlier arrangements for the day. At half-past five or six, according to the season of the year, he drove out, for a time, with Lady Munro; after which he again withdrew to his own room, and applied to business. At eight, tea was served, when he joined his family; from the conclusion of this repast till he retired for the night, which occurred about ten or half-past ten, he remained among them. But even this short period of relaxation was not frittered away in unmeaning or unprofitable idleness. As soon as the drawing-room was cleared, one of his aides-de-camp, or gentlemen attached to his household, read aloud either the debates in Parliament, in which he took at all times a deep interest, an article in one of the Reviews, one of Sir Walter Scott's novels, or some other late publication. Thus was every moment of his waking existence spent in endeavours to promote the welfare and happiness of others; and his own happiness, as a necessary consequence, received, though on his part almost

unconsciously, a daily, I might have said, with perfect truth, an hourly increase.

Such was the manner in which Sir Thomas Munro spent day after day, as often as he remained stationary in one place: his mode of acting whilst prosecuting the journeys, of which notice has been taken, was not dissimilar. The morning's march was always so regulated, as that the party might reach their ground in sufficient time to permit breakfast to be served at eight o'clock, when the routine of conversing with such European functionaries as chanced to be near the spot was continued. Four was still the hour of dinner; but the period set aside at Fort St. George for carriage-exercise was now given up to hearing the complaints of the natives. Whilst the family sat at table, multitudes of Hindoos and Mussulmans were seen to collect round the door of the tent, anxiously expecting the moment when the Governor would come forth; and when it arrived, the eagerness to address him was such as to occasion at times considerable inconvenience. It very seldom happened that the charmana, or audience-tent, proved sufficiently capacious to contain the whole of the applicants. Sir Thomas Munro was accordingly in the habit of walking abroad to some open space, where he stood listening to all who desired to address him, till Nature itself appeared sometimes in danger of giving way. He never retired from these audiences otherwise than jaded and fatigued, as well

from the excessive heat of the atmosphere, as from the continued exertion which he found it necessary to make

A life thus exclusively devoted to the discharge of important public duties, whilst it presents few points of which his biographer can make particular use, necessarily left little leisure for the continuance of familiar correspondence on the part of Sir Thomas Munro himself. Not that he ceased at times to communicate both his feelings and circumstances freely to his family; but every moment was now too precious to permit the opportunities of doing so to occur frequently; and hence the number of private letters written by him between the years 1820 and 1824 are less numerous than at any other period of similar extent throughout the course of his active career. The following specimens will however show, that the tone of feeling which casts so bright a charm over his earlier correspondence, was by no means altered; and that if he wrote more rarely, he used no greater reserve than when his mind, less harassed by the cares and responsibility of office, poured itself forth in descriptive or playful controversy upon paper.

It is necessary to premise, for the right understanding of several allusions in these letters, that a serious accident occurred to Lady Munro on the 11th of February, 1821. She was thrown from her horse, and, falling upon her head, received a severe injury in one of her eyes, for the preservation of which doubts were entertained

many weeks. Happily, however, these proved to be groundless; and her recovery, though tedious and distressing, was complete.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras, 15th October, 1820.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I WRITE you merely to say, that I have got your letters of the 8th of September about your plans, and of the 15th about more plans, and the Malwa Encyclopedia. I have weighed the ninth chapter in my hand; and I could not help thinking, when poising it as Sancho did when poising Mambrino's helmet in his hand, "what a prodigious head the Pagan must have, whose capacious skull could contain thirteen such ponderous chapters as this!" I look at it with reverence when I open the drawer in which it lies deposited; but I must not open it till I can get a little spare time to consider the recondite matter with which it is filled. Any remark that I can make must be very general, for Malwa is as little known to me as Tartary. I hope, from my not hearing of Lord H——'s answer to your proposals, that it is to be more favourable than you expected.

Yours most truly,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 15th April, 1821.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I HAVE got your letter of the 19th March from Oudipore, and thank you for the interest you so kindly take in Lady M——. She is recovering, though slowly; and I fear, with regard to complete recovery, doubtfully. Your friend Captain Laurie will write to you about his proceedings. He has acted like a schoolboy with fine

feelings, where strong ones were wanted. I think the better of him for it, but am vexed at his weakness. I did not think that your Teviotdalers had been such simple swains as to be circumvented by a cornicopilly. I am glad to hear that you are well again; and I trust you will have no more relapses. Macdonald sent me your introduction to your history of Malwa; and when I think of it, and of your chapters, or volumes rather, on revenue, police, &c., I wonder how you have found time for such works. I think that all this must end in your writing a general history, and making all other histories unnecessary, by beginning, like the Persians, with Huzzut Adam, or at least with Mehta Noah. I have been much pleased with your first chapter; it contains a great mass of information: much of it is new; and though much of it also is what was known before, it is not the less interesting on that account; but rather the contrary, as it shows us how general and uniform many of the Indian institutions and customs were in provinces very remote from each other. If you persist in your plan of going home at present, and if ever you venture to India again, I hope you will come and relieve me; for I should be delighted to see this Government in the hands of a man who has had more practical experience in India, than any European who ever visited it. If I am permitted to choose my own time for retiring, and if you have any desire to return, I shall give you intimation that you may take your measures.

Yours most truly,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Nagangeri, 30th May, 1821.

THIS is the last day in which I am likely for some months to be in a cool climate; and if I do not write you now, I do not know when I shall. We had a great deal of rain the night we left Bangalore, and we have had

showers every day since. Our journey has so far been very pleasant; but it will be very different to-morrow, when we descend into the burning plains of the Carnatic. We are now encamped about two hundred yards above the spot where our tents were when we last passed this way, and very near the large banian tree to which we first walked. It is a beautiful wild scene of mingled rocks and jungle, and aged trees and water. I wish we had something like it at home. It is pleasant to see the different groups of travellers with their cattle coming in one after another; some sitting and some sleeping under the shady trees and bushes so thickly scattered around. There is something delightful in viewing the repose and stillness which every one seems to enjoy. To me it has always the effect of something that is plaintive, by recalling times and beings which have long since passed away. I wish I could indulge in these dreams, and wander about in this romantic country, instead of returning to the dull and endless task of public business in which I have already been so long engaged. When we last landed in England, I never expected to have been again toiling under an Indian sun, or that I should ever have been obliged again to leave you among strangers. I thought that we might have often travelled together, or that if we sometimes parted, from my being a greater wanderer than yourself, you would at least have remained among your friends and relations. But as these expectations cannot now be realized for some time, we must endeavour to make ourselves as contented as we can, while we continue in this country.

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TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ.

Bangalore, 28th September, 1821.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

I CAME here two days ago, to accompany Lady M—— back to Madras. I found her perfectly recovered

in every respect; but her eye, though much better, is not quite right. I should have made an excursion at this time, even if it had not been necessary, on her account, because I require occasionally to renew my old habits of travelling in tents, as the heat of Madras, and constant application, without bringing any sickness upon me, exhausts and wears me away. The last season at Madras has been one not of extreme, but of continued heat.

* * * * *

I am afraid that I never shall be able to make what is called a respectable appearance in the world. I have been too long in getting money, and I am too old to wish to remain long in this country to save it, even if I had the option of remaining.

* * * * *

TO HIS SISTER.

Trippitore, 13th October, 1821.

MY DEAR ERSKINE,

I DO not write you to answer letters, but rather to renew the memory of old times, when you and I were regular correspondents, and when I seldom made a journey without your hearing of it. I set out for Bangalore about a month ago, where Lady Munro had been ever since for the recovery of her health; and I am now on my way to Madras with her, where I shall arrive about the 25th of this month. The distance from Bangalore to Madras by the direct route is two hundred and eight miles; but I have come round by the Baramahl, which is about fifty miles farther, both for the purpose of seeing the inhabitants, and making some inquiries into the state of the country, and of revisiting scenes where, above thirty years ago, I spent seven very happy years. They were the first of my public life, and I almost wish it had ended there; for it

has ever since, with the exception of the time I was at home, been a series of unceasing hard labour. The place where I now am, is one where Colonel Read lived between 1792 and 1799, where I often came to see him, with many old friends who are now dead or absent. I thought I had taken my leave of it for ever when I went with the army to Seringapatam; but I have since twice returned to it, once in 1815, and now; and I shall probably yet return to it again before I leave India. We get attached to all those places where we have at any former period lived pleasantly among our friends, and the attachment grows with the increasing distance of time; but, independently of this cause, the natural beauty of the place is enough to make any one partial to it. There is nothing to be compared to it in England, and, what you will think higher praise, nor in Scotland. It stands in the midst of an extensive fertile valley, from ten to forty miles wide, and sixty or seventy long, surrounded by an amphitheatre of mountains of every shape, many of them nearly twice as high as the Grampians. The country here among the hills has none of the cold and stinted appearance which such countries have at home. The largest trees, the richest soil, and the most luxuriant vegetation, are usually found among naked masses of granite, at the bottom of the hills. We are travelling with tents; our stages are usually from twelve to sixteen miles. You will think this but a short distance, but we find it long enough. It generally takes three or four hours, and the last half of the journey is usually in a burning sun: when this is to be repeated every day for some weeks, it becomes very fatiguing. In cloudy or cool weather it is delightful, and far preferable to any travelling at home; but at present, just before the change of the monsoon, the weather is clear and sultry. When therefore we reach our tents, though we get out of the burning sun, we merely escape from a greater degree of heat to a lesser; for we

have no refreshing coolness, as you will readily perceive when I tell you that the thermometer in my tent is generally ninety-two the greater part of the day.

Your affectionate Brother,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Tekli, 9th August, 1822.

I GOT your short note of the 28th July this morning, after a very hot march. We have now made four marches from Itchapoor, and have four more to Chicacole, where we must give our cattle rest for two days, if they get there without stopping, which is very doubtful, for the roads are very bad. In many places no road at all, except through deep paddy fields, the country covered with water, and the nullahs all full with steep muddy banks, which make it difficult either to get into or out of them. We have had only two fair days since we landed. The sun is always very hot during the day, and in the afternoon or at night, the rain pours down upon us. I am in hopes however, from so much having already fallen, that it will not continue at the same rate, and that we shall now have every second day fair. The country through which we pass is very beautiful. It has the largest topes of old mangoes I have ever seen; jungles of every kind, close and open; rice-fields and wood-covered mountains; but the great heat of the sun takes away much of the pleasure of travelling amidst such scenery.

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TO THE SAME.

28th August, 1822.

ON the 26th we encamped at Cassimcottah, where I was stationed thirty-five years ago when a subaltern, and when the hours passed much more pleasantly than they do now. It was a rainy day; but I walked alone in the evening to visit the spot on which our quarters were situated. Most of them had disappeared from the lapse of time; but part of them were still standing, surrounded by waving grain, as all the ground about them had been cultivated. There was to me something very solemn and melancholy in the scene. Most of my companions there are now dead; and how changed I am myself! I then thought that I was labouring to rise in my profession, and to retire to enjoy myself in my native land; but the older I grow, I get the more involved in business, and oppressed with labour.

TO THE SAME.

Rajahmundry, 6th September, 1822.

WE have been here since the 4th, without any prospect of getting away, as the Godaveri is not only full, but has overflowed its banks, and made the road impassable for several miles on the opposite side. We might cross to the other side, and be put down in a village half under water, but we could not get away from it, and prefer remaining here in bungalows. An experiment is now making by sending over some tents, to ascertain whether, by placing them on coolies and rafts, and letting the camels and elephants travel without loads, they may not reach a rising ground about five miles beyond the river. If they suc-

ceed, we shall follow; but we cannot receive an answer until to-morrow evening, as the boat takes more than a whole day to make a single trip. Even if our advance is successful, it will require five or six days to carry us all over. I have just been interrupted by Captain Watson, who tells me that, by information just received, there is too much water to make any attempt, so we must just remain quiet for a few days.

The bungalow which I now occupy stands on the top of an old bastion, close to the edge of the river. The scene is magnificent. We see the Godaveri coming along from the Polaveram hills about twenty miles distant, and passing under our walls in a deep and rapid stream, two miles broad. The mass of water is probably greater than that which flows in all the rivers in Britain together. Most of the party, as well as myself, spend two or three hours every day in looking at it. I never get tired of it; but I wish it were a little nearer to Madras, for it is one of those fine sights which will very much derange all my calculations of seeing you.

I inclose Mrs. Erskine's letter, because it mentions our boy.

TO GEORGE BROWN, ESQ.

Madras, 1st February, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

I HOPE that the King liked his visit to Scotland. The people there seem to have exerted themselves to please him. They have given him all sorts of ancient sights, except a tournament; but this was never much in fashion in Scotland in days of yore; probably because their horses were such poor beasts, that very few of them could have

charged with a knight in full armour. He must however, I think, have seen more novelty, and been more amused than any where in his other travels. It will do his Scottish lieges some good as well as himself: it will make them look back to their meeting with satisfaction, and will give them something to claver about for the rest of their lives.

I don't know what to think of your Irish distresses; but I suppose that they are very much exaggerated in the newspapers. It will however most likely be of some use eventually by teaching the people to be more quiet and industrious hereafter. Your agricultural distresses do not appear to me to be very serious: they seem to consist very much in the country gentlemen and farmers not liking to return to their modes of life before the French war. I should like to see a comparative statement of the rental of the land of any one of the distressed countries for 1790 and 1820.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 4th July, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

THE general fall of interest will not affect me more than other people; and if we must all sink a little in our expenditure, I shall still keep my relative place. I hope with you, that there will be no war with Spain. It will probably depend on the opinion the French Government may have as to the intention of England engaging in the contest or not. If the French do enter into a war with Spain, I hope it will end in the expulsion of the Bourbons both from France and Spain. Nothing but the most absurd infatuation can make the French Government think of making war to reform the Spanish constitution.

Their armies, if once set in motion, will be as likely to reform their own; and Russia and Austria may then take the opportunity of dividing the Turkish dominions. I trust that the independence of Greece will be secured. I am more anxious about that little country than about all the great powers.

I read and write from six to eight hours every day in the year, without more inconvenience than I felt ten years ago. My general health for the last seven years has been as good as at any former time; and for the last three years I do not think that I have had a single headach. This is more than I can say for any similar period of my earlier days. Your plan of employing a person to read to me would not do, as I should never get through my business by it. My reading is all manuscript, official papers, chiefly relating to accounts, estimates, and plans, requiring attention; and I get through more with my own eyes in one hour, than with any other man's in six. I never employ any one to read for me, unless in some matters of common routine; and when I dictate, it is when the case is short and simple. In all important cases, I must write myself. I have enough to tire me every day, but it was the same twenty years ago. Almost the only time that I have any thing read, is in the evening after tea. I then get some one to read the leading article and the debates from a newspaper, or a new book, for about an hour. But as the newspaper takes up most of my spare time, I make very little progress in any other kind of literature.

TO THE SAME.

Rycottah, 29th August, 1823.

MY DEAR GEORGE,

* * * * *

WHETHER the Spanish constitution be good or bad, the French invasion is both unjust and impolitic; and I imagine there can be no doubt that nothing but our national debt could have prevented us from supporting Spain. Notwithstanding that debt, I should have been rather inclined to have supported her. I see that the Opposition are clamorous for war, and yet say that we cannot maintain our Peace Establishment. It is the old cry—Plenty of war and fighting, without any expense of British blood or treasure.

* * * * *

I have had more inquiries about my declining health since I wrote you last. As far as I can judge myself of my constitution, I shall return to England with as good health as when I left it. There will be one difference—I left England very grey, and I shall return very white. Kind remembrance to Mrs. Brown and family.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Cuddapah, 4th October, 1823.

I RECEIVED this morning yours of the 1st; we have now got to the fourth day of the last month of our absence. I expect to see your young Toto some time between the 25th and 30th.

We shall leave Cuddapah to-morrow; and I shall be glad when I turn my back upon it, for it is hotter than even it used to be. The thermometer is at 94, with a dry parching wind, curling up the paper, thickening the ink,

and, I imagine, aiding time in impairing my sight. I was often at this place twenty years ago, but the heat made me always glad to get away. It is surrounded by lofty hills; but the country has no other beauty. It is flat and highly cultivated, but, unless when the harvest is on the ground, naked and without verdure, and this is one main cause of the heat. You know how much warmer a day becomes by having your tent pitched on sand or black ground; and if this difference is produced by a small spot, you may guess how much greater it must be in Cuddapah, where a great part of the surface of the country is either sand or black earth. I still like this country, notwithstanding its heat. It is full of industrious cultivators; and I like to recognize among them a great number of my old acquaintances, who, I hope, are as glad to see me as I to see them.

CHAPTER III.

War with the Burmese.—Correspondence with Lord Amherst.—Letters to the Duke of Wellington, Mr. Canning, &c.

It has been stated that, in accepting the office of Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro was not actuated by any selfish motive, either of avarice or ambition. Of extravagant wealth he never appears to have been covetous; and if the honours which he had already acquired were not such as to satisfy the eager aspirant after titles and decorations, they were at least as numerous as a well-regulated mind, conscious of its own merits, and the part which it had acted, need desire. Besides, he had served long in India; his constitution, though still sound and vigorous, was not what it had been; whilst the prospect of an increasing family advanced claims upon him, which no thinking man is disposed to treat with contempt. On all these accounts he would have preferred, had his own wishes only been at stake,

a quiet residence in England, to a return into the turmoils of public life. But Sir Thomas Munro was singularly alive to feelings of the purest patriotism, and would have accounted the loss of life itself a poor sacrifice, had he been assured that its surrender would in any degree advance his country's welfare. His patriotic views, moreover, extended far beyond the bounds of the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. He regarded the many millions of Hindoos and Mussulmans, whom the fortune of war have placed in subjection to the British crown, as possessing claims of the highest order upon the regard and attention of their European rulers; and having formed a theory of his own, as to the measures which were likely to confer lasting benefits upon them, he could not cast behind him so favourable an opportunity of carrying it into practice. It was this, and this alone, which induced him to give up a thousand pleasurable schemes which he had formed for himself and his family at home, and to quit England after a sojourn there of little more than four months.

But though he cheerfully consented to make so great a sacrifice, it was by no means his design to linger on under the burning sun of India, till the capability of relishing existence, were it continued so as to permit his revisiting Europe, should be entirely taken away. He desired indeed to set the machine in motion, but he desired also to leave its working to be superintended by younger

hands than his own. In other words, he sailed for Madras with the fixed determination of abandoning it for ever, after a residence of three or four years. The consequence was, that in September, 1823, when India appeared to enjoy a state of profound repose, he addressed a memorial to the Court of Directors, requesting to be relieved; and so urgently in earnest was he, as to the success of the application, that he despatched, by different conveyances, no fewer than four copies of the letter in which it was contained.

The appointment of a successor to a man like Sir Thomas Munro was not, however, a point to be settled in a moment; and the authorities at home seem to have been little disposed to settle it at all. Month after month rolled on, without bringing any answer to his application, till the year 1824 was as far advanced as 1823 had been, when the application was first despatched. In the mean while, however, a great change occurred in the political prospects of British India. A failure in the usual rains caused, as it invariably does, a scarcity amounting almost to famine in the Madras territories; whilst a war broke out, if not more justly alarming, unquestionably more dreaded, than any in which the Company had of late years been involved. The war to which I allude was that with the Burman empire, of which, though it is now admitted on all hands to have been one of defence and violated territory, there were not wanting multitudes at the mo-

ment, to condemn both the causes and the conduct.

I am not called upon to enter, in a work like the present, into any inquiry, however slight, touching the general grounds of animosity between the rival powers. Let it suffice to state, that for many years previously to 1824, movements had been made plainly indicative of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Burmans, and that during the latter months of 1823, and the earlier of the year following, a series of desultory hostilities was carried on between the troops of that nation and certain British posts on the eastern frontier of Bengal. Still no expectation seems to have been formed, nor any preparations made for a general war, till in the month of February it was deemed essential by the Supreme Government to make a formal appeal to arms. The following letter, written some time posterior to the opening of the campaign, will show how the writer was affected by the measure, and how little it had been anticipated, at least in the Presidency of Madras.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 18th September, 1824.

MY DEAR DUKE,

THE few young men who have brought me letters from your Grace, have, I fear, derived little benefit from my acquaintance. I have however done what I believe you would have done yourself. I have requested the

officers under whom they were placed to look after them, and make them learn their duty. In September last, I sent an application to the Court of Directors to be relieved. I had been quite long enough in India; and as every thing was quiet and settling into good order, I thought it a proper time for my leaving it. Had I then suspected, that within a few months we were to have both war and famine, I should of course never have thought of resigning until our difficulties were at an end. But I regret that it is now too late. I was probably more surprised at hearing of the intended war than people at home will be; for I never had the least suspicion that we were to go to war with the King of Ava, till a letter reached this Presidency, in February last, asking us what number of troops we could furnish for foreign service. I thought that the local officers of Chittagong and Arracan might have carried on their petty aggressions on both frontiers for another year, and that they would probably have got tired and settled matters among themselves. Such fellows do not read Grotius or Vattel; and we must not expect them to be guided entirely by their piety. Now that we are actually at war, it is some satisfaction to have those great names on our side. Our case is a clear one of self-defence and violated territory; and I have little doubt but that fortune will on this occasion take the right side. Our force, under Sir A. Campbell, got to Rangoon in May, with the intention of embarking when the river should rise next month, and proceeding by water, before the S.W. monsoon, to Amrapoor, a distance of five hundred miles. This plan failed from a want of boats; but even if there had been boats, it would have been impracticable. I think that this force can advance only by land, when the river falls, and the country is dry, in November. It has, to be sure, no draught or carriage cattle; but we can send enough for a few light field-pieces, and it ought to be able to pick up more in the country. Its heavy

baggage and stores must go in boats, which, with proper exertion, may be prepared in sufficient number. I am more afraid of sickness than of any thing else: the rains have been constant and unusually severe, since the end of May. Fever is very general, but not often fatal; but many Europeans have been carried off by dysentery, and we are not sure that, by continuing two or three months longer in the same confined spot, the sickness may not increase so much as materially to cripple the army. The Europeans have no fresh meat: they are fed on salt beef and salt fish. There are plenty of cattle in the country, and there were numbers at Rangoon when the troops landed; but they were not permitted to be seized, lest it should offend the prejudices of the natives. This is carrying the matter farther than we do in India. We must not allow our feelings for the cows to starve ourselves.

The Bengal Government do not seem to have yet determined on their plan of operations. They intended at one time to have entered Ava with their main force from Arracan, and with a small one from Cachar. They have learned that Arracan is too unhealthy, and talk of making their principal attack by Cachar and Munnipoor. They seem to think that Sir A. Campbell cannot advance towards the capital, as he has no bullocks nor elephants, and that it is quite impossible to supply him with them. We could not equip his force like an Indian army; but there would be no impossibility in sending him three or four thousand bullocks. The expense would be great—five or six lacs of rupees; but this is little to the whole expense of a campaign, and nothing when we consider that the success of the campaign may turn on their being sent or not.

The military character of the enemy is far below that of any of the Indian native powers, and they are miserably armed: no matchlocks, a very few bad muskets, and their pikes and swords do not deserve the name. They are not

nearly so well armed as the common villagers of the Deccan, who turn out to fight with each other about a village boundary. The war began on the eastern frontier of Bengal, by employing detachments of sepoys to attack stockades in the jungle, in which they met with frequent checks, and were harassed and dispirited. The defeat of six or eight of these companies, encamped under cover of the bank of a tank, by the Burmans, after three days' regular approaches, gave the enemy at once a high military character, and his numbers were estimated at fifteen thousand men. It is probable that they never exceeded four or five thousand. This body, after its victory, stockaded itself at Ramoo in the Chittagong district, where it remained about two months; but retired lately, on finding that troops were collecting at Chittagong. The enemy's numbers and resources have been greatly exaggerated. He has no means of offering any serious opposition; and I should be very sorry to see peace made, until we have marched through every part of his country, and occupied the capital. We have sent from Madras to Rangoon three regiments of Europeans and nine battalions of Native infantry, and another battalion is on its passage. In addition to this force, Sir Archibald Campbell has two European regiments, and a marine battalion which he brought from Bengal. I cannot understand why this force should not be able to penetrate through a fertile country, when it is well supplied with salt provisions and grain. As the villages and population all lie near the Irawaddi, such a country cannot be driven, except very partially. Their cattle and grain could not be removed out of the reach of light detachments of two or three corps making a sweep of thirty or fifty miles. I do not like to hear people talking of difficulties when an army can be fed, and when the enemy is too weak to oppose it. I think that, in such circumstances, it never can be im-

practicable to march through his country. It is however useless for me to talk any longer on a point on which all that I can say must be mere conjecture, as I have never been in Ava.

I say nothing to you of any body here, for I believe there is not one man in this country of whom you know any thing. Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

From the contents of the preceding letter, it will be seen that, till the arrival of an official inquiry as to the number of troops which could, within a limited space of time, be spared by the Madras Presidency, for foreign service, Sir Thomas Munro continued in profound ignorance that British India was on the eve of war. The information, however, tended in no degree to deprive him of that presence of mind which formed a marked feature in his intellectual organization. He made no pause for the purpose of inquiring how far the immediate commencement of hostilities was or was not judicious, but gave himself to second, with all the resources within his reach, the efforts of the Supreme Government.

Of the share which he took in the different operations that ensued, the following extracts from a voluminous and confidential correspondence, carried on during the progress of hostilities, between Lord Amherst and himself, are better calculated, than any detail from me, to convey an accurate idea. It will be seen that, war once begun, Sir Thomas Munro became a strenuous

advocate for its prosecution with ardour and perseverance. The whole strength of the nation ought, in his estimation, to be called forth, provided efforts less gigantic should fail; whilst to grant peace on any other terms besides the thorough humiliation of the enemy, he treated as an arrangement not more impolitic than unsafe. Nor is this all. There was not a point connected with the equipment and operations of the army which he failed to consider,—from the movements of columns, to the providing of a competent supply of water-casks and carpenters' nails; whilst his advice, whether solicited or not, was on every occasion given with the freedom which his high character entitled him to use. It is but justice to the nobleman who then held the reins of government, to add, that no course of proceeding could have been more agreeable to him; and that he was, and continues to be prompt in his acknowledgments of the assistance which the sound judgment and experience of Sir Thomas Munro afforded him.

The following private letter was despatched on the day after a formal answer had been made to the official communication already referred to.

TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 25th February, 1824.

MY LORD,

THE official letters from the Supreme Government, regarding the number of troops that could be fur-

nished by this Presidency, for the proposed expedition, were received on the 23d, and answered on the same day. In our answer, the number of troops is stated that can be ready for "embarkation." There can be no difficulty about the troops, or even a greater number, if necessary; but there will be serious, and, I apprehend, insurmountable difficulty about the shipping required to transport them. The Bengal letter says nothing about shipping; and it is therefore doubtful whether it is intended that we should provide it. But the general tenor of the letter, and the expression "to be despatched," led us to suppose that we are to find the shipping, because it is evident that, unless it be ready, and the stores on board early in April, the troops cannot be despatched at the time. We shall therefore take measures for procuring tonnage; but as we have none of our own, and can only get it by hiring such vessels as may touch here, it is very doubtful that we shall be able, within the short time prescribed, to secure one-half of the number requisite for the transport of four to five thousand men; and we shall thus incur a very heavy expense without accomplishing the object intended, unless another letter from Bengal, instructing us not to prepare tonnage, should reach us in a few days, before we have gone too far.

But the mere tonnage, even if it were ready, is not sufficient. There ought to be a number of flat-bottomed boats, sufficient to land at once the whole or the greater part of the force. In all maritime expeditions, it is essential that we should have the means of embarking or disembarking rapidly,—an object for which the common ships' boats are totally unfit. The last expedition that sailed from Madras had an ample supply of flat-boats, which were built for the purpose. The preparation of such a number as would be necessary for four or five thousand troops, would require some months. The distance between Calcutta and Madras making it nearly a month before an

answer can be received to a letter, renders all sudden operations, in which the forces of both Presidencies are to cooperate, extremely liable to accidents, because there is no time for consultation or explanation; and under such circumstances, no operations are so liable to failure as maritime expeditions. A service of this kind requires, more than any other, that every equipment should be ample, because there can seldom be any medium between complete success and failure; partial success is little better than an expensive failure.

The Supreme Government have, no doubt, some information, which may render a sudden operation against the enemy advisable, provided it can be effected; but the want of tonnage, if tonnage is expected to be found here, will certainly render it impracticable, unless some unlooked-for supply should arrive soon. I must own, with the little information which I can be supposed to possess, I should think it better to avoid all inferior expeditions, to wait until we are fully prepared for the main one, and to undertake it with such a force as should leave no doubt of success. This would give time for the two Governments to communicate freely, and for the subordinate one to understand exactly what it was to do, and to make its arrangements accordingly; and it would be more likely, in the end, both to ensure success and to save expense. The occasional hostilities on the eastern frontier of Bengal might, perhaps, still be allowed to continue for some months without much serious inconvenience; and even if the Burmans brought a greater force to that quarter, it might divert their attention from the main object of the attack.

Our troops in the Peninsula lie convenient for all such expeditions, and they are eager to be employed. I am no less anxious that they should go wherever there is service; but I wish, at the same time, that they should go with every means to guard against failure. The drought and

scarcity make the march of troops difficult; but this is a difficulty we can get over; but the want of shipping is one for which there is no remedy, unless longer time be allowed for our preparations.

I hope that your Lordship will pardon the freedom with which I have offered these remarks. We shall address the Supreme Government again in two or three days.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

In pursuance of the above promise, Sir Thomas Munro again addressed the Governor-General, on the 6th and 20th of March. Of these letters it may suffice to state, that they give an account of the progress of the preparations, and report, with much apparent satisfaction, the alacrity displayed by the sepoys in volunteering. Mention is likewise made of the difficulties attending the construction of flat-boats, whilst care is taken to keep the superior authorities in mind, that the scarcity which still pressed severely upon the inhabitants of the Carnatic, ought not, even on account of the war, to be neglected. In the mean while, however, Lord Amherst had written at length, giving a detailed account of the plan of operations which it was intended to pursue, and enclosing two memoranda, one by Captain Canning, relative to the mode of conducting the war, the other by Mr. Larkin, head of the Marine Board, touching the supply of tonnage. The following is a copy of his Lordship's letter, to which the answer of Sir Thomas Munro is appended.

Calcutta, 10th March, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHILE waiting for the communication which you promise us in two or three days, I take upon myself to acknowledge the letter of the 25th ult., which I had the honour to receive from you yesterday; and I will even go so far as to hazard a few observations on matters on which I cannot but speak with considerable diffidence.

With reference to the difficulty which you state respecting tonnage, I send you a copy of a private note from Mr. Larkin, head of our Marine Board, to Mr. Swinton, our Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, by which it would appear, that quite as large a quantity of tonnage as we shall be likely to require, will be available at Madras. I likewise enclose a copy of a memorandum addressed to me by Captain Canning, who, I believe, is better acquainted with Rangoon, and with the kingdom of Ava, than any officer in our service.

We contemplate an attack on Rangoon as speedily as it can be made; and have no reason to doubt that four or five thousand men will be sufficient for its capture and occupation. Of these we may be able to furnish from hence nearly three thousand; namely, his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, two hundred artillery, and a battalion of the 20th Native infantry. We should not require, therefore, from Madras, above two thousand Native troops, with European and Native artillery; and I should hope that these may be ready to sail from Madras by the 15th of April. Say the whole reaches the rendezvous by the 1st of May. During the first week in that month they may be in possession of Rangoon.

Captain Canning, whom we propose to send with the expedition as political agent, will be directed, on our oc-

cupying Rangoon, to tender from thence to the Burmese Government the terms on which we shall consent to make peace. Meanwhile, every possible inquiry will be instituted at Rangoon into the practicability of procuring a sufficient number of boats to transport an army of eight or nine thonsand men to Ummerapoora. This point, upon which there are those who speak confidently, but on which it is natural to entertain considerable doubts, may be ascertained in a very few days after reaching Rangoon.

If the measure is found practicable, avessel will be despatched from Rangoon to Madras with the intelligence, by the middle of May. She will reach Madras before the middle of June, and by the end of that month the whole army may be assembled at Rangoon, ready to proceed to Ummerapoora, at the most favourable season of the year for ascending the river.

If it is found impracticable to procure a sufficient supply of boats for the pupose above-mentioned, notice to that effect will be sent to Madras; and it may possibly be proposed to you, instead of sending an addition of four or five thousand men to Rangoon, to detach only a sufficient number to occupy the Island of Cheduba, off the coast of Arracan, or for such other service as the commander of the troops at Rangoon may deem advisable.

I should hope that, although the main enterprise may be relinquished, the possession of Rangoon, Cheduba, and perhaps other ports or islands belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to accede to such terms of peace as we shall propose.

I acknowledge a difficulty which is not yet removed. I do not know how we shall transport to Rangoon a sufficient number of gun-boats, to protect the advance of our troops up the river to the capital. I understand that the flat-bot-

tomed boats which you naturally point out as essential to a maritime expedition, will not be required to land the troops at Rangoon.

You have stated many reasons, which I acknowledge to be powerful ones, why the expedition should be deferred till farther communication can be held between this place and Madras. I think they are overbalanced, not only by the consideration of the proper period for ascending the Irawaddy River, and the impossibility of moving from Rangoon to Ummerapoora by land, but also by the security which an early blow would afford to our eastern frontier, and by a reference to the unprepared state in which we may expect to find the enemy.

It is really with considerable hesitation that I have entered into this detail with you. Arrangements like these are far beyond the reach of my experience; and I may have overlooked objections which would readily present themselves to persons more conversant with these matters. But I have thought it desirable that you should be made acquainted with circumstances as they stand at present; and you may rely upon frequent communications from this Government, upon all matters connected with the measures in contemplation.

I am, with sincere respect and esteem, &c. &c.

AMHERST.

To this sensible and modest letter Sir Thomas Munro wrote the following reply:—

Madras, 21st March, 1824.

MY LORD,

AFTER writing your Lordship yesterday, I had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 10th instant.

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I have read Captain Canning's paper* with great attention. He proposes to advance to the capital, and to occupy the country until we can make peace on our own

* I subjoin this document, as essential to a right understanding of the accompanying correspondence. The memorandum of Mr. Larkin is omitted, because it contains nothing whatever of public interest.

MY LORD,

ANXIOUS to obey, with the least possible delay, your Lordship's injunctions, I proceed to offer a few hurried remarks on those points towards which you have been pleased more immediately to direct my attention.

The subjects on which your Lordship has more particularly required information, appear to refer, in the event of an expedition being sent against Rangoon, to the number of troops that would be required for that service; to the period of the year at which it might be attempted with most advantage; and to the situation in which the European settlers might be placed by the vindictive visitation of the Burmese Government.

To the first question I should, with all diffidence, reply, that if it be intended merely to take and occupy the town of Rangoon, with a view to the prevention of a possibility of the Burmese driving the British force out again, one regiment of Europeans and three battalions of Native troops, with a detail of artillery, and a due number of armed vessels, might probably be about the mark—perhaps rather over than under it. But in these matters your Lordship may probably be of opinion that it is safe to err on the right side. Shells would be on this occasion, as in all attacks of stockades, highly useful. A few thrown into a town built entirely of wood, could hardly fail to cause early conflagration and consequent submission. The mode of warfare on which the Burmese mainly rely, is fire rafts, which, if looked for, are easily guarded against. A cruiser, with a few gun-boats, stationed at Yonghenchenah, where the Rangoon river branches off from the main stream of the Irawaddy, and

terms; and, in order to effect this, he recommends that a force of ten thousand men move from Rangoon, and that another force advance by Munnipoor. This plan appears

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a few more where the Sirian falls into the Rangoon river, two miles below the town, would effectually prevent any number from being collected, or approaching Rangoon. The great temple of Shweh Dugourg, two miles from the city, and connected with it by a causeway, offers a ready constructed fortification. Nor would the occupation of it by our troops in any manner give offence to the natives in a religious point of view.

The above observations refer to the possession of Rangoon on our part, merely with a view to the place being retained pending negotiations of a more general nature. Should it be intended that the occupation of this poit should be a prelude to the advance of our troops on Ummerapoora, the capital of the Burmese empire, (a measure, in my opinion, perfectly practicable, the success of which would be still farther insured by the co-operation of a force by the way of Munnipoor,) a large body would of course be required,—say, Europeans three thousand, Natives seven thousand; and this number, with a proportional detail of artillery, and particularly gun-boats, would, I entertain not a doubt, place the capital in our possession, when terms might be dictated, (a leading feature of which I should certainly recommend to be the payment of the expenses of the war,) or permanent possession be retained of the country.

Should an advance on Ummerapoora be determined on, a force from Madras might probably be called on to co-operate; in which case, a most safe and convenien. place of rendezvous is afforded by Port Cornwallis, a deep landlocked lagoon at the north-east end of the great Andaman.

With respect to the time of the year at which an attack on Rangoon should be made, it may, in general terms, be said that the place is accessible at all seasons.

During the strong prevalence, however, of the south-west monsoon, or from the beginning of July to the end of September, a degree of difficulty, and perhaps risk, exists, particu-

to me to be a good one. We have here no knowledge of the country or of the people, and have therefore hardly any means of forming a judgment as to the best plan for a

larly if vessels, in bad and foggy weather, overshoot the Rangoon river, and become entangled among the dangerous shoals of the Selang river and Gulf of Martaban. For the advance of a force on the capital, the commencement of the rains, or beginning of June, should be selected, when the rise in the river would remove all obstacles from the sand-banks, &c. &c. &c. and a strong southerly wind convey the troops to their destination in a month or five weeks, the distance from Rangoon being about five hundred miles.

The effect that an attack on Rangoon might have on the property and lives of the Europeans settled there, becomes next an object of consideration. Their number in 1812 may have been ten or twelve; and I do not understand it has increased since. That their lives would be sacrificed, I do not believe. They would, I conceive it likely, be sent up to the capital, where the mild character of the present king would probably screen them from personal violence. Their property would of course be seized. But this question becomes, in some degree, connected with the measure now in contemplation, of an attack on the island of Chedubah. Whenever this takes place, it will naturally become a signal to the Burmese to fortify, to the utmost of their means and resources, every place in their dominions accessible to our forces; and even a weak and contemptible enemy, thus put on his guard, must, in some degree, become formidable. Of these places, Rangoon is indubitably the most prominent and important. The consequence will therefore probably be, that available vessels, of which a sufficient number is always to be found in the port, will be seized and attempted to be sunk on the bar, whereby the entrance of the river would be rendered impracticable. The approach by land is by an impervious jungle of eighteen miles, and endless swamps, morasses, and creeks put it out of the question; and even were that not the case, and supposing our troops to have ob-

campaign against the Burman empire. But there are some general rules which are applicable to campaigns in all countries, viz. not to lose time in subordinate objects, if we

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tained possession of the town by an overland route, what inconvenience would not be sustained by the absence of all shipping? Should an early and separate attack on Chedubah be deemed preferable to a combined and simultaneous attempt on that place and Rangoon, and possibly Merghi and Tavoy, the two latter places involving weighty considerations as connected with Siam, the danger of the Burmese closing the entrance of their river might effectually be obviated by a cruiser, or I should rather recommend two being stationed within the bar, which, by moving up and down between the town and that spot, would prevent all mischief; and the commander of these vessels might, with a little management, give notice to the European settlers of the situation of affairs, and receive such on board as might choose to avail themselves of their protection.

Of the number of men that the Burmese could bring into the field, it is difficult to form even a distant conjecture. The population of the country has been greatly overrated by Colonel Symes (*vide* account of his mission) at eighteen millions. The uncertain data on which I was enabled, in 1810, to build a rough guess, did not give three millions, which may be probably under the mark. Of a regular army they have no idea. When troops are required, each district of a province is assessed at a certain number of men, who are levied from the different houses, agreeably to the number of male inhabitants they contain. The men thus raised receive no pay; in lieu of which they are provided with food; powder, and ball, each man manufactures from the raw materials supplied him by the Government. The ammunition thus compounded can, of course, be little effective; but at close quarters the dah, a species of broad-sword, is in the hands of the Burmese a formidable weapon. Strength and individual courage they possess in a high degree. Independent of which, desertion or cowardice they well know will be punished by the most savage execution of the whole family.

have the power of attaining great ones; not to divide our force too much; to act on those points which will most facilitate the subjugation of the enemy; and from whatever quarter we advance into his country, to do it with such a force as may be amply sufficient to drive before it any thing that he can oppose to it. We can easily furnish ten thousand men, the force proposed to operate from Rangoon; and the Bengal Government can probably furnish an equal or a greater force to advance by Munnipoor, or any other route that may be deemed more practicable. I should certainly place more dependence on the ultimate success of an attack by Munnipoor than by Rangoon, because, though it may require more time, yet regular troops possess greater advantages against irregulars, in acting by land than by water; and the success of their operations is not left to depend on their finding a sufficient number of boats.

It would be desirable that hostilities should be avoided, by the enemy acquiescing in the conditions which may be prescribed; but military operations ought not to be relaxed for a single day on account of negotiations, but should be carried on as if there were no chance of peace.

Artillery they have none, with the exception perhaps of a few old ship guns of the very worst description.

The above details may probably be already known to your Lordship; at all events, they appear deserving of notice. To look upon the Burmese as a foe altogether contemptible, and treat them as such, might lead to serious evil; while, by adopting the means to the end in view, certain success may be anticipated, and your Lordship be enabled to dictate terms to the Burmese Monarch, or otherwise dispose of his country in his own capital and palace. I have the honour to remain, &c.

(Signed) J. CANNING.
B. A. B.

Government House,
March 4th, 1824.

Such an enemy will endeavour to gain time, because it will be more useful to him than to us, and will not hesitate to break off at any time when he thinks he can do it with advantage.

I do not know in what state the countries of Pegue, Arracan, Cassey, and other provinces subdued by the Burmans, now are; but they are probably anxious to regain their independence; and in this case they might, for their own sakes, aid our operations, and might, by judicious treatment, be rendered of great use in providing us with every kind of supply in provisions, boats, &c. They might be promised future protection in proportion as they might exert themselves in expelling the Burmans, and co-operating with us.

As it appears to be necessary that Rangoon should be occupied by a sufficient force as soon as possible, both for the purpose of securing the place, and of enabling us to assist the people of Pegue in any attempt to regain their liberty, we shall send the whole force now ready to the rendezvous. The chief part of the expense has already been incurred; there could be no use, and much inconvenience might be found in detaining them. They will sail about the 8th of April; and by the end of May we shall have a second division ready for embarkation.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that at the period when the above letter was written, the most profound ignorance touching the resources, population, and even the geography of the Burman empire, prevailed. By some strange oversight, no care seems to have been taken to obtain even a moderate knowledge of the circumstances of a people with whom it was scarcely possible to doubt that, sooner or later,

the Company's troops must come into collision. The consequence was, that when war was finally decided upon, no higher authority than that of Captain Canning could be consulted, as to the best mode of conducting it; and as he spoke with the confidence of a man who had spent some months in Ava, it was natural that his suggestions should receive their full share of attention. But it will be seen from a variety of expressions in the correspondence yet to be brought forward, that of the plan of advancing entirely by water, Sir Thomas Munro never thought highly, and that there were other points in the paper, given in a note, of which he decidedly disapproved. In the mean while, however, I transcribe a few sentences from two letters, the former bearing date Madras, 26th March, 1824, in which the writer makes allusions to the merits of certain officers whom he desired to employ; the latter, dated April 3, having reference to the means of transport.

"Major-General Doveton, who is well qualified for the command, is prevented from accepting it by the state of his health; and Major-General Sewell has declined it. * * Colonel Scot, who is now at Bangalore, has therefore been nominated to the command of the Madras troops ordered on foreign service; but I have not yet got his answer, and am not sure that his health will enable him to go. We have no officer better qualified for such a charge. He was selected by Lord Hastings, on account of his services

in the late war, for the command of the field-force at Jaulnah; but was compelled to abandon it, by bad health alone, two years ago."

Unfortunately for the service, Colonel Scot's health was still in so delicate a state, that he could not avail himself of an opportunity which, under different circumstances, he would have embraced with avidity, and turned to a good account.

April 3, Madras.

MY LORD,

THE information conveyed in the report from your Marine Board, forwarded in your last official letter from Bengal, is very satisfactory, and removes all doubt regarding the facility of landing. We shall therefore not wait for the flat-bottomed boats, but we shall send such as may be ready, perhaps not more than six or eight, as they will most likely be found useful in some way or other. The expedition will sail under convoy of the Sophie, on the 12th instant. The force will amount to about six thousand fighting men, of whom one thousand seven hundred and fifty will be Europeans, the rest natives, and there will be about two thousand public and private followers. The whole will have water for six weeks, and provisions for three months. After the expiration of that period they must depend wholly on Bengal for all supplies beyond what can be procured in the country, because the dearth on the coast will render it impossible to send any from Madras, except the single article of arrack. Bengal, I imagine, can have no difficulty in supplying whatever is wanted; but it is a matter which will require early attention, and in which nothing should be left to chance. If the second expedition required to be ready the end of

next month should proceed to Rangoon, the force in that quarter will be doubled; and even if the inhabitants should be well-disposed, and the country to the southward open, though it may contribute materially to the subsistence of our troops, it will not be safe to trust to it entirely in so essential a point. * * *

The selection of Colonel Sir Archibald Campbell, by the Supreme Government, to the chief command of the expedition, necessarily interfered with other arrangements which the Government of Madras had proposed to make; and the coast division, as is well known, departed in charge of Colonel M'Bean, an officer junior to Sir Archibald in point both of rank and standing. No petty jealousy, however, was permitted for a moment to break in upon the good understanding which had hitherto prevailed between the two Governments. On the contrary, Sir Thomas Munro gave his ready approbation to the motives which actuated the Governor-General in the proceeding; and whilst he congratulated Lord Amherst on having at his disposal an officer of Sir Archibald's high character and acknowledged gallantry, he himself persevered in endeavouring to give to the Madras contingent all the efficiency which circumstances would permit. The next question discussed between them involved a consideration of the terms on which peace ought to be offered.

"The Siamese," says Lord Amherst in a letter dated from Calcutta, 2d April, 1824, "inveterate enemies of

the Burmese, would cause a most powerful diversion in the South. The aid to be derived from the Siamese, in the event of protracted hostilities, has entered deeply into our calculation. But I am not disposed, if we can possibly avoid it, to engage too largely in the intrigues and politics of the Indo-Chinese nations, or to enter into engagements which we are not prepared at all hazards to fulfil. Our main object will be, not the acquisition of new territory, but the security of that which we already possess. This we shall make the principal condition of the treaty which we hope to dictate from Rangoon. The defrayment of the expenses of the war will be also a prominent article, if we can bring it forward with any prospect of success;—I mean, if we shall be well assured that the country possesses the means of payment. These, with one or two points of minor importance, will form the terms on which I shall hope to make peace. I am not at all sure that the dismemberment of the Burmese empire, even if we had the means of effecting it, is an event to be desired. The balance is now tolerably equal between them and the Siamese, and they help to keep each other in order. The only tribe to which we have yet held out hopes of independence is the Assamese. These were annexed about four years ago to the kingdom of Ava, and it is highly desirable on every account that they should no longer remain subject to the Burmese yoke. In the instructions to Captain Canning and Sir Archibald Campbell, I am happy to have introduced an injunction almost in your own words, that whenever they negociate a peace, they must go on acting as if they were sure that their proposition would be rejected."

To this letter, which reached him on the 15th, Sir Thomas Munro made the following reply:—

"The security of the Bengal frontier, rather than any increase of territory, ought undoubtedly to be the first object of the war; and the next, the payment of the expenses. If the Burmese can be made to pay them, it will be a sufficient security against their disturbing our frontier hereafter. If they do not pay the expenses of the war, there will be nothing to deter them from farther violations of our territory, unless they are deprived of a part of their own. Even if we should not penetrate to Ummerapoorah, I hope the war will not end without our having advanced so far, both by Rangoon and Munnipore, as to give us a complete knowledge of the country, of the supplies which it can afford, and of the best means of moving an army in it; so that if, at some future period, it should become necessary to invade Ava, we should know what we had to expect, and be able to act with confidence. We have no information regarding that country here, excepting what is given by Symes, Cox, &c.; but even from what is stated by them, I can have little doubt that, if boats sufficient for going up the river in the wet season could not be collected, the troops, after the rains, might advance by land along the banks of the Irawaddi, with their heavy stores in boats." * * *

I add to this two short extracts from letters dated the 22d and 28th of April, for the purpose of showing that, whilst the general issues of the war occupied a large share of Sir Thomas Munro's thoughts, the most minute point connected with its progress was not forgotten.

"We have not yet received any official instructions regarding the preparation of transports for the second division of troops now under orders for foreign service; but as it is stated in your Lordship's private letter to me of

the 2d ultimo, that it will be necessary to leave at Rangoon those which accompany the first division, we shall take our measures accordingly, without waiting for any more formal communication. It will no doubt interfere with the rice trade, and subject us to a high freight; but upon occasions like the present, it is always best to sacrifice inferior objects to the attainment of the main one. There is however a difficulty which we cannot get over without help. We have no water-casks, and are deficient in wood, and still more in hoops for making them. After taking into the calculation all that can be done by means of what we have on hand, and of what is expected from other quarters, we shall still want one thousand three hundred water-casks; and as we shall not, without a supply to this extent, be able to equip the second expedition, we have this day written to Colonel M'Bean, desiring him, with the concurrence of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell, to send back instantly one of the transports with one thousand three hundred water-casks, all the hammocks, or as many as can be spared, and about one-half of the ship-utensils."

* * * * *

Again,

"Tonnage and water are the only things which will occasion the least difficulty in sending a part of the second division to the rendezvous, so as all to arrive in May. We cannot purchase water-casks and hoops, and must therefore wait until the commissariat can make them, with very inadequate means. I hope, however, that we shall be able, by the 20th of May, to despatch two battalions of sepoys and the 89th regiment to Port Cornwallis. Should we not have sufficient water for the whole, we shall at all events send the two battalions, and let the 89th follow a few days after." * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort William, 22d April, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

* * * * *

I HAVE taken care to communicate to the proper department the observations which you make upon the subject of provisioning the troops; and I flatter myself that nothing relating to this essential point will be overlooked or neglected.

It affords me very sincere pleasure to hear you express your approbation of the arrangements which we have made respecting the command of the combined force engaged in the expedition. We have thought it becoming to confer on Colonel M'Bean the rank and allowances of a Brigadier-General.

I am sure that I cannot express to you in adequate terms, the sense which this Government entertains of the zealous and effective co-operation afforded us by the Government of Fort St. George. Without your assistance, it would have been impossible for us to have undertaken the vigorous and extended measures with which we have commenced the campaign.

* * * * *

Sir Archibald Campbell and Captain Canning are instructed to tender conditions of peace to the Burmese, as soon as we are in possession of Rangoon. I trust that the terms we shall offer will be deemed moderate, and such as little exceed the demand necessary for the security of our own territory. We have no wish to weaken or dismember the Burmese empire, nor to acquire for ourselves any extension of the territory we already possess. We propose to require that the Burmese should relinquish their newly-acquired possessions in Assam, from whence they have the means of descending the Barrampooter, and

overrunning our provinces at a season of the year when our troops cannot keep the field; that they should renounce all right of interference in the independent countries of Cochar; that the boundary between Chittagong and Arracan shall be accurately defined; and finally, that they shall pay the expenses, or a share of the expenses, of the war in which they have compelled us to engage. These conditions, with the addition possibly of a stipulation respecting the independence of Munnipore, we are, I think, entitled to demand; and as we shall not relax for a single moment in our threats upon the capital from the south, and possibly from the north-west also, I am not without hopes that they may be acceded to before our force has long been in possession of Rangoon.

SIR THOMAS MUNRO IN REPLY.

Madras, 8th May, 1824.

MY LORD,

* * * * *

THE terms proposed to be offered to the Burmese Government are certainly very moderate. Unless it is much poorer than it is represented to be in any of the published accounts, it ought to be able to pay a crore of rupees for the expenses of the war; or if it will not pay in money, it can in territory. Munnipore would perhaps be very useful to us, even if restored to its former chief, by removing the Burmans to a greater distance from our frontier, and facilitating our invasion of their country whenever it might be rendered necessary by any future aggressions. Their power and that of the Siamese may be pretty nearly balanced; but such kingdoms as these are in a perpetual state of fluctuation, and can never, for any long period, remain like the old governments of Europe, within the same limits. Our best policy is not to look

so much to the preservation of any balance between them, as to the weakening of that power which is most able to disturb our frontier. If we go seriously to war, the dismemberment of the Burman empire, to a certain extent, must be the consequence, whether we wish it or not; because the Siamese will undoubtedly seize the opportunity of recovering their ancient possessions to the southward of Rangoon, and their example will be followed by any other state which has any chance of success.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 7th May, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

WE are busied in obtaining every possible information respecting the country lying between Assam and Cachar, and the kingdom of Ava Proper. We keep in mind the probability of its becoming expedient to advance troops in that direction during the next cold season; and although I am willing to hope that the possession of Rangoon and other maritime places belonging to the Burmese, may induce them to listen to reasonable terms of peace, I do not propose to relax in the preparations for attacking the capital, not from the south only, but also from the countries adjoining our north-eastern frontiers; and whether it may be necessary or not, ultimately to advance a force in that direction, it is highly important not to lose the opportunity of making ourselves acquainted with the readiest means of waging offensive war against our turbulent neighbours." * * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 22d May, 1824.

MY LORD,

WE have been two days later than I estimated; but we have got the pioneers, whom I did not expect so soon; they have been enabled to join only by very extraordinary exertion. A detachment of them from the neighbourhood of Hyderabad, has marched at the rate of twenty-five miles daily for fifteen days, without a halt, in the hottest time of the year. Our sepoy battalions have embarked without a man being absent. Their conduct has been highly meritorious: no Europeans could have evinced more readiness to go on foreign service than they have done. * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 22d May, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

YOU will have been informed yesterday by Mr. Swinton of the wish of this Government, that two battalions, with two six-pounders each, forming part of the last portion of your second detachment, should be sent direct to Chittagong. We have thought it best not to interfere, even if we could, with that portion of the second detachment which was to sail on or about the 20th instant, thinking it probable that Sir Archibald Campbell will have calculated upon its joining him, and wishing to avoid the disappointment which might be occasioned to Sir Archibald Campbell by any diversion of that part of the force. It is possible that he may not require the remaining portion of the second detachment. At all events, we have urgent need of its assistance at Chittagong. The irruption of the Burmese into that district was not expected by our

agents there, until within a very few days of its taking place. I regret it most on account of the necessity which it imposes on our troops of remaining longer in the southern portion of the district, where I am afraid their health will be unavoidably exposed to injury. It is not our intention, however, to prolong a contest in a part of the country where it will be scarcely possible to preserve the health of our troops. Much as I shall lament the loss of property, and the personal inconvenience and danger which the inhabitants will suffer from the presence of the enemy, I think that, in the balance of evils, the occupation of the country by the enemy must for a time be endured, rather than risk the almost certain destruction of our troops by the effects of the climate; and our authorities there will therefore be directed to retreat gradually, unless they shall see strong reasons to the contrary, on Chittagong, between which place and the present scene of hostilities, we are informed that the country is of such a nature as to make it easy for a retiring force to check the advance of one much superior to itself in numbers. Chittagong itself is not considered an unhealtny station; and we shall look to our operations at Rangoon for the recovery of such portion of our territory on the Naaf as may be temporarily in possession of the Burmese. Indeed, although we are taking such measures as seem to be necessary for the protection of Chittagong, in the event of the enemy moving still farther forwards, I think I am not too sanguine in expecting that it is very possible they may make a sudden retreat on hearing of what, I hope, is on the eve of taking place—the occupation of the island of Cheduba. I cannot think that the Rajahs of Arracan, and other neighbouring districts, now forming the force which has advanced into our territory, will remain easy when they shall hear that we are at the very gates of their homes. Besides, we are led to be-

force that can be spared, both on the side of Rangoon and of Bengal, and to be prepared for its lasting more than one campaign. Sir Archibald Campbell will require the aid of all the second division that was originally destined to join him. He ought to have ten Native battalions, besides his European force. Whether he advances towards Ummerapoorah by land or water, or partly both, he will have a long line of communication, and must have some posts to secure it; and after making these detachments, he must have with himself such a body of men as the whole force of the enemy shall be unable to oppose. The co-operation of the inhabitants would be the easiest way of securing his communications and the arrival of supplies. The system of terror employed by the enemy, by enabling him to drive away the inhabitants from their villages, and to hinder them from supplying our wants, gives them a great advantage over us; and this advantage will operate against us as long as the people continue to believe that their country is again to be delivered up to the Burman Government. The people themselves will never venture to act in opposition to their present tyrannical masters: before they will venture to take so dangerous a step, they must be satisfied that they are not to return under their dominion; and they must have leaders and a prince of their own to look to. As the southern and most fertile provinces of the Burman empire were formerly under Pegu, it would perhaps be advisable to proclaim the restoration of the ancient family, and to guarantee to it the possession of whatever part of its old territory might be recovered from Ava. Were this done, Sir Archibald Campbell would soon have a friendly instead of a hostile country, along a great part of the line of his operations. If we hold out to the people no hope of their not being placed again under their ancient sovereign, but leave them to suppose, that whenever our troops are withdrawn, they are again to fall under the Burman Go-

vernment, we must expect no co-operation from them, but to be harassed by their withholding supplies and cutting off stragglers. * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 10th July, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE read with due attention your suggestions respecting an offer of our protection to the Peguers, in the event of their assertion of their former independence. We are at present quite in the dark as to the existence of a single individual of their former royal race. I think, indeed, that the whole was exterminated at the time of the final conquest and annexation of the kingdom of Pegu to the empire of Ava. Nothing like a disposition to revolt has at any time manifested itself, I believe, during the present generation; and as circumstances are at this moment, I imagine it would be hopeless to expect that we could excite a disposition to throw off a yoke which has long ceased, at least, to be a foreign one. But circumstances may arise, both in Pegu and in Arracan, to make it our policy to offer assistance in separating those two kingdoms from that of Ava. In fact, if the Court of Ummerapoora obstinately refuses to listen to any terms of peace, there is nothing left for us but to attempt the subversion of that power as it exists at present, and to divide it once more into separate, independent, and comparatively powerless states; and as far as indications go at present, I should think it more likely that Arracan will set the example than Pegu.

There are certainly many malcontents in the former who would join us in an attempt to subvert the authority of Ava. It appears to me, however, necessary to proceed with great caution in holding out assurances of our future inter-

ference and support. Nothing would incline me to such a measure, but the conviction that we had no other way of beating our enemies, or reducing them to reasonable terms of peace.

I do not meet with a single expression from Sir Archibald Campbell indicative of a wish to be joined by more troops. And yet the arrival of the 89th and 2d Native battalion seem likely to induce him to push farther up the river than he would otherwise have done. He knows very well that he has only to speak the word to be joined by the remainder of your second division, with the exception of the two regiments gone to Chittagong. * * *

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 26th July, 1824.

MY LORD,

I WAS not aware that the royal race of Pegu had been so completely destroyed at the last conquest, that it was not known that a single individual of it was now in existence. This circumstance is no doubt unfavourable to any expectation of revolt in the Rangoon districts. I would not however, on that account, despair of such an event yet taking place. We know that in India, when a race of ancient princes has been extirpated, persons claiming descent from them frequently start up, when the Government is weak, to recover their real or pretended rights, and that, without any claim to royal descent, ambitious and enterprising individuals, when they see a favourable opportunity, collect followers, and endeavour to render themselves independent; and there can, I think, be no doubt that under similar circumstances the same thing would happen in Pegu. What we want there is some party hostile to the Government; we should derive from it information regarding the roads and the country, and aid in pro-

curing provisions. We want no military assistance, as our troops, if well supplied, will be quite sufficient for all military operations.

An invasion of Ava by land has many advantages over one by sea. It is much less exposed to danger from unforeseen accidents. The advance of the army can be calculated with much more certainty. The border districts of the enemy differ little from our own, and, when entered by our army, may either be occupied by tributary chiefs, or by our civil officers. And as we advance, district after district will, for the time, fall under our dominion, and contribute with our territories in furnishing supplies for the army. And as the army will be accompanied by the necessary establishment of draught and carriage-cattle, it will be able to regulate its marches, and to make them in any direction which may be thought most convenient. An invasion by sea of such a country as Pegu, is destitute of all these advantages. The people are separated from us by the ocean: they know that our invasion is a mere temporary enterprise, and that we have no intention of making a permanent conquest. They have therefore no motive for favouring us either openly or secretly. They know that such conduct would be punished after our departure with the utmost severity. The only event that could give us any chance of assistance from them, would be an insurrection against the Ava Government. The army, in such circumstances, being, on its landing, without draught or carriage-cattle, can procure none from the country while the authority of the Government continues to prevail. All its operations must be attended with great labour and difficulty. As it advances the people will abandon their villages, and remove their cattle and property. Its supplies must come chiefly by sea, subject to the accidents of contrary winds, and to the chance of their being

intercepted by the enemy in their passage to the interior. * * *

Every thing that has yet occurred seems, I think, to confirm the account given by Captain Canning, that the Burmans are undisciplined and badly armed. Their military character is lower than I expected to have found it. They have never ventured to assail any regular force: they have acted entirely on the defensive, and have shown less resolution in defending their stockades than we meet with among the irregular troops of India in the defence of their barriers and jungles. I wish that Sir Archibald Campbell had made some estimate of the force which he considered as necessary to enable him to execute the measures which he may have in view. He has said nothing on the subject; and it is possible that he may expect the amount of his force to be determined by your Lordship. It should, I think, be completed to ten, and, if possible, to twelve Native battalions. He has already enough of Europeans.

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FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 27th July, 1824.

MY LORD,

I AM sorry to observe, from Sir Archibald Campbell's report, that he is in great want of boatmen. It would be a very important object if the dandies he wants could be procured, and it might be advisable to encourage them by high pay. I should think that a corps of Malay boatmen might be raised about Prince of Wales's Island and Sumatra. Their services would be invaluable in facilitating our movements; and would amply repay their expense, however high their pay might be.

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FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 13th August, 1824.

MY LORD,

WE have received the dispatches of Sir Archibald Campbell brought by the Alligator, which were forwarded in the Secretary's letter of the 30th of July. But as that letter merely transmits the dispatches, we are anxiously waiting for your Lordship's decision on the plans proposed by Sir A. Campbell, and on the destination of our own troops now held in readiness. Of the two plans proposed, we have no means of judging which may be the best. In the event of re-embarking and landing on the coast of Arracan, it is not stated at what point the landing is to be, whether north or south of Chedubah. This change in the operations would hardly be advisable, unless it possessed great and evident advantages, such as being much nearer to the capital than Rangoon; the communication, after the force should have passed the Arracan mountains, being open and secure with the coast, and the facility of receiving supplies from Bengal being greater than at Rangoon, and the force from Arracan being brought into a more early co-operation with that from Bengal.

I am glad however to perceive that Sir A. Campbell himself gives the preference to the plan of carrying on his operations from Pegu. There are many reasons for its adoption, even if the approach to the capital should be slower and more difficult than from Arracan.

The abandonment of a country in which we had been fighting for some months, would appear as a failure, not only to the enemy but to our own troops: it would encourage the Burmans, and it would shake, in some degree, the confidence of our troops in their commanders: it would leave the Burmans in quiet possession of their southern and richest provinces: it would discourage the Siamese and Peguers at the moment perhaps that they

were ready to have risen against the enemy; and it would deter the inhabitants of the province to which the war might be transferred from affording us any aid. After all, however, that plan ought to be preferred which clearly offers the greatest certainty of speedily subduing the enemy. To form a correct judgment on this point requires a knowledge of the country and its resources, its obstacles, its roads, and its water communications, which can be best procured by the officer on the spot.

I think it is evident, that Sir A. Campbell applies for the 54th regiment and a battalion, because these corps are the remaining part of the second expedition, and because he does not know that any other troops can be spared; but I have no doubt that he would rather have three battalions of sepoys, because they are so much more easily subsisted, and because the proportion of Europeans to native troops in his force is already much too great. One battalion of sepoys will therefore sail in the course of five or six days for Rangoon; but we shall keep the 54th regiment until we hear again from Calcutta, as I have no doubt that that regiment will be wanted for the Bengal force destined for the eastern frontier. Draught and carriage cattle, and a small body of cavalry seem to be much required by Sir A. Campbell, and it is desirable that he should have them as soon as possible. They can be furnished much easier from Bengal, and much sooner than from hence; but if any are required from this quarter, we shall take steps to furnish what we can on receiving your Lordship's orders.

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LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort William, 3d August, 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will receive, in a day or two, copies of the last dispatches, which have reached us from Sir Archibald.

He seems to think it nearly impracticable to prosecute his voyage up the Irawaddy, and he consequently asks our instructions upon what he considers the only two remaining plans for him to pursue, either to advance to the capital by the road from Martaban through Old Pegue, or to come round with his force, after leaving a strong garrison at Rangoon, and try what he can do on the coast of Arracan.

If we approve of his advance by land, he desires we will send him field-train and equipment, without which he cannot move, together with some squadrons of cavalry.

It is utterly out of our power to comply with his request. We have not the articles to send him. I do not know if we have come to a right conclusion, that it would not be possible for you to supply him, without incurring an inordinate and unwarrantable expense. Perhaps you have as little the means of supplying him with draught cattle as ourselves. But I will beg the favour of you to let me know what you are able to do, and also to give me your opinion as to the propriety of incurring so very great a charge. I would not hesitate stretching a point for the sake of rendering his fine army effective to all useful purposes; but we are of an opinion here, that the measure is absolutely impracticable, and therefore do not much discuss its expediency.

Sir Archibald told us, in a former dispatch, that one, two, or three hundred boatmen would be of material use to him. We have sent him six hundred; and coupling the use which he may make of this reinforcement with other circumstances, we do not yet relinquish the hope of his being able to ascend the river. If he could get as far as Prome, we conceive it would be of great advantage; for such an advance would almost bring him in co-operation with a force which we propose to send as early as the season will permit into Arracan. It is by this latter route that we now think it advisable to approach the capital, rather than

by Munnipoor. Our force will be more concentrated. The expulsion of the Burmese from Ramoo, possibly their capture or destruction, will combine itself with a movement into Arracan.

From Chedubah we step into the Island of Ramree, and from thence upon another part of the coast of Arracan, but all tending towards the same point. If Sir Archibald is unable to advance either by the Irawaddy or the Martaban road, the remaining alternative of bringing him round to Arracan strengthens our force already in that quarter, and leaves more troops disposable for Cachar and Munnipoor, which, although a secondary point, is still one of considerable importance.

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SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 23d August, 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE been delaying my reply to your Lordship's letter of the 3d instant, until I should have seen Sir A. Campbell's secret dispatch, and the instructions sent to him in consequence. In my last letter, however, I have, in fact, already given my opinion on the main point; namely, that the plan of advancing by the Irawaddy was preferable to that of either marching south, or re-embarking and landing in Arracan. I can see no object in his going to Martaban, because it would not facilitate his advance to the capital, as, according to his own account, even if the Siamese and Peguers were to take a part in the war, he would still require draught and carriage equipments from Bengal. I suspect too, that operations by sea against the enemy's maritime possessions would, at this season of the year, be liable to great delays, and even to danger. If a field-equipment be indispensable, it would still, I think, be advisable to advance by the Irawaddy, for the equipment could not possibly be to such an extent as to move all

the stores without water-carriage. The Siamese should be left to make war in their own way; and the Peguers, if they rise at all, will be more likely to do so by Sir A. Campbell's moving up the river, and drawing the enemy out of their country. With regard to the plan of re-embarking the Rangoon force, and landing it at Arracan, nothing could justify such a measure but the certainty of being furnished there with an equipment of draught and carriage cattle. If they could not obtain it, they would be still more helpless than where they are now, and we should have lost reputation, and given confidence to the enemy by abandoning the original plan of operations.

Sir A. Campbell says, that the prospect of advancing by the Irawaddy is at an end, in consequence of the square-rigged vessels having been found not to answer—the want of country-boats—the want of provisions—and sickness. The square-rigged vessels are surely not absolutely useless, and the other wants may be supplied. If it be found impracticable to ascend the river when it is full, the difficulty will probably be removed when it falls, and the stream loses its rapidity, and the country becomes dry enough to admit of troops marching near the banks. Should this be the case, the advance to Prome would be of the greatest advantage: it would give Sir A. Campbell the command of a rich tract of country, and of an important part of the navigation of the river; and it would perhaps, by bringing him so much nearer to the Bengal army, enable him to open a communication, or to co-operate with it.

There is one serious want, however, which, though not stated by Sir A. Campbell as one of the obstacles to his advance, is yet one under which Europeans cannot long keep the field—I mean the want of fresh provisions. I have however no doubt that, whenever he can move, he will be able to supply himself.

The country along the river is populous and cultivated, and must be full of cattle for agriculture and other purposes. They can easily be driven away from a spot like Rangoon, but they cannot be driven away from a whole country: they cannot get out of the reach of an army that is marching. When the ground is dry, a detachment of two or three thousand men, without guns, can easily march directly inland from the river fifteen or twenty miles, and make a sweep of the villages, and drive in what cattle it may find, always paying for them when their owners can be found.

Sir Eyre Coote, for months together, during Hyder's invasion of the Carnatic, never got fresh beef in any other way. He sent out four or five battalions to some place distant twenty or thirty miles, where it was supposed cattle were grazing in the jungles, and they returned in two or three days with a supply, though always followed and harassed by a body of horse. Operations of this kind however, as well as every other, would be greatly facilitated by a small equipment of draft and carriage cattle. It might sometimes be found necessary to traverse the country to the distance of fifty or sixty miles, in search of cattle, and to employ six or eight days on this service: the Native troops would carry their own rice. Europeans are not usually employed on such occasions; but if the enemy were in force on the route, it might be necessary to have a few Europeans, and also a few light guns. I think therefore that means should be adopted for supplying Sir A. Campbell, as soon as practicable, with from one to two thousand draft and carriage cattle, and more if it can be done. It is evident, if even he had the complete command of the river and all its boats, that his force must still be inefficient, unless it can carry on operations at a distance from the river, and march in every direction. If it cannot do this, it cannot answer the purposes of an army.

I think that a small equipment of cattle would enable Sir A. Campbell to increase it, partly by capture, and partly by purchase. The expense of the equipment would be great, but it must be submitted to for the sake of avoiding a much heavier charge. If Sir A. Campbell cannot move without it, we incur the whole expense of the expedition to no purpose; and even if he can move without it, but if by having it he could shorten the duration of the war three or four months, all the extra-expense of that period would be saved.

I have not yet ascertained the expense of sending draught cattle from hence, because I have not had any report regarding tonnage; but if one, two, or even four thousand, could be sent from Bengal and Madras, at one hundred rupees a-head, four or five lacs employed in this way would eventually prove a very great saving in the expenditure of the war; for all other expense is idle waste, while that part is withheld which puts our army in motion. From the scarcity and dearness arising from the drought, the expense of feeding each bullock, including the pay of the driver during the passage from Madras to Rangoon, will be twenty-two rupees: the tonnage may raise it to a hundred rupees. I shall know the whole probable charge in a few days, as I mean to take up a vessel immediately to send two hundred bullocks to Rangoon. It would be advisable to proceed in equipping Sir A. Campbell as if we expected the war to last more than one campaign, and that he was to extend his operations to a distance from the river to every part of the country. The Commissioners infer, from no overture having been received from Omrapoora, and from the inhabitants not having returned to Rangoón, that the Government is determined to prosecute the war to the last extremity, and that the people are hostile. We cannot expect the Government to offer us any terms, until it sees that we have the power of advancing into the country.

The people, whether hostile or friendly, could hardly have acted in any other way than they have done.

They could not return to their habitations until our advance should give them the pretence that we were masters of the country.

As to their being deterred from remaining in their villages by the apprehension of their families being punished, it deserves very little credit.

The families of the principal officers may be kept as pledges of their fidelity; but those of the great body of the people must be at liberty; and if our force advances, I have no doubt but the greater part of them will return to their villages; and that, though they may give us no open aid, they will privately sell or connive at our carrying off, by force, whatever we have paid for. The only difficulty in this war seems to be that of moving and subsisting. The enemy is the most contemptible we have ever encountered. * * * *

LORD AMHERST TO SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

Calcutta, 4th Sept. 1824.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM not quite sure if, in the letter which I had the honour to write to you a few days ago, I adverted to the embarrassment likely to be occasioned to us by the reports which we have received from the quarters most likely to afford information of the pestilential climate of Arracan. The reports are of such a nature as to induce the Commander-in-chief to abandon the plan of operations which, for a variety of reasons, would have been the most eligible, but which are clearly overbalanced by the almost certainty of the army being rendered ineffective by sickness during its passage through the kingdom of Arracan; and I believe we must revert to the original plan of advancing the

main body of our army through Cachar and Munnipoor, leaving in Chittagong a defensive force only sufficient to protect our Southern district from any attempt which the enemy might possibly contemplate in that quarter. One material inconvenience which arises to us from abandoning operations in Arracan is, that we shall no longer have the prospect of uniting ourselves with Sir Archibald Campbell, should he bring his force round to that coast: and, indeed, the same reasons which prevent our risking the health of the troops intended to advance from Bengal will also make it unadvisable that Sir Archibald should bring any portion of his force into the same pestilential region. It is really difficult to know in what manner to employ beneficially the army now at Rangoon, supposing it impossible for them to accomplish their advance on the capital; but I am inclined to think, that although unable to ascend the river, or to march by land to Ummerapoora, they may still do a great deal towards distressing the enemy, and bringing him to terms, by remaining in possession of the southern provinces, and intercepting the large supplies which those provinces are supposed to furnish to the royal treasury.

Sir Archibald's last dispatches, dated 7th of August, inform us, that he was preparing to take possession of Mergui and Tavoy, on the coast of Tenasserim. These are remote acquisitions; but they would be powerful cards to play in any dealings which we may eventually have with the Siamese. Sir Archibald informs us of an affair with the enemy at Syriam, from which it would appear that they are very unwilling to face us, even under every advantage of position; and, what is still better, he seems to anticipate the return of a part of the neighbouring population.

SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO LORD AMHERST.

Madras, 2d Sept. 1824.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant.

It is unfortunate that the climate of Arracan is so unhealthy as to make it expedient to abandon the plan of advancing through that province. It is certainly better to do so than run the risk of crippling the army by sickness. We have many unhealthy tracts, but none, I believe, except the hills of the northern Circars, through which an army may not pass without any danger from the climate. I hope that the route by Munnipoor will be found practicable. The distance is great; but as the country is not hostile for a considerable part of the way, it will not materially impede the operations of the force. I should imagine that when it enters Ava, the enemy will abandon Arracan and the whole of the sea-coast. The occupation of Mergui and Tavoy may be useful, if they are not allowed to withdraw permanently any part of our force.

The greatest advantage that could be derived, either from these places or from our intercourse with the Siamese, would be a supply of draught and carriage cattle. With a small equipment to begin with, and with a sufficiency of boatmen, Sir Archibald Campbell ought to be able to go any where. He has force enough, and it can be kept up at its present strength, by occasional supplies of recruits and volunteers from Bengal and the coast. I was therefore somewhat disappointed at seeing, by the last instructions to him, that some doubt existed as to his being able to advance to Prome, and ultimately to the capital. There is a danger of lowering the tone of our enterprise by questioning its practicability. He has, I trust, no doubt of it

himself, provided he has boats and a small equipment of cattle. There is no reason, from any thing we have yet seen, to suppose that the enemy can make any serious opposition; and with such a force as he has, Government have surely a right to expect something more than the occupation of the southern provinces, and to look with confidence to the dictation of peace at the capital, as the result of the operations of his force, and of the Bengal army.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 4th December, 1824.

MY LORD,

I DO not know that there is any urgent necessity for an increase to our military force. I think that it is adequate to the protection of our territories, and to the suppression of all disturbances which may arise in those of our allies, where they are employed as subsidiaries. But the case becomes different, when there is a probability of the Nagpore force being obliged to advance, and of the war in Ava being protracted, so as to cause heavier demands upon us to replace the increasing casualties. It does not appear to me however, as far as I can judge at present, that we shall require any other than that of a few additional men to each company, and perhaps an extra local corps to occupy Seringapatam, and set at liberty a regular battalion.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 15th January, 1825.

MY LORD,

IT gives me great pleasure to learn that Sir A. Campbell was to move up the Irawaddy towards Gengainchain, about this time. I apprehend no difficulty from the enemy, but much from the want of carriage. This will

greatly increase the fatigue of the force, and render it more liable to sickness by privations and exposure. It will cripple all its operations by forcing it to move near the river, and preventing it from pursuing the enemy at a distance from it. An army can do little unless it is able to move in every direction. If Sir A. Campbell cannot himself find carriage cattle, they ought, whatever the expense may be, to be sent to him from India: they may be procured here to any extent that tonnage can be found; and it would be of the utmost advantage to the success of the war, that two thousand, or even one thousand, should be sent every month to Rangoon. But I cannot believe that carriage cattle may not be procured on the spot, if proper persons are employed and liberal prices paid.

I see from some correspondence, that a reward of fifteen rupees was paid for every slaughter-bullock or buffalo brought. This is nothing; it would be better to give fifty and insure a better supply. Carriage cattle ought to be taken, if they are to be got, for fifty or even a hundred rupees a-head.

There can be no doubt that, in a populous and well cultivated country, there must be abundance of animals, both for the plough and carriage, and that they may be got by paying double, but not by paying half-price. Paying double prices in an enemy's country is the cheapest way of carrying on war; and if it is done in Ava, it will produce the same beneficial effects as in India. When the force ascends the Irawaddy, and gets possession of the points where the main branches separate, the Burman troops will probably abandon the Delta. I imagine that they will also evacuate the country between Rangoon and Martaban, and that the inhabitants of all these countries, if well treated, will be ready to sell cattle to our army at cheaper rates, and in greater numbers, than they can possibly be sent from India.

It would greatly facilitate the military operations, if some

civil administration were established in the districts from which the enemy might be expelled. I do not mean for the purpose of raising revenue, but protecting the people collecting supplies, and seeing that they are amply paid for in ready money. The officer who may be employed on this business should be one who has had some experience in such matters,—such a man may no doubt be found among the officers present with the force.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 2nd February, 1825.

MY LORD,

IT is of great importance that no time should be lost in ascending the river, to the point where the branches first separate from the main stream, in order to prevent the enemy from carrying off the grain and cattle of the Delta, and secure them for ourselves. I am more solicitous about cattle than grain, because grain can be easily sent from India, if necessary; but the transport of cattle is slow and expensive. If there are officers with the force who understand the business of purchasing cattle in an enemy's country, I am persuaded that enough may be found in the Delta, and the districts occupied by our troops, to supply what is absolutely necessary both for draught and carriage.

But should there be any doubt on this head, the supply ought not to be left to chance, but should be sent from India. The Commissary-General has now ready above six hundred carriage bullocks, and any number may be procured for which tonnage can be got. But as more than double the tonnage we now have is wanted for troops, we must defer sending the bullocks until we get spare tonnage from Bengal, or are authorized to take what may touch here by chance. Sir Archibald Campbell has never distinctly stated what number of carriage bullocks would

enable him to act efficiently: it does not appear to me that less than four, five, or perhaps six thousand, would answer the purpose. Whatever the number may be, it should not only be completed, if practicable, but provision should be ready for filling up all casualties. If his cattle were equal to the carriage at once, without the aid of boats, to a month's supply of his army, I should think it sufficient; but he ought to have elephants to carry some tents for his Europeans. He wants bullocks much more than soldiers. Against such an enemy as the Burmans, I should reckon fifteen hundred European firelocks an ample allowance for the force in camp: a larger body would be only an incumbrance, difficult to move, and difficult to feed, and harassing to the Native troops, who must furnish guards and detachments to supply their wants, and save them from fatigue.

I am glad to learn that no offers of peace will be allowed to interfere with the military operations, which, I trust, will be continued until our armies are in a situation to dictate the terms:—we cannot trust even to the signature. It will be necessary for the troops to retain commanding positions, until every article is completely fulfilled; and when they are recalled, to move by such routes as may give us a perfect knowledge of the country.

As it is advisable not only to keep the original Native part of the expedition complete, but to augment it in order to enable Sir Archibald Campbell to spare troops to occupy posts in the country as he advances, we have, anticipating your Lordship's approval, ordered two Native regiments to embark for Rangoon as soon as may be practicable, one from Madras, the other from Masulipatam: the number of each, including followers, will be about twelve hundred. We have also ordered two hundred pioneers to embark from Masulipatam. Exclusive of these corps, we shall, in the course of three months, have ready for embarkation above two thousand volunteers and re-

cruits, so that we shall want tonnage for nearly five thousand men. What we have is not adequate to one-half of this number. The main body of the sepoy regiment at the Presidency, about six hundred and fifty firelocks, will probably embark on the 12th instant; but the regiment from Masulipatam cannot embark until transports are sent there from Bengal. An official statement of the probable number of men to be ready for embarkation in the next three months is now preparing, and will be sent to Calcutta by the 5th instant, with the view of enabling your Lordship to give necessary orders regarding the tonnage for them. * * *

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

Madras, 3rd March, 1825.

MY LORD,

I WISH that Sir A. Campbell had attempted to move early in January: if he could by short marches, and frequent halts, have in the course of a month only reached Ganganchain Yah, his situation would have been much improved, and he would have been enabled to relieve much of his present wants, by getting supplies from the country. His difficulties, instead of increasing, would, I think, have diminished every day as he advanced. With regard to the policy of insisting upon the fulfilment of that article among the conditions of peace formerly offered, which imposes upon the Court of Ava the payment of a sum of money for the expenses of the war, I am of opinion that it ought not to be relinquished merely on the consideration of their consenting to the re-establishment of the independent states which formerly existed between Ava and Bengal. In forming this opinion, I do not look to the value of the money, for no sum that we can possibly obtain will counterbalance the expense of protracting the war for another

campaign. I consider the exaction of the money of importance only as it will tend more than all the other stipulations to deter the Burmans from committing hostilities upon us in future. Nothing will make such a government keep its engagements but fear or weakness. If in making peace we require nothing more from it than the acknowledgment of the independence of the chiefs between the two frontiers, we shall have no security that it will not encroach upon them again, whenever circumstances may call for our forces in a distant quarter. It will not be deterred by the dread of our resentment, for it will have already seen that it will suffer no permanent loss from it, as we leave it in possession of all its extensive dominions; but if it is forced to pay a sum of money, it will suffer a loss which it cannot recover, and will therefore be more likely to remain at peace.

The great use of exacting a sum of money is, that it will deter the Burmans from venturing to attack us hereafter, and thereby give us some assurance of their sincerity in making peace with the design of maintaining it.

If the Burman empire were dismembered, by the Siamese getting the southern provinces, or by a new state rising up in Pegue, its weakness would prevent its disturbing us, and I should, in such a case, think it unnecessary to prolong the war for any other purpose but to obtain the money.

In the present state of the war, I think that the cession of Arracan, and the payment of a sum of money, would be sufficient; but if the war be prolonged, I think that the Burman power should be reduced, by requiring farther cessions wherever it might at the time be found most convenient to have them.

Whenever peace may be made, it should be stipulated, in the event of our forces not having previously traversed the countries near the capital, that they should march by such routes as they may think proper in returning home. * * *

The preceding letters constitute but a slender portion of the intimate and confidential correspondence which was carried on, during the progress of the Burmese war, between Lord Amherst and Sir Thomas Munro. They are given rather as specimens of the tone in which the late Governor of Madras was accustomed to express himself, than as containing any full or connected narrative of his eminent exertions on that occasion; yet even from them, the reader will be at no loss in collecting the sentiments and views of the writer, both as these affected the nature of the war itself, and the proper mode of conducting it. It will be seen that, of the military power of the Burmans, he thought from the first very meanly; that he treated as mere accidents the petty successes which they obtained, as well on the eastern frontier as at Ramoo; and that the alarm which prevailed at one time so extensively, as to reach even Calcutta itself, was to him a mystery wholly inexplicable. But whilst he thus spoke and thought of the dangers of the war, he was by no means disposed to encounter even the Burmans with an inadequate force; on the contrary, his unceasing exertions were applied to place the army of Sir A. Campbell in such a condition as should enable it to move in every direction, with a moral certainty of success; wisely arguing that, even in point of economy, it were better to act thus than to risk a prolongation of the contest by adopting a narrower policy. Again, though not less desirous

of peace than other public men, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly declared himself against the conclusion even of an armistice till after the enemy should have been thoroughly humbled. He contended that nothing short of this—nothing less than the necessity of purchasing a suspension of hostilities, by a money-payment, or the surrender of a portion of his territories, would convince the King of Ava of his own inferiority; and as the same sentiments were happily adopted by the Government of Bengal, the judicious measure was enforced. But perhaps there is no feature in his public conduct at this eventful period more remarkable than the absolute confidence which he reposed in the loyalty and good feeling of the people of India. Whilst apprehensions prevailed elsewhere of commotions and conspiracies, and a cry was raised for more troops to supply the place of those employed at Rangoon, Sir Thomas Munro uniformly maintained that there existed no ground of alarm; and even the mutiny at Barrakpore failed to convince him that the force already embodied was not fully adequate to preserve the tranquillity of the country. From several long and able minutes recorded by him during the progress of the war, we gather that, at one period, full twenty out of fifty regiments of Native infantry were withdrawn from the territories of Madras; yet he resolutely opposed every effort to increase the military establishment, except by adding a few extra men to each com-

pany. Never was policy more magnanimous, more equitable, or productive of more fortunate results. By acting thus, he gave the surest proof to the natives, that Government neither feared nor distrusted them; and as no disturbance occurred, a heavy additional expense was saved to a treasury already far from being rich.

The following confidential letter to an officer in the Mysore country, will suffice to show how Sir Thomas was accustomed to treat the awful rumours which from time to time came in. It was written in reply to a report made under circumstances of no common agitation and alarm. It is scarcely necessary to add, that of the horrible plot which involved the massacre of all the European officers in the Company's service, not a syllable was afterwards heard.

I HAVE received yours of the —— and read the awful denunciation sent to us by ———. Bundageer Sahib is, I imagine, a man whom I have frequently seen in the neighbourhood of Vascottah, and who has often complained to me of the resumption of some enaum, partly by Tippoo and partly by Purnea; but in this respect he is in the same predicament with hundreds as good as himself. The native prince gives and takes away such enaums at pleasure, and we have no business to interfere.

Bundageer seems to have got up a new and very extensive holy alliance against us, comprehending all the most discordant powers in India; but I have been so long accustomed to them, that I think nothing of them. I have heard of one every five or six years since 1792, when a very alarming one was brought forward by some adherents

of Tippoo, and circulated through the country by tappal. They usually arise from the political speculation of some holy Hindoo or Mussulman.

Bundageer knows too much to deserve any credit: had he been satisfied with telling us that the old Rana of Kittoor was a malcontent, many would have believed him, because nobody doubted that she was dissatisfied at having been robbed of her property. But he gives us a leaf out of an old almanack, in which it is said,—"In that year there will be in the Eastern quarter bloody wars, and great slaughter, and earthquakes, &c.;" and he, or some other almanack man, seems to have been foretelling eclipses in Bengal, "perplexing monarchs with the fear of change;" for they are raising men enough there for a crusade. The shortest and most effectual way to dissipate the present grand confederacy would be, to restore Bundageer's enaum, or to give him a purse of money, as is usual in Persian tales. The General cannot give the enaum, but he may the purse; and pagodas will answer as well as dinars. The story of the confederacy, if not already sent, should be sent forthwith to ———, in order that he may know that his disorder is not fever, as has been supposed, but magic, and that his medical attendant may adapt his remedy to his complaint. I hope in goodness, as the old ladies say, that these fellows will not bewitch ————, for we could ill spare him in the present state of affairs. We should not be able to say that we could have better spared a better man, for we have none better; and I therefore sincerely hope that he, and all of us, may get safe through this ominous year.

Yours truly,

THOMAS MUNRO.

On another occasion, at an earlier period of the war, a disturbance of rather a serious aspect actually broke out at Kittoor, in the southern Mah-

ratta country, which created, as usual, much more alarm than there was any real ground for. The following letter to Mr. Chaplin, who was at the time Commissioner at Poonah, will show the view taken by Sir Thomas Munro of that affair..

Madras, 7th November, 1824.

MY DEAR CHAPLIN,

I HAVE to-day received yours of the 30th ultimo. The attack on Kittoor has been a melancholy affair; but I do not imagine that the insurrection will extend beyond the district. Christamen Row, though always discontented, has, I think, too much at stake to risk a contest with us. You will see, when the official papers reach you, that large reinforcements have been ordered to Darwar, which would have been sufficient for every purpose without calling upon you; but the more force on such occasions the better: it concludes the business sooner, and deters those who are wavering from stirring. There was great imprudence and presumption in the whole of the operation. ——— should have had no troops. He ought to have gone alone, if he went at all: nobody would have injured him. He should have explained his intentions. If they refused to accede to them, he should have parted from them peaceably, and written to the commanding-officer, or to you, that a proper force might have been sent to enforce submission. In all such cases, there ought either to be no force at all, or an overwhelming one. A good teshildar would have been a much better agent at Kittoor than the collector: he would have caused no commotion; and if he failed, there would have been no loss of character, or exasperation, and a military force might then have been employed with better effect. I never knew an instance in which I would have thought it advisable

that the collector should himself be present to direct the employment of force. When he is present, his feelings get engaged, and the dispute becomes in some degree personal. When he remains at a distance, and leaves the military force to proceed in its own way, there is no hostility between him and the insurgents, and they give him credit for acting upon principle and by superior authority.

We are engaged in a foreign war, which has already drawn away no less than four European and twelve Native regiments, and we ought, during its continuance, at least to avoid every measure which may be at all likely to excite disturbance at home. We must however lose no time in putting down the present insurrection. If it does not spread, which I do not imagine it will, there is nothing formidable in it. There have long been parties in Kittoor, and some of them adverse to the zemindars. The widows are probably directed by some of the chiefs. A general amnesty, with very few exceptions, might be offered, and liberal provision for the widows and principal followers, &c. I should never have thought the treasure an object of any consequence, and would much rather have let it go to the widow than have endangered the tranquillity of the country for the sake of it. This little disturbance will not only cause great expense, but embarrass almost every military arrangement from Trichinopoly to Nagpoor.

Yours truly,

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Subjoined are a few out of many private letters addressed, during the continuance of the war, to eminent persons at home. They cast some fresh light upon the politics of the times, and they fully illustrate the sagacious and statesman-like views of the writer.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Thomas Munro to Mr. Sullivan, dated Madras, 11th July, 1825.

THE Burmese war still occupies our attention more than any thing else; but its active operations are for the present nearly suspended by the monsoon. As the official accounts of the progress of the war are sent home regularly up to the latest date, it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any details. The original plan of the invasion of Ava was romantic and visionary, and was, I believe, suggested by Captain Canning. It was, that Sir A. Campbell, after occupying Rangoon and collecting a sufficient number of boats, should, with the help of the south-west wind, proceed against the stream to Ummarapoora at once. This, even if it had been practicable, was too hazardous, as it would have exposed the whole force to destruction, from the intercepting of its supplies. Had there been boats enough, this scheme might have been partially executed with great advantage, by going up the river as high as Sarawa. This would have given us the command of the Delta, and of the navigation of all the branches of the Irawaddy, and would have saved the troops from much of the privations which they have suffered from being shut up at Rangoon. But even if there had been a sufficient number of boats, Sir A. Campbell would have been justified, by our ignorance of the country and of the enemy, in not making the attempt until he should have received more troops, to leave detachments at different places on the river, to keep open his communication with Rangoon.

When Captain Canning's plan of sailing up to the capital was abandoned, two others were thought of, but both were impracticable: one was to proceed in the dry season by land from Pegue; the other was to re-embark the troops, land somewhere on the coast of Arracan, and

march from thence through the hills to the Irawaddy. This Government, from its subordinate situation, has of course nothing to say in the plans of foreign war; but I took advantage of a private correspondence with which I have been honoured by Lord Amherst, to state privately my opinion strongly against both plans. I said that re-embarkation would be attended with the most disgraceful and disastrous consequences; that the measure would be supposed to have proceeded from fear; that it would encourage the enemy, and would deter the people of the country, wherever we might again land, from coming near us, or bringing us provisions for sale; that we knew nothing of the coast of Arracan or the interior; that if the troops landed there, they would be in greater distress than at Rangoon, because they would find less rice, and be as much exposed to the weather; that they could not possibly penetrate into the country without carriage cattle, of which they had none; and that they would be at last compelled to re-embark again, without effecting any thing. I said that the nature of the country, and the difficulty of sending draught and carriage cattle by sea, pointed out clearly that our main line of operations could only be by the course of the Irawaddy, partly by land and partly by water, and that this would give us the double advantage of passing through the richest part of the enemy's country, and of cutting off his communication with it, whenever we got above the point where the branches separate from the main stream of the Irawaddy, I calculated that if Sir A. Campbell adopted this plan, he would reach Prome before the rains; and that when they were over, he would be able to continue his march to Ummarapoora. When I reckoned on his getting no farther than Prome this season, I had not so low an opinion of the Burman troops as I now have. I was induced to form a very low estimate of their military character, from their

cautious and irresolute operations against the detachment at Ramoo, in May, 1824; and from all their subsequent conduct, they appear to be very inferior in military spirit to any of the nations of India. There were no letters from Prome later than the 6th of June: the monsoon had set in, and every thing in the neighbourhood was quiet. The heads of districts had submitted, and were sending in supplies. It was expected that offers of peace would be sent from Ava as soon as the occupation of Prome should be known. It is difficult to say what such a government will do; it may submit to our terms, or reject them; but we ought to be prepared to insure them by advancing to Ummarapoora, and, if necessary, dismembering the empire, and restoring the Pegue nation. If we encouraged them, a leader would probably be found, and we might, without committing ourselves to protect him hereafter, make him strong enough, before we left the country, to maintain himself against the broken power of Ava.

We have sent on foreign service beyond sea, from Madras, five regiments European infantry, fourteen regiments of Native infantry, two companies of European artillery, a battalion of pioneers, and above one thousand dooly bearers, and we have relieved the Bengal subsidiary force at Nagpoor. The rest of our troops are thinly scattered over a great extent of country, and will have very severe duty until those on foreign service return. We are obliged to be more careful than in ordinary times; but I see no reason to apprehend any serious commotion, or any thing beyond the occasional disturbances of poligars, which we are seldom for any long time ever entirely free from in this country. I confess I cannot understand what the Bengal Government want to do with so many additional troops, or with any addition at all. Mr. Adam left them quite enough, and more than enough, to carry on the Burman war, and to protect their own territory. They

have not sent a single Native regiment beyond sea, except a marine battalion: they have in Arracan and their Eastern frontier twelve or thirteen Native regiments more than formerly; but they have got nine of them by troops at Nagpoor and Mhow having been relieved from Madras and Bombay, while these troops, which have moved to the Eastward, still cover the country from which they were drawn. We had once five battalions in the Baramahl; we have one there now;—the whole have been advanced to the Ceded Districts. The military authorities in Bengal seem to think that when troops are drawn together in large bodies in time of war, new levies must always be made to occupy the stations from which troops have been taken to join the large body. If we follow such a principle, there can be no limit to the increase of our armies. I found much inconvenience from its adoption in Bengal, because the increase of the Bengal army is narrowly observed by the armies of the other Presidencies, and raises expectations which cannot be satisfied.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Thomas Munro to the Right Honourable C. W. W. Wynn.

Madras, 16th July, 1825.

DEAR SIR,

ONE of our greatest defects in this country is our readiness on every occasion to exaggerate the power and resources of the enemy. This is productive of very serious evils: it discourages enterprise, excites idle apprehension, causes a large force to be employed where a very small detachment would be sufficient, and leads to much delay and heavy expense in making great preparations where there is no enemy. There are many officers who never see five or six hundred of the enemy without estimating them at as many thousands, and who suppose that

the Burmans must have an army of Rangoon, an army of Arracan, and an army of every province we can approach. I think it is clear that they have but one army, or but one large body of men, which from its number may be called an army; that they have great difficulty in keeping it together; and that, when it is together, it is much inferior, in every military quality, to the troops of any Indian prince. The long time required by Bandoolah, in December last, to bring a force against Sir Archibald Campbell, shows plainly enough that he had great difficulty in collecting it; and I think that this difficulty is one proof, among many others, that the population of the country is extremely thin. We have now traversed the country, in different directions, to the extent of three or four hundred miles at least; and when we consider the mountainous tracts with which it is intersected, that wherever we leave the banks of the rivers the villages are very few and small, and that even on the banks of the Irawaddy the country in many places is desolate, I think there can be no doubt that the population is far below what it has ever been estimated at. I should scarcely suppose that it can exceed four or five millions for the whole empire. I am therefore convinced that the Burmese, if they do not submit during the rains, can give no serious opposition to our advance to the capital next campaign. It is not likely that they will persevere, after that event, in refusing to come to terms; but it is possible that they may; and we should therefore be prepared for it, in order that we may not continue involved in this expensive war longer than is necessary. We cannot retain the country as a conquest, but we may set up any new prince in Ava who has ability and influence to maintain himself. We might make Pegue again independent, and set up any chief of that nation who would be agreeable to the people; and as our troops would necessarily be a considerable time in his territory

before they could be entirely withdrawn, he would have leisure, under their protection, to confirm his power. Some such arrangements as these may become necessary; but if the Court of Ava submit, peace may be more expeditiously made on other terms. I should think it desirable, on every account, that Pegue should be made independent; but should it still be continued subject to Ava, I should think that the Bengal provinces will have no cause to dread another invasion, and that no additional troops will be necessary to cover their eastern frontier. I regard the whole of the fifteen thousand men now raising as entirely superfluous. I know of nothing that should make it now necessary to have a larger native army in Bengal than in Lord Hastings' time, when it was found strong enough both to carry on war with the Mahratta powers, and to protect our own territories. It ought certainly to be able to do as much, or more now, as it has been augmented since then by Mr. Adam, and has had eight or nine native regiments set free by the relief of Mhow and Nagpoor, by the troops of Bombay and Madras. I cannot at all agree with the military authorities in Bengal, that it is necessary to draw together a division of ten or twelve thousand men to the north-west of Delhi, when half that number might do; or that the stations left by the troops, when drawn together, should be occupied by new levies.

TO MR. RAVENSHAWE.

18th July, 1825.

We want no additional regiments of Europeans. All that is wanted, is to keep the corps already in the country complete during the war. I am induced to mention this again, by hearing reports of an intention of sending out more regiments. We have already more than we have use for, and have in consequence sent more to Rangoon

than can be fed or moved. The Bengal people are alarmed about their frontier. They could take care of it when they had not a single regiment of cavalry, and now that they have two, they talk of want of protection: they seem to think their force must, even in numerical strength, be equal to that of the enemy. One to five, or even to ten, was once thought enough.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Bangalore, 29th Sept. 1825.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

By the desire of Macdonald, I enclose you an interesting paper of his on the difficulties of a Russian invasion of India. I have always considered such an undertaking as impracticable, without the previous conquest of Persia, and the quiet submission of the people to their new masters, neither of which events are likely, unless we are very negligent. At all events, the Russian invasion will not come so soon, I hope, as to find us in Ava. Let us get out of that country, and then come Russians and Persians when they will.

The armies, as they are called, of Ava, are, as far as we have yet seen of them, a most miserable half-armed rabble, greatly inferior to the peons of any Indian zemindar. They are the best ditchers and stockaders since the time of the Romans; but as a military body, they are little better than an assemblage of badly-armed tank-diggers. The army from Ummarapoora, which was approaching Prome the end of last month, and of which about one-half, or twenty thousand, were then entrenched at Meaday, are said to be chiefly, if not entirely, armed with muskets. I should as soon believe that they were all armed with Manton's fowling-pieces. You must of course have long since observed, that ten or fifteen thousand men, more or less, make very little difference in the military arithmetic of Ava.

One of the most extraordinary circumstances attending the Burman war, is the effect which it has in increasing the Bengal army;—fresh regiments are raised, because others have gone to the frontier, and more are raised to fill up the places of some which it is proposed to draw together in order to strengthen some of their field-forces, already strong enough.

The Bengal army, as it stood before the Burman war, was at least as numerous as it ought to have been. No increase was necessary for Ava. It never has been customary in India, when ten or fifteen thousand are sent into the field, to raise an equal number to supply their places in garrison and cantonment. The Bengal Government has got more troops by transferring Nagpoor and Mhow to Madras and Bombay, than it has sent into Ava. It can hardly be said to have sent any into that country; for those in Arracan and Cochar are still on their own frontier. Since the commencement of the war, we have sent beyond sea, viz.—

Fighting men	Europeans	5237	
	Natives	15,277	
Bearers		1088	
Followers	public	2644	
	private	2326	
			26,572

The great addition to the Bengal army, on account of the war in Ava, in which we have so great a share, without any addition, is a subject much felt and much talked of in this establishment. I regard the increase as entirely useless in itself, and as worse than useless as it affects the Madras army. An adjutant-general officer will always find very urgent reasons for increasing, and even for doubling, the army, if Government is disposed to receive them.

Yours most sincerely,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. WYNN.

Madras, 5th January, 1826.

DEAR SIR,

We have private accounts from Rangoon up to the 28th, which mention that Sir A. Campbell had passed Meaday without seeing any thing of the enemy, who had abandoned their stockades at that place after their defeat near Prome. The enemy have evidently retreated in great consternation and disorder; and Sir Archibald will, I imagine, push on as rapidly as he can to Maloon, or even to Sembewgow, in order to prevent the enemy from re-assembling in force at those places. Should he even find both abandoned, he will probably be obliged to halt a short time in order to let his supplies overtake him; for I suspect that his ardour has made him outrun them.

In the beginning of last month he had reason to expect that Colonel Morison's force in Arracan would reach Sembewgow, on the Irawaddy, about the middle of the present month; but this hope must now be at an end, because the Arracan force has been destroyed as an army by sickness much more fatal than that experienced at Rangoon the preceding year. The loss of a powerful diversion from Arracan will not however, I think, hinder the Rangoon army from reaching Ummarapoora in the course of the present campaign, unless the enemy show more resolution and more skill in harassing us than they have ever yet done. There are two ways by which our advance to the capital might be rendered impracticable: one is by the enemy not fighting us in front, but sending numerous detachments from their army to act on our flanks and rear; and the other is by the people of the country becoming hostile and intercepting our supplies. As far as I can judge, from all the past conduct of the enemy, I think that we have no-

thing to fear from detachments from their army acting in our rear, because these detachments never seem to trust themselves at any great distance from the main army—never to come forward without it, and never to remain long behind when it retreats. A rising of the people is what is most to be apprehended, as it would involve us in very serious danger. Among most nations, the knowledge that they were to be restored to their former conquerors would produce a hostile feeling, which would raise them against their new masters; but among the Peguers, I rather think that this will not be the case, because the mass of the people are too unwarlike, and because they do not seem to have a local militia, so common in India. It must be owned, however, that our avowed intention of giving up Pegue to Ava furnishes that power with the best means of exciting the Peguers against us, and which, though it may have little effect while we are successful, might be very dangerous if we met with any reverse. It is not unlikely that another armistice will be immediately requested by the Burmans; but, as it may be merely with the view of gaining time and wasting the fair season, I scarcely believe that Sir A. Campbell can with prudence accede to it, until he reaches the capital or its neighbourhood. I should then hope, though not very confidently, that we may have peace. We shall then, at any rate, have possession of the most fertile part of the empire, and be able, by collecting the revenue, to reimburse ourselves for a portion of the expenses of the war. The deplorable state of what was the Arracan army compels us to give what farther aid we can possibly spare, with safety to ourselves, to the army in Ava. We are sending to Rangoon one or two additional regiments of sepoys, and we are preparing to relieve all the weak corps of sepoys now in Ava, by fresh and complete ones from hence. I have left India as naked of troops as it can safely be; and if I have committed any error, it

is rather in having sent away too many than too few. But I have not acted without fully considering the state of the country, and all the chances of disturbance; and as I find that we must either weaken ourselves a little more than is prudent, or expose the army in Ava to failure from the want of reinforcements, I have not hesitated to support Sir A. Campbell to the utmost extent of our power. Any evil which might arise in this country from the want of troops in one quarter, may be repaired by drawing them from another; but the want of troops in Ava would be fatal to the success of the campaign.

I am, with great esteem and respect,
Dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
THOMAS MUNRO.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Madras, 16th April, 1826.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I DID not think of troubling you with another letter; but as we have at last made peace with the Burmans, I think I may as well give you a few lines, by way of finishing the war. I mentioned in my last what kind of troops the Burman armies were composed of, so that it is not necessary to say any thing more of them except that they did not improve in the progress of the war. We are well out of this war. There have been so many projects since it commenced, that I scarcely expected ever to see any one plan pursued consistently. There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated, and its success rendered more certain. There were no doubt great difficulties;

every thing was new; the country was difficult, and the climate was destructive; but still, more enterprise in exploring the routes and passes on some occasions, and more foresight in others in ascertaining in time the means of conveyance and subsistence, and what was practicable, and what was not, would have saved much time. We are chiefly indebted for peace to Lord Amherst's judgment and firmness in persevering in offensive operations, in spite of all arguments in favour of a defensive war, founded upon idle alarms about the power of the Burmans, and the danger of advancing to so great a distance as the capital. Had he given way and directed Sir A. Campbell to amuse himself with a defensive system about Prome or Meaday, we should have had no peace for another campaign or two. Every object that could have been expected from the war has been attained. We took what we wanted, and the enemy would have given up whatever we desired, had it been twice as much. They have been so dispirited, and our position in Arracan and Martaban gives us such ready access to the Irawaddy, that I hardly think they will venture to go to war with us again. The Tennasserim coast cannot at present pay the expense of defending it: it may possibly do so in a few years, as its resources will no doubt improve in our hands, and there may be commercial advantages that may make up for its deficiency of territorial revenue. I should have liked better to have taken nothing for ourselves in that quarter, but to have made Pegue independent, with Tennasserim attached to it. Within two months after our landing at Rangoon, when it was ascertained that the Court of Ava would not treat, I would have set to work to emancipate Pegue; and had we done so, it would have been in a condition to protect itself; but to make this still more sure, I would have left a corps of about six thousand men in the country until their government and military force were properly organized; five or six years would have

been fully sufficient for these objects, and we could then have gradually withdrawn the whole of our force. We should by this plan have had only a temporary establishment in Pegue, the expense of which would have been chiefly, if not wholly, paid by that country; whereas the expense of Tennasserim will, with fortifications, be as great as that of Pegue, and will be permanent, and will not give us the advantage of having a friendly Native power to counterbalance Ava. Pegue is so fertile, and has so many natural advantages, that it would in a few years have been a more powerful state than Ava. One principal reason in favour of separating Pegue was, the great difficulty and slowness with which all our operations must have proceeded, had the country been hostile, and if the Burman commanders knew how to avail themselves properly of this spirit, and the risk of total failure from our inability to protect our supplies upon our long line of communication. The Bengal Government were however always averse to the separation of Pegue: they thought that the Burmans and Peguers were completely amalgamated into one people; that the Peguers had no wish for independence; that if they had, there was no prince remaining of their dynasty, nor even any chief of commanding influence, to assume the government; that it would retard the attainment of peace; that the project was, in fact, impracticable; and that if even practicable, the execution of it was not desirable, as it would involve us for ever in Indo-Chinese politics, by the necessity of protecting Pegue. Even if we had been obliged to keep troops for an unlimited time in Pegue, it would have saved the necessity of keeping an additional force on the eastern unhealthy frontier of Bengal, as the Burmans would never have disturbed Bengal while we were in Pegue. The Bengal Government were no doubt right in being cautious. They acted upon the best, though imperfect, information they possessed.

Those who have the responsibility cannot be expected to be so adventurous as we who have none. But I believe that there is no man who is not now convinced, that the Taliens (Peguers) deserted the Burman Government, sought independence, and in the hope of obtaining it, though without any pledge on our part, aided in supplying all our wants with a zeal which could not have been surpassed by our subjects.

Yours very sincerely,
THOMAS MUNRO.

We sent to Rangoon about three thousand five hundred draught and carriage bullocks; and could have sent five times as many, had there been tonnage.

TO SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras, 15th June, 1826.

MY DEAR MALCOLM,

I THANK you for your letters of the 20th and 28th February. Your friend Dr. Mack seems to be a favourite, and will, I have no doubt, get forward; and if I can help him properly, I shall do it. I am quite impatient to see your last chapter. Have you seen the Last Man? He ought to die reading your last chapter. Your new edition will be by far the most valuable book in our language on our Indian empire, to every person who takes any interest in its stability. It was so before, and it will be much more so now with its additions and improvements. Much is still wanted about the army: it is a long subject, and I dare say that you have said all that can be said about it.—Look at the Madras army just now. We had no officers fit to be employed in Ava in any high command, who did not want either rank or health. R. Scott was too

ill to be employed; and almost all the lieutenant-colonels, who were fit for command, were junior to the King's lieutenant-colonels. Boles, R. Scott, and Deacon, are going home. M'Dowell will be the only colonel in the country. After him comes Welch, a very brave and respectable officer; and then ——— and ———, both at present, for the sins of the Company and a judgment upon the Madras army, in temporary command of divisions. G. Scott and Forbes, or any respectable officers who want divisions, should be sent out.

Nothing can equal the absurdity and wrong-headedness of ———, and his advisers the prize-agents. When I saw Cadell, after the arrival in this country of the first communications between ——— and the trustees, I told him ——— was mad, and would do nothing but mischief, and advised him to withdraw from the alliance. What could the man want with lawyers? We had got in the Duke of Wellington, the best trustee that could have been found in the kingdom; and if lawyers were wanted, he had the aid of those of the Crown. As the Court of Directors will now send my successor to Madras, I hope that you will be appointed without opposition. I do not understand the politics of the matter; but it appears strange to me that there ever should have been any question on the subject of the candidates. I do not know that you will now, after the lapse of so much time, wish to come; but I trust you will, for you are yet younger than I was when I came out last. I hear that you are going into Parliament. This would be very well if you had nothing else to look to; but it is almost too late to begin a new trade and serve a new apprenticeship. You would be much more at home, and could do much more good at Madras than in the House of Commons. I do not know whether your health be an insuperable obstacle; but if it is not, there is no way in

which you could, so honourably to yourself, and so usefully to the nation, close your career as in the government of Madras. Nothing will give me greater pleasure, than to leave you in this country preparing materials for a new edition of your Political History.

Yours ever,

THOMAS MUNRO.

TO MR. WYNN.

Venkalaghery, 17th October, 1826.

MY DEAR SIR,

IT would have been desirable to have avoided the extension of our dominion; but it could not easily have been done. We could not have restored our conquests to the Burmans, without making them in a few years as powerful as ever, and ready to enter into a new war with us with improved means, and the benefit of past experience, whenever they saw a favourable occasion. We could not show the Burmans that we would not avail ourselves of success in war to extend our territory. Such a measure would have the effect of encouraging them and the surrounding nations to make war upon us; for if they are sure that, however unsuccessful it may be, they will lose none of their territory, they have little inducement to remain at peace. It is the dread of losing a part or even the whole of their dominions, that is our best security against their aggression. We could not give Martaban and Tennasserim to the Siamese, because they had no claims upon us, because they could not have defended them for a single season against the Burmans, and because the transfer would have rendered us odious to the inhabitants.

Whatever rules we may prescribe to ourselves for the limitation of our territory, they can never be absolute, but

must always, in some degree, yield to circumstances. A civilized and warlike nation, surrounded by half-civilized neighbours, must necessarily, in spite of itself, extend its empire over them. It is the natural progress of human affairs, and the march of civilization over barbarism. All that we can do is not to precipitate, but to retard events as much as possible; and rather to be forced on by them than to cause them, lest we should produce anarchy by advancing faster than we can consolidate our power and establish order and good government in the countries we subdue.

In the question of retaining Tennasserim, we should consider not only what direct advantages we can derive from it in a commercial or political view, but likewise what purposes it may be turned to in the hands of the European nations. The French have, in former times, sought to establish themselves in Siam and Cochin China. They probably have not relinquished the design of establishing their power in that quarter; and were they to occupy Tennasserim, and some of the principal islands, they would soon extend their territory, and might, at a future period, become very troublesome neighbours.

I remain, with great esteem,
My dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,
THOMAS MUNRO.

Before concluding the detail of Sir Thomas Munro's meritorious services during this season of war and famine, it is necessary to state, that clouds no sooner began to gather in the political horizon, than he repented of a step which had been taken under widely different circumstances.

Eager as he was to return home, a sense of duty prompted him not to abandon his post, now that dangers and difficulties beset it; and he at once volunteered, in the event of no successor being nominated, to continue at the head of the Madras Government. As may be imagined, no offer could have come more opportunely, or been more readily embraced, as the following official document will show:—

EXTRACT FROM A PUBLIC LETTER TO FORT ST. GEORGE.

Dated 10th December, 1827.

2. OUR Chairman has acquainted us that he has received from the Governor of Fort St. George two communications, under dates the 3rd March and 19th July last, in both of which Sir Thomas Munro states the reasons which would have induced him to have withheld the intimation of his wish to be relieved from the office of Governor of Madras, made known to us in his address of September, 1823, and expresses his intention to remain till the arrival of his successor. The Right Honourable the President of the Board of Commissioners has likewise made known to our Chairman a letter to the same effect which he received from your President under date the 8th July last.

3. We have derived the most sincere satisfaction from the foregoing communications. We consider Sir Thomas Munro to have evinced the same high public spirit and ardent zeal to promote the interests committed to his charge on the present, as on all past occasions, throughout his long and honourable course of public service. As no arrangement has yet been made for the appointment of a

successor to the Governor of Madras, we are happy to signify to you our unanimous desire to avail ourselves of an extension of Sir Thomas Munro's services in that high station, at a period when his distinguished talents and peculiar qualifications cannot fail of being eminently beneficial to the country under your government, as well as to our interests; and we have accordingly unanimously resolved to abstain from nominating any successor to Sir Thomas Munro, until we shall have received from you an acknowledgment of this communication, and an intimation of his wishes in consequence.

4. With the view of making known to the service and public in general the sentiments which we entertain regarding Sir Thomas Munro, we direct that this dispatch be published in the Government Gazette.

I cannot better close this chapter than by the insertion of the following official correspondence between the Governments of Bengal and Fort St. George. Many other testimonials to the merits of Sir Thomas Munro's services are contained in the private letters of Lord Amherst; but enough have been already adduced to prove, that by no individual in public or private life was his character more justly estimated.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR THOMAS MUNRO, K.C.B.
GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR,

ON the happy termination of the long and arduous contest in which we have been engaged with the Government of Ava, and the ratification of a definite treaty of

peace with that state, we should fail to discharge a duty not less indispensable than gratifying in the performance, if we delayed to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to offer our congratulations on this important occasion, and to express our heartfelt obligations for the ever-active and cordial co-operation of your Government in the conduct of the war.

2. In the general orders which we have issued under this date, as contained in the accompanying copy of the Government Gazette Extraordinary, we have endeavoured to do justice to the feelings of admiration with which we have regarded the services of the coast army serving in Ava; and we have now to convey to you the grateful sense we shall ever retain of the alacrity with which you placed the military resources of Fort St. George at our disposal, and not only met, but, in many instances, anticipated our requisitions for aid.

3. We sensibly feel, and are happy to avow, that to the extraordinary exertions of your Government we are mainly indebted for the prosecution of the Burmese war, to the successful issue which, under Providence, has now crowned our arms, and which, we trust, will be productive of important benefit to the British interests, by securing us from farther insult and aggression from a haughty neighbour, who had long been bent on trying his strength with the British power. We have, &c.

(Signed) AMHERST.
J. W. HARINTON.
W. B. BAYLEY.

Fort William,
11th April, 1826.

REPLY OF THE MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

To the Right Honourable William Pitt Lord Amherst, Governor-General in Council at Fort William.

MY LORD,

1. We have derived a high degree of gratification from the receipt of the letter from your Lordship in Council, under date the 11th instant; and, in again tendering our cordial congratulations on the successful and honourable termination of the war in Ava, we beg leave to express our acknowledgments for the share which your Lordship in Council is pleased to ascribe to the exertions of this Government in accomplishing that result. The discharge of our duty in co-operating with the Supreme Government to the entire extent of the means at our command, has been rendered grateful to our feelings, and must have proved more efficacious in consequence of the uniform confidence with which your Lordship in Council has honoured us, by a liberal communication of the views of the Supreme Government, and an ample discretion as to our means of promoting them. Flattered and gratified by this confidence throughout the whole course of hostilities, we have sincere satisfaction in acknowledging how much it has strengthened our hands and increased our resources, as well as stimulated our zeal in calling forth all the energies of this Government.

2. The most remarkable circumstance in the conduct of the late war, as far as the army of Fort St. George is concerned, has been the spirit and cheerfulness with which the Native troops, without a single exception, and to an extent far beyond all precedent, have, disregarding their habits, attachments, and prejudices, embarked on board

ships and proceeded to a foreign country, and submitted, without repining, to hardships and privations, at the simple call of professional duty. It has afforded us extreme pleasure to perceive, that this additional claim to the approbation and favour of Government, established by the Madras sepoys, has been so cordially recognised and so honourably promulgated by your Lordship in Council; and we are convinced that the justice done to the Native troops on this occasion, will tend powerfully to confirm them in their devoted attachment to the service.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,
(Signed) T. MUNRO.
G. T. WALKER.
H. S. GRÆME.

Fort St. George,
25th April, 1826.

On the 24th of November, 1826, shortly after the conclusion of the Burmese war, the Court of Directors passed the following resolution, with reference to the part taken in it by Sir Thomas Munro, which was confirmed by the Court of Proprietors on the 13th and 19th December following:—

Resolved unanimously—That the thanks of this Court be given to Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. K.C.B. for the alacrity, zeal, perseverance, and forecast which he so signally manifested throughout the whole course of the late war, in contributing all the available resources of the Madras Government towards bringing it to a successful termination.

A vote of thanks was also passed, on the same occasion in favour of Lord Amherst and Sir Archibald Campbell; but neither the vote to that nobleman nor to Sir Thomas Munro were echoed in Parliament, though my Lord Goderich, in the House of Lords, declared "that it was impossible for any one to form an adequate idea of the efforts made by Sir Thomas Munro, at the head of the Madras Government."

CHAPTER IV.

Private Proceedings.—Illness of his Son.—Departure of Lady Munro for England.—Letters to Lady Munro.

WHILST these great transactions were passing, a variety of events befel, calculated, some of them to gratify, others not a little to harass, the private feelings of Sir Thomas Munro. Among the gratifying occurrences may be enumerated his elevation to the dignity of a Baronet of Great Britain, an honour which, like all the rest, came upon him unsolicited, but which was conferred as a mark of His Majesty's gracious consideration of his distinguished exertions in the conduct of the Burmese war. This event took place in June 1825, and was, as may be supposed, valued as it deserved; but it may be questioned whether, to a man of Sir Thomas's high and honourable sentiments, another project, then in contemplation, caused not at least equally pleasurable sensations. It is now well known, and need not therefore be

denied, that when the Burmese war began to assume a serious appearance, great dissatisfaction was experienced and expressed at home, touching the conduct of the Governor-General. By some, his Lordship was accused of entertaining ambitious designs, to the accomplishment of which the interests of the Company were about to be sacrificed; whilst others laid to his charge a total absence of such qualities as are essential in the head of every government. However groundless these accusations might be, affairs certainly came at one period to an extremity, and serious thoughts were said to be entertained of recalling him from his Government.

In this emergency, it was suggested that no fitter person could be nominated to succeed to the Supreme Government than Sir Thomas Munro. How far arrangements were actually entered into with that view, I am not enabled to state; but that there was a considerable disposition to bring the matter about is rendered indisputable from the tone of the following letters. They were addressed to a friend in the India House, from whom Sir Thomas had received intimation of the designs then in agitation; and they are given, not less on account of the elucidation of the writer's opinions, but because they contain a full and manly vindication of Lord Amherst's public character.

FROM SIR THOMAS MUNRO TO ——.

18th July, 1825.

As to my going to the City of Palaces, it is now too late; but had I gone, I should have had no fear of envy and jealousy; nobody could have thwarted me; I should have taken care of that. I think, however, that the present Governor-General is as good as any other that you are likely to send, and that great injustice is done to him in the idle clamour which has been raised against him. His situation was a very arduous one. He was new to India; the Burmans were an enemy entirely unknown to us; we were ignorant of their military force—of their mode of warfare—of their resources, and of the face of their country.—Lord Amherst, in his first ideas of the plan of operations, was probably guided by Captain Canning, and the men who were best acquainted with Ava. When he found that the project of sailing at once up the Irawaddy to Prome or Umarapoora could not be effected, and that other measures must be adopted, he no doubt, in his new plans of military operations, consulted the best military authorities in Bengal, and followed their opinions. I do not see that any other Governor-General, in similar circumstances, could have done more; and ever since he has been fairly embarked in the war, he has taken the best means of bringing it to a successful close, by never relaxing in his exertions to keep the forces in Ava efficient. Some of the military arrangements are not exactly what I approve of;—but what of that? No two men ever agree on such points. There is, I think, one error by which the Bengal plans are all too much influenced; namely, a most exaggerated estimate both of the numbers and prowess of the Burmans, and indeed of all other enemies. This has led to the discouragement of enterprise, to slow and cumbersome operations, to much expense and loss of time, by employing several corps where one would have been

enough; and lastly, to what appears to me a great and useless increase of the Bengal army.

FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME.

May 17th, 1826.

THE question regarding the Bengal Government will have been settled one way or other by this time, so that it is hardly worth while to say any thing about it now. I think that the policy of a sudden recall, even when things do not go on as you wish, is very questionable, because it tends to shake the authority and the respect which Government ought to maintain. Lord Amherst has now taken Bhurtpore, and dictated peace to the King of Ava; and has conducted these measures just as well, if not better than most of the Governors-General you could have sent out. The Court are too unreasonable when they expect to find every day for the Supreme Government such men as appear only once or twice in an age. You cannot have a Lord Cornwallis, or Wellesley, or Hastings every day, and must take such men as are to be found.

With respect to the plan of sending me to Bengal, I should have been delighted with it ten or fifteen years ago, or even when Lord Hastings resigned; but it is now too late. You forget that it is above forty-six years since I arrived in India, and that I have always been in laborious situations. I ought, according to all ordinary rules, to have been dead seven years ago; and nothing but a very strong constitution and great temperance have saved me. My constitution may be expected to break every day; for I fancy that I already see some symptoms. My hand shakes in writing, especially in a warm land-wind day like the present, which it did not do till lately; and I lost from a cold last year more than one-half of my bad hearing. I am like an overworked horse, and require a little rest. Ever since I came to this Government, almost every paper of any importance has been written by myself; and during

the whole course of the Burman war, though little of my writing appears, I have been incessantly engaged in discussions, and inquiries, and correspondence, all connected with the objects of the war, though, from not being official, they cannot appear on record. Indeed, as we had not the direction of the war, we had no right to give opinions regarding it; and it was only by laying hold of the opportunities furnished for remark, by sending away so great a part of our army, that I was enabled now and then to say something about the war.

Were I to go to Bengal, I could hardly hold out two years, certainly not more; and this period is too short to do any good. Among new people, and new modes of conducting business of every kind, it would require the whole time merely to look about and consider what inquiries I should enter upon, to make myself acquainted with the real state of affairs. When this was done, I should next consider what parts of the system might be improved by change, and what ought to be left untouched. All this could not be done in less than four or five years; and my remaining so long is entirely out of the question. I never wish to remain in office when I feel that I cannot do justice to it; and I know that I could once have done as much in three or four days, as I can now do in a week.

At the very moment when the tide of his public life ran thus smoothly, the subject of this memoir was afflicted by domestic cares of no ordinary weight and bitterness. Of Lady Munro's accident, which occurred early in 1822, some notice has already been taken; and it has been stated, that the recovery of the invalid, though ultimately complete, was extremely tedious. The consequence was, that Sir Thomas was deprived of her society during a considerable portion of the year,

the medical attendants requiring her to reside at Bangalore, whilst his official duties rendered it impracticable for the Governor to join her there, except at intervals.

The illness of Lady Munro naturally increased Sir Thomas's anxiety to quit India as soon as possible; and that desire obtained additional strength when, in September 1823, a second son was born to him. But the Burmese war, and the failure of the crops, stood in the way, and, as has been shown, private happiness was freely sacrificed to a sense of political duty. Sir Thomas, accordingly, remained at his arduous post, and for the space of nearly three years bore, with firmness and magnanimity, whatever of pain usually accompanies "hope deferred."

Things were in this state, and the war, though protracted beyond all expectation, appeared as far from its termination as ever, when the child was seized with a dangerous distemper, and reduced to the point of death. After every other expedient had been tried in vain, an immediate removal to Europe was recommended, and the anxious parents lost not a moment in carrying it into execution. But the bitterest pang of all remained to be endured. Neither Sir Thomas nor Lady Munro could admit the idea of entrusting a child so circumstanced to the care of entire strangers; and painful as the prospect was, they saw that a separation was inevitable. They yielded to their fate; and in the month of March

1826, Lady Munro with her infant embarked for England. They never met again.

The following beautiful letters serve to show how deeply this rending asunder of the tenderest ties of nature was felt by Sir Thomas Munro. I give them, not without some apprehension lest the privacy of domestic life should seem to be violated; but it appears to me that it is by such exhibitions only that the real characters of public men are to be ascertained; and I am sure that society is never more benefited than when proofs are brought before it, that a man may be great both in camps and cabinets, yet retain in perfect freshness all the amiable qualities of the heart. It is only necessary to premise, that the names Kamen and Toto were assumed by Sir Thomas's sons: the elder, called after his father, Thomas, bore the latter appellation,—the younger, Campbell, gave to himself the former.

TO LADY MUNRO.

Guindy, 2nd April, 1826.

We came here last night, for the first time since you went away; Col. Carfræ and I drove out together. We alighted at the old place, near the well. It was nearly dark, and we passed through the garden without finding you. We had nobody in the evening but Captain Watson, which I was glad of. He has got the floors covered with new mats, which smell like hay; but they are of no use when those for whom they were intended are gone. The cause which occasioned the desertion of this house gives every thing about it a melancholy appearance.

I dislike to enter Kamen's room. I never pass it without thinking of that sad night when I saw him lying in Rosa's lap, with leeches on his head, the tears streaming down his face, crying with fear and pain, and his life uncertain. His image, in that situation, is always present to me whenever I think of this house. I walked out this morning at daylight. I followed Captain Watson's new road, which is now made hard with gravel, as far as the place where it divides; but on reaching this point, instead of turning to the left, as we used to do, I continued along the main branch to the little tank, and there halted a few minutes to admire the view of the distant hills. I then turned towards the garden, where I always found you, and Kamen trotting before you, except when he stayed behind to examine some ant-hole. How delightful it was to see him walking, or running, or stopping, to endeavour to explain something with his hands to help his language. How easy, and artless, and beautiful, are all the motions of a child. Every thing that he does is graceful. All his little ways are endearing, and they are the arms which Nature has given him for his protection, because they make every body feel an attachment for him.—I have lost his society just at the time when it was most interesting. It was his tottering walk, his helplessness, and unconsciousness, that I liked. By the time I see him again he will have lost all those qualities,—he will know how to behave himself,—he will have acquired some knowledge of the world, and will not be half so engaging as he now is. I almost wish that he would never change.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 10th April, 1826.

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At nine to-day I had Sir Ralph Palmer, and half an hour after a missionary from Ceylon. The cause of Sir

Ralph's visit was a very melancholy one, which I am sure you will be greatly distressed to hear. It was to consult about a monument to the memory of our late excellent Bishop, who died at Trichinopoly on the 3rd of this month. He had been early in the morning at a Native congregation; he returned home about seven, and immediately went into a cold bath, about seven feet deep, at Mr. Bird's house, into which he had gone the two preceding mornings. His servant, after waiting half an hour, became alarmed at his not coming out, opened the door, and saw him lying at the bottom. Medical aid came immediately, but too late, as every means tried to restore animation failed. The medical opinion is, that on entering the bath he was seized with a fit, fell forward, and was suffocated. I never knew the death of any man produce such an universal feeling of regret. There was something so mild, so amiable, and so intelligent about him, that it was impossible not to love him.

The following extracts are given to show his anxiety to return to England.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 29th April, 1826.

I TOLD you in my last that I had sent home my resignation by the Neptune, and four copies of it by different ships earlier in this month. I hope that some one of them may reach England soon enough to enable my successor to arrive in February or March; but I fear it will be September. If I could get away in March, and make a good passage, our separation would not be more than about sixteen months; but if I am detained till September, it will be nearly two years. The shortest of these periods is a great deal too long. I have not seen

Tom since he was five months old. I can never see him as a child, and I part with Kamen just at the time he is most interesting.

Madras, 16th May, 1826.

ON this day last year we were all together at Chittoor, on our way to Bangalore, looking forward to a pleasant journey through Mysore. We little suspected that you and Kamen would now be going round the Cape, and that I should be here. Had it not been for his unfortunate illness, we might have been all now in Mysore; we might have returned in October by Ryacottah, after spending some days again on the banks of the Kistnagerry river, and gone home in the same ship next year. This is the plan on which I had set my heart; but we have been sadly disappointed. After making the voyage between India and Europe together three times, it is very hard upon you to have been obliged to go home alone. The separation is distressing, but there is no help for it; it is one of the evils attending service in India. I hope I shall not be here another hot season; for, as Lord Amherst has taken Bhurtpoor, and humbled Golden Foot, I do not see what use either you or I can be of any longer in this country. If I am lucky, I may sail sooner than you think, and see you in June or July next year. I wish to make a long tour this year, if nothing extraordinary occurs to detain me here. I want to examine the state of affairs in the Southern Provinces. * * *

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th June, 1826.

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I HAVE been reading and writing very hard all day, which always for the last year makes my hand shake so

much, that I can hardly write. This is a sign that I have been long enough in a warm climate. The weather at this season has been cooler than ever I knew it at Madras. It has been continually overcast all last week, which induced me to come out here yesterday evening, after the usual Saturday's dinner. I took a walk in the morning of an hour and a half, and ended with the garden, where every thing is growing in great luxuriance. After getting out of the carriage yesterday evening, I looked at the new well, and found it had water enough to hold out till it got a fresh supply from the rains; but I did not find you or Kamen there, or in the drawing-room. I always miss you both here more than at Madras, because we had fewer visiters, and I was more accustomed to see you and him quietly. Your rooms look very desolate; they are empty all day, and in the evening have one solitary lamp. I now go along the passage without seeing a human being, and often think of him running out to pull my coat. I cannot tell you how much I long to see him playing again. I believe that I shall follow your father's example when I go home, in playing with children. When you reach Craigie, give me a full account of Tom, and of all the points in which he is like or unlike his brother. I have no letter from you since the 24th of March; and I begin to fear that I shall not hear from you until your arrival in England.

The troops are returning from Ava. Major Kelso arrived a few days ago in command of the Kimendyne regiment. There is no chance of hostilities, as the Burmese are completely tired of war. I am glad of it, as I can have no pretence for staying longer in the country; and if the weather were not too hot for calling names, I could call them "*barbarous*, and *ferocious*, and *arrogant*," for not letting me go home with you I am quite at a loss to know what I am to do when I go home. Where are we

to live? in town or country? or both? Are we to travel and see the world and sights, or to jaunt about in our own country, or to stay fixed in one place? You must consider of all this, and be ready with a plan when we meet. Love to all at Craigie.

TO THE SAME.

Madras, 29th June, 1826.

As I understand that a ship for England has left Calcutta, and is to touch here, I shall begin a letter to you; because by this means I shall be ready at any time to send you one, whether it contains four lines or four pages. The China-men, and other ships lately arrived, have brought several letters for you from your friends. I shall send them all back to you, because you will, I think, be sorry to lose some of them, and will like to read them all, if it were only for the sake of comparing the feelings with which you read them at home and would have read them in India. I read them with pleasure; but would much rather have sat down in Mr. Elliott's chair and listened to you reading them, after returning from our evening ride or walk. I shall keep a letter from Tom to you, as it is on the same sheet with one from him to me, both in his own hand-writing. He is the only one of the family whom I now see. I go into the room where his picture is every day for two minutes, on my way to the dining-room, or rather varandah. I think him more like Kamen than I used to do; and sometimes almost fancy that he looks happier since you went away. I am not sure, however, that there is any change. It is likely enough that, even when you were here, he looked as well pleased as now, but that I did not observe it.

7th July.—I went to Guindy on Saturday evening, and shall probably not go there again before November, as I

must set out on the 21st on a long journey to the Southern Provinces. I took as usual a long walk on Sunday morning: there had been so much rain, that the garden looked more fresh and beautiful than I ever saw it; but I found nobody there, except a boy guarding the mangoes and figs from the squirrels—not even the old French gardener. It was a great change from the time when I was always sure of finding you and Kamen there. It is melancholy to think that you are never again to be in a place in which you took so much pleasure. This idea comes across me still more strongly when I enter the house and pass from my own room to the drawing-room along the passage, now so silent and deserted, and formerly so noisy with your son and you, and his followers. It always makes me sad when I visit the place; but I shall be *wae* when I leave it, like you, for the last time. In my visits there I have never had any strangers. I generally go about once a fortnight.

15th July.—I am now writing in my own room at Guindy. I did not expect to have come here again until after my return from our tour; but Captain Watson had arranged that the travelling baggage should come here, and start from hence to-morrow for Madranticum. I leave Madras on Friday (21st), after council, and go in the chaise to Polaveram, and then go into my palankin.

Our journey will be a long one, by Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madara, to Palamcottah, from thence to Dindigul and Coimbitore to the Nilgheri hills; and when we get there we shall be guided by the time of the year in returning by Mysore or Salem and the Baramahl. We shall have very hot weather a great part of our march, but there is no help for it. We shall have the pleasure of travelling, and probably some cool days to reward us.

* * * * * *

I was in the garden this morning,—every thing is growing in great luxuriance, but particularly the Hinah and

Baboal hedges. The new well is half full. I looked, on my way home, at what you call geraniums, but which seem to me to be more like wild potatoes. I stood for a minute admiring them, merely from the habit of doing so with you; for, had I followed my own taste, I should as soon have thought of admiring a brick-kiln as of gazing at a hundred red pots filled with weeds. There is something very melancholy in this house without you and your son. It has the air of some enchanted deserted mansion in romance. I often think of Kamen marching about the hall equipped for a walk, but resisting the ceremony of putting on his hat. * * *

TO THE SAME.

Cotallum, 5th September, 1826.

I BELIEVE I wrote you from Tanjore and Trichinopoly. I have since been at Madara, the most southern point of our travels about ten years ago. From Madara we came by the western road to this place—the distance is about a hundred miles. The road runs along the foot of the lofty chain of mountains which separate Tinavelly from Dindigal and Travancore: they are high and naked, and full of ragged peaks, and are altogether the most dreary hills I have seen in India. For the last eighty miles after leaving Madara there was not a blade of grass, —no rain had fallen since April,—the fields were all ploughed up,—rice sown and flying about in dust, which you know always makes heat more oppressive. I was in hopes that, on coming here, we should again have green fields; but the ground here is as parched as any where else. Though the hills are constantly covered with clouds, and though we see light showers falling upon them every day, we get none. The mist sits on the hills, and we have generally a clear sky with the thermometer in the day from

84° to 89°. This is cool; but it is much above the temperature of this place in more favourable years, though it is far below what we must expect to experience every day on our march to Coimbitore. We came here on the 1st, and set out on our return to-morrow. I am charmed with this place; the scenery is very grand,—the hills are high, and the country below is full of avenues and clumps of trees of an immense size, such as you may remember to have seen about Talmulla. The waterfall, though a small stream, has a fine effect, tumbling from a naked rock, with the mountain behind it, rising two and three thousand feet, and its summit at this time of the year always wrapt in clouds.

Tokumputti, 6th September, 1826.

I WAS interrupted yesterday by being called away to receive a poligar. Besides the principal waterfall, there are two or three others not visible from below,—one about half a mile, and the other a mile and a half above the first. The road is steep, rugged, and romantic; but, notwithstanding the romantic, I was obliged to be satisfied with going as far as the second fall, for I had business waiting at my tent, and could not afford to be idle for a day. If I could I should have been delighted to have passed the whole day wandering about the hills, resting or moving on whenever I liked. Nothing soothes me so much as being alone among mountain-scenery;—it is like resting in another world. There are many fine old choultries at Cootallum, and at Tenkassi; about two miles from it there is a very ancient pagoda and choultry, ornamented with figures, of which the sculpture is far superior to any thing of the kind at Madara.

Colonel Newal came over from Quilore on hearing of my approach, and stayed three days with us at Cootallum, where we left him this morning. He has been so ill that the doctors despaired of him; but his six months' visit to

the Nilgheries has almost restored him: he is thin and weak, but in good spirits, and desires to be remembered to you. If he does not recover his strength, he means to go home in January. He will be a great loss to the service, both as a political and a military officer.

We marched sixteen miles this morning, on our way to Dindigal. We do not return to Madara, but leave it about fifteen miles to the eastward, as we mean to take the road which runs near the foot of the great range of hills.

You have not, I hope, forgotten Dr. Jones, whom you saw at Dindigal. I wish you were there now; but you are better at home with your sons, among your friends.

TO THE SAME.

Dindigal, 16th September, 1826.

NOTHING has given me so much pleasure as your letter and journal from St. Helena. I can think of nothing else since I got them; they have removed all my apprehensions about you and Campbell. From the state in which he left this, I was almost afraid to hear of him from St. Helena, and was glad that Captain Watson's note mentioned that you and he were well before I began to read my letter. Now that he has got so near home, and he would only be a few weeks longer in a tropical climate, I am in great hopes that he will have no return of his complaint. Poor child! It is a very hard thing to have such a complaint impending over him, to be obliged to keep him on low diet, and to be afraid to see him looking strong and healthy. I hope, however, that after he has been a short time in Scotland, and had the benefit of its cool climate, he may, without danger, be treated as other children. I like to hear of all his little sayings and doings on board ship,—of his making acquaintance with the passengers and the sailors, and of his attachment to his old

friends, Rosa, and Abdul Cawder; and I hope you will continue your narrative of all these interesting things in your voyage from St. Helena to England. I never doubted that you would feel for Bonaparte in his wonderful reverse of fortune. I should have been surprised if you had not; for no person, I think, of proper feeling, can approach the black solitary rock of St. Helena, without being moved at his fate.

24th September.—We arrived at the bottom of the Nilgheri hills this morning. Our tents, or rather Sullivan's, are pitched about a mile from the hills; and the tent in which I am now writing is one of the two sitting tents which sheltered you and me, after many a hot march, when you were first in India. The scenery here is very grand; but you can form a much better idea of it than I can give you, by recollecting what you saw at Gujelhatty. We begin to ascend to-morrow, under the guidance of Sullivan, who met us at Darraporam. It will take about five hours to reach Kotaghery, where we are to be accommodated by Colonel Cubbon and Captain Fyfe. We remain with them the following day. On the 27th we proceed to Cotakamund, where Sullivan lives, and stay with him till the morning of the 30th, when, having seen all the waters of these upper regions, rising at one place as high as eight thousand nine hundred feet above the sea, we shall, with the help of horses and palankins, make a run of forty miles to Goondlapet in Mysore, where we shall find our tents, which went off yesterday by Gujelhatty. On the 1st of October we shall march about twenty-four miles to Sham Raj-pet, near Ardenhilli, where the tents we left this morning will be waiting for us. You know the rest of the road by Collegal and the Happy Valley, and Sattigal, and the Falls of the Caveri to Bangalore, which I shall be delighted to see again, and which I shall leave with a heavy heart.

29th September, Whotakamund.—Our party reached Captain Fyfe's house, at Kotaghery, on the 25th, after a very tiresome ascent and descent of five hours. The house is that which was occupied by Colonel Newal, and which you, I believe, once thought of taking. We found Mrs. F. and her children much improved in their looks and health. We felt the cold much more than I expected. We took a walk of three hours after breakfast; but several of the party, as well as myself, were more sun-burnt than ever we had before been in India. We have walked a great deal, both in the forenoon and in the evening, ever since we came up to the hills. The country round Kotaghery is about six thousand feet above the sea: it differs from every thing you have seen. It has no level ground, but is composed of an assemblage of hills green to the summit, with narrow winding valleys between. The sides of the hills are at present covered with a purple flower, of the size of your Bangalore geraniums, which makes them look as if they were covered with heath. A few hamlets, inhabited by the Bargars, an agricultural race, are scattered on the face of the hills; for they never live either at the bottom or on the summit. The cultivated fields, running up the face of some of the hills to the very top, have a beautiful effect; but the cultivation is thinly spread, and probably does not cover one-tenth of the ground.

We set out for this place on the 27th at daylight. The distance is about fifteen miles. The ride was, beyond all comparison, the most romantic I ever made. We were never on a level surface, but constantly ascending or descending, winding round hills, and stopping every now and then for a few minutes to rest our horses, who thought it hard work, and to admire the ever-varying scene. Before reaching Sullivan's house, we came upon the highest ridge of the Nilgheri, rising in general above eight thousand feet, and many of the peaks from eight thousand three

hundred to eight thousand eight hundred feet, which is the elevation of Dodubet, the highest of them all. We dismounted on the top of the ridge, and ascended a hill about three hundred feet above it, from whence we had a view so grand and magnificent, that I shall always regret your not having seen it. We saw over all Coimbitore, a great part of Mysore and Wynand, and the hills of Malabar. But the district of Whotakamund, every spot of which lay below us like a map, surprised me most: it at once reminded me of Bullim. It is Bullim, but Bullim on a grand scale. The face of the country is covered with the finest verdure, and is undulated in every form. It is composed of numberless green knolls of every shape and size, from an artificial mound to a hill or mountain. They are as smooth as the lawns in an English park, and there is hardly one of them which has not, on one side or other, a mass of dark wood, terminating suddenly as if it had been planted, just in the same way as you must remember to have seen in Bullim. In comparing the two countries, I should say that this was much the grandest, but that Bullim was perhaps the more beautiful; for it is better wooded, and has fine cultivated fields, of which Whotakamund is destitute, as it is inhabited solely by the Todars, a pastoral tribe. But when I look at the fine rich verdure with which this country is every where covered, and at the beautiful form of its hills, I begin to think that even in beauty it is superior to Bullim. You must not suppose, that what are called ridges and peaks are rocks. There is hardly a stone to be seen upon them. They are round and smooth, and clothed with firm grass. You may ride over every one of them, even Dodubet himself: they differ from artificial mounds only in their magnitude. There was formerly no water in the scenery here, except some rivulets, until Sullivan made a little loch, about two miles long and a quarter of a mile broad, by damming up a

rivulet with an immense mound: it looks like a river, and winds very beautifully among the smooth green hills. After riding five or six miles yesterday afternoon, over the hills and valleys, we embarked in a little boat at the head of the lake, and rowed to the lower end, about a mile and a half from the house. It was beginning to get dark, and very cold, and by the time we got home we were very wet with dew. Nothing surprises me more on these hills than the effect of the cold. It is now two o'clock, the thermometer 62. I am writing in a great coat, and my fingers can hardly hold the pen. I am almost afraid to go to bed on account of the cold. The first night I came up the hills I did not sleep at all. The two last nights I have slept tolerably well, but not comfortably. I have over me, in place of a single sheet, or no sheet at all, as in the low country, a sheet and English blanket, and two quilts, the weight of which oppresses me without making me warm. I am therefore glad that this is to be the last night. Were we to remain a week longer, this cold feel would go off. Our party are no doubt more susceptible to it, from being relaxed by a journey of two months in tents, with the thermometer generally from 95 to 101.—The brightness of the sun here is very remarkable. You have, I think, noticed the brightness of both the sun and the moon at Madras, but you can have no idea how much greater it is here. In the morning, when the sun rises without a cloud, the sky is sparkling with light; the hills appear much nearer than they are; the smallest objects upon them are visible, and there is a dazzling lustre poured upon every thing, as if two suns were shining instead of one. I have not seen Mrs. Sullivan, because she is too near her confinement; but I have seen his two children. They are both pretty, particularly the boy, and have as fine complexions as any children in England. I was made very happy last night, by the arrival of your letter of the 25th of May, sent to

Penang by the Camden. I had previously got your long letter of the same date; but still it was very satisfactory to get another. It is rather singular that a letter written by you at St. Helena should find me at Whotakamund. I received at the same time a letter, of the 5th of June, from General Walker, telling me of you and Campbell, and expressing regret at your leaving Plantation House so soon. I must now stop, for I have other letters to write before dinner. I have written you so much lately, that this may probably be my last letter for some time. I hope you are, by this time, safe with your two sons.

TO THE SAME.

Bangalore, 11th October, 1826.

ALTHOUGH I have written to you so often lately, I cannot leave Bangalore for the last time without sending you a few lines. I shall not wait till to-morrow, because, as it is the last day of our stay here, I shall probably have little time for writing, and the letter might be too late for the ship. Some good fortune seems to attend your letters, and I hope ever will; for when I returned from my walk in the garden this morning, and was thinking that I should receive no letters, as it was Sunday's post from Madras, I was delighted to find on my table a note from Mr. Dalzell, inclosing your letter of the 4th of June, bringing me accounts that you and Campbell were well, and that your voyage had hitherto been pleasant and favourable. But I am not so sanguine as either you or the Captain; and I shall think you fortunate if you reach England by the 15th or 20th of July. When I go home I shall not forget to thank General and Mrs. Walker for their attention and kindness to you; and I hope the acquaintance you have made with them will be continued in our own country. Your account of the present state of Buonaparte's house at

Longwood, and of the manner in which it is occupied, and of your visit to his solitary tomb, has interested me very much, and affected me more than any ordinary tale of woe could have done. I am surprised that there should be any person so thoughtless, or so unfeeling, as to trample on his tomb; and I trust that the bar in the iron railing will be replaced to protect his grave from such vulgar profanation.

After leaving the Nilgheries, we visited the Falls of the Caveri; they are very grand, and rather exceeded than fell short of my expectations. The fall on the southern branch of the river is about a mile below that on the northern, which we visited together. It is something in the form of a horse-shoe, and consists of seven streams falling from the same level, and divided only from each other by fragments of the rock. There is a descent to the bed of the river by steps; and when you stand there, nearly surrounded by cataracts covering you with small rain, and look at the great breadth of the whole fall, and the woody hills rising behind it, the scene appears very wild and magnificent. We went from this fall to the northern one, which, as the river was more than half-full, appeared to much more advantage than when we visited it ten years ago. Close to the Fakeers' retreat at this fall, our breakfast-tent was pitched. After breakfast we returned to Sattigall, and crossed the Caveri there to our encampment. Our march was very fatiguing; it amounted altogether to about thirty miles. We were obliged to make it so long, lest the Caveri should rise and become too rapid for our basket-boats. In passing Colligal, I looked towards the happy Valley, where the villagers cropped the spreading branches from so many fine trees, lest you should run your head against them. We came to Bangalore by the Rankanhilli road; we encamped about five miles from the cantonment,

on the 9th, and came in in the evening.. I found Colonel Scot, as usual, looking for us; but neither you nor Campbell standing on the steps to receive us.

We leave this on the 13th: we go to Oscottah, and by regular stages by Pednaig Darsum. I am sorry we are too late to take the Baramahl road. There has been more rain here than for many years, which has made the country green and beautiful. It still rains heavy every night, which makes the garden a little wet in the morning, but makes every thing in it grow rapidly. Though I have no great enjoyment in so short a visit, I count every hour which brings me nearer the time when I must take a final leave of this place, and grieve that they pass so fast.

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TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 17th January, 1827.

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THE arrival of your letters has made me quite unsettled for some days, but they have been a wonderful relief to me, as I began (from the length of the voyage) to fear at times that you had been obliged to go into some place for water, or that some accident had happened to the ship. But all these alarms are now over; and I hope that, by the end of the year, we shall meet again, and never again have the sea between us. I could almost stay here for the pleasure of getting your letters, and reading how you were employed on certain days, and what Campbell was doing and saying. Nothing can be so interesting as all his little ways, and to see him reconciling himself to the ship, and learning new things every day. But it is a strange and melancholy feeling to see India, the land in which he was born, and all past events, gradually fading from his me-

mory. It is wonderful to see how they are sometimes brought back to his memory by slight incidents; as when, upon your telling him that the day was Friday, he said, "Council-day." I dare say he thought that the Council-house was not far off, and that I might have come to the ship in the evening, as at Guindy.

TO THE SAME.

February, 1827.

It is above two years now since I had the first attack of increased deafness. During the first year, it was so much better occasionally, that I was in great hopes it would have left me; but for the whole of last year it has been so uniformly the same, that it will probably never be better. I hear nothing that is said in company: it is with difficulty that I can hear the person who sits next to me, and then only by holding up my hand to my ear. It is fatiguing to people to raise their voices high enough to talk to me, and still more to me to listen to them; but still this does not affect my spirits in the least. I have plenty of business on my hands, and much of it consists in reading papers, writing notes, and giving orders, which do not require much hearing. When sitting in company, I amuse myself with thinking of any thing else. The loss of my conversation is not felt, and my silence is perhaps attributed to dignified gravity, or profound thought on state affairs, when the subject of my meditations is very likely Campbell riding on a stick, or one of your lectures on my temperance, which you so often prophesied would ruin my health. It is a great pleasure to think I shall see you before this year is at an end: it will be a year, next month, since you left this.

TO THE SAME.

Guindy, 11th April, 1827.

It is difficult to part with a country where we have lived long, and become attached to the people, without a heavy heart at thinking that we shall never again see it, or any of its inhabitants. I wish however that the time for my departure was come, for, as I am to go, it is tiresome to be waiting for the day.

I went to Madras on Monday, the 9th. You will wonder what took me there on that day:—it was to see the Enterprize steam-vessel manœuvre for the gratification of the public. She got up her anchor, and sailed past the Government-house a little after four, while we were at dinner. At five I went up to the top of the Council-house on the Fort, and, after staying a few minutes, we determined to join the crowd on the beach. The evening was as favourable as it could possibly be; a clear sky, a smooth sea, and a light breeze directly from the sea. The immense crowd of people reminded me of what you see at a race in England, but only that there was no drinking and quarrelling. I never saw half so great a number on any occasion. The beach was crowded from the saluting battery to the Custom-house, with thousands of natives, in all their various fanciful costumes. The multitude of carriages was far beyond what I thought the whole Carnatic could have furnished. Every thing that could be mounted on wheels, from a hencoop or a dog-house to a barouche, was in requisition. In some of the hencoops, which would not have held two European ladies, seven or eight native women and children were crammed, all grinning with delight. Among the multitude there were, I believe, people from almost every province in India. I saw a great number of respectable-looking Indian women in carriages, who, I

imagine, never appeared among Europeans before, and many of whom, I am sure, you would have thought beautiful, and certainly graceful, beyond any thing in Europe. I scarcely looked at the steam-vessel: all that it can do may be seen in five minutes; but I wish that I could have made a panorama of the living scene to send to you. We have still no southernly wind, but the weather is getting very warm.

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CHAPTER V.

Tour to the Ceded Districts.—Illness, Death, and Character.

REPEATED mention has been made, in the preceding chapters, of the anxiety experienced by Sir Thomas Munro to return to England; and the letters just given contain ample testimony that this desire gained, as it was natural that it should, increased force every day. It was not, however, till the Burmese war came to a close, that he considered himself justified in again bringing the subject before the notice of the Court of Directors. But intelligence of that event no sooner reached him, than he hastened to take advantage of it. On the 28th of May, 1824, the very day when the signing of the definitive treaty was communicated to the Madras Government, he despatched not fewer than six copies of a letter, in which his extreme impatience to resign office was stated, and an urgent request made that a succcessor might be sent out as early in the following year as circumstances would permit.

Whence it came about, I pretend not to possess the means of explaining, but not one of these despatches was laid before the Court earlier than the 6th day of the following September; and though a successor had already been fixed upon, in the person of the Right Honourable S. Lushington, the 4th of April, 1827, arrived, ere he was formally appointed. To sum up all, Mr. Lushington remained in England till the month of July in the same year, thus rendering it barely possible for himself to reach Madras, and quite impossible for Sir Thomas Munro to quit it, previous to the commencement of the monsoons.

Far be it from me to insinuate any thing harsh as to the intentions of the authorities at home; but no man, I conceive, can be aware of these plain facts, without arriving at the conclusion, that less attention was paid than might have been paid to the wishes of a more than ordinarily meritorious public servant. Though he never complained, it is very evident, from the tone of his private correspondence, that Sir Thomas Munro felt this; and when the melancholy consequence is taken into consideration, those who admired him most and knew him best may be pardoned if they feel it also.

To give occupation to his own mind whilst in this state of anxious suspense, and in some degree perhaps with a view to avoid the excessive heat of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro unfortunately came to the resolution of paying a farewell visit to his

old native friends in the Ceded Districts. For this purpose, he determined to begin his journey early in the summer of 1827, at a period when the cholera was known to have made its appearrance in the country into which he proposed to penetrate. His friends, uneasy at the circumstance, would have retarded his journey by their entreaties; but as he had come repeatedly within the influence of that fatal disease before without suffering severely, in consequence he paid, on this occasion, no attention to their admonitions. Besides, he believed himself, in some degree, bound to ascertain how affairs were conducted in the interior, previous to his retirement for ever from the theatre of Indian politics; and neither now, nor at any other period, was a question of personal hazard permitted to interfere with what he had taught himself to regard as a point of public duty.

Having made up his mind to this proceeding, Sir Thomas Munro, attended by a small escort, and a single medical gentleman, Dr. Fleming, set out from Madras towards the end of May. The party reached Anantapoor on the 29th, at which date several cases of cholera had appeared among the country people; but it was not till the 4th of July, when they halted at Gooty, that the infection reached the camp. There, however, several sepoys and followers were attacked, and perished, under the circumstances of awful rapidity which usually attend this malady; and the malady itself, with the little progress made in the

manner of treating it, became, as might be expected, a subject of frequent conversation at the Governor's table. It is worthy of remark, that to this dire disease Sir Thomas Munro had, at different times, devoted much of his attention. It broke out in his camp during the Southern Mahratta war, and being still unsubdued when he resigned his command, he requested a young friend whom he left behind, to keep him regularly acquainted with its progress; and the result of all his observations was to impress him with a conviction, that it was decidedly contagious in its nature.

On the 5th of July the party reached Jolmagerry, in which, as well as in all the villages round, the cholera raged with extreme violence. Here Captain Watson and another gentleman attached to his suite, were attacked; but the former so far recovered, as to be able to present himself in the audience-tent ere the cavalcade quitted their ground on the 6th. Sir Thomas Munro expressed himself exceedingly delighted by the event, and began his march in excellent health, and in his usual good spirits.

Nothing occurred during the early part of the day to denote that he was in the slightest degree indisposed. On the contrary, he conversed freely with such of the villagers as met him by the way, touching the condition of their crops, and the state of their affairs; and his gratification was as sincere as the declaration of it was undis-

guised, when he found that the district generally was improving. In like manner, when the party halted at Putteecondah, after a march of about ten miles, Sir Thomas dressed, and sat down to the breakfast-table as usual. He made a hearty meal upon "Joogie," a dish of which he never partook when at all disordered; and then, walking abroad to the audience-tent, transacted business with the collector. He was in the act of expressing his approbation of that gentleman's conduct, which a careful examination of certain official statements had elicited, when he suddenly called for his hat and quitted the tent, without assigning any cause for the proceeding. Dr. Fleming was immediately summoned, who found him slightly indisposed; but as the symptoms were not alarming, no fears were entertained as to the result: he accordingly prescribed some medicine to his patient, and left him.

These events took place about nine o'clock in the morning, from which time till half-past ten, Sir Thomas remained alone. At that hour, Colonel Carfræ, who had been long in his family, entered the tent, and inquired into the state of his health. The reply was, that "he was not very unwell, but that he had no doubt of having caught the distemper." Sir Thomas then swallowed the medicine ordered, lay down upon his couch, and continued to converse on matters of public business for some time.

As the day advanced, the illustrious patient

became gradually worse, yet neither anxiety nor alarm was perceptible in his own countenance or proceedings. He spoke with perfect calmness and collectedness; assured his friends that he had been frequently as ill before; regretted the trouble he occasioned to those about him, and entreated them to quit the tent. "This is not fair," said he, "to keep you in an infected chamber;" and when told that no apprehensions were entertained, because there was no risk of infection, he repeated his usual observation,—"That point has not been determined; you had better be on the safe side, and leave me."

It was now one o'clock in the day, and his pulse being still full and good, sanguine hopes were encouraged that all might yet be well; but from that time he failed rapidly, and the fears of his friends and attendants became seriously excited. About three, however, he rallied, and feeling better, exclaimed, with a tone of peculiar sweetness, "that it was almost worth while to be ill, in order to be so kindly nursed." Between three and four no event of importance occurred, except that he repeatedly alluded to the trouble which he gave, and repeatedly urged the gentlemen around him to withdraw; but soon after four he himself remarked, that his voice was getting weaker, and his sense of hearing more acute. These were the last articulate sounds which he uttered; for the disease increased rapidly upon him: and though faint hopes were

more than once entertained, owing to the appearance of certain favourable symptoms, for the apprehensions that accompanied them there was too much ground. Sir Thomas Munro lingered till half-past nine in the evening, and then fell asleep.

To describe the effect produced by this melancholy event upon all classes of persons in India, is a task for which I confess myself wholly incompetent. Seldom has a man, holding an office of authority and control, contrived to secure, as Sir Thomas Munro did, the affections of those placed under him; and hence, when a rumour of his unlooked-for demise spread abroad, it were difficult to determine whether men lamented it most on public, or on private grounds. Among the many proofs, however, which have been laid before me, of the estimation in which this great man was held, there is one so touching in every particular, that I cannot refuse to insert it here.

Three days after Sir Thomas Munro's death, Captain Macleod, who commanded the escort, fell a sacrifice to cholera. At sunset on the evening previous to his decease, that gentleman sent for his native officers, and assuring them that he could not recover, enjoined them to take great care of the men; he then minutely inquired whether all their accounts were settled; and being answered in the affirmative, he raised his hand with difficulty to his forehead, and made them a *salam*. Shortly afterwards, he alluded

to their march on the following morning, and besought Colonel Carfræ, who was present, "that he would allow a small party to remain, and see him decently interred." He was informed that, in the event of any such melancholy service becoming necessary, his body would be sent back to Gooty. "No, no," exclaimed the dying man, "I am perfectly satisfied; it is too much honour for me to be buried near Sir Thomas Munro."

About an hour and a half after the Governor's death, his corpse was removed to Gooty, where it was interred with the expedition necessary in tropical climates, and with all the marks of respect which could be paid to it, in so remote a situation. "There was something exceedingly solemn and touching in the funeral," says a gentleman who was present on the occasion. "The situation of the churchyard; the melancholy sound of the minute-guns reverberating among the hills; the grand and frowning appearance of the fortress towering above the Gont, all tended to make the awful ceremony more impressive." And he adds, "Of all the dispensations of Providence I have ever witnessed or experienced, none have been equal to this,—not even the death of my own father."

On the arrival of the sad intelligence at Madras, the following Extraordinary Gazette was published:

GOVERNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Madras, Monday, July 9, 1827.

WITH sentiments of the deepest concern, the Government announces the decease of the Honourable Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Governor of the Presidency of Fort St. George. This event occurred at Putteecondah near Gooty, on the evening of Friday the 6th instant.

The eminent person whose life has been thus suddenly snatched away, was on the eve of returning to his native country, honoured with signal marks of esteem and approbation from his Sovereign, from the East India Company, which he had served for more than forty-seven years, from every authority with which he had occasion to co-operate, from the public at large, and from private friends. From the earliest period of his service, he was remarkable among other men. His sound and vigorous understanding, his transcendent talents, his indefatigable application, his varied stores of knowledge, his attainments as an Oriental scholar, his intimate acquaintance with the habits and feelings of the Native soldiers, and inhabitants generally; his patience, temper, facility of access, and kindness of manner, would have ensured him distinction in any line of employment. These qualities were admirably adapted to the duties which he had to perform in organizing the resources, and establishing the tranquillity of those provinces where his latest breath has been drawn, and where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father* of t People. In the higher stations, civil and military, wh he afterwards filled, the energies of his character failed to rise superior to the exigencies of public He had been for seven years at the head of the ment under which he first served as a Cadet.

wards became the ablest of its revenue officers, and acquired the highest distinction as a Military Commander. He had raised its character and fame to a higher pitch than it ever enjoyed before. His own ambition was more than fulfilled; and he appeared to be about to reap, in honourable retirement, the well-earned rewards of his services and his virtues, when these have received the last stamp of value from the hand of death.

Though sensible how feeble and imperfect must be any hasty tribute to Sir Thomas Munro's merits, yet the Government cannot allow the event which they deplore, to be announced to the public without some expression of their sentiments.

The flag of Fort St. George will be immediately hoisted half-staff high, and continue so till sunset.

Minute-guns, sixty-five in number, corresponding with the age of the deceased, will be fired from the ramparts of Fort St. George.

Similar marks of respect will be paid to the memory of Sir Thomas Munro, at all the principal military stations and posts dependent on this Presidency.

By order of Government.

D. HILL, Chief Secretary.

Fort St. George, 9th July, 1827.

The publication of the preceding order was followed by the calling together of a meeting of the inhabitants of Madras, which was held, according to advertisement, on the 21st of July. [illegible]f the general proceedings of that day it is un[illegible]cessary to give any detailed account; but the [illegible]wing resolution proposed by Sir John Dove[illegible]d unanimously adopted by the large assem[illegible] persons present, deserves insertion.

Resolved,—That this meeting largely participates in the affliction of all classes of the community, Native as well as European, at the calamity which has occurred in the death of our late revered Governor, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Baronet, K.C.B., in the province where he had long been known by the appellation of *Father* of the People, and at a time when he was on the eve of returning to his native country, after a public career, extending to upwards of forty-seven years, and growing in success and honour up to its close:

That this meeting, many of whom were members of the same profession, many fellow-labourers in the same field, and all eye-witnesses of his conduct, take pride in the fame which this most honoured servant of the East India Company first acquired in duties and scenes that are familiar to them, and which, during the last seven years, he consummated by the most eminent and approved public services, at the head of the Government of this Presidency:

That his justice, benevolence, frankness, and hospitality, were no less conspicuous than the extraordinary faculties of mind with which he was endowed, and the admirable purposes to which he constantly applied them; and that he commanded, in a singular degree, the veneration of all persons by whom he was known:

That to perpetuate the remembrance of his public and private virtues, a subscription be immediately opened for the purpose of erecting a statue to his memory:

That a Committee be requested to undertake the management of the business, and to adopt such measures as shall appear to them best calculated to give speedy effect to the foregoing resolution.

As soon as the above resolution became known in the several provinces subject to the Madras

rule, subscriptions were eagerly offered by all classes of the inhabitants; and a sum was raised in an incredibly short space of time, great beyond all precedent. Out of this the Committee appropriated eight thousand pounds for the purpose of procuring an equestrian statue of the lamented Govenor; and seven gentlemen* in England, friends and admirers of the deceased, were solicited to take upon themselves the charge of seeing the work properly executed. It is scarcely necessary to state that they readily undertook the office intrusted to them; and when it is added, that to Mr. F. Chantry was committed the task of casting the statue (for a statue in bronze was preferred to one in marble), no doubt can be entertained as to the excellence of the performance.

Besides this public testimony of respect to the memory of the late Governor of Madras, a separate subscription was entered into among his more intimate personal friends, with the view of obtaining a full-length painting of the illustrious deceased; whilst a third sum was raised in order to defray the costs of an engraving, likewise at full-length, both of Sir Thomas and Lady Munro. Of these works, the former has already been executed by Mr. Shee, of Cavendish-square, from

* Colonel Blackburne, Colonel Cunningham, Colonel Wilkes, Colonel R. Scott, C.B. John G. Ravenshawe, and Alexander Read, Esq.

a portrait taken by the same gentleman some years ago; whilst the latter is in progress under the skilful superintendence of Mr. Cousins.

I have hitherto taken notice only of the proceedings of the European population of Madras, in consequence of the lamented death of Sir Thomas Munro. Keenly as the sad event was felt by them, it may be questioned whether their sorrow equalled that of the warm-hearted Natives; more especially of the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts, where Sir Thomas had so long resided, and where he was generally spoken of by the appellation of "the Father of the People."

It was justly considered by the gentleman who succeeded to the temporary authority of Governor, that feelings so creditable to both parties ought, by some mode or other, to be indulged; and he accordingly directed Mr. F. W. Robertson, the principal collector of the district, "to communicate fully and freely with the most respectable inhabitants, and to ascertain in what manner the object of Government, to do honour to the memory of the illustrious Sir Thomas Munro, could be effected most conformably to Native feeling." Though the above recommendation was issued so early as the 10th of July, the 17th of September arrived ere Mr. Robertson was enabled to make his report upon the subject. In doing so, he regrets the delay that had occurred, and adds—

"In a matter so interesting to the Native community, I did not like to write till I had heard from all the talooks, but which I could not accomplish sooner, in consequence of the prevalence of that fatal disease, the cholera, having for a time deterred the inhabitants from meeting together."

He then says—

"The veneration with which the character of Sir Thomas Munro was regarded by the people of the Ceded Districts, being so perfectly known to the Government, it would be idle on my part to describe the affliction they felt at the misfortune of his death; I shall therefore proceed at once to state the propositions *they* have suggested to do honour to his memory.

First—"That a choultry of sufficient dimensions to accommodate Native travellers, and merchants of all castes, be erected at Gooty by a *voluntary* subscription, as a permanent memorial of the unanimous feelings of the Native inhabitants of the district, on the death of their venerated benefactor.

Secondly—"That an extensive tope of mango and other fruit-trees (besides a well with steps) be planted at Putteecondah, at the spot where their venerated benefactor breathed his last.

Thirdly—"That should the funds raised by subscription be more than enough for the above purposes, the surplus shall be appropriated to the erection of Native choultries elsewhere, or of other useful works of public convenience.

Fourthly—"That the Honourable the Governor in Council be respectfully solicited to endow the charity choultry with sufficient funds for its support.

Fifthly—"That the tomb which it is intended by Government to erect over the remains of the illustrious

deceased, and the charity choultry at Gooty, be placed in charge of one and the same establishment, for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of both." Mr. Robertson then adds, in support of the proposition of the Natives to erect the choultry at Gooty, "that it would prove eminently useful; and that, in Native estimation, a better monument could not be devised to preserve the memory of the great, the good, the just Sir Thomas Munro."

With respect to the amount of subscription to be calculated upon, he estimates that at thirty thousand rupees; whilst the cost, to be defrayed by Government, of providing food for travellers and their servants, will not, he presumes, exceed the moderate sum of sixteen hundred. After taking these propositions into consideration, the Government resolved—

"That a proper and substantial stone monument be erected at Gooty, over the remains of the late Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B.:

"That ten caconies of land be allotted for planting trees and sinking wells at the public expense, round the spot at Putteecondah, where Sir Thomas Munro died:

"That a choultry and tank be built at Gooty for the accommodation of travellers, to be called 'The Munro choultry and tank,' suited in extent to the population of the place, and to the nature of the thoroughfare:

"That an establishment of servants be maintained for the preservation of the tank and choultry, and for providing travellers with water,—all at the public expense."

The proposition of the collector to convert the

choultry into a charitable establishment was however rejected, upon the ground that it would be difficult to restrict the expenses, and that it might otherwise lead to abuses; whilst the offer of the Native inhabitants to erect the choultry by subscription was also declined, for reasons which deserve to be given in the words of the Acting Governor himself.

"The benevolent, the disinterested, the unostentatious, and modest nature of Sir Thomas Munro," says Mr. Græme, "made him avoid any personal gratification at the expense of others, and it should be the object of this Government to protect his memory from any evil, direct or remote, which the too eager enthusiasm of his admirers might produce. In this view, it appears to me objectionable that the choultry at Gooty should be erected by the subscriptions of Natives. If it were confined to the most opulent among them, it would be of little consequence,—they can afford it, and they can judge for themselves, and they may be supposed to be acting voluntarily when they contribute; but it is to be apprehended, that contributions may be exacted, by undue influence or control, from many by whom they would be felt as an inconvenience, and thus to the irreparable calamity of the loss of a great benefactor would be added the hardship of an extra assessment.

"The inhabitants of the Ceded Districts should not only be declared relieved of the expense of building it, but the collector should be enjoined not to permit the levy of contributions for this purpose: they should derive every benefit, but be spared every inconvenience from erecting monuments which are to do honour to Sir Thomas Munro. There should be no feeling arising from it but what is unequivocally pleasurable."

Instead of the distribution of alms, however, Mr. Græme proposed,—"That a building, to be designated the Munro College, should be erected not far from the choultry, in which should be maintained six professors, for the gratuitous instruction of a certain number of youths of the Ceded Districts, in the English, Sanscrit, Mahratta, Persian, Hindostanee, Teloogoo, and Canarese languages. Such an institution," he observes, "will secure a perpetual association of Sir Thomas Munro's name and character, with the system of education of the Natives of this Presidency, which was introduced by him; whilst the annual expense of the institution, falling short of three hundred and fifty pounds, could not possibly be felt as a burthen upon the Company's treasury.

Judicious as this proposition was, it received the decided opposition of the Commander-in-chief, on the ground that it would occasion an unnecessary drain upon the Company's finances. "It cannot be supposed," continued he, "that the Court of Directors, who did not feel it necessary to grant even a tomb to their old and faithful servant, the late Sir Alexander Campbell,* who expired in their service, however favourably they may regard the memory of the late Governor, should approve of an expense so disproportionate to its object,—an expense not even attached to the memory of our sovereigns."

* Formerly Commander-in-chief.

In like manner, one of the other two members of Council conceived, that such an establishment was not needed, the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts benefiting, like the inhabitants of other provinces, by the establishment of the Board for Public Instruction; whilst the third member suggested, "that a more correct estimate of the expense be prepared, and the question then referred to the Court of Directors."

The proposition being thus opposed, the acting Governor relinquished it; but in a second minute, "he trusts that the Court of Directors, to whom he proposes to refer the question, will perceive sufficient utility in the proposed institution to warrant *their* connecting with it *their* sense of the eminent merits of Sir Thomas Munro; remarking, at the same time, that it would only be a superior branch of the general system founded by that eminent individual; that it would be strongly promotive of its success; that its locality at Gooty would be particularly appropriate, as the place in which the founder of the general system lies interred, and as being situated in the districts where his benevolence, his justice, and his wisdom, acquired for him the enviable appellation of 'Father of the People.'"—"It cannot," adds the Acting Governor, "be money misappropriated to commemorate the virtues of such a man."

The melancholy intelligence of Sir Thomas Munro's death reached England the end of No-

vember, 1827. On the 28th of that month, the Court of Directors recorded their feelings at the event in terms to the following effect:—

RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS, 28th November, 1827.

Resolved unanimously,—That this Court has learnt, with feelings of the deepest concern, the decease of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, K.C.B., late Governor of Fort St. George; and its regret is peculiarly excited by the lamented event having occurred at a moment when that distinguished officer was on the point of returning to his native land in the enjoyment of his well-earned honours, after a long and valuable life, which had been devoted to the interests of the Company and his country:

That this Court cannot fail to bear in mind the zeal and devotion manifested by Sir Thomas Munro, in retaining charge of the Government of Madras after he had intimated his wish to retire therefrom, at a period when the political state of India rendered the discharge of the duties of that high and honourable station peculiarly arduous and important; and this Court desires to record this expression of its warmest regard for the memory of its late valuable servant, and to assure his surviving family, that it deeply sympathizes in the grief which so unexpected an event must have occasioned to them.

It must be admitted, that gratifying as the above resolution may be to the feelings of Sir Thomas Munro's surviving relatives, his own lengthened and meritorious services had amply earned it; whilst something like regret will be generally experienced, when it is known, that to

the plan brought forward by Mr. Græme, the Honourable Court refused its sanction.

The following are the terms in which that refusal was conveyed:—

"That, participating fully in the sentiments expressed by the inhabitants of Madras at their meeting on the 21st July, 1827, and being desirous of promoting the object they have in view, the Court have authorized bills to be drawn on them for the amount of the subscriptions received from the Indian community, for the purpose of erecting a statue to the memory of the late Sir Thomas Munro; they have also cordially approved of the measures which the local government had resolved on to do honour to his memory in the Ceded Districts; but, in consideration of the liberal encouragement which has been given to the Board of Public Instruction, and the benefits which have resulted, and may hereafter be expected to result, from their labours, they consider it quite unnecessary to entertain the proposition for erecting a college, to be designated the 'Munro College.'"

I take it for granted, that no person can have perused the extensive and unrestrained correspondence which has been interwoven into the preceding Memoir, without attaining a tolerably just estimate of the public and private character of Sir Thomas Munro. Few individuals ever possessed, in a more remarkable degree, those rare qualities of the mind which, united with correct feeling, and a thorough knowledge of human

nature, fit a man for high stations; and hence few have ever been better adapted to fill situations, not of authority alone, but of great and trying responsibility. Endowed by nature with talents of the highest order; possessed of a judgment singularly clear and sound; calmly and resolutely brave; full of fortitude; full of energy and decision; patient in inquiry, prompt in action; cool and persevering amid difficulties and hindrances; quick and ready in adapting his means to his ends; yet so sober-minded as never to be taken by surprise, Sir Thomas Munro seemed formed for a life of active enterprise: whilst the qualifications which are necessary towards using aright the influence which active enterprise can, for the most part, alone obtain, were, in his case, to the full as conspicuous as the spirit of enterprise itself. Extremely temperate in all his habits; equally indisposed to give as to take offence; candid, open, manly in his bearing, over which neither jealousy nor prejudice was permitted to exert the slightest control, Sir Thomas Munro succeeded in securing the love and veneration, not less than he commanded the respect, of all around him. No man was more ready to acknowledge the merits of others—no man was more free to denounce their errors; and whilst he was always prepared to forgive, where signs of repentance were shown, he was equally disposed to admit his own mistakes, should he chance to have committed them.

Such was Sir Thomas Munro: considered as a public man, well qualified to take a leading part on any stage; whereas if we cast our eyes towards that to which peculiar circumstances restricted him, we shall discover, that India never produced a more able or devoted functionary. He lived but to promote the public good; whilst, in a thorough knowledge of the manners, customs, institutions, wants, and wishes of the Natives—in his endeavours to obtain their confidence—in the success which attended those endeavours—and in just conceptions of the measures best calculated to contribute to their welfare, few men have ever equalled—fewer still have ever surpassed him.

Though possessing, and not unaware that he possessed, all these great and shining qualities, there was about Sir Thomas Munro a degree of modesty such as rarely attaches to men in public life. So far from obtruding his own claims on the notice of his employers, it required something like positive exertion on their part to drag into light not a few of his meritorious actions; whilst more than one instance might be recorded in which praise and honours were bestowed upon individuals who merely carried into effect his suggestions. It has been already stated, that if there was one disposition which, more than another, Sir Thomas Munro held in sovereign contempt, it was that of exaggerating the value of particular services for the sake of obtaining

distinctions; and he rarely concealed his disgust as often as he saw the Government of a country prostitute its choicest prerogative by the promotion of persons undeserving of its notice; yet no man could more justly appreciate unsought honours than he. He regarded them as the just recompense of industry and talent; and he conceived that every government was as much bound to seek out and reward its meritorious servants, as the servants of the government were bound conscientiously to discharge their duty.

Of the literary habits of this remarkable man, so much notice has already been taken, that it appears scarcely necessary to advert to them here. There was no subject within the range of philosophy or science, no question connected with poetry or the belles lettres, in which he failed to take an interest, and which he was not prepared to discuss; whilst the facility with which he could pass from one to another was scarcely less surprising than the degree of correct knowledge which he possessed upon all. For metaphysics alone he appears to have encouraged no taste; inasmuch as he looked upon the different systems to be equally founded in conjecture, and equally ending in doubt; but he was a profound mathematician, an able chymist, a judicious speculator in political economy, and a keen and successful student both of moral and natural philosophy. His acquaintance with the European languages, moreover, ancient as well as modern, was very extensive; whilst of

those in use throughout the East, there were, comparatively speaking, few of which he knew not something. Persian he wrote and spoke like a native; he was well versed in Arabic; Hindostanee was perfectly familiar to him; and in Mahratta, Canarese, and other of the vernacular tongues, he could maintain, with great exactness, either a correspondence or a conversation. Of his English style, the reader has by this time judged for himself; and I am mistaken if many professed authors will be found to be more completely masters of it.

Notwithstanding these numerous accomplishments, few governors of an Indian province have ever devoted their energies, as he devoted his, to the public service. There was no department of the state the chief proceedings of which he did not personally superintend and minutely watch: there was no important question brought forward, concerning which he failed to record his written opinion: and the quantity of records and other papers which he perused in consequence, would surpass belief, but for the notes, in his own handwriting, which remain. From among these minutes and notes, many might be found, the publication of which would do honour to the Court of Directors, whilst the opportunity of studying them would confer a lasting benefit upon both civil and military servants of the East India Company.

In the private character of Sir Thomas Munro, again, as a son, a brother, a friend, a husband, and

a father, we find nothing which does not demand our unqualified admiration and respect. Generous and warm-hearted, utterly devoid of all selfishness, his career presents but a series of noble actions; which began when he was a subaltern, very scantily provided for, and ended only with the close of life itself. For it was not to his more immediate connections only, that Sir Thomas Munro freely extended his aid. He never heard of a case of real distress without making an effort to relieve it; and so quietly and unostentatiously was the effort made, that, to use the expressive language of Scripture, "his left hand knew not what his right hand did." Of the extreme affection, however, which he bore towards every branch of his family, sufficient evidence has been advanced in the tone of his letters; yet such was the perfect command which he had learned to maintain over himself, that even of his amiable feelings he made no display. On the contrary, it is remarked of him that he seldom noticed either Lady Munro or his children, farther than appeared absolutely necessary, provided there were strangers by to watch the proceeding; though there was an expression in his eye, as often as it rested upon them, which no one acquainted with his real character could misunderstand.

Sir Thomas Munro's natural turn of mind was contemplative and grave: he thought much, and reflected deeply; yet was he cheerful, and in the society of his more intimate friends, humorous

and entertaining. Among entire strangers, and in public meetings, more especially after he came to the head of the Madras Government, there was a reserve about him which passed generally current for moroseness or hauteur; yet no man could be more free from either disposition, as those who knew him best bear ready witness. Of his peculiar faculty of seeing into the true characters of men, numerous proofs remain; one of the most generally known of which occurred in the case of Bishop Heber; whom, though they met but once, and that casually, he depicted with the force of truth, which has been felt and acknowledged wherever the lamented Prelate's fame has extended.

Nevertheless, Sir Thomas Munro was exceedingly cautious how he spoke of others, especially if his judgment happened to be unfavourable. In this case, a sense of public duty alone ever urged him to speak out, because his own mind was too well regulated to take the smallest pleasure in wounding the feelings even of an enemy.

Though gifted with a constitution more than ordinarily vigorous, Sir Thomas Munro spent not so many years in India without suffering occasional attacks of illness. These he always bore with the fortitude of which a remarkable specimen is given in his correspondence during the campaign of 1799; and it is characteristic of the man, that he usually bore them in solitude. As soon as he perceived that a fit of indisposition was approaching

he withdrew altogether from society, and sat in silence, with his elbows on his knees, and his head resting on his hands, till it passed away. His great remedy, in cases of fever and other complaints peculiar to the country, was abstinence; and his aversion to medicine was extreme.

Sir Thomas Munro was brought up in the communion of the Scotch Episcopal Church, to which he continued sincerely and steadily attached to the day of his death. Of his early admiration of the poetical portions of the Bible, something has already been said; but it is not to be imagined that these were the only books in the Sacred Volume which he both read and admired. On the contrary, his acquaintance with the inspired Writings was singularly intimate, arising from a custom, which he never omitted, though, like every other custom connected with religion, it was practised with the strictest privacy,—Sir Thomas Munro never permitted a day to pass, without setting aside some portion of it to devotional exercises; and as the reading of the Scriptures formed a part of these, his knowledge of their contents was remarkably accurate. The following rather ludicrous anecdote, illustrative of this fact, has been communicated to me by a gentleman who was present on the occasion.

It will be recollected, that in the year 1823, during the examination of Sir John Bradley King before the House of Commons, Sir John Newport, Mr. Butterworth, and others, were

extremely anxious to peruse the verse in Holy Writ, which was supposed to form part of an Orangeman's oath; chiefly because it was asserted that mention was made in it of the Divine command to root out the Amalekites. Sir John Bradley King refusing to satisfy the House in this particular, the anxiety to effect the discovery became more intense. The verse, it was reported, was to be found in the Book of Joshua. Mr. Canning suggested that probably it would not be found there. Mr. Butterworth also declared that he had examined the Book in question, but could not discover it. Sir John Newport then quoted the chapter and verse. Mr. Butterworth retired to examine the verse again; but returned with a report, that the Amalekites were not mentioned in the verse quoted. The debate, after a long discussion, turned off upon some other point, and the important discovery was never made. When these circumstances were communicated to Sir Thomas Munro, who caused all the debates in Parliament to be regularly read to him, he smiled; and, after making some humorous remarks on the conduct of the parties engaged in this fruitless pursuit, observed, that they might have saved themselves and the House much time and trouble, if they had looked into the 3d verse of the 15th chapter of the 1st Book of Samuel.

But there are other and better proofs on record, that to study the Bible was to Sir Thomas Munro a pleasing task. His whole life, both in

public and private, was modelled upon the rules laid down in the Gospel; and he is, after all, the most vitally religious man, whose general behaviour corresponds best with the revealed Will of God.

Of the personal appearance of Sir Thomas Munro, a few words will suffice to convey a sufficiently accurate idea. In stature he was tall; of a spare but bony make; very upright and soldier-like in his carriage, and possessed of great muscular strength. There was an expression of decision in the lines of his face, which a stranger might readily mistake for sternness; but his eye was bright and penetrating; and when he began to relax, good-humour and benevolence were remarkably displayed in his countenance. When he spoke, the voice appeared to issue rather from one side of his mouth, and the looker-on might easily detect as often as a playful or ludicrous idea struck him, by a peculiar curl in his upper, and a projection in his lower lip. Upon the whole, it may with truth be asserted, that his countenance was decidedly pleasing, whilst there was an indescribable something about his air, manner, and expression, which no one could behold without respect.

Such was Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, to whom the words of the poet may with perfect justice be applied, that—

> "He was a man, take him for all in all,
> We shall not look upon his like again."

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

I.

MAJOR MUNRO'S OPINION ON THE PARTITION OF MYSORE.

10th June, 1799.

MOST of the principal points respecting the division and settlement of Mysore having been already determined by his Lordship, it is now perhaps too late to give any opinion upon them.

The speedy restoration of peace and order, united with security, which his Lordship states as the first matter of consideration, must necessarily follow the complete possession and division of the country amongst the allies. Most of the principal forts have already surrendered; and if we may judge from the readiness with which Savendroog, Nundydroog, and many other places, were given up to Colonel Read, without any specific conditions, there seems to be little reason to apprehend that those which are still garrisoned by Tippoo's troops will attempt to hold out. The partition of the country, and the form of government, are the only objects which now require much deliberation; and, in making this partition, we have only to consult our own advantage and that of the Nizam,—for there is not the smallest risk of opposition from any quarter. The military power of Mysore is broken, and the remnant of it,

together with the inhabitants of the country, have neither the means, nor, in general, the wish to see the family of the late Sultan established in the government of any part of his dominions. The people of Mysore are not to be regarded as a distinct nation, who submit with impatience to a foreign yoke, but as a part of a great people, who have been sometimes consolidated into extensive kingdoms by conquests, and sometimes broken up by revolutions into petty states, under rajahs and poligars, and who have been long accustomed to the government of strangers. They have no national spirit or antipathies to stir them up to resistance, and they therefore behold a change of rulers with indifference. No struggle was made in defence of their ancient princes against the Delways or Hyder; and it cannot be expected that any should be made in favour of a Mohammedan government but recently established, and which, under the Sultan, was a system of violence and oppression, and a scene of bloodshed probably never before equalled in India. The very means which he took to strengthen himself have facilitated the conquest of his dominions: for, by removing all great jagheerdars, by establishing a regular army, and making every man dependent on himself alone, by paying them from his treasury, when he fell with his capital, there was not a man left who had sufficient influence to keep together a body of troops for any length of time; and it was the consciousness of this, as much as the hope of reward, that compelled Cummer ul Din to make a merit of submission so soon after.

The Mahrattas are the only people who can be supposed hostile to a complete partition of the Mysore territories between the Company and the Nizam; but they are so unequal to a contest with these two powers, or even with the Company alone, that the cession of Anagondy, and some of the neighbouring districts, which they have long coveted, would certainly induce them to remain quiet at least,

though they might not be perfectly satisfied. It may be argued, that our occupying Chitteldroog and Biddanore, and thus advancing all at once to their frontiers, would excite their jealousy; but they are jealous of us now, and will always be so as long as we are able to meet them in the field. Our abandoning our advantages will not extinguish their jealousy: let them retain it; but let us, while we can, make ourselves so strong, that we shall have nothing to fear from it. We shall be most likely to enjoy peace when our enemies shall have no hope of gaining any thing by making war upon us. (The power of the Mahrattas rising on the ruins of the Mogul empire,' was for a period formidable not only to the Native governments, but also to that of the Company; but their comparative military force, and the Company's, have undergone a very great change within the last twenty years. Two, or perhaps three, armies might be sent into the field from the Carnatic alone, each of them capable of opposing the whole united force of the Mahrattas. We have served enough with them to know, that though their detachments can scour and plunder a country with great rapidity, their main body does not move faster than ours; that they are accompanied by a mere unwieldy bazaar, and that they are often obliged to halt for binjaries.)The devastation, in the end, distresses them as much as us: they cannot take forts; they are liable to night attacks if they halt near them; they are obliged to fall back for provisions after laying waste the open country; and as they cannot prevent us from entering their own country without destroying it in the same manner; nor, if we have magazines of grain at Chitteldroog, from taking every place they hold on this side of the Kistna, it cannot be believed that any measures we may pursue respecting Mysore, would tempt them to hazard a war in which they could gain nothing, but in which they would certainly be driven beyond the Kistna.

As I am convinced that the Mahrattas will not dare to give any interruption to the partition of the Mysore dominions, excepting Anagondy, &c. between the Company and the Nizam, I do not know a single argument against it, unless it may be thought that it would make the Nizam too powerful; but this is an objection without much foundation; for there can be no doubt that the actual power of the Company will be increased in a much higher proportion than the Nizam's, by the acquisition of an equal share of territory; and that, consequently, his relative strength, with respect to them, will be rather diminished than augmented. We may assert, that the Nizam's army has not contributed so much as the Company's to the conquest of Mysore; but he has done all that he could; his troops have done more than was expected and had they done less, still every principle of good faith demands that both parties should share alike; but if we only divide with him a part of the territories of the late Sultan, and set up a pageant over the rest to pay a British garrison in Seringapatam, and subsidize a large body of our troops, he must see and feel that we have infringed upon our engagements with him. No political advantage can be gained by dragging the descendant of the Rajahs of Mysore from his obscurity and placing him on the musnud, unless we suppose it to be one to divide only a part of the country, in order that we may, by excluding the Nizam, extend our own influence over the rest. (Had we found a prince in captivity who had once enjoyed power, a proper regard for humanity, and the supposed prejudices of the nation in favour of one who had once been their sovereign, would no doubt have pleaded strongly for his restoration; but no such motive now calls upon us to invest the present Rajah, a boy of six years old, with royalty;) for neither he nor his father, nor his grandfather, ever exercised or knew what it was; and long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Ra-

jahs had been held as state prisoners by their Delways or ministers. No attachment remains towards the family among the natives; for it has been long despised and forgotten, and there is perhaps none of them who would not prefer a strong permanent government like that of the Company, to one like that of the Rajah, which must necessarily be composed of different interests,—must be weakened and perplexed by intrigue, and must carry with itself, like the double Governments of Oude and Tanjore, the destruction of the resources of the country. It may be argued, that as all great and sudden revolutions ought to be rendered as light as possible to the conquered people, by making as few alterations as may be consistent with their prosperity and our own security, we ought to raise up again the ancient Hindoo Government. But the inhabitants of Mysore would suffer no internal change from the country being in the hands of the Company instead of those of a Rajah. Their laws and customs—their religion and their whole interior policy, would remain the same as before; and the only difference would be, that, in one case, a few Europeans would administer the affairs of the country openly, and that, in the other, a Rajah and a few of his friends would be supported in splendour, while the Government would be secretly enthralled by an European resident. The difference is so very trifling, that it could very little interest the great body of the people, whether they lived under the one or the other of these forms; but where the people themselves are so indifferent about the matter, for strangers to raise a child to sovereign power, whose ancestors have been in prison about half a century, would be a proceeding so altogether new in the transactions of the world, that we could scarcely hope that any man would believe that they were moved to it by compassion for fallen royalty, rather than by a wish of securing to the Company a more general influence in Mysore than they could have otherwise obtained.

I doubt much if we should, after all, gain greater political advantages by establishing a Rajah than would result from a fair division of the country with the Nizam. By a division, the share that falls to us would come immediately under our own management. We should ascertain its resources—we should know what we had to trust to—and we should be able to call them forth whenever any emergency required it. And it is also not improbable that the Nizam would consent to increase his subsidy.

By establishing a Rajah, and keeping Seringapatam in our own hands, and a strong detachment in Mysore subsidized by him, we apparently get rid of some present expenses; but by leaving the administration to him, we remain in ignorance of the state of this country; and at some future period, when it might be necessary to move our troops in this quarter to meet an enemy, we might find it impracticable, from his not being able to furnish the requisite supplies. It is true, we should in some measure have the remedy in our own hands, by our always being able to resume the country: but why embarrass ourselves with a complicated scheme of government that may eventually force us to take such a step? There may be many good reasons for upholding this system with respect to the nabobs of the Carnatic and some other allies, who have long been habituated to the enjoyment of wealth at least, if not of power. But why seek to extend it to the obscure descendant of a family almost forgotten, without any solid grounds either of sound policy or humanity? On the whole, I am convinced, that not only the simplest but the wisest plan would be to admit the Nizam to an equal partition of all the territories which we do not give up to the Mahrattas. The method in which Mysore should be divided, and the government under which it should be placed, are the only points that appear to deserve much consideration; for the military of the late Sultan being entirely

broken, the surrender of the forts still garrisoned by his troops, and the tranquillity of the country, would instantly follow the promulgation of the partition.

II.

THE FOLLOWING ARE A FEW OF THE MANY NOTICES ON RECORD, OF THE VALUE OF MAJOR MUNRO'S SERVICES AS A COLLECTOR.

THE Government of Fort St. George, under date the 9th October, 1800, informed the Court of Directors that the Company's authority had been completely established in Canara and Soondah, by the activity and prudence of the Collector, Major Munro, whose "success had enabled him, at an early period, to pursue his inquiries into the resources, administration, and history of these districts;" and that the result of the researches of that able officer had been submitted to them, "in one of the ablest reports (dated 30th May, 1800,) which had passed under their observation."* That Major Munro had traced the government of those countries, from the wise and liberal policy of the ancient Gentoo institutions, down to the tyrannical exactions of Hyder and Tippoo. That in the former, the Collector had discovered, from the existence of authentic records, the foundations of that simple form of government which it was then intended to reintroduce, (viz. the proprietory right of land under fixed assessments,) and, in the latter, had exhibited those destructive changes which had undermined the wealth and population of once flourishing districts. That the revenue settled by Major

* Printed in Appendix, No. 24, to Fifth Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on India affairs, page 803 to 814; and highly spoken of by the Committee.

Munro, for the year 1209, amounted to Sr. Pags. 5,99775, being an increase of about 93 per cent. on the schedules produced by Tippo Sultan in 1792.

Extract of a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George, dated 24th August, 1804.

24. We derived great satisfaction from the perusal of Major Munro's report of the 30th May, 1800, on the resources, administration, and history of Canara and Soondah, and from the subsequent report of the 9th November following. When we consider that, from an actual examination of a number of ancient sunnuds and revenue accounts, Major Munro has been able to ascertain the state of the revenues of the province under the Rajah of Biddanore, as well as under Hyder and Tippoo, and the cause of the decline, and that enough of the ancient documents remain to enable him to furnish a complete abstract of the land, during a period of four hundred years; and that he has actually furnished, from the most authentic materials, a statement of the land-rent of Canara and Soondah, from 1600 to 1799; we are greatly surprised that Mr. Place, in his minute of the 9th October, 1802, should have spoken of those statements as merely hypothetical, and recorded an opinion, that the public revenue of the whole province of Canara amounts to little more than a tithe of the gross produce.

25. Under a consideration of the destructive changes which are said to have undermined the population of these once flourishing districts, and reflecting, also, on the consequences of a recent increase upon the former assessment of the province of Malabar, without due attention being had in proportioning that increase in an equitable manner, so as to fall equally upon all, you will proceed with caution upon the reference which was made to you in a preceding

despatch on the subject of Mr. Place's remark; and not hazard any material increase in the present jumma of the province of Canara, without being well assured that the actual state of the produce of the country will warrant you in so doing. By Major Munro's letter of the 9th November, 1800, we observe, "that the revenue had been paid with a readiness of which he had seen no example; not because the inhabitants are more able than formerly to pay their rents, but because they believe that their readiness in discharging them will not, under the Company's Government, be regarded as a proof of wealth, or as an argument for laying new impositions upon them." We trust that no measure will be adopted by you that may be likely to lessen this confidence; and you will proceed with great caution in augmenting the present assessment, even should you entertain an opinion that it is disproportioned to the actual resources of the country, since we feel very much inclined to the opinions of the Revenue Board—"That the revenue will improve, not by increasing the assessment, but by inspiring confidence, that it will be moderately fixed."

From Major Munro's report of the 9th November, 1800, we observe, that the proprietory right in the lands of Canara had been derived from a very remote period, and the existing knowledge and estimation of the value of those rights among the descendants of the original proprietors, indicated the easy means of introducing a permanent system of revenue and judicature. We likewise observe, that, previous to Hyder's conquest, the districts were divided into small estates, which were considered the actual property of the holders, and assessed at a fixed moderate rate. When we consider the attachment of the proprietors to the lands of their ancestors, we recommend to your most serious attention the observation contained in Major Munro's report of the 9th November, 1800, respecting the impolicy and injustice of placing a number of small estates under

the collection of one head-landlord, preparatory to the perpetual settlement. It were best to adhere, as nearly as possible, to the division which at present subsists; to conclude the settlement with the proprietors of small estates, and not to break in upon ancient boundaries or land-marks, lest any attempt at innovation may be productive of disquietude and disgust, especially as almost all the land in Canara is represented as private property, derived from gift, or purchase, or descent, too remote to be traced; where (according to Major Munro) "there are more title-deeds, and where the validity of those deeds have probably stood more trials than all the estates in England." Of such lands, however, as are denominated sirkar lands, you will make such a division as may appear to be most convenient.

Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, 5th October, 1806.

THE annual Jummabundy report, with its accompanying general comparative statements of the revenues of the Ceded Districts, for July, 1215, which we had the honour to lay before your Lordship in Council, with our address, under date the 14th August last, will have afforded satisfactory evidence of the improved resources of the province,—of the growing confidence of the inhabitants,—and of the unrelaxing energy and successful result of the administration of the principal collector.

114. We consider these remarks as applicable to the judicious and considerate regard which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has uninterruptedly evinced in advancing the revenues of these districts, from the reduced condition in which he found them, to their present state of comparative prosperity, in proportion only to the capability of the people and the capacity of the country. This is one of the most delicate and difficult of the various important duties

with which a collector is entrusted; and in the present case, it has been performed in a manner highly creditable to the collector, and entirely satisfactory to us. Amidst the care and exertions necessary for conducting and upholding such extensive collections, the assiduity, ability, and success with which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro has prosecuted, and now nearly accomplished, the arduous duty of surveying and classifying the lands of so large a tract of territory, and assessing thereon a moderate and equitable money-rent, are equally entitled to public approbation. In his experience and intelligence we had the best earnest for the correctness of this important undertaking; but the punctual and complete manner in which the collections have for several years been made, is the most convincing proof of its accuracy and moderation.

Extract from a Report of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, 5th October, 1808.

THESE countries, valued at a gross annual jumma of canterroi pagodas 19,18,758, or star pagodas 16,51,465,* and, by a census made within these two last years, computed to contain 1,917,376 inhabitants, were, in the month of October, 1800, confided to the executive management of Lieutenant-Colonel (then Major) Thomas Munro, who, with the aid of four subordinate collectors, acquitted himself of the trust with eminent ability and success, from the date above-mentioned until the month of October, 1807.

The judicious policy we remarked, would not be too highly applauded, by which Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, fixing, in the first instance, on a moderate scale of jumma,

* Though the value at which they were ceded was 16,51,465 star pagodas, the first year's jumma amounted only to 10,06,543 star pagodas.

and increasing it only as the means of the renters and the capacity of the country enabled him safely to do, advanced these provinces from the almost ultimate point of declension to which they had been sunk by a weak and improvident Government, to the degree of comparative prosperity and promise in which they now remain.

The example we believed to be unparalleled in the revenue annals of this Presidency, of so extensive a tract of territory, with a body of inhabitants little accustomed to passive submission and legitimate obedience to the ruling authority, reduced from confusion to order, and a mass of revenue, amounting to no less a sum than 119,90,419 star pagodas, being regularly and at length readily collected, with a remission on the whole of only 3415,28,22 pagodas, or 1 f. 22d. per cent.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George, dated 12th February, 1806.

36. THIS considerable augmentation of produce having succeeded to three years of unfavourable seasons, marked in a strong degree the care with which the resources of the Ceded Districts had been guarded and preserved in the previous settlements formed under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. We trust that the large augmentation of revenue which you have derived, combined with the improved condition of these valuable possessions, will exhibit a proof, not less satisfactory than it is incontrovertible, of the unexampled success of the principal collector in the execution of the arduous duties committed to his charge, and of the essential benefit which has been produced to the public service, by the indefatigable exertion of the zeal and talents of that valuable public officer.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George, dated 21st October, 1806.

19. It affords us much satisfaction to observe, that the able services of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro have received your approbation. You were informed in the dispatch from this Government, dated the 11th February, 1806, that the revenue of the Ceded Districts had nearly attained the standard specified in the schedule of the Treaty of Hyderabad, and that the augmentation of revenue had kept pace with the progressive improvement of the internal resources of the country. We are at the same time aware, that it is natural that your attention should be excited by the extraordinary proofs of comprehensive detail, which are evinced in the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; and it cannot be doubted that there are very few public officers who would be equal to the labours involved in so arduous a charge. It could not be reasonably expected that, in the minute mode of assessment pursued by the principal collector, inequality in the rates of assessment should not occasionally occur; but we have entire confidence, that by the vigilance and industry of the principal and of the sub-collectors, those inequalities will be gradually rectified, and the whole revenue be at length fixed on an equitable and defined basis; while it must be apparent, that the system which is pursued by Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, is that which is best calculated to lead to such an accurate knowledge of the resources of the country, as it would be hopeless to expect without a vigorous personal investigation.

117. This explanation of the state of affairs in the Ceded Districts will be the best encomium that can be conferred on the superior merits of the principal collector, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, by whose persevering exertions a country which, at the period of its transfer to the authority of the British Government, was infested with every species

of disorder and irregularity, has been preserved in the enjoyment of almost entire tranquillity, and has been advanced with the utmost rapidity to a state of progressive prosperity and improvement.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George, the 21st October, 1807.

WITH all due submission and deference to the sentiments of your Honourable Court, we think it our duty to say, that we should have great satisfaction if the exertions which have been made by Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in the advancement of the public service, under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and with a degree of success unequalled in the records of this, or probably of any other Government, should receive a corresponding recompense in the approbation of your Honourable Court.

260. Mr. Petrie (the Acting Governor) reviewed the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in the Ceded Districts, noticed the gradual augmentation which he had produced of the revenue from twelve and a half lacs to eighteen lacs of star pagodas per annum, and the general amelioration and improvement of the manners and habits of the Ceded Districts, which had kept pace with the increase of revenue. From disunited hordes of lawless plunderers and freebooters, they are now stated to be as far advanced in civilization, submission to the laws, and obedience to the magistrates, as any of the subjects under this Government. The revenues are collected with facility; every one seems satisfied with his situation; and the regret of the people is universal on the departure of the principal collector.

Extract from a Revenue Letter from Fort St. George, 12th August, 1814.

6. EVERY writing of Colonel Munro's is entitled to attention. His vigorous and comprehensive understanding; the

range which his mind takes through the whole science of political economy; the simplicity and clearness with which all his ideas are unfolded; his long and extensive experience, and his uniform success, rank him high as an authority in all matters relating to the revenues of India. Independently of the general interest excited by the character of its author, his paper, dated the 15th of August, 1807, claims notice as containing the only project of a rayetwar permanent settlement. To that paper your Honourable Court's dispatch makes a marked reference, and we accordingly feel ourselves at liberty to regard the project which it contains as the permanent settlement which your Honourable Court would wish to introduce. In speaking of the rayetwar system, we therefore beg, for the sake of accuracy, to be understood to mean the system recommended in Colonel Munro's letter of the 15th August, 1807.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George, dated 6th November, 1805.

36. THE reports of Colonel Munro now brought under our observation, afford new proof of his knowledge of the people, and the lands under his administration, and of his ability and skill as a collector. The mode of settling on the part of Government immediately with the individual cultivator of the soil for the land-rent, under the term of kulwar, appears to be more practised in that division of the Peninsula, where he presides, than we understand it to have been in any of the ancient possessions of the Company. We see reason to be surprised at the industry which has carried the collector into a detail of no less than 206,819 individual settlements of this nature, averaging only pagodas 65,62 each of annual rent.

Extract from a Revenue Letter to Fort St. George, dated 24th April, 1811.*

WE have perused the Survey Report of the Ceded Districts, drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro, with much interest. This document not only furnishes a new proof of the zeal, judgment, and talent which have been so often displayed by that meritorious officer in our service, but it contains some curious statistical information, which it would not have been easy for a person of less experience than Colonel Munro to have obtained.

205. The measurement and assessment of the land seems to have been conducted with a just and equal attention to the interests of Government and the rayet; indeed, nothing could be a stronger testimony in its favour than the concurring facts of the large amount of the fixed assessment, and the universal satisfaction of the people who are to pay it.

217. The information contained in the short paper communicated by Colonel Munro to Mr. Petrie, and recorded along with the latter gentleman's minute, referred to in the hundredth paragraph of your subsequent letter of the 24th December, 1807, is peculiarly gratifying. It cannot but be highly pleasing to us to learn that the distractions which prevailed under the government of the Nizam no longer exist; that the country is quiet, and that the inhabitants are well affected; in fine, that in districts which it is calculated will, "*communibus annis*," yield about eighteen lacs of pagodas, it will not be necessary to call out a single sepoy to support the collections.

218. In such a state of things, we heartily approve of the suggestions of Colonel Munro, which we are pleased to find were adopted by Mr. Petrie, at that time our Governor in council. Innovation, which never ought to be rashly resorted to, would, in circumstances like the present, be altogether inexcusable.

Of the respect and veneration in which he was held by the natives, an anecdote is related by Colonel Wilkes, in his Sketches of the South of India. "I will not deny myself the pleasure," says Colonel Wilkes, "of stating an incident related to me by a respectable public servant of the government of Mysore, who was sent in 1807 to assist in the adjustment of a disputed boundary between that territory and the district in charge of the collector. A violent dispute occurred in his presence between some villagers; and the party aggrieved threatened to go to Anantpore, and complain to their *father*. He perceived that Colonel Munro was meant, and found upon inquiry that he was generally distinguished throughout the district by that appellation."

In 1808, after his return to England, Colonel Munro received the following letter, with a piece of plate of the value of five hundred pounds, which was presented to him by several civil servants who had been employed under him in Canara and the Ceded Districts. It was a silver-gilt vase of an Etruscan form, decorated with Oriental ornaments; and the plinth on which it stands is supported at each corner by elephants' heads.

16th February, 1808.

DEAR SIR,

WE have all had the happiness of serving under you, either in the Ceded Districts or Canara. We admire the generosity, the kindness, and the magnanimous equality of temper which, for eight years, we constantly experienced from you, amidst sickness, difficulties, and fatigue. As public servants, we can bear witness to the justice, moderation, and wisdom with which you have managed the important provinces under your authority. We know that the Ceded Districts hold your name in veneration, and feel the keenest regret at your departure. As for ourselves, we attribute our success in life, in a great measure, to you,

and think, if we are good public servants, we have chiefly learnt to be so from your instruction and example. We are at a loss how to express our feelings; but we request your acceptance of a cup, which Mr. Cochrane, your former deputy in the Ceded Districts, will have the honour to present to you.

Inscription on the piece of plate.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Munro, by William Thackeray, G. J. Travers, H. S. Græme, Alexander Read, Peter Bruce, Frederick Gahagan, William Chaplin, and John Bird, as a mark of their respect and affection for his public and private virtues, witnessed by them in the course of their service under him during his administration of the provinces of Canara and the Districts ceded to the East India Company by his Highness the Nizam.

The subject represented on this vase is copied from a drawing by Thomas Daniel, R.A. of a bas-relief of great antiquity sculptured in the excavated mountains of Ellora.

I subjoin a letter addressed to Colonel Munro just before he quitted India, by Lord Wm. Bentinck. It speaks for itself.

Fort St. George, July 30, 1807.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM concerned to say that I have no good excuse to offer for having so long delayed the acknowledgment of both your letters. In truth, the arrival of the Governor-General, and his protracted stay, has deranged the ordinary course of business, and has been the cause of a great mass of private and public papers being put off for future consideration. I trust I need not take any pains to convince you of the sincere concern which I have felt at your intended departure. I say to you now, what I shall re-

commend may be stated in the most public manner, that the thanks of this Government are, in an especial manner, due to you for the distinguished and important services which you have been performing for the East India Company for so many years. These have been no ordinary revenue duties; on the contrary, the most difficult work that can be assigned to man has been most successfully accomplished by you. You have restored the extensive provinces committed to your charge, long infested by every species of disorder and calamity, private and public, to a state of prosperity, and have made them a most valuable acquisition to your country. It is a consolation to know that the most important part of the revenue arrangement, the survey, which could scarcely have been executed under any other superintendence, has been completed before your departure. This will make the road, in respect to the revenues, easy for your successors. But I fear that, in provinces not long since so very much disturbed, a continuance of the same good policy will be indispensable. It is to your advice that I must refer for determining by what arrangement these districts shall be hereafter managed, —whether by a principal and subordinate collectors, or by two or three separate zillah collectors. The zillahs are the cheapest and most convenient mode. Are the servants at present there equal to the charge? The present arrangement was always, according to my judgment, the most eligible. A principal collector partaking of the confidence of Government, is more particularly necessary as your successor. It may be expected that the absence of your authority and arrangement must be attended with some injurious effects. These effects may grow into serious consequences, if there is not immediately established an able and efficient superintendence. It had occurred to me that Mr. Thackeray might be inclined, and would be the most proper person, from various considerations, to succeed you,

in case the same arrangement as now obtains should be continued. I am desirous, in the first instance, to receive your sentiments upon this subject. My great and anxious object is to preserve to the Ceded Districts, as far as possible, a continuance of the same system, in all its parts and branches, by which such vast public benefits have been obtained. I remain, my dear Sir,

With great respect and esteem,

Your obedient servant,

W. BENTINCK.

III.

MISCELLANEOUS MEMORANDA BY COLONEL MUNRO.

IN the formation of a government for India, we are not left to mere theory; we have not to create a new system; the present one has existed long enough to show us how far it is calculated to answer the purposes for which it was intended, and to enable us to judge with tolerable precision what are its advantages and its defects. The arrangements originally formed for the management of a few factories have gradually, without any preconcerted plan, but following the change of circumstances, been enlarged and organized into a system fitted for the administration of an extensive empire. The mixture of commercial and political principles in which it is founded, however contrary to all speculative notions of government, have not been found unfavourable to its practical operations. The commercial spirit which pervades its constitution, by introducing habits of regularity, perseverance, and method into every department, civil and military, has enabled it during many long and arduous contests, sometimes for existence, sometimes for dominion, to support reverses and overcome difficulties, which, under any other form of government, would

perhaps have been impossible. But it must be confessed that this commercial spirit has also frequently interposed delay where vigour and decision were necessary, and embarrassed the execution of the most important enterprises. But the system, on the whole, with whatever defects may adhere to it, calls rather for amendment than fundamental change.

The India Board, as it is now constituted, does not appear to require any material alteration. It would be desirable that the President should hold his office for a fixed period, and as much longer as might be thought expedient, and not be renewable on every change of ministry; but this would, I fear, be incompatible with the nature of our government. The power which he possesses of sending orders to the governments of India for the formation of alliances, and for making peace or declaring war, and of altering all dispatches from the Court of Directors, when not purely commercial, invest him with authority amply sufficient for the due control of the important affairs confided to his management. It might be proper to authorize him to originate dispatches on any matter whatever, when the Court of Directors either declined doing so, or delayed it beyond a specific time. The exercise of this authority would occasionally be required, particularly in restraining the local governments from enacting fundamental laws, where the subject merely demanded temporary regulation. No regulation ought to be adopted as a part of the constitutional law of India, until it has received the sanction of the India Board.

Ceylon, and the conquered European settlements to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, with the exception perhaps of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, are so intimately connected with India, that they ought to be placed under the Governor-General and the Board of Commissioners.

IV.

ON BENARES HOUSE-TAX,

8th May, 1812.

If the house-tax introduced at Benares did not exist under the Native Government, it ought to be relinquished; and it would perhaps be advisable that no direct tax of any kind should ever be imposed, unless it has been sanctioned at some former period by the customs of the country. It is not likely that any thing will be lost by attending to this rule; for the natives of India are too intelligent and acute to overlook any sources from whence the public revenue could with propriety be increased; and wherever they appear to have neglected the establishment of a productive tax, it will probably be found on examination to have proceeded from attention to the prejudices of caste or religion.

It does not follow, therefore, that even though the house-tax should have been unknown at Benares, it did not form an article of revenue throughout the provinces of Bengal and Behar under their native rulers. It is scarcely credible that a tax which extends at this day to most of the Company's other possessions, and to the dominion of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, should have been excluded from Bengal.

It may be questioned, however, whether a tax like that of Benares on the rents of houses, ever prevailed in India. The tax which is levied in the Deccan and the Carnatic is of a different nature. It is not regulated by the rents for houses, and shops are hardly ever rated. It is in some cases called the ground-rent of the houses, in others the equivalent of a certain number of days' labour, and in others of a certain proportion of income. But though not regulated by any fixed standard, it is in general so low as

to be easily paid, and so comprehensive as to be considerably productive. It extends, with a few exceptions, to all towns and villages, and every part of the country. It is paid by labourers, mechanics, manufacturers, and merchants. The rate to labourers is usually from two anas to one rupee. To mechanics it is nearly the same. To manufacturers, shop-keepers, and merchants, it rises according to their estimated income; and most of those classes, besides the house-tax, usually pay a licence, or professional tax.

The introduction of a tax should always be preceded by a careful investigation, to ascertain whether or not it was levied under the former government; whether it was abolished, and for what cause; or whether it fell gradually into disuse, and how long it has been discontinued. Should it appear upon full inquiry, that the house-tax now established at Benares, was not levied under the Native rulers, our Government ought not to insist on enforcing a measure so unpopular.

When the state of the public resources calls for an increase of revenue in India, it will be better to seek that increase in the revival of old, than in the adoption of new ones; and upon this principle it might be advisable to examine whether a house-tax similar to that now existing in the South of India has not formerly been a branch of revenue in Bengal, and to consider, in that case, whether it might not be again introduced without being burthensome to the people.

In order to make it be little felt, and at the same time be productive, it should be rendered as general as possible, exempting, however, all such persons and places as formerly enjoyed that privilege, and rating the manufacturers and merchants by a low scale, to be raised hereafter as experience might dictate.

V.

MEMORANDA, DATED 1812–13.

THERE can be no doubt that a surplus revenue (in India) will gradually arise, and that it may in part be remitted to Europe without injury to India. A continual drain will not ruin a country whose continual surplus produce is greater than that drain.

It is our political power, acquired by the Company's arms, that has made the trade to India what it is: without that power, it would have been kept within narrow bounds by the jealousy and exactions of the Native Princes, and by some, such as Tippoo, could have been prohibited altogether.

All corporations are inimical to the natural rights of British subjects. The corn laws favour the landed interest at the expense of the public. The laws against the export of wool, and many others, are of the same nature. But none are perhaps more adverse to the interests of the nation than those by which West Indian commodities are protected and enhanced in price. It would be better for the community, that the West India planter should be permitted to export his produce to all countries, and that the duties on Indian sugars should be lowered. The gain to the nation would be more than equivalent to that of the West India planters. Their profits would be reduced, but not so low as to disable them from continuing their trade.

The Company, it is said, have exported woollens to the value of a million annually, at a loss of fifty thousand pounds; and their opponents say, Why carry on a losing trade? But it is not a losing trade to the nation, though it is to the Company, if it increase the gain of the manufacturers.

A rude ignorant people relinquish their superstitions without much difficulty, in exchange for the religion of other nations, whilst a civilized one preserves them with most persevering obstinacy. The Turks of Europe have attained a considerable degree of civilization; but their intercourse with the Christian powers has not abated their faith in all the wild visions of their prophets. The change, if ever it is effected, will be extremely slow, and will not even begin until, by the improvement of the country, India shall abound in a middling class of wealthy men, secure in the possession of their property, and having leisure to study our best authors translated into the various languages of the country.

It is a mistaken notion, that the growers of cotton make, in their own family, their light clothing: they get it from the weaver and merchant, and they have a desire for the produce and manufactures of Europe, provided they are suitable to the purposes for which they intend them, are equally good and cheaper, and they can afford to pay for them.

Upon the claims in the India Bill of 1813, which provides that, after establishing a guarantee fund of twelve millions sterling, the excess of territorial revenue paid into the Exchequer is to go, in the proportion of five-sixths, to the public, and one-sixth to the Company, he remarks, "This is converting India into a rack-rent estate for England."

Every great state must have the means of raising extraordinary taxes in time of war. If it has not, it can only meet its expenses by reductions in peace; a resource which must soon fail, as it cannot, without danger, be carried beyond a certain limit.

This principle ought to be kept in view in all revenue measures, and ought to be fully explained to the inhabitants.

Military allowances, both to European and Native officers, ought to be regulated on the principle of holding out in-

creasing advantages at every progressive step, and the means of realizing a competency after a certain period of service; but under no government will the public resources be adequate to this object, if the allowances to the inferior ranks of the army are too high.

A subaltern upon half-batta may live not only without distress, but comfortably, in any part of India. It is not necessary that he should do more. It is even better that he should feel difficulty occasionally; but it is a bad training for an officer to place him in a situation where he shall always be at his ease, and scarcely ever feel the necessity of practising economy.

The best remedy to all suits respecting boundaries, village accounts, and exactions, is a well-organized revenue system, which checks in a great degree these disorders in their origin, and, when they do arise, furnishes at once a clear document for settling them. An independent spirit amongst the rayets themselves is, however, the most sure defence against exaction. This spirit can only exist when the rayets are, as in Canara, actual proprietors, not mere cultivators of the soil. Such a body of men will not submit to exaction from any authority less than that of the Government itself. They will resist it, and, by so doing, guard more effectually their own rights than can be done by all our judicial and revenue regulations united. It is evident, therefore, that the more widely landed property is diffused, the more numerous the class of small proprietors holding of no despot zemindars, of no superior but the Crown, the more will this spirit of independence spread among the people, and the greater will be the number whom it will protect from extortion and every kind of oppression. But landed property can never arise under a system which leaves no landlords rent. If we wish to see landed property and all its good effects, we must reduce the assessment of the greater part of the provinces under the Madras Government.

Under the zillah judge there should be a certain proportion of Native judges, one to each teshildari or two where the teshildari was large. The Native judge should hold his court in the same town with the amildar's cutcherry, for the convenience of receiving the aid of that magistrate in assembling punchayets, &c.

The separation of power has certainly lowered the European character. It has already, perhaps in some degree, created, and will continue to spread gradually among the Natives, a spirit of independence, but springing less from confidence in themselves, than from an abated respect for the British Government. If we wish, in order to remove their prejudices, to communicate to them more of the European character in their habits and opinions; if we are desirous of raising in their minds that proper independence which results from living under a well-regulated Government, and of rendering them fit to take a share in it, and even at some future period to govern themselves, we have not, I fear, taken the steps most likely to conduct us to this object. The independence which our institutions create is more likely to lead to discontent and disturbances, than to a just estimate of the advantages which may be enjoyed under them, or to any anxiety for their preservation or improvement. While we are endeavouring to diffuse European knowledge among the Hindoos, and just notions of the benefits of good government, we must be cautious that we do not, by too great a division of power, weaken their reverence for our authority, and encourage them to resist it. We must keep them so far united, as may enable us to maintain our dominions unshaken to distant ages, or at least until the time shall arrive when the Hindoos have acquired sufficient knowledge and energy of character to govern themselves.

The main evil of our system is the degraded state in which we hold the Natives. We suppose them to be superstitious, ignorant, prone to falsehood, and corrupt. In our well-meaning zeal for their welfare, we shudder at the idea of committing to men so depraved, any share in the administration of their own country. We never consider that their superstition has little or no influence on their public conduct; that individuals, and even whole nations, the most superstitious and credulous in supernatural concerns, may be as wary and sceptical in the affairs of the world, as any philosopher can desire. We exclude them from every situation of trust and emolument; we confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence; and even these are left in their hands from necessity, because Europeans are utterly incapable of filling them. We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a Native government, might have held the first dignities of the state, who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants; are often no better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence. We reduce them to this abject state, and then we look down upon them with disdain, as men unworthy of high station. Under most of the Mohammedan princes of India, the Hindoos were eligible to all the civil offices of government; and they frequently possessed a more important share in them than their conquerors.

In the Ceded Districts (Madras), reckoning only one toti and one talliar to each village, there are from twelve to fifteen thousand. If these are what are called Paikes in Bengal, the number in the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, could not have been less than one hundred thousand, who, with their families, were at one sweep, by a regulation professing to establish landed property, bereft of their little patrimonial estates, which their ancestors had held for ages.

The usage of the country, or common law of the Hindoos, is very different from the written law, which is in a great measure obsolete among themselves. Before the introduction of a new code, we ought to have employed men properly qualified to collect all that could be found of usage or Hindoo common law. Many of the rules would have appeared trifling and absurd, and even contradictory; but from the whole a system might have been formed much better adapted to the genius and condition of the people, than our theoretical code.

Is the effect then of our boasted laws to be ultimately merely that of maintaining tranquillity, and keeping the inhabitants in such a state of abasement, that not one of them shall ever be fit to be intrusted with authority? If ever it was the object "of the most anxious solicitude of Government to dispense with their services, except in matters of detail," it is high time that a policy so degrading to our subjects, and so dangerous to ourselves, should be abandoned, and a more liberal one adopted. It is the policy of the British Government to improve the character of its subjects; and this cannot better be done than by raising them in their own estimation, by employing them in situations both of trust and authority.

There are many reasons why the civil government of India should have a greater control over the military power, than in other foreign dependencies of Great Britain. In all of these, the military force is too inconsiderable, and too closely connected with the Mother Country, to attempt any thing against her; and in most of them the civil government is strengthened by the weight and influence of the colonial assemblies. But in India, Government has nothing to support it but its own character, and the authority with which it is invested. It has no great

civil societies to come forward to its aid in the time of difficulty. The chief strength of the army is composed of Natives; and even of the European soldiery, the greater part have no desire to leave the country. It is evident that the authority of Government over such an army, ought to be maintained by every means not incompatible with the respect due to the Commander-in-chief, and that the supreme military power should be vested in the Governor in Council.

After the Commander-in-chief, there is no officer it is of so much importance to uphold as that of the regimental commanding officer of the Native corps; for on the respect which he can maintain, rests the subordination of the Native army, and the very existence of our dominion in India. The authority he once possessed has, with the view of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is too little left any where to command respect. Part of his former power should be restored to him; and he should receive such allowances as will enable him to make an appearance suitable to his rank, in the eyes of the Natives and of the European officers.

Whatever plans may be adopted for accelerating promotion among the European officers, it ought to be accompanied by one for improving the condition of the Native officers; and no room should be left for them to feel, that in every arrangement for the improvement of the army, their interests are neglected.

1814-15. The people will often object to paying a tax expressly for the police of their own town, while they will make none to paying a much greater increase on houses, lands, or any established tax, though not intended for their protection. Government should adopt the tax most agreeable to the people, not that which appears most reasonable to us.

No modification can make the Mohammedan criminal law good for any thing: it ought to be abolished, and our own substituted. For whom is this law preserved? There is not one Mohammedan to twenty Hindoos; nor was the law ever administered worse than among that small portion.

The absolute power of dismissal at discretion is the only foundation of an efficient police: without it there can be no energy or zeal, and all regulations will be useless.

In 1812, a judge, or the judges, of a provincial court having, in a Report, said that the Mohammedan law, with all its modifications, was not suitable to the state of India, and that trial by jury might be introduced easily and with great benefit, Sir Thomas, then Colonel Munro, remarks, at the date of this fragment—"There can be no doubt that a Native jury would find the facts much better than any European judge."

Corporal punishment should be restrained within the narrowest limits. Public officers are too apt to inflict it; and when, as sometimes happens, it appears that there was no ground for the punishment, no compensation can be made. A fine is preferable, and can be returned.

Upon a proposition to make persons compounding theft guilty of a misdemeanour, he remarks—"This is much too severe. Before we punish for compromising theft, we ought to take measures to secure the speedy recovery of stolen property, and its return to the owner. If we cannot inspire the people with some hope of recovering their property through the operation of *our* measures, we ought not to expect that they are to take none *themselves* for this purpose.

"Magistrates who are chiefly engaged in the investigation

of thefts and robberies are apt to lose their temper—to proceed as if the whole population consisted only of thieves and receivers; and for the correction of a partial and contingent evil, to propose remedies inflicting a lasting inconvenience on the community in general, by making every member liable to penalties; and on some classes in particular, by restrictions in the exercise of their trades. The evil of theft and robbery, after all, is not so great as a magistrate, with his head full of stolen property, is apt to believe. If we consider the facility given to theft, by the unguarded manner in which property is usually kept, and in which goods are carried through the country, and the encouragement given to robbery by the weakness of the Native Governments, we shall not find that these crimes prevail to a greater extent in this country, (India,) than under similar circumstances they would have done in our own. A zealous magistrate thinks nothing of subjecting the whole inhabitants of a village to a kind of police martial law, and of making a considerable portion of them neglect, in some degree, their own occupations, in order to keep constant watch against thieves and banditti, merely because it is possible that a theft might be committed in the course of the year.

Upon a clause in a regulation, which subjects proprietors, landholders, &c. to fine, imprisonment, and forfeiture of estate, if guilty of harbouring, feeding, or assisting banditti, he remarks,—"Where aid is given *from fear*, which it often is, no punishment should be inflicted. The *robber* is often much *more able* to punish the person who refuses him aid, than the *Government* to protect him."

The following remark is made on the fact, that an appeal from the Sudder Court lies to the King in Council:—"This was ordered, I believe, when the Governor was at the head of the Sudder Court; and it ought not to *pass him*: if it does, it is no Government. The Government

has the power to reverse wrong decisions and wrong rules; or it may be involved in the work of suppressing commotions raised by the execution of orders of which it was ignorant."

In 1815, a magistrate of Canara stated, in one of his Reports,—"Unfounded accusations of the most atrocious crimes have been the cause of so many innocent people having been subjected to a long and ignominious confinement." Upon this Sir Thomas, then Colonel Munro, remarks—"This most intolerable of all evils arises from our system, from bringing every man before an European magistrate, who knows little of the people, or of what he ought to believe or reject, instead of assigning more of the duty of investigation to natives, who are so much better qualified to appreciate evidence. Were we to commit only upon the report of a jury of Natives, much oppression would be obviated, and much time saved."

1820–21.—The Mohammedan law in criminal cases never having been generally diffused, should be abolished, and the English substituted.

There is nothing we ought to avoid so cautiously as precipitancy in committing the faith of Government in permanent measures of which we cannot possibly foresee the consequences, and which may often be quite contrary to our expectations. We ought always to keep open the road for correcting our mistakes, and never to bind ourselves in such a way, by hasty regulations, as to render our injustice, once committed, permanent.

The difficulty which the Bengal collectors and judges find in answering Lord Wellesley's queries, proceeds chiefly from the curnums or village accountants being no longer Government officers. They can say nothing of the

resources, of the population, or of the cultivation of the country. They cannot ascertain even the number of villagers or their true proprietors. On every subject their answers are vague. They are reduced to guess, and acknowledge that they have no data from whence to form a judgment. One conceives, another is convinced, another is given to understand, and another as far as he is able to learn.

The potails and curnums of every village, as political instruments holding together the internal frame, are of the highest use to Government. They are immortal; but the zemindar can command no respect. His property dividing and passing away, prevents his acquiring permanent influence. Government loses the services of the potail and curnum, and gets none from the zemindar.

1823.—The rise of the character of the natives is to be effected by means of the higher classes in the judicial and revenue department; by collectors and revenue board cutcherries; by consultation on taxation with them, and with the principal rayets and merchants; by a system admitting a regular reduction of taxation in peace, and increase in time of war; by showing the reason of it, and gaining their confidence, so that they may pay willingly in war, from the certainty that reduction will follow in peace.

Let each Presidency pursue the course best calculated to promote improvement in its own territory. Do not suppose that one way will answer for all, and that Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay,—places a thousand miles from each other,—must be in every thing so much alike, as to require exactly the same rules of internal administration on every point. Let each Presidency act for itself. By this means, a spirit of emulation will be kept alive, and each may borrow from the other every improvement which may be suited

to the circumstances of its own provinces. If there is only one system, and if one Presidency is to be the model of the rest, it will have no other standard to compare its own with; and when it falls into vices, it will, instead of correcting it by the example of others, communicate it to them.

Our Adawlut courts in the several provinces act like so many steam-engines, breaking the great estates into small ones, and the small ones into dust.

The introduction of regular troops into all the countries of India, lately occupied by the numerous irregular armies of the Native princes, operates, like the first establishment of the steam-engine, in throwing a great body of men out of employment, because it performs with a few what before was the work of many. It occasions very severe and extreme distress, as well as disaffection, by depriving at once a large body of military men of the means of subsistence. The evil to the common sort may be temporary; but to all the better, and particularly the Mussulman officers, it is permanent, because they cannot follow any other profession, and cannot find employment in our armies. We ought therefore, in extending our arms over new countries, to consider the state of these men, and either find employment for them as irregulars, or pension them for life. Their children will enter into our service, or seek a livelihood in some other occupation.

1826.—The Court themselves have been the great destroyers of discipline, by authorizing all subalterns of the army to receive full batta and command-allowance. The subaltern is never taught economy; he starts with extravagant notions, and never afterwards becomes sober. You may, in fact, pay as high as you please: if you pay upon a wrong principle, you will never have content or discipline.

VI.

ON THE STATE OF THE SOUTHERN MAHRATTA COUNTRY.

TO THE HON. M. ELPHINSTONE.

Bangalore, 28th August, 1818.

SIR,

My stay has been too short in the Southern Mahratta provinces, and my time too much occupied in military operations, to have permitted me to acquire any very accurate knowledge either of the political state, or of the revenues of the country; yet, from my having held civil as well as military authority, and had constant communication with every class of the people, I had ample opportunity, as far as my leisure admitted, of learning their disposition towards our Government, and of ascertaining the means most likely to ensure future tranquillity.

2. In every conquered province, there are three points which require immediate attention; namely, the military protection, the political settlement, and the civil administration of the country: but of these, the military protection is by far the most important, since without it no order can be established or maintained, more particularly in a country long accustomed to anarchy, arising from the weakness of the sovereign, and the pretensions of turbulent feudatories.

3. The force now stationed in the Mahratta country between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, usually called the Carnatic, is barely sufficient for its protection; and if it is expected that it shall cover the districts of Bijapoor and Sholapoor, beyond the Kistna, and Rastiah's late jagheers on the north bank of that river, it ought to be reinforced with two additional battalions of Native infantry: the whole of the force, with the exception of that part which is required for garrisons, should be kept in

readiness for field-service. I do not apprehend that, while such a force is in the country, any serious disturbances can happen. The principal jagheerdars have too much at stake to wish to excite them. The condition of the Putwurdhans, and of the Dessye of Kittoor, will be much improved by the change of government. The Putwardhans will have more territory; both will be secured in the enjoyment of their possessions, instead of being exposed to constant attempts to diminish them, as when under the dominion of the Peishwah. The family of Goklah may be regarded as extinct. The elevation of that chief was too recent, and his conduct too violent, to have left him, even if he had lived, any chance of support from the inhabitants of his jagheers. Rastiah's administration was in general moderate and just; but there is, notwithstanding, no desire to see his jagheers restored, except among his immediate dependents. The Dessye of Nepauni is dissatisfied at being deprived of the districts of Chickori and Manowlee, and would readily join in any combination against us, which he thought was likely to be successful. But he is too wary, and has still too many possessions, acquired almost entirely from his connection with the British Government, to run any risk of losing them. He is, besides, not ignorant that he is detested by all the inhabitants of his jagheers for his oppressive and wanton cruelty, and that they would gladly co-operate in his destruction. During the late campaign, I received invitations from most of his villages to take possession of them. They did not even demand assistance; all that they asked was, that I would authorize their expelling the garrisons, and engage not to restore them to the Dessye after the war. I am therefore persuaded that he will remain quiet. Some of the petty zemindars will be more likely than the great jagheerdars to excite disturbances; but their acts, if they attempt any thing, will be those of banditti, rather than of rebels. The

strength of their country along the borders of Soondah and of the Goa territory, has enabled them for many years to resist the authority of the Peishwah's officers, to withhold their rents, and to levy contributions on travellers, or plunder them. The principal of these petty chiefs is the Dessye of Koodlague and Misricottah. He came in to me in January, on a promise of indemnity for all past offences. He had about three hundred and fifty armed followers. He retained fifty, and the remaining three hundred, many of whom were Abyssinians, or their descendants, were distributed, in parties of forty or fifty, among the peons whom I was then raising, and sent to different garrisons. The Dessye, who is a youth of about twenty years of age, told me that both his father and himself had been compelled to subsist by plunder, because they could not reside in their village without the danger of being treacherously seized by the Mahratta Government. I believe that the Government had cause to look after the father, but I think that the son is desirous of living peaceably. The garrisons of Bheeringhur and Phangur, two hill-forts, with their dependent districts, situated among the Western Ghauts, have long paid but a nominal submission to the Peishwah's authority. They received their killedars from Poonah, but attended by only a few followers, whom they could turn out at pleasure. The main body of the garrison in both places was composed of the country militia, who had for above a century enjoyed the rents of the neighbouring villages, as service-lands, together with the produce of the customs on goods passing to and from the sea-coast. They also received a small allowance in money from Poonah, both on their own account and on account of the killedars and their followers. Both places offered to capitulate on the fall of Belgaum, provided their arrears were paid. I rejected the terms. Bheeringhur did not surrender till June; and it was not till the beginning of the present month that Phanghur,

having lost all hope of succour, sent me a deputation composed of the acting killedar, and two of his head men, which arrived in camp on the 7th instant. On the 8th they agreed to give up the fort, on the single condition of being permitted to hold their ancient service-lands and fees. This was of course granted, and a karcoon, with a small party of peons, was sent back with them to take possession of the place. It is said that they will break their engagements, and that the inhabitants of the neighbouring jungles are a savage and faithless race, who will never submit to any regular government. I have certainly myself no apprehensions on this head, and am convinced that, if well treated, they will be found just as tractable as the inhabitants of the plains. As far as my own experience goes, I have never yet found what were usually called the wild tribes of the hills or jungles, to be any wilder than the people of the open country; but they are often more independent. Their petty chiefs are enabled, by the nature of the country, to resist a weak government, and to obtain favourable rents; and when a government, which fancies itself stronger, attempts to impose a higher rent or tribute, they resist, and are termed wild and turbulent. There are frequently unfavourable circumstances attending the situation of such districts, which render rents, apparently low, as high as they can easily bear; an attempt is made to raise them still higher, without ascertaining the true state of things, and rebellion follows, which would have been avoided, had care been previously taken to inspire confidence, and to show the inhabitants that no increase would be demanded, unless it could be easily paid.

4. The horsemen thrown out of employment are no doubt dissatisfied with the change, but they will not venture to rise; they have no leader; they fear the loss of their property in the villages, and their number is much smaller than is usually supposed. A great part of the horses em-

ployed in the Mahratta armies, are the property of men who do not belong to the military profession. Many of the wealthy inhabitants, most of the despandes, dessyes, and other hereditary civil officers of the potails and curnums of villages, and many even of the most substantial rayets, breed horses for the armies. They send them to the field mounted by their own domestics and labourers, and hire them to the jagheerdars or the Government. They are horse-dealers rather than soldiers; and when they find that there is no longer the same demand for horses as formerly, they will breed fewer, and seek employment for their funds in some other branch of trade. Rayets who send one or two horses to the field, do so merely for the purpose of raising money to pay their rents. They are not likely to join in any insurrection, for the cultivation of their land is their chief object, and the advantage which they will derive under our Government from enjoying in tranquillity the produce of their lands, is much greater than what they could ever obtain under the Mahratta dominion, exposed almost every year to the ravages of war. They wish for peace, because no class of men suffer so much as they do from war, when their fields are laid waste by the contending armies. There can therefore be no doubt that they will not only not act against us, but that they will assist in suppressing every hostile attempt in their respective villages.

5. The number of horsemen who depend for their livelihood solely on military service is very small; it probably does not exceed the proportion of one-tenth of the whole horsemen usually employed under the southern jagheerdars. It is too inconsiderable, and the individuals of which it is composed are too unconnected, to give any opposition to our Government. In calculating the causes which may give rise to disturbances, we should also consider the means we have of preventing them. We have in our favour, with the exception of a few disbanded horsemen, and the immediate servants of the late Government,

almost the whole body of the people. We have all the trading, manufacturing, and agricultural classes, and we have the potails and curnums of villages, and under them the setbundi, or local militia. With these advantages, if we keep a body of troops in the Carnatic ready for the field, it is scarcely possible that the peace of the country can meet with any serious interruption. The military force stationed in a newly-conquered country should always be a strong one, because, as it then leaves no hope of successful opposition, it deters the disaffected from attempting any thing; and the confidence which this state of security inspires, increases the resources of the country, and amply repays the additional military expense which may be incurred. It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of such a country, that it be so strongly occupied at first, as to be preserved in peace for some years. When this is done, a system of order gradually springs up, which is afterwards easily maintained.

6. The want of regular troops obliged me to raise, during the campaign, from nine to ten thousand peons, and three hundred horse. I disbanded, in the course of the last two months, three thousand four hundred peons. The remainder, about six thousand, may, after a few months, be placed upon lower pay, and be gradually reduced; at present they are distributed among the numerous forts and gurries with which the country is covered, and from which they cannot be withdrawn until it becomes more settled.

7. A survey of the forts ought to be made by a committee of officers, in order to determine in which of them it will be necessary to keep garrisons of regular troops or peons, and which of them may be left unoccupied. Such forts as cannot be garrisoned ought not to be hastily destroyed. They afford, in time of war, shelter to the inhabitants, who will themselves defend them against horse; and they will always be more useful to us, who depend

chiefly on our infantry, than to an enemy whose strength is in his irregular cavalry.

8. Upon the breaking up of an empire like the Peishwah's, it becomes a measure of necessity, as well as of humanity, to give employment to a portion of the irregular troops of the country, both with the view of preventing them from exciting disturbances, and of enabling them gradually to find some other means of subsistence. Where a choice is left, regulars only ought to be employed, for the sake both of economy and safety. If we compare the number of regulars and irregulars required for any particular service, and consider their respective efficiency for executing it, we shall find that the regulars are not one-half so expensive as the irregulars. The result will be the same whether we take the ordinary local militia, or the irregular corps, disciplined and commanded by an European officer. The expense of equipping corps so disciplined, increases in a greater degree than their efficiency, and they are at least twice as expensive as any regular troops. But there is another reason against the employment of irregulars as a matter of choice: it withdraws a great number of useful hands from the labour of the country. The place of one thousand regulars can hardly be supplied by less than five or six thousand irregulars. The loss of so many additional hands must proportionally diminish the produce of the country.

9. The events of the war have rendered the political settlement of the Southern States easier than it might otherwise have been. The whole of Gokla's jagheers have been resumed. Rastiah's jagheers have shared the same fate, with the exception of the village of Tullikattah, which has been left to him, as it is the residence of a part of his family. The districts of Manowlee and Chickori have been taken from Appah Dessye, and given up to the Rajah of Kolapore; but the Dessye has of course been allowed to

keep Nepauni, and also Sirkopah, which he obtained from Purseram Bhow.

10. In transferring Chickori to the Rajah of Kolapore, the three enaum villages which formerly belonged to his vakeel's brother were restored, and four villages were given as a jagheer to the vakeel Bhow Maharay himself. I meant at one time to have given him only two; but, on farther consideration, I thought it as well to satisfy the Bhow, by giving the whole, as the Rajah was as likely to be displeased with the grant in the one case as the other. It is said that the Rajah dislikes and fears the Bhow. The report has, I suspect, some foundation; for, when I proposed to the Bhow that I should only recommend, and that the Rajah should make the grant, he objected to it.

11. On the arrival of the reserve before Nepauni, Appah Dessye surrendered without delay the whole of the districts of Chickori and Manowlee, excepting twenty-four villages, which having appropriated to the support of his household troops and principal servants, he gave up with great reluctance, after an interval of six weeks spent in evasion. He has now nothing to give up, but something to receive. He is not entitled, from his conduct, to any compensation for the territory transferred to the Kolapore Rajah; but he is entitled, from the assurances given to him, to retain all the remaining part of his jagheer which he held at the breaking out of the war; to recover the part of his jagheer resumed by Raj Row, unless when a promise, as in the case of Purrusghur, has been made to the inhabitants, that they will not again be placed under his authority; and to obtain from the Government of Hyderabad an equivalent for his rights in the Nizam's territories. I have told his vakeels that he must not expect to recover any of these lost rights, unless he previously execute all that has been required of him. He has, from the very beginning of his career, pursued a system of throwing

into prison all the rich inhabitants, not only of his own districts, but of every district wherever he obtained a temporary authority, with the view of extorting money from them, and of seizing and keeping in confinement the women most remarkable for their beauty. Many of these unfortunate people had been in prison ten or twelve years, and many had died from cruel treatment every year. While I was in the neighbourhood of Nepauni, I heard of only a few prisoners, whom I ordered to be released. It was not until after I had marched from the place, that I learned that about three hundred still remained in confinement. I wrote to Appah Dessye to release them. He has set many at liberty, but many are still detained; and until the whole are set at liberty, I have directed some of his jagheer villages on the south bank of the Kistna, which were occupied during the war, not to be restored.

12. The peshcush, or rather the rent of the Dessye of Kittoor, never was regularly paid, and seldom without force. It is now converted into a fixed peshcush, and the zemindary erected into a summastanun. The peshcush is fixed at its former amount of Shahpoore rupees, 1,75,000, and the honorary dress (tushruf) to be given yearly by the sirkar to the Dessye, according to custom, at rupees 3,955.

13. The Dessye has paid no peshcush for the last two years. The peshcush, for the first of those years, has been remitted, on account of some expenses incurred by him during the war, but more on account of his early defection from the Peishwah. The whole of the peshcush for the last year is to be paid by the end of October.

14. Raj Row had assigned to the Dessye and the Putwurdhans, seranjami lands in each other's districts, with the view apparently of causing dissension between them. But neither party obeyed his orders. Both retained what they had before; for this reason, and still more for that of their

being ancient possessions of Kittoor, Bhagwaddi-Suptguon and Olkottah are continued to the Dessye.

15. By his sunnud, the Dessye was bound to maintain four hundred and seventy-three horse, and one thousand foot. He is now absolved from the keeping up of any contingent, and the district of Khannapoor, and an annual allowance of 25,000 rupees from the sirkar, are resumed, because these constituted the whole of what he actually received for furnishing his contingent, as the gudwal peshcush, estimated at 25,000 rupees, and the lands of Chintamun Row estimated at 68,473 rupees, though calculated as forming a part of the allowance for his contingent, were never given up to him,

16. The Dessye is perfectly satisfied with the present arrangement, and he has cause to be so; for, although his peshcush is not lowered, he is exempted from many private demands by the Peishwah's officers, with which he found it necessary to comply. His country is now freed from the incursions frequently made into it lately by the neighbouring jagheerdars and the Peishwah's troops, and will yield him a greater revenue; and he is secure in the possession of what he has. I have therefore no doubt that he feels the advantages of being under the protection of the British Government, and will endeavour to preserve them.

17. The Putwurdhans are the only great jagheerdars with whom an arrangement has not yet been made; but as they are to receive, and not to give, no difficulty is likely to be met with beyond what may arise from their discussions among themselves respecting their several shares of the additional allowances in money and land which may be granted by Government. I have not stated to their vakeels the amount proposed to be given; but they are desirous that, whatever it may be, the division should be left to be made among themselves. The Tagaone, Chinchanir, and Karnudwar chiefs, from the disposition they

showed at an early period to quit the Peishwah, are entitled to a greater proportion than the others, and it will therefore, be necessary that we make the distributions, unless they themselves express a desire that it should be made without our interference. Two lacs of rupees will, I think, be sufficient to satisfy all their expectations. This sum will be made up by a remission of the daishmook fees paid to the sirkar, by a transfer of such sirkar villages as are insulated among the lands of the Putwurdhans, and by making over a part of Rastiahs, resumed jagheer, on the north bank of the Kistna. The amount of the daishmook is variously estimated from fifteen to forty-five, or fifty thousand rupees. As soon as a correct account of it can be obtained, the lands required to make up the two lacs of rupees will be granted.

18. All the branches of the Putwurdhan family are popular in this country. They treat the inhabitants with great kindness, and their lands are well cultivated. Their attention to their improvement renders them averse to war. Their peaceful habits, the great value of their possessions, the facility with which we might seize them, and the benefits they have derived from their connection with us, hold out the strongest security that they will discourage every attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the country.

19. The remaining jagheerdars of the greatest importance are those of Nergoond, and Ramdroog, and the Gerhurroh families of Gujundughur and Madoolah. These jagheers are all personal, and not held by military tenures. The jagheerdars of Ramdroog and Madoolah were however with Raj Row during the war, but were paid as jemadars of horse. The Ramdroog never left the Peishwah after his defeat at Ashti. The Madoolah never came away with Appah Dessye. The Madoolah horse, though few, are esteemed the best in the Carnatic. The Jagheerdar of Nergoond, though allied by marriage to Goklah,

and though Goklah's mother and daughter were in his fort, was friendly from the very commencement of hostilities. The brother of the Gujundughur Jagheedar was for some time actually employed against us under Muddun Sing; but he was recalled by the Jagheerdar, on my threatening to treat the jagheer as a hostile district. These Jagheerdars had nothing to expect from Raj Row; and as they have no wish for military service, they will think themselves fortunate if left in the quiet enjoyment of their lands. We have no claim upon them either for rent or service; but the Nergoond Jagheerdar had obtained from Goklah some villages, which I have ordered to be resumed.

20. The petty Jagheerdar of Hibly, whose ancestors possessed both Nergoond and Ramdroog, joined us on the breaking out of the war, and will for his services receive an addition to his jagheer of lands yielding a rent of two or three thousand rupees. Eshwunt Row Garpurrah has been put in possession of all his villages except three, which belonging to Chukun, have been transferred with that district to the rajah of Kolapore. But as Eshwunt Row will be satisfied with getting other villages in the Carnatic of the same value, they will be given up to him. The vakeels of the principal jagheerdars have brought forward claims to official lands and fees, of which they have been deprived by Raj Row. It will be advisable to grant them some lands, not as a matter of right, but of indulgence. The whole will not exceed five or six thousand rupees.

21. The total amount of grants in the Carnatic to jagheerdars and others, for their conduct during the war, will probably be nearly as follows:

To the Putwurdhans	Rs. 200,000
To Eshwunt Row Garpurrah, the Hibly jagheerdar, and the vakeels of the jagheerdars	30,000
	Rs. 230,000

I do not reckon the districts given to the Kolapore Rajah, because they have been taken from Nepauni; nor do I include any compensation to Appah Dessye, because he is entitled to none.

22. The jagheerdars may be made to maintain from one-fifth to one-fourth of their nominal contingents during peace, and one-third during war. The number of horses have greatly diminished since the time when the Mahrattas were accustomed to lay all their neighbours under contribution. They will decrease rapidly now, as the demand for them for the purposes of war will in a great measure cease, and in place of them most of the owners will probably rear cattle for husbandry.

23. There was no opportunity during the campaign of acquiring any knowledge of the revenue. Not only the collectors, but the officers of accounts absconded, so that it will stil require some months, and probably the whole of the current year, before any tolerably accurate estimate can be formed of the state of the revenue during the last eight or ten years. We know, however, that it has declined greatly since the succession of Raj Row, from the system of renting and sub-renting, and the frequent disturbances arising from the weakness of the government. The most flourishing period of the revenue during the last fifty years, was when the country was under the Mysore dominion. The sum entered in the partition treaty schedules of 1792 is supposed to have been almost one-fourth more than the real amount. The revenue may undoubtedly be again brought to that standard; but it will be necessary to proceed with great caution, and to keep the assessment very moderate for some years.

24. The soil is in general extremely fertile; but as the cultivators are few and poor, the country cannot possibly be improved, unless their rents are low. The settlements should be annual. Every rayet should be at

liberty to cultivate as much or as little as he pleases, and should pay only for what he cultivates. The rents of the rayets should be collected by the heads of villages, and be paid by them to the teshildars of the collectors. An agricultural survey of the country should be made, in order to ascertain the better its resources, and to establish a fixed and moderate assessment. But as such a survey, if precipitately undertaken, would cause an alarm that an increase of rent was intended, and thereby diminish cultivation, it would be proper not to begin it for three or four years, when the inhabitants will have acquired more confidence in our forbearance."

25. The coining of money, and the levying of customs on goods passing through the country, by the jagheerdars, are prejudicial to trade, and ought to be abolished whenever the jagheerdars can be prevailed upon to accept a fair compensation for the sacrifice of these rights.

26. The dessyes, potails, and curnums have, in general, considerable enaums. It is better that it should be so, as it establishes a respectable class of landholders and gradations in society between the cultivators and Government; and, as by giving to the heads of villages more influence, it renders them more useful as instruments of internal administration. Some confusion has arisen from revenue officers of one class having, by purchase or violence, obtained the offices and enaums of those of another. The dessye or despundi of a small district is sometimes both potail and curnum of several villages. His right cannot now be set aside; but the evil may be corrected by insisting on his employing fit persons to execute the duties, and making them a sufficient allowance.

27. All enaums have already been guaranteed to the owners by proclamation, but many enaums will be found, on examination, to have been given clandestinely by revenue officers without authority. Every one, from the curnum

of a village to the sirsoobah of the Carnatic, grants both lands and pensions. The sirsoobah, or his deputy, when he is about to quit his office, fabricates a number of enaum sunnuds; he gives away some, and sells the rest; the new sirsoobah resumes some, but continues a part of them. Where such enaums have not, by long possession, become in some degree the fair property of the possessors, they ought to be resumed. I would consider all grants of this kind, since the cession of the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan in 1792, as resumable; but the Mysore conquests did not extend beyond the Gulpurrbah; and the year 1792 can therefore have no particular applicability to the rest of the Carnatic and the districts south of the Kistna. In those countries, I would therefore substitute the year of Nana Furnavee's removal from power, or of Raj Row's accession, because there has since been no regular control over the disposal of the sirkar's property.

28. It would be advisable that no zillah court should be introduced for some years. The collector ought, in the mean time, to act as judge and magistrate, and the teshildars of districts, and heads of villages under his superintendence, to manage the police, and exercise judicial authority in petty suits within their respective circuits.

29. The collector should have under him two subordinate collectors, one at Bijapoor, or Shulapoor, and the other at Haveri or Ranie Bednoor. The collector should, as usual in such cases, be called the principal collector, as it serves to give him more weight in the eyes of the natives.

30. I am convinced, from long experience, that the system of management by principal and subordinate collectors is the best calculated for an extensive collectorate, particularly where the territory is a recent acquisition, and requires much investigation; and that it is also the best adapted for producing a succession of efficient collectors. A subordinate collectorship is the best of all schools for acquiring revenue knowledge. The subordinate collector

has all the practice of his principal in revenue details; and being exempted from all public correspondence and duties of a general nature, he has more time to examine and understand them thoroughly.

31. With the exception of the small tract south of the Werdah, the other districts fell into my hands during the progress of the war. The enemy in all had collected more or less of the revenue of the year, and in some which were last occupied, the whole, so that in such districts a considerable expense was incurred for an establishment of revenue officers and irregular troops, without any returns. The teshildars and their irregulars were sometimes driven out of a district, after having obtained possession of it, and every district was too much disturbed to admit of any jummabundi or regular settlement of the revenue being made. The collections, or rather contributions, were carrying on both by the enemy and us at the same time, and in the same districts. I looked to the collections merely as the means of facilitating our military operations, by lessening the resources of the enemy, and increasing our own. Whatever was got in the struggle was so much gained from the enemy, and might be regarded rather as captured property than as revenue. Under all these disadvantages, enough was realized to defray the charges of all the civil establishments of a body of three hundred horse, and of a body of peons amounting at one time to nearly ten thousand, and to leave a balance in the treasury on the 8th instant, of star pagodas 52, 65, 32, 444; so that the campaign in the Carnatic may be said to have been carried on without any expense to Government.

32. The preparation of the English revenue accounts has been hitherto delayed by the death of the English writer brought from Madras; but they are now nearly finished, and will be forwarded to you in a few days by Mr. Chaplin. I have, &c.

VII.

NOTES ON RICARDO'S POLITICAL ECONOMY. 1820.

VALUE.

He maintains with Adam Smith, that labour is the measure of value. That in the early stages of society, the exchangeable value of commodities "depends solely on the comparative quantity of labour expended on each."

P. 8. "In the same country, double the quantity of labour may be necessary to produce a given quantity of food and necessaries at one time, that may be necessary at another and a distant time; yet the labourers' reward may possibly be very little diminished."

P. 24. No alteration in the wages of labour could produce any alteration in the relative value of these commodities, &c. (N.B. While the capitals are equal.)

It is always the quantity of labour required at the present time which regulates value.

If, by improvements in machinery, two commodities, now of equal value, were to be manufactured, the one with one-half, the other with one-quarter of the labour now required, they would fall in value in proportion to the diminution of labour; and the exchangeable value of the one would only be half of that of the other.

It is always supposed that the capitals are equal, and in the same proportion of fixed and circulating.

He supposes the capital of the fisher and hunter to amount each to 100 fixed, and 100 circulating capitals —total 200*l.* That in both 210*l.*, instead of 200*l.*, would be required, when wages rose 10 per cent., to produce the former quantity of commodities; that they would,

therefore, remain at the same relative value, and profits would be equally reduced in both trades.

P. 28. "The relative value of commodities is subject to fluctuations, from a rise of wages, and consequent fall of profits, if the fixed capitals employed by either be of unequal value, or of unequal durability."

He supposes that all capital must yield the *same rate* of profit. That fixed capital must, in proportion to its annual waste, yield the profit of an annuity. That if when profits were 10 per cent. wages rose 6 per cent. profits in all trades would fall to 4 per cent. But that, as no more labour is bestowed, no increase of value could arise; and that the fall in value would be greater in proportion as the share of fixed capital was greater; because the profits of paid capital would be reduced from those of an annuity at 10, to one at 4 per cent.

P. 34. "By a rise in the price of labour under 7 per cent. which has no effect on the prices of commodities wholly produced by labour, a fall of no less than 68 per cent. is effected on those commodities wholly produced by machinery."

He supposes a machine which has cost 20,000*l.*, to last 100 years, and to produce annually, without the labour of man, goods of the value of 2000*l.* That labour so rose that profits fell to 3 per cent. That as the owner's profits must fall to 3 per cent., and that as he pays no wages, the fall of

RENT.

P. 48. "Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil."

P. 50. "No one would pay (rent) for the use of land where there was an abundant quantity not yet appropriated."

P. 52. "Suppose land No. 1, 2, 3, to yield, with an equal employment of capital and labour, 100, 99, and 80 quarters of corn, net produce. If only No. 1 were cultivated, the whole net produce would belong to the cultivators. When No. 2 was cultivated, rent would commence on No. 1, which would pay 10 quarters; and when No. 3 was cultivated, rent would commence on No. 2, which would pay 10 quarters, while the rent of No. 3 would rise to 20 quarters."

profits must be the value of his goods.

Whatever portion is paid for improvements, for the erection of buildings, &c. though called rent, is actually profit of stock.

This abundance of unappropriated land, in many parts of India, would probably hinder rent from being paid, even though the assessment left an excess above the profit of stock.

He supposes that the land last cultivated pays no rent, but only the profits of stock. That, as there cannot be two rates of profit, the landlords of 1 and 2 will get as rent, the difference between the net produce of their land, and of 3; because it is the same to the farmer whether he cultivates 3 rent-free, or pays 20 quarters for No. 1.

P. 54. Rent is always the difference between the produce obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of capital and labour.

It is the same thing whether capital is employed on new land, or in augmenting the produce of old. A farmer who employs a capital of 1000*l.* and obtains 100 quarters of wheat, if he employ another 1000*l.* on the same land, and obtain 85 quarters additional, the landlord would take 15 quarters as rent.

P. 55. The reason then why raw produce rises in comparative value, is, because more labour is employed in the production of the last portion obtained.

In the progress of society the comparative value of raw produce increases, while that of manufactured decreases; because by taking inferior land into cultivation, raw produce requires more labour, while, by improvements in machinery, manufactures require less.

"The *value of corn* is regulated by the quantity of labour bestowed on its production on that quality of land, or with that portion of capital, which pays no rent."

Improvements in agriculture tend to lower rent, whether they make the same land yield more produce with the same capital, or the same produce with a smaller capital.

Corn is not high, because a rent is paid; but a rent is paid because corn is high.

If the land yield more produce without an increase of population, there will be no demand for the excess, and therefore, the worst land

No reductions would take place in the price of corn,

although landlords should forego the whole of their rent.

P. 62. "Rent *increases* most rapidly as the disposable land decreases in its productive powers."

P. 71. "Whatever diminishes the inequality in the produce obtained from successive portions of capital employed on the same, or on new land, tends to lower rent."

P. 74. "It is obvious that the landlord is doubly benefited by difficulty of production. First, he obtains a greater share, and secondly, the commodity in which he is paid is of greater value."

must be withdrawn from cultivation, or the portion of capital last employed on the same land; and as the inequality between the produce of the first and last portions of land or of capital will be diminished, rent must be diminished.

In the case, however, where the improvement consists in obtaining the same produce by the saving of labour, or with a smaller capital, though money-rent would fall in consequence of the diminution of labour, corn-rent would fall, rise, or remain stationary, according to the increase or decrease of the difference between the capitals employed. If four capitals, 50, 60, 70, 80, yield equal produce—if five be saved from each, corn-rent remains as before. If 20 be saved from 80, the least productive of profit, corn-rent falls; if from 50, it rises, because the difference is increased.

NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE.

P. 83. "It is then the desire which every capitalist

has of diverting his funds from a less to a more profitable employment, that prevents the market-price of commodities from continuing for any length of time, either much above or much below their natural price."

WAGES.

P. 85. "The natural price of labour is that price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist and perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution."

P. 86. "The market-price of labour is the price which is really paid for it from the natural operation of the proportion of the supply to the demand; labour is dear when it is scarce, and cheap when it is abundant."

P. 88. "Capital may increase at the same time that its value rises. An addition may be made to the food and clothing, at the same time that more labour may be required to produce the additional quantity than before."

"A capital may increase without its value increasing,

He observes, that when capital increases while its value rises, "the natural price of labour, which always depends on the price of food, &c. will rise;" but that when capital increases, while its value remains stationary or diminishes, the natural price of labour will remain

and even while its value is actually diminishing."—"The additions may be made by the aid of machinery without any increase, and even with an absolute diminution in the proportional quantity of labour required to produce them."

stationary or fall. "But in both cases the market-rate of wages will rise; for, in proportion to the increase of capital will be the increase in the demand for labour." Although the increase of capital will always finally increase the demand for labour, there is a case in which it may be some time before it does so, and during which the demand may even fall. If while I employ 1000*l.* in paying wages, I find a machine which will do the same work for 500*l.* I shall have a disposable capital of 500*l.*; but until it is augmented, I cannot pay 1000*l.* to labourers.

P. 95. "The friends of humanity cannot but wish that in all countries the labouring classes should have a taste for comforts and enjoyments. There cannot be a better security against a superabundant population."

P. 101. "When wages rise, it is generally because the increase of wealth and capital have occasioned a new demand for labour,

It is not very clear why a rise of wages should not raise prices. It is evident enough that population and wealth remaining the same as be-

which will infallibly be attended with an increased production of commodities. To circulate these additional commodities, even at the same prices as before, more money is required."—"Whenever a commodity is required in greater abundance than before, its relative value rises. If more hats were wanted, their price would rise. If more gold (money) were required, gold would rise."

"If then all commodities rose in price, gold could not come from abroad to purchase those dear commodities; but would go from home to be employed with advantage in purchasing the comparatively cheaper foreign commodities."

"It appears then that the rise of wages will not raise the prices of commodities."

"All commodities could not rise at the same time, without an addition to the quantity of money."

"To purchase any additional quantity of gold from abroad, commodities at home must be cheap, not dear."

fore, there cannot be a demand for the same quantity of commodities at a higher price; but might there not be a demand for a smaller quantity at the increased price, amounting to the same value?

One would think that those who paid wages would add the increase to the price of their produce, and if they could not sell the usual quantity, reduce it to the demand, and either sell the smaller quantity at the reduced price, or the greater at the old price, as might be found most profitable.

If the rise of wages cannot be thrown upon the price of commodities, it falls upon the particular classes who produce them, without affecting landlords and stockholders. If thrown upon the commodity, landlords, &c. would have a share of the burden. It might not be their full proportion, because they might save a part by reduced consumption, or by the manufacturers, &c. finding it necessary to throw a part upon their profits.

PROFITS.

P. 109. "Neither the farmer, who cultivates that quality of land which regulates price, nor the manufacturer, who manufactures goods, sacrifice any portion of the produce for rent. The whole value of their commodities is divided into two portions only; one constitutes the profits of stock, the other the wages of labour."

"Supposing corn and manufactured goods always to sell at the same price, profits would be high or low in proportion as wages were high or low."

P. 115. "Thus we see, that whether the produce belonging to the farmer be 180, 170, 160, 150 quarters, he always obtains the same sum of 720*l.* for it; the price increasing in an inverse proportion to the quantity."

P. 134. "Thus then I have endeavoured to show, that a rise of wages would not raise the prices of commodities, but would invariably lower profits; and as the farmer must always retain the profits of stock, rent must always fall on the consumer. Increase of wages, from rise in the price of corn, must always fall on profits. As the farmer's share of the produce diminishes as the price rises, it is as much his interest permanently as that of the manufacturer, that the price should not rise; because he is obliged, as a consumer, to pay a higher price for articles into which raw produce enters.

P. 133. In proportion as capital accumulates, rent and wages absorb all profits.

It appears that, even if the prices of commodities were permanently raised by high wages, as (erroneously) supposed in the above note, it would not make any difference in the loss of profit to the employers of labour. The increase of wages is no doubt a sum withdrawn from profits. The transfer of capital will prevent it from falling more on one trade than on another. If a hatter,

condly, that if the prices of commodities could be raised, still the effect on profits would be the same, and that in fact the value of the medium only in which prices and profits are estimated would be lowered."

from a rise of wages, should sell his hats for 110*l.* instead of 100*l.*, his money-profits would be the same as before; but as he would be obliged to pay *one-tenth* more for every commodity, and more for his raw materials, and labourers at the increased prices, he would be no better than if his profits had been diminished, and prices remained as before.

Landlords and annuitants could not be made to bear any part of the increased wages, because their portion of consumption, though raised in price, only compensates the rise in the cost of the raw material. It can do no more, because the rise both of the raw material and of wages cannot be added to the price of the manufacture; for if when wages rise, the same rise be made in prices, the labourers will be just as they were—they will get more money-wages, but no more corn or commodities. They must therefore get a second rise, equal to the first, and commodities must be raised again to

answer this new rise, which is absurd.

FOREIGN TRADE.

P. 135. "No extension of foreign trade will immediately increase the amount of value in a country, although it will tend very powerfully to increase the mass of commodities."

"As the value of all foreign goods is measured by the quantity of the produce of our land, and labour which is given for them, we should have no greater value, if by the discovery of new markets we obtained double the quantity of foreign goods in exchange for a given quantity of ours."

Foreign trade can only increase profits by importing, at a cheaper rate, corn and other necessaries of the labourer. No importation of articles used exclusively by the rich can raise profits; but their cheapness and abundance, while they increase our enjoyments, enable us to save and accumulate; and in this way they have an effect similar to profit.

P. 140. "If by the introduction of cheap foreign goods I can save 20 per cent. from my expenditure, the effect will be precisely the same as if machinery had lowered the expense of their production; but profits would not be raised."

P. 142. "Foreign Trade has no tendency to raise the profits of stock, unless the commodities imported be

Whatever diminishes labour, lowers price; but has no effect on profit.

Whatever diminishes wa-

of that description on which the wages of labour are expended."

"'The remarks' "apply equally to home trade."

ges, raises profit; but has no effect on price.

P. 144. "In one and the same country, profits, generally speaking, are always on the same level."—"It is not so between different countries."

This is because capital, though it goes easily to equalize profits from one district to another of the same country, does not readily remove to a foreign country.

P. 145. "The quantity of wine which she (Portugal) shall give for the cloth of England, is not determined by the respective quantities of labour devoted to each."

The cloth might in England be the labour of . . 100 men
The wine in do. 120 :
The wine in Portugal . 80 :
The cloth in do. 90 :

Yet Portugal, though she could produce cloth with less labour than England, would find it advantageous to take cloth from England; because she could, by applying her capital to wine in place of cloth, get her cloth with the labour of 80 in place of 90 men.

P. 153. "But the diminution of money in one country, and its increase in another, do not operate on the price of one commodity only, but on the prices of

He supposes that England discovers a mode of making her own wine. Portugal now pays in money for her cloth. The accumulation of money in England raises the price

all."—"The price of cloth, from being 45*l.* in one country, and 50*l.* in the other, would probably fall to 49*l.* or 48*l.* in Portugal, and rise to 46*l.* or 47*l.* in England, and not afford a sufficient profit, after paying a premium for a bill, to induce any merchant to import that commodity."

"It is thus that the money of each country is apportioned to it only in such quantities as may be necessary to regulate a profitable trade of barter."

P. 165. "Whenever the current of money is forcibly stopped, and when money is prevented from settling at its just level, there are no limits to the possible variation of exchange." The effects are similar to those which follow when a paper money, not exchangeable for specie at the will of the of cloth, and prevents its exportation. England, in such a case, must export gold as a commodity, until she has no more than her proper share for carrying on a trade of barter, and her commodities will then fall to their proper price.

The greater facility in working goods, the shorter distances to which they are to be sent in exchange for gold, are the only two circumstances which regulate the comparative value of money in the different countries of the world, and make it most abundant and cheapest in those countries which have the advantage of easy production and short distance.

Whenever a country forces into circulation too much paper-money, or forcibly retains more specie than is necessary for circulation, she makes the exchange unfavourable to herself. When each country has its own proper quantity of money, the exchange will be at par, and 100*l.* in England, or the

holder, is forced into circulation.

silver in 100*l.* will purchase a bill of 100*l.* or an equal quantity of silver, in France, Spain, &c.

The exchange is never ascertained by the comparative value of money in commodities; but by estimating the value of the currency of one country in the currency of another.

TAXES.

P. 172. "The desire which every man has to keep his station in life, occasions most taxes, whether laid on capital or income, to be paid from income."

Both he and Adam Smith condemn all taxes on the transfer of property, "*stamp duties*, and duties on the registration of bonds, &c."

"It should be the policy of Government never to lay such taxes as will inevitably fall on capital, since by so doing they impair the funds for the maintenance of labour."

"They prevent the national capital from being distributed in the way most beneficial to the community."

P. 175. "Those taxes, however, are easily collected, and this by many may be thought to afford some compensation for their injurious effects."

In India they should perhaps be abolished entirely; but certainly in all cases affecting the rayets, who are continually borrowing to pay their rents.

TAXES ON RAW PRODUCE.

P. 176. "Any tax which may be imposed on the cul-

Taxes on rent fall on the landlord.

tivator, whether in the shape of land-tax, tithes, or a tax on the produce when obtained, will increase the cost of production, and will therefore raise the price of raw produce."

Taxes on land, tithes, raw produce, and poor-rates, fall on consumers. Taxes on wages fall on profits. Taxes which raise the price of raw produce, so far as they raise the price of the labourer's necessaries, fall on profits.

P. 182. "It would raise the price of raw produce by a sum equal to the tax, and would therefore fall on each consumer in proportion to his consumption."

"It would raise the wages of labour, and lower profits."

Taxes which raise the price of raw produce cannot fall on the cultivator, because if they did, he would remove his capital to some other employment.

P. 178. "In the case of a tax on raw produce, of a land-tax or tithes, the corn-rent of land will vary, while the money-rent will remain as before."

The quantity of corn will not be altered by the tax; but as rent is regulated by the profit of No. 3, which pays no rent, and is always equal to the difference between the produce of No. 3, and land of a better quality, Nos. 1 and 2, or between 160, 170, and 180 quarters.

The rent is equal to the absolute difference between those numbers, or to 10 on No. 2, and 20 on No. 1; but when a tax of 8*s*. per quarter, or 10 per cent. is imposed, the *absolute difference* is lessened, though the

P. 193. "Taxes on production, or on the profits of stock, whether applied immediately to profits, or indirectly, by taxing the land or its produce, have this advantage over other taxes: no class of the community

can escape them, and each contributes according to his means."

relative one remains: since No. 1 and 2 pay the tax on 180 and 170 quarters, instead of 160, as No. 3. Had all paid the tax on 160 only, no fall would have taken place in the corn-rent; but as they do not, the corn-rent falls.

P. 194. "If 100*l.* is my fair proportion of the expenses of the country, the virtue of taxation consists in making sure that I shall pay that 100*l.* neither more nor less"—"and that cannot be effected in any manner so securely as by taxes on wages, profits, or raw produce."

As No. 3 must always yield the profit of stock, it must always add to price what is taken in tax, and always yield the sum of 640*l.* The cultivator of No. 1, also in the same way adds the tax to the price, and therefore pays the same money-rent; but though the difference of the money-produce of No. 1 and 3 is the same as before, yet, as the price of corn is greater, this difference is equal to the price of fewer quarters of corn, and corn-rent falls. It falls by a quantity of corn equal to the tax on the 20 quarters difference of produce which the cultivator must now deduct from the rent.

P. 195. "The probable effect of a tax on raw produce, would be to raise the

The tax could not raise the price of all commodities, because the same quantity

price of raw produce, and of all the commodities in which raw produce entered, but not in any degree proportioned to the tax; while other commodities in which no raw produce entered, such as articles made of the metals and of the earths, would fall in price, so that the same quantity of money as before would be adequate to the whole circulation."

P. 196. "A tax which should have the effect of raising the price of all home productions would not discourage exportation, excepting during a very limited time."

"The tax would produce the same effect as an alteration of money confined to a single country."—"That country might not be able to sell, but she would be able to buy, because importable commodities would not be raised in price; under these circumstances nothing, but money could be exported. Part of the tax would fall on wages and profits, and part on the price of earthen and metallic articles, by the transfer of capital to these manufactures. The whole amount of produce and circulation would remain as before, because though individuals from paying the tax would have less to expend, government would just have so much more.

If all home productions were raised, they could not be exported; but money would fall, and be exported for foreign articles, until its scarcity would raise the price of the remainder, when goods would fall in price, and be again exported as before.

ported."—"A nation cannot be exhausted of its money, for after a certain quantity has left it, the value of the remainder will rise."

TAX ON RENT.

P. 200. "A tax on rent would affect rent only; it would fall wholly on landlords, and could not be shifted to any class of consumers."

TITHES.

P. 205. "Lands of the worst quality, as well as the best, pay tithes, and exactly in proportion to the quantity of produce obtained from them. Tithes are therefore an equal tax."

P. 207. "The chief objection against tithes is, that they are not a permanent and fixed tax, but increase in value in proportion as the difficulty of producing corn increases."

Tithes fall on the consumers, like all taxes on raw produce.

They resemble rent in augmenting both in quantity and value, with the difficulty of production.

As the country improves, the net produce of land diminishes in proportion to the gross produce; but as tithes are a tenth of the gross, they become a larger share of the net produce.

Tithes do not discourage cultivation more than an equal amount would do raised in any other way, because all taxes are paid from the net produce of the country.

LAND-TAX.

P. 211. "A land-tax levied in proportion to the rent on land, is in effect a tax on rent."—"It will not affect raw produce, but will fall wholly on the landlords."

"But if a land-tax be imposed on all cultivated land, however moderate that tax may be, it will be a tax on produce, and will therefore raise its price."

He shows that if the tax be laid on all land in proportion to its produce, it does not differ from tithes; that if it be laid on all land at the same rate per acre, "it will raise the price of corn in proportion to the tax paid by the cultivator of the land of the worst quality," and will therefore *increase the rent* of all the owners of the better land, without benefit to the State.

TAXES ON GOLD.

P. 226. "Corn being a commodity indispensably necessary to every one, little effect would be produced on it in consequence of a tax, and therefore the supply could not be long excessive, even if the producers had great difficulty in removing their capitals from the land. The price of corn therefore will speedily be raised by taxation."

"If the mines which sup-

He supposes that the price of corn would rise almost immediately, and throw the tax on the consumer, because the demand of every person for food remains as before. He supposes that the quantity of gold would diminish slowly, by the poorer mines being shut; and that as the value could not rise until the diminution took place, the money-owners, not those who used it, would pay. The

ply us with gold were in this country, and if gold were taxed, it could not rise in relative value to other things till its quantity were reduced."

demand for gold is not for a specific quantity, as in the case of food and clothing, but is regulated entirely by its value, and the value by the quantity.

TAXES ON PROFITS.

P. 245. "Taxes on luxuries fall upon those only who make use of them."

"Whatever *raises* the *wages* of labour lowers the profits of stock, therefore every tax on any commodity consumed by the labourer has a tendency to lower the rate of profits."

P. 253. "A tax on the profits of the farmer is not a tax proportioned to the gross produce of the land, but to its net produce, after the payment of rent, wages, and all other charges."

P. 254. "A tax on the profits of stock always leaves corn-rent unaltered, and therefore money-rent varies with the prices of corn; but a tax on raw produce, or tithes, never leaves corn-rent unaltered, but generally leaves money-rent the same as before."

He shows that a tax of 10 per cent. will affect the prices of commodities, not in the same, but in different rates, according to the nature of their capital, because if it did not, the rates of profit would become unequal. That a rise or fall in the value of money would affect *prices unequally*. That the argument of those who maintained that the Bank restriction had not depreciated currency, because all commodities did not rise in the same proportion, was not correct. That in a country without taxes, an alteration in the value of money would operate in an equal proportion on the prices of all commodities. But that in a country where there are taxes, it could not do this, because it would render profits unequal, as a fall in the value of money would raise the

P. 255. "By taxing the profits of the farmer, you do not burden him more than if you exempted his profits from the tax; and the landlord has a decided interest that his tenants' profits should *be taxed*, as it is only on that condition that he himself remains really untaxed."

profits of taxed articles above the general level, until equalized by the transfer of capital.

If the profits of the farmer are not taxed 10 per cent., like those of other trades, the price of corn does not rise, and he pays 10 per cent. more for all articles. If his profits are taxed, corn rises 10 per cent., and after paying the tax, leaves him the same amount as before.

While the *farmer* is *not taxed* like other trades, the landlord has no rise in the price of his corn-rent to balance the increased price of 10 per cent. on all other articles. When the farmer is taxed, the landlord gets a rise of 10 per cent. on his corn, which balances the 10 per cent. additional price of articles of expenditure, and leaves him untaxed.

N.B.—The above reasoning would be true, if the mine furnishing money were in the same country; but as it is not, all commodities could not rise in price without more money to circulate

them, and more could not be got for dear articles. Even if prices did rise, the export of gold for cheap foreign goods, would raise its price until the home goods fell to their old level.

TAXES ON WAGES.

P. 258. "The ultimate effects which will result from such taxes then, are precisely the same which result from a direct tax on profits."

The tax falls entirely on the employers of labour. It *cannot* raise the prices of commodities.

P. 274. "If they could all raise the price of their goods so as to remunerate themselves with a profit for the tax, as they are all consumers of each other's commodities, it is obvious that the tax could never be paid."

He shows, that if Adam Smith's doctrine were true, that the tax raises prices, and that the farmer deducts it from his rent, manufacturers would repay themselves by the rise, and there would be nobody to pay the tax but the landlords, who must for this end consume all commodities.

P. 279. "If the trade in the precious metals were perfectly free, and money could be exported without any expense whatever, the exchange could be no otherwise in every country than at par."—"Even with the expenses of transporting them, the exchange could never in any of them devi-

The stockholder and landlord would pay nothing to the tax. The manufacturer could gain nothing by raising the price, for he could throw no part of the tax upon them. If he sold to the stockholder the goods which cost him 10*l.* for 12*l.*, his profit is 2*l.* If the tax is 1*l.* his profit will be re-

ate more from par than by these expenses."

duced to 1*l.* It will be no more if he add the tax to the price, as the other dealers will do the same; he must pay 11*l.* and sell for 13*l.*; and after paying 1*l.* to the tax, will have only 1*l.* as profit.

But the prices could not possibly be raised by the tax, because this would again raise provisions and wages, and the rise of wages must be compensated by another rise of goods, and so on without end.

He shows, that if 10 millions only being required, 11 shall be forced into circulation, whether in specie or paper, the exchange would be 9 per cent. against England; if 12 million, 16 per cent., and if 20, 50 per cent. —that the prices of goods would be doubled, but would not disturb foreign commerce, as the difference of exchange would be allowed on both sides in the bills for the import and export goods.

TAXES ON OTHER COMMODITIES THAN RAW PRODUCE.

P. 302. "By cancelling the National Debt, one man's income might be raised from 1000*l.* to 1500*l.*; but another man would be lowered from 1500*l.* to 1000*l.* These two men's incomes now amount to 2500*l.* They would amount to no more then."

It is clear that neither income nor expenditure would be diminished; the same property would remain, but it would have changed hands.

One objection may be made to his plan of redeeming at once the National Debt, by each person paying for his share by giving up a part of his capital. It is, that each person would expect, by delay, that his share would be lessened by the increasing revenue of the country.

As the transfer of capital equalizes taxes and profits, it might perhaps be practicable, by limiting taxation to a very few principal heads, greatly to simplify and improve the revenue. If income could be ascertained without vexation, it would be the best object for taxation.

VIII.

MAXIMS, SUGGESTIONS, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES, COLLECTED FROM THE VARIOUS WRITINGS OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

KEEP your temper.

Be slow to take, and never give offence in official correspondence or communications; and abstain even from the use of expressions which, though not generally calculated to give offence, may yet be taken offensively.

When a question is once decided, whatever difference of opinion may have existed upon it among those whose duty it was to consider it, discussion should at once give way to co-operation.

There is no use, but much unnecessary trouble, in disputing a question where the argument you favour is at all doubtful, and not clear.

Write down a thought when it occurs to you.

A public man should give up his situation when he finds that he is no longer capable of performing the duties of it efficiently.

Government ought to be extremely cautious in passing censure on appeals from its subordinate officers, because, as almost every appeal must be against the decision either of the Commander-in-chief or of Government, it would evidently tend to prevent the complaints of individuals for real or imaginary grievances from reaching the superior authority at home.

Do what is right; never mind clamour.

Temper and perseverance in a right course must always insure success.

Improvement in civil affairs must always proceed slowly; more particularly where much is to be undone that ought never to have been done.

Many measures of Government ought only to be adopted as you have servants properly qualified to carry them into effect; to attempt them without, is only to create confusion and useless expense.

A public man should have no motive but the good of his Government and his own reputation, which are inseparably connected.

What India wants most is a free export of her produce to England, as is permitted from England to India. Admission to all our silks and coloured goods, &c. on moderate duties.

If you want discipline, you must support the respectability of commandants of corps; this, more than any thing, is wanting.

All armies, but more particularly mercenary armies, such as we have in India, require something like service to keep up their attention when, for any length of time, we have no war. The best thing is distant marches to and from a foreign territory.

A Governor should always be a man who will maintain the system prescribed by the Court of Directors.

You do great injustice to a Governor if you give him counsellors adverse to the system he is enjoined to follow, as well as great injustice to the Company and their subjects.

In recommending new systems, people are too apt to think that mankind are mere pieces of machinery, on which it is perfectly harmless to make experiments every day.

When we are actually at war, it is not the business of a subordinate government to ask questions about the origin or justice of it; but to use every exertion to enable the superior government to get out of the war as well as possible.

Of our troops, one to five, or even ten, of the enemy is enough.

Government loses all its dignity when a bankrupt is employed to rule over his creditors.

Nothing is more unphilosophical, and, what is of more consequence, more imprudent, than to show a slight to any person however humble his capacity. There is hardly any one who ever forgives it. True philosophy consists, not so much in despising the talents or wealth of other men, as in bearing our own fortune, whatever it may be, with an unaltered mind.

It is always dangerous, and often fatal, to have a force barely sufficient to maintain ourselves in a hostile country, more particularly in a country like Ava, the powers and resources of which we are so ignorant of. The best chance of peace, under such circumstances, is never to trust to appearances, but to consider war as likely to last, to make

preparations accordingly, and to engage in it with our whole disposable force. Nothing is so expensive as war carried on with inadequate means. It entails all the expense, without the advantages of war.

If we wait till we hear of the wants of an army, and then only prepare to meet them, the aid may come too late; such wants should be anticipated as far as possible.

There is no time when it is more essentially necessary an army should be strong, than at the very moment when its commander is treating for peace.

Troops will always make allowances for any hardships imposed on them by the exigency of the public service, if proper attention is paid to their comfort and feeling.

An extensive country and scanty population are usually great obstacles to invasion, and more so to conquest.

An enemy should always be made to fear the worst.

No theoretical improvement should make us abandon what is supported by experience.

Any alteration in the rates of exchange at which troops are paid, is a thing desirable at all times to be avoided. It should not even be brought into discussion, especially when the rate at which the coin is paid is already above its value, and when the object is to raise it still higher.

Every thing is possible to a sound and persevering Government.

All the writing in the world will not put people right who do not know, or cannot or will not learn, how to go about a thing.

The way to make our administration efficient is to simplify it,—to employ our European and Native servants on those duties for which they are respectively best adapted. Employ all civil servants at *first* in the revenue line, not merely to teach them revenue business, but because they will see the natives under their best form, as industrious and intelligent husbandmen and manufacturers—will become acquainted with their habits, manners, and wants, and lose their prejudices against them—will become attached to, and feel a desire to befriend and protect them; and this knowledge and feeling will adhere to them ever after, and be most useful to them and the natives during the rest of their lives.

IX.

MINUTE ON THE CONDUCT OF EUROPEAN FUNCTIONARIES TOWARDS THE NATIVES.

THE unfortunate riot at Masulipatam on the 29th of May, in which three persons lost their lives, seems to have arisen from one of those disputes about ceremonies, which are so common between the right and left-hand castes. The great population of Masulipatam renders it peculiarly liable to such disturbances; and the well-known zeal of the collector has led him to adopt measures for their prevention; but I fear that they will not have the desired effect, and that, if sanctioned, they would rather augment than mitigate the evil. His proposition is, that all differences respecting processions and other ceremonies should be decided by the courts of law, and that, in the mean time, he should support the party whose claim seems consistent with natural right. He observes, that the beating of tomtoms, riding in a palanquin, and erecting a pandal, are privileges which hurt nobody, and naturally belong to every person who can afford to pay for them. This is very true; but it is also equally true, that things equally

harmless in themselves have, in all ages, and in all nations, and in our own as well as in others, frequently excited the most obstinate and sanguinary contests. The alteration of a mere form or symbol of no importance, has as often produced these effects, as an attack on the fundamental principles of national faith. It would therefore be extremely imprudent to use the authority of Government in supporting the performance of ceremonies which we know are likely to be opposed by a large body of the natives.

On all such occasions, it would be most advisable, that the officers of Government should take no part, but confine themselves entirely to the preservation of the public peace, which will in almost every case be more likely to be secured by discouraging, rather than by promoting, disputed claims to the right of using palanquins, flags, and other marks of distinction, during the celebration of certain ceremonies.

The magistrate seems to think, that because a decision of the zillah court put a stop to the opposition given to a caste of Brahmins, in having the Vadookhan rites performed in their houses, in the language of the Vedahs, that it would have the same efficacy in stopping the opposition to marriage processions; but the cases are certainly different. The Banians have the sanction of the Shasters for the use of the Vadookhan rites in their families; the ceremony is private, and the opposition is only by a few Brahmins. But in the case of the marriage procession, there is no sanction of the Shasters; the ceremony is public, and lasts for days together; and the opposition is by the whole of the right-hand castes, against the whole of the left-hand castes, and brings every Hindoo into the conflict.

The result of the magistrate's experiment ought to make us avoid the repetition of it. We find from his own statement, that the mischief was occasioned by his wish to restore the caste of goldsmiths to the right of riding in a

palanquin, which he considered to belong to every man who chose to pay for it. He annulled a former order against it, in consequence of the complaint of the writer of the zillah court, that he was hindered by it from performing his son's marriage in a manner suitable to his rank; and as he did not apprehend any disturbances, he left Masulipatam before the ceremony took place. The assistant magistrate however, two days before its commencement, received information that opposition was intended.

He did whatever could be done to preserve the peace of the town, but to no purpose. He issued a proclamation; stationed the police in the streets to prevent riot; reinforced these with revenue peons, and desired the officer commanding the troops, to keep them in readiness within their lines. But, in spite of all these precautions, a serious affray, as might have been expected, occurs, in which property is plundered, and lives are lost; and all this array of civil and military power, and all this tumult, arise solely from its being thought necessary, that a writer of the court should have a palanquin at the celebration of a marriage. Had the writer not looked for the support of the magistrate, he would undoubtedly not have ventured to go in procession, and no disturbance would have happened.

The magistrate states, that this writer had gone about for many years in a palanquin without hindrance; but this is not the point in dispute:—it is not his using a palanquin in his ordinary business, but in going in procession:—it is this which constitutes the triumph of one party and the defeat of the other, and which, whilst such opinions are entertained by the natives, will always produce affrays. The magistrate supposes that the opposition was not justified by the custom of the country, because it was notorious that, in many places of the same district, the goldsmith castes went in procession in palanquins. This is very likely, but it does not affect the question, which

relates solely to what is the custom of the town of Masulipatam, not to what that of other places is.

It is not uncommon for a caste to have a privilege in one place, which it has not in another. In a small village, where there are but few persons of the opposite caste, it goes in procession in a manner which it could not do in a great town, where the numbers are more equally balanced. The magistrate has not shown that the goldsmiths had in the town of Masulipatam the privilege which they claim: had it existed, he could have had no difficulty in finding the proof of it among the Mohammedan population, or even among the Brahmins, who, in general, have no interest in the disputes of the right and left-hand castes. We may infer, not only from the magistrate having stated no precedent, but also from the unwillingness of the revenue and police servants to take an active part, or even to give information, that the claim of the goldsmiths was unfounded.

The assistant-magistrate remarks, that the police servants connived at the conduct of the rioters; but that the sepoys, though they might be supposed to act under the influence of the same prejudices, showed no improper bias.

We are not however to conclude, from the conduct of the sepoys, that they were less inclined to the cause of the rioters than the police. Sepoys are often led, by the habit of military discipline, to act in opposition to their prejudices; but nothing can be more dangerous than to expose their fidelity to such a trial, and it ought never to be done unless in cases of the utmost necessity.

It would be desirable that the customs of the castes connected with their public ceremonies should be the same every where, and that differences respecting them should be settled by decisions of the courts; but as this is impossible while their prejudices remain, we ought, in the mean time, to follow the course most likely to prevent disorder and outrage.

The conflicts of the castes are usually most serious and most frequent when one party or the other expects the support of the officers of Government. They are usually occasioned by supporting some innovation respecting ceremonies, but rarely by preventing it. The magistrate ought therefore to give no aid whatever to any persons desirous of celebrating marriages, or other festivals or public ceremonies in any way not usual in the place, but rather to discountenance innovation. He ought, in all disputes between the castes, to take no part beyond what may be necessary in order to preserve the peace; and he ought to punish the rioters on both sides, in cases of affray, for breach of the peace; and, on the whole, to conduct himself in such a manner as to make it evident to the people that he favours the pretensions of neither side, but looks only to the maintenance of the peace.

I recommend that instructions in conformity to these suggestions be sent to the magistrates for their guidance.

(Signed) T. MUNRO.

3rd July, 1820.

X.

I INSERT the following admirable remarks on a decision by the Chief Justice of Madras, because they convey the most accurate definition which I have any where met of the peculiar tenures by which lands are held in India. I have taken no notice of this subject in the MEMOIR, because it is in no necessary degree mixed up with the narrative of Sir Thomas Munro's public or private life.

In Consultation, 15th March, 1822.

IN 1783, Asim Khan, Dewan of the Nabob Walajah, obtained a jagheer, which was confirmed to him by a perwannah, dated 29th July, 1789, by way of "an Altamgha Enaum" of the Kamil Jumma of sixty-four thou-

sand chuchrums, eleven anas. The grant is in the usual form,—"to be enjoyed by him and his descendants for ever, from generation to generation." He is authorized to divide it among his descendants; and the local officers are required to consider the perwannah "as a most positive peremptory mandate, and not to require a fresh sunnud every year."

The terms employed in such documents, "for ever," "from generation to generation," or in Hindoo grants, "while the sun and moon endure," are mere forms of expression, and are never supposed, either by the donor or the receiver, to convey the durability which they imply, or any beyond the will of the sovereign. The injunction with which they usually conclude—"Let them not require a fresh sunnud every year," indicates plainly enough the opinion, that such grants were not secure from revocation.

This very grant to Asim Khan was resumed on the death of Walajah, by his son Amdut ul Omra, but renewed, by a fresh perwannah, dated the 30th of August, 1797. On the assumption of the Carnatic by the Company, it was again resumed, with other jagheers and enaums, for investigation, on a change of Government, according to the usage of the country on such occasions. Soon after this event, and while the jagheer was under resumption, Asim Khan died, in October, 1801. He left several children, for all of whom he made a liberal provision by his will, written in the September preceding his death; but he left the bulk of his fortune to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan, whom he constituted guardian to his younger children. He said nothing of the jagheer in his will, because he was too well acquainted with the usage of India, to believe that he had any permanent proprietary right in it; because he was aware that these grants were revocable. Although, therefore, he knew that he could not claim the jagheer as a right, he wrote a letter to Government, stating that he had held it by the favour of the Nabobs Walajah and Amdut,

and trusting that it would be continued by the favour of the Company. Lord Clive answered his letter, and assured him that attention would be paid to his high character; and in his minute of the 28th of May, 1802, recommended that, in conformity with the resolutions of Government in 1790, all the country jagheers then current should be restored; and as the jagheer of Asim Khan was one of them, it was restored to his eldest son, Kullum Oolla Khan; but the grant was not for ever; and the revenues arising from salt, saltpetre, and the customs, were expressly excepted; and as it was submitted to the Court of Directors, and sanctioned by them, it might have been expected that it would not be shaken by any authority in this country. This expectation, however, has been disappointed by the proceedings in the Supreme Court. The brothers of Kullum Oolla Khan, instigated by certain Europeans, endeavoured to set aside their father's will, on the ground of insanity; but the will was established in Court, in 1813. They succeeded afterwards in establishing their claim to the personal property, according to the shares prescribed by the Mohammedan law; but the Court twice gave a decision against their claim to a share of the jagheer. They soon after filed a new bill, in which the Company were made defendants, as well as Kullum Oolla Khan, and in which they prayed that he might be compelled to account for the revenues of the jagheer, and the Company to issue a new grant to all the brothers and sisters jointly. The Company told their law officer that they had no interest in the suit, and that it ought to be prosecuted between the parties interested. But the objection was overruled by the Court, on the ground that the Company had an interest in the matter; and the cause was tried; but before judgment was passed, the Advocate-General, conceiving that the case was not well understood, proposed that fresh evidence should be taken on two points: first,

as to the nature of the interest conveyed by jagheer grants; and, second, as to the usage of Native Governments in the resumption of such grants. This application was refused, and judgment passed against the defendants on the 22d of May 1820.

The Court decreed, that the perwannahs granted by Walajah and Amdut ul Omrah are "good, valid, and subsisting perwannahs; and that the same are, and were, and have been in force since the resumption of the civil and military authority of the Carnatic by the defendants:" That the complainants "are entitled to their several and respective shares of the jagheer lands and villages;" and also to "like shares of the rents, issues, and profits of such jagheer lands and villages." And it is also ordered, "that the said defendant, Kullum Oolla Khan, do account, before the Master of this Court, touching the said jagheer lands and villages, and of the rents, issues, and profits thereof," from the death of Asim Khan. And it is farther declared, that the "said Kullum Oolla Khan hath been, during all the time aforesaid, and now is, a trustee of the said jagheer lands and villages, and of the rents, issues, profits, and revenues thereof, for the benefit of the complainants, to the extent of their respective shares and interest in the same, according to the Mohammedan law of succession."

The arrears of rents decreed by the Court amounted to the enormous sum of eleven lacs of pagodas, being the balance found by the Master, according to his report of the 27th March. This balance was found in the absence of Kullum Oolla Khan, who, on finding himself involved in utter ruin, had fled to Pondicherry; and the report of the Master regarding it was confirmed by the Court on the 5th of April last. Previously to the confirmation of that report, an application, on the part of the plaintiffs, was made to the Court, for the appointment of a receiver of this jagheer, which the Advocate-General resisted on two

grounds:—1st, "That the jagheer being out of the jurisdiction of the Court, and the defendant having then quitted it, the Court had no authority to make such an order, the charter having restricted the Court's jurisdiction over the Natives to such only as are inhabitants of Madras and its limits;"—and 2ndly, "That even if the Court had, generally speaking, such authority, yet it did not extend to this case, on account of the specific nature and incidents of the property in question involving the sirkar's share of the produce, and consequently, the collection of the revenue, from the intermeddling with which, the Supreme Court is, by the charter, specially interdicted." Both these objections were overruled by the Court:—the first, "because the defendant, having been originally amenable, and having submitted to the jurisdiction, the Court had a right, by its process, to act upon the property any where within the Company's territories:"—and the second, "because the Government having assigned to the defendant the jagheer, it could no longer be regarded as public revenue, but was subject to the same process as any other property of the defendant:" and an order was made for the receiver. But on the Advocate-General urging the inconvenience which would result from an order so unprecedented, and intimating that there would be an appeal from the decree; it was agreed by the parties, on the recommendation of the Court, that, in place of the aforesaid receiver, the collector of the district should be substituted, and should, under the orders of Government, collect the profits of the jagheer lands, pay them into "the public treasury, with the privity of the Accountant-General of this Court, to the credit of this cause, and subject to the farther order of this Court." This course was acceded to by Government, for no other reason but that of its being the only one by which discussion with the Supreme Court could be obviated; and the Advocate-General was directed to take

immediate measures for appealing the suit to England. Though Government has therefore already done all that it can do, I ought not, I think, to let so extraordinary a decision pass, without stating, individually, my own sentiments upon it.

The case, on the side of the Company, has been so ably argued by the Advocate-General, and the long and able minute of Mr. Thackeray has so fully explained the grounds on which the right of the Company rests in this case, that no room is left for me to add any thing material to what has been already adduced; and I must therefore content myself with noticing the main arguments on which the Chief Justice founded his decision, and with stating those ancient usages of the country of which long experience has given me some knowledge, and by which I am led to regard his opinion as erroneous.

The Supreme Court are, by their charter, expressly prohibited from taking cognizance of any matters relating to the public revenue; but, in the present instance, they get over this difficulty by saying, that the revenue of the jagheer having been assigned to Asim Khan, was no longer revenue, but private property, subject to the same laws which regulate private inheritance. If this doctrine were admitted, it would lead to the most dangerous consequences; for it would enable the Court to entertain suits against the Company in all cases of jagheer, enaum, or other grants of public revenue wherever situated, on the plea that, having been granted, it is no longer public revenue. As all the Native religious establishments, and municipal servants throughout the country, are maintained by grants of land, the Supreme Court might gradually extend their jurisdiction over them, destroy their respect for the authority of Government, and throw the affairs of the country into confusion. Were the Court once to begin to receive suits respecting lands assigned for the maintenance of

public servants, it would be impossible for Government to realize the revenue, or to maintain good order in the country. It may be said, that the Court is not likely to interfere in such matters, but of this we can have no assurance at present; for, but a few years ago, its interference in the jagheer of Kullum Oolla Khan, above a hundred miles from the limits of its jurisdiction, was regarded as at least equally improbable. There will never be wanting men whose interest it will be to bring into Court, at all hazards, the jagheers and enaums allotted to the civil and religious establishments of the country; and as the Court will judge for itself in determining whether these lands do or do not come under the description of what is meant as revenue by the charter, I own that I see no hope, after what has passed, of their being regarded as any thing else than mere private property. The only effectual way in which the Government would be secured from the mischievous effects of the Court's extending their interference to public revenue, assigned, in the form of services and charity, for the maintenance of various establishments, would be by restraining the Court from taking cognizance of any suit, respecting any land whatever, situated beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.

It is manifest, from the observations made by the Chief Justice in the course of the trial, that the notions of the Court, regarding public and private lands in India, are very vague, and that it must therefore be continually liable to exceed the bounds prescribed to its authority in the charter, by mistaking public revenue for private landed property. The Chief Justice says, "That it does not appear that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown:" he thinks that the grant to Kullum Oolla Khan is not revenue, because Lord Clive "excepts the sayer, salt, and saltpetre, which are revenue." He supposes that a private property in the land is granted, from the expres-

sions used by the Chief Secretary, "deliver over these lands;" and in Walajah's grant, "put him in possession of the pergunnah." It is well known that the usual meaning of these terms is nothing more than that the deshmooks, deshspendies, and other public officers, shall make over the management of the village, or pergunnah, to the jagheerdar, and pay him the public revenue. The sunnud says nothing of private revenue; it states clearly, that what is granted is public revenue, estimated according to the kamil jumma, or perfect, or standard assessment, at sixty-four thousand six hundred and three chuchrums and eleven annas. Grants of land usually contain a clause saving all private rights; and when it is not inserted, it is always understood that no private, but only public rights are transferred by the grant. It seems strange that the Chief Justice, after reading the sunnud, should have had any doubt as to what was granted being revenue.

He seems to have been uncertain throughout, and sometimes to have thought that it was public revenue, and sometimes that it was not; and to have given his decision, in a cause of the highest importance, both from the magnitude of the property, and the political consequences which it involved, without having any very distinct idea of the nature of the property on which he was deciding. But it is not surprising that an English judge should have believed that grants of land by the sovereign must be grants of crown-lands. It is easy however to show that they are not so in India; and it would have been better perhaps if the Advocate-General had more fully explained in what the difference consists. It might have been shown in a very few words; and by defining the nature of the thing granted, the question of right will be more easily understood. If we suppose the gross produce of the lands of any village of a pergunnah to be one hundred—

That of this amount the expense of cultivation is .	40
The landlord's rent or share . . .	20
The Government revenue or share . . .	40
	100

If this village, or pergunnah, be granted as a jagheer, it is the forty only, composing the Government revenue or share, which is granted. The twenty, forming the landlord's rent, is not granted, but remains, as before, in the hands of the owner, as also the forty, making the expense of cultivation, as he must defray it. If the jagheer be resumed, the property of the landlord is not effected by the change: it is the forty only, composing the Government revenue or share, which is affected by the resumption. It is paid to the Government instead of the jagheerdar, in the same manner as it was before the grant. The jagheerdar ceases to have any interest in the village or pergunnah, because he never had any property in the land, but merely in the revenue, which is now resumed. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that wherever private proprietary right in land exists, whatever is granted by Government must be public revenue only; and that as the grants to Kullum Oolla are of lands in the Carnatic, where all lands are the hereditary private property of the inhabitants, the thing granted is public revenue only in the share which the proprietors paid to Government; and that there is not the smallest foundation for the supposition of the Chief Justice, that a proprietary right in the land itself, or any private property of the sovereign, was conveyed by the grant.

In stating the landlord's share at 20 per cent. of the gross produce, I have done so merely for the sake of illustration. It is in some provinces higher, and in others much lower, and in some so low as not to be distinguishable from the charges of cultivation.

The jagheer sunnud conveys the rights of Government, whatever they are, and no more. These rights vary in different parts of the country. Wherever the lands are held, as in the Carnatic, by rayets having an hereditary proprietary right in the whole lands of the village, they are limited to the public revenue, or Government share of the produce, and do not give a foot of land. In some provinces of India, where the lands are held by rayets having an hereditary right to the lands in cultivation, but not to the waste, the jagheer sunnud gives the government revenue, or share of the produce only, in the cultivated lands; but in the waste it gives the proprietary right in the land, whatever it may be, by the custom of the country. When such a jagheer is resumed, no private rent is affected by the resumption. The ancient hereditary rayets pay the public revenue of their lands to Government, in place of the jagheerdar, and the jagheerdar himself pays the public revenue of the waste-lands which he may have brought into cultivation; and if he agree to this condition, he retains possession of them with the same proprietary right as the other landowners, or rayets of the district. It is obvious, therefore, that though in rare cases of unclaimed, or waste-lands, Government may confer a private proprietary right, it never resumes it, and that there is no foundation for the opinion, that resumption is an unjust violation of private property, since the thing resumed is always public revenue, never the landlord's rent.

This long explanation respecting Indian grants will appear unnecessary to those who are conversant with the subject; but as the Chief Justice certainly never understood clearly what was the precise nature of the thing granted, and as the main part of his argument rests upon its having been private property, it became indispensably requisite to show at the outset, that it was not private property, but exclusively public revenue.

As the thing granted was public revenue, and as the grant itself was a political act of the Company in their sovereign capacity, the cognizance of it was, on both grounds, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; but the Court has set the Company's grant aside, and decreed that the perwannah of Walajah to Asim Khan is a "good and subsisting grant." If it is a good and subsisting grant, it ought to be so wholly, and not partially. It ought to be good for the salt and customs, as well as for the land. The decree of the Court has altered the nature of the grant altogether. It ought to have confirmed either the grant of the Company or the Nabob. It has done neither. It has set aside the Company's grant, but has not restored the Nabob's. It has given to the parties the land, but not the salt and customs; and as the Chief Justice says, that this is because these articles are revenue, we may infer that his decree is founded on the belief that private property only, and not revenue, was granted with the land. It may likewise be observed, that the decree has deviated in another point from the Nabob's grant. By that grant it is required that a division of the jagheer shall be made, whenever Asim Khan requires it. To make the division, or not, is left optional with him. But he never made it, and most probably never intended it; for he makes no mention of any such design in his address to Lord Clive; and his whole conduct towards Kullum Oolla Khan, as well as his last will, leave no doubt that he wished, after allowing a moderate provision for the other children, the rest of his property should go undivided to his eldest son, as the only way in which the rank and character of his family would be preserved.

All the circumstances connected with the grant of Walajah, as well as with that of the Company, show that they were of a political nature, and not property cognizable by the Court. * The grant of Walajah to Asim Khan was

a grant by the Sovereign of the Carnatic to his minister, as a reward for his long and faithful political services. When the Company succeeded to the government of the Carnatic, they granted the jagheer of Asim Khan to his son Kullum Oollah Khan; but, in so doing, they acted in their political capacity, in concurrence with the Nabob; and a little attention to some of the articles of the treaty of 1801 will show, that the regulating not only of Kullum Oolla's jagheer, but of all the other jagheers, was a measure of state independent of the jurisdiction of every municipal court.

By the first article, "The Nabob Asim ul Doulah Behader is formally established in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent thereon, of his ancestors."

By the third article, the Company "charges itself with the maintenance and support of the military force necessary for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the protection of the rights, person, and property of the said Nabob; and the said Nabob stipulates that he will not enter upon any negotiation or correspondence with any European or Native power," &c.

By this, the Nabob does not relinquish his sovereignty: he merely renews the article of former treaties, by which he engaged not to correspond with foreign states without the consent of the Company.

By the fifth article, one-fifth part of the net revenue of the Carnatic is allowed for "the maintenance and support of the said Nabob."

The fifth part is his claim as sovereign of the whole Carnatic. It is the revenue which remains, after providing for the civil and military charges, and is probably as large a clear revenue as was received by any of his ancestors.

By the sixth article, the one-fifth is to be calculated after deducting, first, "all charges of collection;" second, "the amount of the jagheer lands stated in the ninth article of

the treaty of 1787, at pagodas 2,13,421, and the same sum of pagodas 6,21,105, appropriable to the liquidation of the debts of the late Mahommed Ally."

By the ninth article, the Company engages "to take into consideration the actual situation of the principal officers of his late Highness's Government." It charges itself with the expense of a suitable provision for their maintenance, to be distributed with the knowledge of the said Nabob, in such manner as shall be judged proper.

By this article, it appears that the Company, in conjunction with the Nabob, may regulate the provision for the officers as it thinks proper. And by the second separate article it is stipulated, "that it shall not be incumbent on the Honourable Company to appropriate lands yielding a revenue to the said amount of pagodas 2,13,421; but that the said Company shall be at liberty to exercise its discretion on the mode, and in the extent, of the provision to be made."

By the tenth article, the rank of the Nabob as a Prince, and as an ally of the British Government, is declared. No change in the political situation of the Nabob has taken place since 1801. He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a party to the treaty by which one-fifth of the net revenue is secured to him. Without a breach of the treaty, we cannot, except with his consent, alter any of the articles. By one of these articles we are bound to provide for the dependents of the Nabob, and among them, for Kullum Oolla Khan. The Nabob concurred in the provision made for him. If we take it away without the Nabob's consent, it is a breach of the treaty, which is cognizable by the Government at home, but not by the Supreme Court here. The question is not one of private right between two brothers, as maintained by the Chief Justice, but one of state policy, whether a public grant, confirmed by treaty, shall or shall not be set aside by a municipal court.

If the Court has jurisdiction in any jagheer included in an article of a treaty, it must have it equally with regard to all the other jagheers; and if it can alter any provisions of an article, it may, on the same principle, set aside the whole treaty.

I doubt whether the Supreme Court can legally exercise jurisdiction in the Carnatic, even in cases of private property. Had the Nabob retained the civil administration, it certainly could not have done so, neither could it have done so under a temporary assumption similar to what has occurred at former periods. The present assumption of the country is more permanent; but the relative situations of the Company and the Nabob are the same as in former cases of assumption. The Nabob is still Prince of the Carnatic,—receives in that capacity one-fifth of the net revenue, and has a right to object to any measure which, by the increase of grants or otherwise, may tend to a diminution of his dues. But if the Company, with the concurrence of the Nabob, were to resume a grant of land or money, and if the Court were to consider the grant as private property, and secure against the resumption, it is obvious that the revenue of the Nabob would be injured thereby. There are many other cases in which the decrees of the Court might be at variance with the rights of the Nabob; and whatever therefore may be thought of the expediency of the Supreme Court's having jurisdiction in the Carnatic, in matters of private property, where the claim is against the Government, or any of its officers, it would be advisable that it should have none in matters of private property, where the Nabob and the Company have a common interest.

The Chief Justice denies the sovereignty of the Company, and considers the words of Lord Thurlow as a clear authority against their being regarded as a sovereign power, except in the case of dispute with a sovereign re-

ative to peace and war with Pagan states. Whether the Company have or have not either an independent or delegated sovereignty, in the technical sense that the Chief Justice or Lord Thurlow may have affixed to the expression, is of little consequence; for, though the sovereignty be reserved to the Crown, all the powers of the State, by the present constitution of things, as far as regards the Natives of the country, are exercised by the Company. They make peace and war—raise and maintain armies—have articles of war for enforcing their discipline—acquire and cede territories—impose and collect taxes, and make laws, founded on ancient usage, for the administration of the affairs of the country. The Chief Justice, after arguing that the Company can act as sovereign only in the two points of making war and peace, admits that the Nabobs exercised absolute and uncontrolled authority, and that the Company "have the same rights as the Nabobs of the Carnatic." He says, "If the Advocate-General can make out that the Amdut's son would have had a right to resume the grant made by his father and grandfather, I admit the Company has the same right; and this, after all, seems the great point in the case." It is unquestionably the main point at issue between the parties; but the Chief Justice has decided that the Amdut's son could not resume the jagheer of Asim Khan, and of course that the Company could not resume it, either from the reason of the thing, or by the customs and usages of the country, or by the Mohammedan law.

What the Chief Justice says of the Kings of England not having the power of resuming grants, has no analogy to the present case. The Kings of England durst not, could not resume these grants. They would have been opposed by their barons and churchmen, who chiefly enjoyed them. The Kings of England gave up private landed property; but this did not affect the public revenue.

These Crown grants were not, like Indian grants, exempted from contribution to the public revenue. Though lost to the king as private property, they contributed, like other lands, to the national revenue. The land revenue in India is what the excise and customs are in England,—the main source of revenue, and cannot be permanently alienated with safety to the state. The Kings of England never could alienate the public revenue in perpetuity, nor could any government do so. No government can debar its successors from the use of the public revenue. The existing government must always have the power of calling it forth, for the preservation and defence of the state. In India there is no assembly or public body between the prince and the people, to regulate the rate or the amount of the taxation or revenue. The sovereign himself is the only authority by which revenue is levied and disbursed, and by which it is granted or resumed. The power to resume as well as to grant must be lodged somewhere; and in India, where there is no other authority, it is obvious that it must be vested in the Prince. But this is denied, because opinions are drawn from European institutions, and strained analogies are found, where none exist, between the usages of India and Europe. And hence the Chief Justice observes, that "he cannot see how any argument can be derived from the particular situation of the Nabob of the Carnatic, which shall, on general reasoning, deprive him of the same right to alienate the revenues of the state, as was actually enjoyed by the Kings and Queens of England." This is not a correct view of the case. The Kings of England could not alienate the great sources of public revenue in perpetuity. They could alienate their crown-lands, but not the public revenue upon them. But the alienation by the Nabob is that of the whole of the public revenue of extensive districts. The alienation in England was merely a transfer of the crown-lands to private indi-

viduals, to be liable to all the public taxes. The alienation by the Indian Prince was a transfer from the state, of all public taxes on land, to individuals as private property. The Chief Justice does not appear to have perceived the distinction in the nature of English and Indian grants; for, in speaking of the grant to Asim Khan, he says, "It ought to appear that it was properly belonging to the public, or, at least, that it was not part of the private possessions of the Crown." It has already been shown, that all grants of jagheers in India, are grants of public revenue. They cannot indeed be otherwise, because there are no crown-lands. The Chief Justice is evidently acting all along under the influence of English analogies, and endeavouring to find a resemblance in things which have not the remotest connection. He thinks, that because the sovereigns of Europe, under the feudal system, possessed extensive crown-lands, the sovereigns of India must, from their being more despotic, have had still more extensive private dominions; but nothing can be more unfounded than such an opinion. Crown-lands, according to the English acceptation of the term, are unknown in India. The most powerful monarchs had none; neither Akhbar nor Aurungzebe had any; and the despotism of the sovereign was itself the very cause of their being none, because, by giving him unlimited control over all land throughout the empire, it rendered the aid of any private domain altogether unnecessary. A small part of the public revenue arose from customs; the rest, about nine-tenths of the whole, from the land revenue or tax. All land was assessed to the public revenue; a part of the land was allotted to religious and charitable purposes, and to municipal institutions, and the public revenue of such lands was enjoyed by the incumbents. But the public revenue of all other land came to the royal treasury, unless when assignments of particular villages or districts were made to civil and military officers

for their personal allowances, and the pay of their respective establishments; all which assignments, however varied, ceased at the will of the sovereign. As there was no public body, no class of nobles or clergy, which had any right to interfere in the settlement of the land-tax; as this power was vested in the Sovereign alone, and as he could raise or lower the tax as he saw proper; and as the whole produce was at his disposal, it is manifest that he could derive no advantage, and therefore have no motive for holding, as "private possessions of the Crown," any lands apart from the general mass of the sirkar or Government lands of the empire; and it is also obvious, that whenever he granted land rent-free, he granted the public revenue.

The Chief Justice says, that if we are to argue from the reason of the thing, we may have recourse to the history of our own country, where he shows, that it was declared by the twelve judges, as late as the time of King William, that "it was the ancient and undoubted right of the Crown to alienate its hereditary estates;" and he hence infers, that the Nabob of the Carnatic must have the same right. This argument would be very just if the estates alienated in England and the Carnatic were of the same nature; but as they are totally different, it is not at all applicable. The King of England might, without injury to the nation, alienate his hereditary estates. The owners were changed, but the estates themselves were still liable, like the other lands of the kingdom, to all the public burdens of the time; to military service, aids, &c. By the transfer, the Crown became poorer, but the nation richer. But an Indian grant is the reverse of all this: it gives away the public revenue of the lands, it exempts them from military service, from every kind of tax or public burden, and renders them entirely useless as a resource to the state. In England, the alienation of the crown-lands does not lessen the resources of the state; in India, it

annihilates them. In England, the effect of such alienation could only have been partial, as the crown-lands bore but a small proportion to the lands of the kingdom. In India, it might have extinguished all revenue, as the Sovereign, though he has no crown-lands, has the power of granting all lands.

The Chief Justice observes, that it was not in the contemplation of the great men who investigated the subject of the crown-grants, when Queen Anne first succeeded to the throne, to remedy the evil of the resumption. He thinks that their moderation furnishes a contrast with the conduct of the Company's Government. But this Government has never claimed a right to make a resumption at all similar to what a resumption of the crown-lands in England would be. It does not claim to resume any private property conveyed by the grants; it claims the public revenue only, and leaves the rent of the landlord with the proprietor.

If all Indian Princes could grant altamgha jagheers, and if none could resume them, a great portion of the country might, in time, be released from affording any aid to the state, either in revenue, or in military service. Some idea may be formed of the probable effect of such a system, by looking at what happened in a few years under the Nabob Walajah and his son Amdut ul Omra. Family jagheers were granted to the amount of above six lacs of pagodas, and containing a population of above six hundred thousand persons. Of these jagheers, only about one-fourth was altamgha; but the whole might have been so, and the state would have been deprived of every kind of aid from more than half a million of its subjects. Many of the jagheers, too, might have been held, as was actually the case, by persons who, though attached to the donor, were inimical to his successor; but, when once granted, they could not, according to the opinion of the Court, have been resumed. If, therefore, the increase of altamghas during

successive reigns, might, if not checked, have materially impaired, if not altogether exhausted, the resources of the state, and as the evil could only be remedied by resumption, it seems to follow, from the reason of the thing, that the sovereign must have had the right to resume as well as to grant.

The next ground on which the Company's right to resume the grant to Asim Khan has been denied by the Court, is that of the usage and custom of the country. The usage of the country is undoubtedly the rule by which the question ought to be decided; and, in a case of this kind, the common practice of the Native princes must be admitted to be the usage. It can easily be shown that princes resumed altamghas at pleasure. It cannot be shown, that when they were disposed to resume, the act of resumption ever was or could be prevented. It may be said that they were despots, and acted unjustly. Had they seized private property, they would have been regarded as unjust by the country; but no injustice was attached to the seizure of an altamgha, as the people knew that it was a grant of public revenue. The princes were, it is true, despotic; but they were liberal, and even profuse in their grants, and the grants themselves grew out of their very despotism; for it was because they found no difficulty in resuming, that they made none in granting. Altamghas were not, in fact, more respected than money pensions, which, though every day liable to resumption, are frequently continued for generations. The resumption and renewal by the Amdut of the grant to Asim Khan, the favourite minister of his father and himself, is a strong proof of the practice of the country, and of the opinion of the public. If altamghas were not resumable, it may be asked what has become of them. Their very scarcity is a proof of the usage to the contrary. There is not one in the Carnatic older than Walajah. Where are all those of

his predecessors, which, according to the Chief Justice, ought to have been protected by usage, and by the Mohammedan law? The right of resumption never was doubted in the Carnatic until called in question by the Supreme Court. The Company's Government could have had no doubt of it, when, in 1801, they resumed all jagheers, though they afterwards continued most of the old ones, but none of the altamghas to the Nabob's family. The usage is shown by Walajah himself, who certainly best knew what it was in his own dominions; but his opinion is in direct opposition to that of the Court. In his letter to Government, of the 18th October, 1790, he says, "I am Prince of the Carnatic, and for these forty years I have granted, resumed, and altered jagheers, from time to time, in such manner as I have thought proper." The right of resumption is in Native states the usage and the constitution, and it ceases only when the Government is too weak to enforce it; and when this happens, the Government is soon overthrown, and a new one arises, and maintains itself by exercising the right of grant and resumption.

It is not easy to collect written documents respecting altamghas, because most of these grants have long since been resumed; but enough still remain to show what were the opinions of the Nizam and Walajah on the subject, and their practice ought certainly to be received, as the best proof of what was the usage of the country. The Nizam granted altamgha sunnuds to several members of Walajah's family, and resumed them again. On the death of Amdut ul Omra, the Nizam resumed the altamgha jagheer which he held of him, and regranted it to his successor, Asim ul Dowlah, on whose decease he resumed it again. The jagheer of Ejmangunlah was held many years by Hissam ul Mulk, the third son of the Nabob Walajah, under an altamgha grant from the Nizam, as was also the

Kiladaree of Gumpoore, under a similar sunnud, by his younger brother, Missun ul Mulk; but, on the death of the Nabob Amdut ul Omra, both these grants were resumed by the same Soubahdar of the Deccan, who had granted them, and conferred by a new sunnud on the late Nabob Asim ul Dowlah. Walajah was so sensible of the little respect paid to altamghas, that when he granted one to Reisul Nissa Begum, he made his son, the Amdut, put his seal and signature to it, as affording the only chance of its being continued after his own death. No case can evince more strongly the insecurity of altamghas beyond the pleasure of the donor than this, of a father requiring confirmation from a son to such a grant. But, notwithstanding all this precaution, the grant was, soon after the death of Walajah, resumed by the Amdut, in consequence of the misconduct of the officer placed in charge of the estate by the Begum, and was not restored until she had consented to dismiss him from her service.

Walajah had no confidence in altamghas since. Though he had obtained one from Ahmed Shah, Emperor of Delhi, for the Carnatic, he did not think it sufficient, and afterwards solicited and obtained grants from Salabut Gung and Nizam Alli Khan, Soubahdars of the Deccan. The very circumstance of such extensive provinces as the Deccan and the Carnatic being disposed of by altamgha sunnuds, indicates clearly the political nature of these grants; and Walajah's application to every succeeding superior for a new one, shows that he considered them as liable to be resumed at pleasure. He knew that this must either be the case, or that they must be maintained by force. The usage, in this respect, has probably arisen from necessity; for, as altamghas are chiefly given to members of the reigning family, and to the higher officers of state, and as they are usually for extensive districts, it is obvious that, in every case of a new dynasty, and in every instance of

disputed succession in an old one, which is so common in India, the new Prince could not be secure, unless he had the power of resuming the altamghas of all whom he supposed were not well affected, and of rewarding his adherents by new grants. This has been the usage with regard to all large grants; the small ones of a few hundred rupees are, from their insignificance, sometimes neglected, and allowed, like charity lands, to pass through several generations.

There is nothing either in existing records, or in the state of the country, to support the opinion that altamghas were not resumable at pleasure. The altamgha was so far different from a common grant, that it was not for any specific period; and that it frequently, but not always, contained the words, "from generation to generation." It was therefore a grant that the donor was anxious should be durable; and his son might on this account continue it, if he had no cause of being dissatisfied with the jagheerdar; but the next prince could hardly show the same forbearance, as he would probably have new favourites to provide for, by the resumption of old grants. If we examine Mr. Falconer's report on the jagheers of the Carnatic, we find no old altamghas on the list. The whole of the altamghas, sixteen in number, are by Walajah and his son. The old grants which have passed through several generations, are not altamgha, as might have been expected from the principle of their not being resumable, but common jagheer grants, neither hereditary, nor for life, but temporary. Many of these common jagheerdars were killedars of strong forts, and, from this circumstance, held their jagheers longer than they would probably have done under the dynasty by which they were granted; because, in the convulsions attending the decline of the Mogul power, their forts enabled them to secure terms for themselves. But even after the new Government became strong, and

could easily have removed them, they frequently permitted these to remain, either on account of family alliances, out of respect for their high birth, or some other cause. The greater part of the jagheers of Asim Khan were held under a royal firman, not altamgha, by Mulk Mohammed Ali Khan, with the fort of Mustaphaghur. Though the grant was merely temporary, yet it continued in the family, and descended lineally from father to son, for three generations, till 1780, when the jagheerdar having died during Hyder Ally's invasion of the Carnatic, his family was sent into captivity in Mysore by that prince. The jagheerdar of Awelwandah and several others, held by the common tenure, have in the same way descended through several generations. It appears from these facts, that in the Carnatic, altamgha grants, so far from being irresumable, have not been so much respected as many of the ordinary jagheers. It would not weaken the argument, even if it could be shown that, in other parts of India, the practice was different, because the question before us regards the usage in the Carnatic only; but I believe that it was nearly the same throughout India; we know, at least, that it was so in the Peishwah's dominions; for the commissioner at Poonah, in answer to a reference made to him on the subject, has stated that he has not been able to find a single altamgha in the Deccan, and has transmitted a list of five hundred and fifty-nine jagheers, resumed by the Peishwah's Government within the last fifty years, none of which are altamgha. Of these, he observes, three hundred and sixty-four were resumed for reason assigned, usually offences against the state; and one hundred and ninety-five without any reason assigned. In the Nizam's dominions, too, the resumption of jagheers appears from the note of his minister, Chundoo Lal, transmitted by the resident, to have been regulated, as in the Carnatic, by the will of the Prince. It is stated, that "altamgha jagheers which are

granted to children generally, without any specification of names, are continued to the descendants of the deceased person; but if any great fault has been committed, or there are no descendants, the jagheer is resumed." It is also stated, that the sons sometimes share equally; "but if one is found fit, and another unfit, the sovereign exercises a discretion, and continues the jagheer as he may think proper, in consideration of the merits of the persons;" and it is added, "there are no persons to whom jagheers have been continued, without some change or modification." What is here said corresponds very nearly with the practice of the Company, and the Nabob in the Carnatic, with regard to the jagheers of Kullum Oolla Khan and others. When any great fault is committed, the jagheer is resumed. The sovereign exercises his discretion, in renewing or continuing the jagheer to all the sons, or to one son in preference; and no jagheers are continued without some change.

The next ground on which the Chief Justice maintains that altamghas are not resumable, is that of the Mohammedan law. The Advocate-General cites Mohammedan law authorities, to show that the King has power to grant or resume kheraj or the sirkar's share of the produce of the land. The Chief Justice did not think that the authorities cited by the Advocate-General, forbidding the alienation in perpetuity, were conclusive; but admitted, that if he had adduced instances of similar grants having been resumed, it would have greatly aided his case. The Advocate-General, had time been allowed, might easily have adduced instances of similar grants in the Nabob's family having been resumed by the Nizam.

The law-officers of the Sudder Adawlut, in answer to the queries from the Advocate-General, observe, in speaking of the Mohammedan law authorities "respecting lands belonging to the State, and the private property of

princes," that there "is so much discrepancy of opinion among these learned personages, respecting the legality or illegality of grants of land, and of the revenues of land belonging to the State, by the sovereign, to individuals, that it is next to impossible to come to any determination, or to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion." The discrepancy here complained of is not to be wondered at,—it could not have been otherwise; for, as no person had ever seen the Mohammedan law applied in the case, the question was not one concerning any political matter of fact, but was one of mere theory. As to what would be the operation of the Mohammedan law, if made applicable where it had never before been permitted to enter, as it was never used in the continuance or resumption of altamghas by the sovereign, every attempt to ascertain its operation must always bring us back to the usage of the country, by which alone the transaction was regulated. The Indian princes consult no law, either in granting or resuming: they grant from favour or political expediency, and resume at pleasure. Their right to resume is never questioned; and as there is no tribunal that can take cognizance of it, it is evident that it is regulated by no law but their will. If it be said that this right, though it could not be denied or opposed, was not exercised, we shall find that this assumption is not supported by facts, and that it is at variance with the usage of the country. It is useless to consult Mohammedan lawyers regarding this usage; for the resumption of grants is a question which was never submitted to them by any sovereign; and when we seek legal opinions on matters of policy, which never were, nor ought to be, subjected to legal discussion, we must expect endless conflicting opinions, all equally well supported by texts and quotations from Mohammedan or Hindoo law. It is not necessary to go to Arabia, or even to Hindostan, to discover the usage of the Carpatic; we ought to search

for it on the spot in the South of India, and to look for it in the history of the Deccan and the Carnatic. If we adopt this course, we shall see, as has already been observed, that altamgha grants were not more inviolable than common jagheers. If they were, what has become of them all? There are none in Mysore, none in the Ceded Districts, and none in the Carnatic, of an earlier period than a few years before the death of Walajah. We must admit either that former princes in these countries never granted altamghas, or that they have been all resumed. But we have no reason to suppose that altamghas were not granted under former princes, or to doubt that their disappearance is owing to their having been resumed by their successors. It was in fact because such resumptions were considered as an ordinary transaction, that they excited little attention and were soon forgotten, and the very record of them lost.

It has been seen that altamgha and all other jagheers were resumed. It ought to have been shown by those who disputed the right of the Nabob and the Company to dispose of the jagheer of Asim Khan, when and where resumption was, or could be hindered by the Mohammedan law.

The last ground of objection made by the Chief Justice to the resumption of Asim Khan's jagheer, is Lord Clive's proclamation. He remarks, that it has been argued, that by the words of the proclamation, "all jagheerdars may rest satisfied that their interest will sustain no injury from the temporary arrangement made by the Company," that Lord Clive renounced his right, if he had any, to resume. He states also, that the words of the re-grant have raised in his mind, as in that of the Sudder Adawlut at Calcutta, a strong doubt whether Lord Clive did himself intend to resume the grant in question at all. The proclamation of Lord Clive cannot be regarded as any thing more than a

general assurance of attention to the interests of the jagheerdars. This was fulfilled by allotting a provision for them. But the assurance was not intended to preclude Lord Clive from exercising the authority always exercised by the Nabob, of limiting or extending the jagheers at discretion. Lord Clive was the best judge of his own intentions; and, if we are to judge of them from his own acts, he leaves us no ground to join in the doubts of the Chief Justice. He certainly did intend to resume the grant, for he resumed the customs, salt and saltpetre belonging to the jagheer, and continued the land-rent only; and the new grant which he issued for the land-rent was not a renewal of the old altamgha; but a common jagheer grant. Kullum Oolla Khan is the heir of Asim Khan. It was not in the name of the other sons and heirs, because Lord Clive knew that Asim Khan was desirous that the jagheer should be conferred on his eldest son. His Lordship also knew that it was only on account of the high character and long services of Asim Khan, that the jagheer had been originally granted; that the respectability of the family could only be maintained by giving the undivided jagheer to the eldest son, and that the Nabob approved of the measure. The original grants both of Walajah and the Amdut left the division of the jagheer to Asim Khan to be made as he chose, and he never expressed a wish to make any. The sunnud of Lord Clive states expressly, that it is on account of "the respectable character and commendable conduct of the said Beharder (Asim Khan), and a well-founded expostulation that his son Kullum Oolla Khan will pursue the same laudable line of conduct, that the jagheer is renewed."

I expect that the answers to the queries respecting altamghas, transmitted to various public officers, will contain different opinions as to their being renewable or not. They will vary according as they are founded in the usage

of one province or another, or on the opinions of Native lawyers, or on extensive or limited observation. We are too apt to be carried away by supposed analogies, and to build up systems of uniform practice, where none ever existed, or ever were thought of; and much of the argument on the present occasion seems to have arisen from this cause. The conflicting opinions may be easily accounted for, by considering what really took place.* The small altamghas were frequently neglected on account of their insignificance, and allowed, like common charity or enaum-lands, to continue for two or three generations, and to be regulated by the laws of private property. But the greater altamghas were, from their nature, objects of state jealousy, and were resumed or transferred at the discretion of the sovereign, to punish one person, or to reward another: they could not be left as private property, without danger to the State.

I have now delivered my sentiments on the principal objections made by the Chief Justice to Lord Clive's grant to Kullum Oolla Khan. The sum of what I have said is this: That the grant of the Amdut to Asim Khan was resumed by Lord Clive: that the grant by his Lordship to Kullum Oolla Khan, was a new grant different in its nature from the old one by the Nabob: that the Nabob of the Carnatic had a right to resume the altamgha of Asim Khan, and that the Company's Government had the same right: that this right was founded on the reason of the thing, and in the custom of the country: that it was not affected by the Mohammedan law of inheritance: that this law was applicable only between individuals when the sovereign permitted the altamgha to descend in this way in the family, not between the sovereign and the individual when it was resumed: that the thing granted to Kullum Oolla Khan was public revenue, from all cognizance of which the Court are precluded by their charter, and that

even if it had not been public revenue, the resumption was an affair of state, which, whether right or wrong, did not come within the jurisdiction of the Court, and for which, as well as for all other political acts, the Government in this country are amenable only to the Superior Government at home.

Although Government, at the commencement of the trial in the Supreme Court, were not fully aware of the important political considerations which it involved, they soon saw them; and on the 8th of January, 1819, they tell the Advocate-General, that "they attach a high degree of importance to the principles in dispute,—the right of the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the matter; and secondly, the denial of the authority of Government to revoke grants of the nature of that now called in question." It is absolutely necessary, both for the good government of the country, and the security of the revenue, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be more strictly limited and more clearly defined; and that it should be completely debarred from all cognizance, in any shape, of the acts of Government. If the Supreme Court are permitted to set aside, by their decrees, the orders of Government, we shall weaken, and at last perhaps destroy, that authority which, our own safety demands, should in this country be strengthened by every possible means. The proceedings of the Court on the present occasion have ruined the first private family in the Carnatic, and lowered the Government in the eyes of the people; and if measures of prevention be not adopted, the evil will increase every day. Most of the old wealthy families of Madras have already been impoverished by their litigations in the Court. The attorneys and law dubashes now look to the provinces; and if the doctrine maintained by the Court continues to be acted upon, its jurisdiction will in time reach to every zemindar, jagheerdar, and official landholder under this

Presidency; because, Madras being the capital, many of the great proprietors and principal inhabitants will occasionally visit this place and reside in it for a time, and thus become amenable; and every person also holding an official or charitable grant, which it may be deemed expedient to assess or resume, will be able to bring his case before the Court, as a complaint against European oppression.

The powers of the Supreme Court and of the Government should never be suffered to come into collision; and both the Court and the Government will thus be enabled the more efficiently to discharge their respective duties, and to command the respect of the natives. But, in order to attain these objects, it will be necessary—

1st, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court all civil suits between native and native, except where both parties agree to submit to their decision.

2nd, To alter the present boundaries of the local jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so as to include the fort and town of Madraspatnam, but to exclude Chepauk and Triplicane.

3d, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all lands situated beyond the limits of the Court.

4th, To exclude from the jurisdiction of the Court all acts done by the Government as a Government, and making such acts cognizable only by the superior authorities in England.

5th, To vest in Government the powers now exercised by the justices, of assessing the inhabitants of Madras for paving, lighting, and cleansing the streets, or at least to vest in it the power of exempting from the tax all such Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons as, from the usage of the country, are exempted from such taxes.

If suits between native and native are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it will check litigation, and lessen greatly the expense where it actually occurs,

and save thousands from ruin. The local boundaries of the Supreme Court are far too extensive; they seem to have been fixed at first without much consideration; they reach to a distance of five miles from Madras, and include several populous villages which ought never to have been within them. They contain a population of above five hundred thousand persons. The line proposed by Mr. Stratton ought to be the new boundary. It runs along the river at the Government-house to Cochrane's canal, and would place about two hundred thousand natives under the jurisdiction of the Company's Court. It would also enable us to accomplish a most important object, in withdrawing the Nabob, with all his relations and adherents, from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That jurisdiction has, for many years, been a source of constant complaint from his Highness. While it exists, it cannot be otherwise; for, whatever may be the forbearance of the judges, and their attention to native prejudices, circumstances must occur almost every day, offensive to the Nabob, and to every Mussulman of rank. The authority of the Nabob over his family and dependents has been impaired by political events, and still more by the interference of the officers of the Court. Daughters of Walajah have turned prostitutes, and been released from the custody of their husbands and the Nabob, by *habeas corpus*. Other women of rank have been encouraged, by their example and their impunity, to follow the same courses. The disgrace of these women is felt, not only by their own families, but by every Mussulman here, as a degradation of their caste. The Mussulman population of Triplicane, always distressed and dissatisfied since the assumption of the Carnatic, has had its discontent increased by these transactions; and it is therefore desirable that the cause of them should be removed, by placing the Nabob without the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is also

chiefly for the purpose of removing the causes of discontent, that I have proposed that Government, rather than the justices, should possess the authority of taxing the inhabitants of Madras, for paving, cleansing, and lighting the streets. The majority of the justices is composed of men either not in the Company's service, or who, having always resided at Madras, know little of the native usages. Bramins, priests, and other privileged persons, have in consequence been subjected to this house-tax, from which they are every where else exempted by the custom of the country; and the Hindoo population has been rendered discontented as well as the Mohammedan. The discontent has shown itself only in complaint and clamour; but for this we are indebted to the presence of a military force. Had the same measures been attempted to be carried into execution when there was none, they would have been resisted by insurrection. The Advocate-General has given it as his opinion, that Government has no authority over the assessment, as it is by the act of Parliament committed to the justices alone. Government has requested, and the justices have agreed, that the privileged classes should be exempted; but nothing final has yet been done; and whatever may be done will always be liable to alteration, at the discretion of the justices. Government is placed in the extraordinary situation, not of being restrained from taxing, but from relieving its subjects from taxation. The justices, although they are themselves nominated by Government, can levy taxes without its consent; and though it may be convinced that the laying of a tax may excite discontent, and even occasion disturbance, it can only obtain a remission of it by application to the justices. Government should never be obliged to solicit. Such a proceeding must always weaken the respect by which it ought to be supported. If the framers of the act did actually intend to exclude Government from all authority over the

assessments, they must have supposed that the justices had a common feeling with the people, and were more likely than Government to protect them from undue exactions. Nothing can be more erroneous than such an opinion. The justices can neither, from their habits nor situation, have any such feeling. They have no common interest with the people. Government has, and to it therefore should be confided the direction of the assessment; or, at all events, the power of modifying or remitting it, whenever it is apprehended that it may excite disaffection or outrage. It seems to be contrary to every sound principle of policy, that a body of justices should be able, by an injudicious application of a tax, to produce disturbance in the country, and that Government should not have the means of preventing it.

The inconvenience which has arisen from the suits relative to the jagheer of Kullum Oolla Khan, naturally leads to the consideration of the means by which the extension of the evil to all other jagheers and enaum lands may most easily be obviated. These means appear to be, 1st, To prohibit the Supreme Court from all interference regarding such lands; and 2nd, To rescind Regulation XXXI. of 1802. Enough has already been said concerning the interference of the Court. The regulation in question was too readily adopted when we had little experience, and the sooner it is repealed the better. All Native states exercise, in the most unlimited manner, the right of granting and revoking enaums at pleasure; sometimes at once, sometimes gradually, by a small quit-rent at first; and then raising it to a greater, next to a half, and so on to the full rate of assessment. In India, revenue always follows the population and the produce wherever they go. This is the usage, and it cannot be relinquished without endangering the future resources of the country; because, as the Government waste-lands, together with the jagheer and

enaum lands, are equal to from one-fourth to one-half of the whole of the lands in cultivation, if they were permanently exempted from the payment of revenue, they would gradually, instead of lying half waste and poorly cultivated, as at present, become completely cultivated, by drawing off the cultivators and stock from the lands now paying revenue, which would be proportionably diminished. If an effect of this kind has not already been experienced, in provinces containing a large proportion of jagheer and enaum, it is because it is prevented by the usage of transferring the assessment from the deserted to the newly cultivated lands. Whenever it is found that the revenue of a district has been considerably diminished by the abandonment of assessed, and the occupation of waste lands belonging to jagheerdars or enaumdars, an assessment, proportionate in some degree to the loss, is imposed on the jagheer or enaum. It is this which guards the public revenue from loss, by former profuse grants; and if this power were relinquished, we should have no means of saving it from very considerable defalcation. The smaller enaums, though they separately contain only a few acres each, are very extensive collectively. They have, for the most part, been granted without authority, by heads of villages and revenue servants; and when they have escaped notice for a few years, and have afterwards been discovered, they have been allowed to continue, from charitable or interested motives, and they have, from various causes, a constant tendency to increase.

The investigation of enaums was therefore, among the Native Governments, like an inquiry into the state of the nation; and it is advisable that we should occasionally investigate and resume, in order to prevent the abuses and increase to which enaums are liable from neglect.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XI.

MINUTE ON MONOPOLY OF TIMBER AT MALABAR.

6th December, 1822.

THE proposed regulation for the forests of Malabar and Canara, and the whole subject of those forests, have been so fully examined, and the impolicy of the present system so fully explained by Mr. Thackeray, in a paper which will be laid before the Board as a minute, that it is hardly necessary for me to say any thing more than to express my concurrence in his opinions.

2. The forest monopoly has arisen partly from public, partly from private views. As far back as 1799, only a few months after we had got possession of Canara, the collector* was requested to recommend the appointment of a conservator of the forests; but he refused, because he was convinced that it would prove injurious to the country.

3. In 1805, the Madras Government assented to the appointment of an agent from Bombay, to ascertain to what extent the forests could be made available for ship-building. This was no sooner done, than Captain Johnson asked assistance to get timber not claimed by individuals as private property. They promised reasonable assistance; but there can be no reasonable assistance where Government interferes; and this slight beginning with reasonable assistance has now grown into a wide and oppressive monopoly.

4. The Supreme Government, in 1806, forward an order of the Honourable the Court of Directors, dated the 3d of July, 1805, to the Madras Government, to transfer to that of Bombay full authority over the forests and timber-trade of Malabar, in order to ensure a supply of wood to the navy, as well as for their own shipping, provided the Supreme Government saw no "weighty objection."

* Sir Thomas Munro himself.

None appears to have been seen, as the transfer was made immediately. The Madras Government went even beyond the orders of the Honourable Court, which applied only to Malabar; for in December, 1806, at the request of Bombay, it made over to that Government the forests of Canara also, because they were said to have crooked timber, which Malabar wanted. The conservator of the forests, at this early period, wanted a regulation to arm him with powers in the country. The Madras Government answered, that it was not intended to "give him powers which might infringe on the positive rights of the inhabitants," and refused to enact a regulation; but, being constantly urged, gradually gave way, and in April, 1807, a proclamation was issued in Malabar, which begins with declaring, that "The Honourable the Court of Directors, having resolved to assume the sovereignty of the forests," &c. This proclamation excited a discontent, which has never subsided. It places the forests of Malabar and Canara under the superintendence and control of the Bombay Government; announces Captain Watson as conservator, and prohibits the cutting or destroying trees in the teak forests. Orders were transmitted with this proclamation to the local officers, to assist the conservator in preserving the forests. Orders were likewise soon after issued, at the request of the Bombay Government, exempting the timber trade generally on the Malabar coast, from the payment of duties. The judge at Tellicherry having requested instructions as to whether the conservator was at liberty to prevent the transit and export of private timber, without a permit from the Madras Government, answered, that they saw no objection, provided it was only with the view of ascertaining the quantity of timber exported; but that the Court was to see that it did not interfere with the right of individuals to export their own private timber.

Oct. 14th, 1807.

5. Complaints had been constantly coming, even before this time, against the system; and Mr. Thackeray, who was then in Malabar, recommended that the private rights in the forests should be bought up by Government. This plan was adopted by Captain Watson, but seems to have been executed only in part, and to have been relinquished on his departure by his successors. Complaints still continued, and the Madras Government, in transmitting to Bombay a petition from certain timber merchants against the proceedings of the conservator, and the monopoly of the forests by Government, suggested the propriety of the conservator confining his operations to the forests undoubtedly public property; but this was the very difficulty, for it had never been ascertained what was public and what private; and the conservator's establishment had therefore little difficulty in extending their claims over the private forests. After the petition in question had been referred to Bombay, and received from thence with the conservator's reply, the judge of Tellicherry was directed by Government to inform the petitioners that their claims could not be admitted, and that they might prosecute them in the manner prescribed by the regulations. But it is evident, that whatever might have been the merits of these petitioners' claims, the actual proprietors were exposed to great hardship; for they are first placed under a system the inevitable tendency of which is to invade their rights, and they are then left to seek redress in the courts. The consequences were what might have been foreseen. The evil increased every day. The conservator gradually asserted a claim to teak grown on private estates, which not being sufficiently resisted, the monopoly, by the end of 1809, was pretty well established over Malabar and Canara.

To Bombay, Mar. 31, 1808.

6. In 1809, the Bombay Government proposed, on the

ground of weakening the pirates, to prevent the export of timber for ship-building, from Cochin and Travancore, to the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia; but the Supreme Government, on the case being referred to them from Madras, refused to interfere. In 1811, an application to the same effect was made by the Bombay to the Supreme Government, who authorized the Madras Government to endeavour to carry the measure into effect, if it appeared advisable.

7. In September 1811, the Bombay Government stated that the Mangalore merchants being shut out from getting timber in Canara, resorted to Coorug, and requested that the Rajah might be required to hold all the teak and poon in his country, at the disposal of the Company. The Supreme Government refused their assent to this proposition. Had they decided otherwise, the merchants of Mangalore surely would have had much ground for complaining of the rigour of our administration. They had been shut out by us from getting timber in their own country; and when they go for it into a foreign one, they are also followed by our restrictions.

8. The conservator of forests having made a contract for one year for supplying the Mahratta districts with timber from Soondah above the Ghauts, the Board of Revenue objected strongly to this measure, and showed that it was a complete deviation from the intention of the conservator's system, as it raised a land revenue from the forests of Soondah, by the sale of wood for inland consumption.

From Bombay, 5th Nov. 1812.

9. In 1812, the Bombay Government, in forwarding to Madras an application from a Native merchant to build a ship at Cochin, suggested the propriety of removing the restrictions on the timber-trade of Malabar; and this measure, on being recommended by the Madras to the Supreme Government,

was authorized. But as it was interpreted merely to remove the prohibition on the export of timber to the Gulfs of Persia, Arabia, and Cutch, the monopoly still remained with little diminution as before. The Madras Government, in answer to a question from Bombay on this subject, explained that their late orders on this head were meant to put the timber trade on its former footing, and not to open the Company's forests to private merchants. But the original and main grievance was not removed by this declaration. The line between public and private forests had not been ascertained; all that the merchants wanted was, that they should be allowed to dispose of private timber not required for the King's or Company's ships; but what they called private, the conservator called public timber.

To Bombay, April 13, 1813.

10. In 1814, the conservator attempted to stop Cochin teak on its passage to the sea. Though the Bombay Government had agreed, on the representation of the Resident, that timber belonging to Cochin should be allowed to pass through the Company's territories, on paying the regular duties; and though this resolution had been communicated to the Resident, they afterwards, on the recommendation of their Marine Board, objected to the arrangement; but it was allowed to continue on the suggestion of the Madras Government, that it was too late to withhold what had already been granted. The Bombay Government communicated at the same time, that they had it in contemplation to treat with the Rajah of Cochin for all his timber. This was followed by another application for assistance, in obtaining all the timber cut in Cochin and Travancore, for the purpose of ship-building. The Resident, in answer to a reference made to him on the

From the Resident, December 18, 1814. From Bombay, Feb. 15, 1814. Feb. 25. April 4. April 5. To Bombay, June 3, 1814. To the Resident, March 1, 1814. April 22, June 3. From the Resident, May 24 and 27, 1814.

subject, that the Rajahs of Travancore and Cochin would be happy to enter into engagements to sell all their wood to the Company, provided they got a fair price, exposed the impolicy of acting on any other principle, and by his just and enlarged views he saved the people of Travancore and Cochin from the evils of the forest monopoly. But though these two provinces have been kept out of the hands of the conservator, we have still, down to the present year, frequent complaints by his department and the inhabitants of mutual encroachments.

11. In our own provinces of Malabar and Canara, the severity of the forest system increased every day; and no wonder, for it was so undefined, that the judges who punished the rayets for trespasses, were in doubt whether the conservator was amenable to the courts. In such a state of things, it was quite natural that the system should, from one of mere preservation, become one of oppressive monopoly. It was complained of by all the local authorities, by the judges, the magistrates, and the collectors. The judge of South Malabar observes, that by the Bombay instructions of 1806, "it was considered that the timber on the inhabited parts of the country is the property of the landholders; and the jungles forming the eastern boundary, the undoubted right of the Honourable Company;" and that "it may be equally unknown to the Bombay Government, and to that of Fort St. George, that teak-timber, the growth of private estates, paying revenue to Government, is cut down and appropriated to the use of the Honourable Company; and that jungle-timber, the growth of the cultivated parts of the country, is equally liable to the duty levied by the conservator, with that felled in the forests." These remarks were contained in a letter, submitting his opinion on the draft of a proposed regulation for the conservator. The Madras Government had, in

From Mr. Pearson, July 27, 1815.

To Bombay, July 26, 1814.

1814, suggested to that of Bombay the propriety of a regulation to define and limit the powers of the conservator. In the following year, a draft of a regulation was received from Bombay, which had been received by the Marine Board; but as it was calculated rather to strengthen than to limit the authority of the conservator, it was objected to by the local authorities, for whose opinion it was circulated. Mr. Warden, the collector of Malabar, stated the hardship of the inhabitants not being permitted to cut wood for ordinary purposes without paying duty, or even firewood without a permit,—proposed to draw the line between public and private forests, and submitted an amended draft. This amended draft was approved by the Honourable Court of Directors, and ordered to be engrossed upon the body of the proposed regulation. It was sent to Bombay, but was not returned until the present year.

From England, Dec. 30, 1817.

12. The regulation in its present shape, though much improved, is still highly objectionable. Section II. provides for the appointment of the conservator by the Bombay Government:—if we are to have conservators at all, they should be from Madras. It is contrary to all just principles of Government, that the servants of one Government should be vested with such powers in the territories of another, as are given to the conservator. The appointment of the conservator should be vested in the Government to which the forests belong, as being the arrangement most likely to ensure cordiality and efficiency. By Section III., the collection of the interior duties on timber, and the general superintendence of the export timber-trade, are transferred to Bombay. These powers are very objectionable in the hands of the servants of another Government, who can have no interest in the protection of the inhabitants of this. We are foreigners in this country

even under our own Governments, and can seldom take all the interest we ought to do in the welfare of the natives; but when we bring the servants of another Presidency to exercise authority over them, we augment the evil of this indifference. By Sections VII. and VIII., cutting and wasting are to be punished, and the magistrates are to order their servants to assist those of the conservator in apprehending offenders: this is erecting a double jurisdiction, with all the confusion and clashing of authorities which the transfer of the police to the collector was intended to obviate. By Section XII., the public forests are defined to be the Ghauts and the hilly tracts: but this definition is not accurate, and would not prevent abuse, as private lands and forests are often situated among the Ghauts and the hilly tracts along their bases. But it is needless to examine the provisions of a regulation which ought never to be enacted. To pass a regulation at all would only serve to confirm the system which we wish to abolish.

13. In order to protect the property of the public and of individuals in the forests, their limits must first be ascertained, and this can only be done by a survey. But there can be no investigation of rights while the monopoly continues: the conservator and the monopoly must first be withdrawn, and then public and private rights may be freely and fairly ascertained. It is inseparable from the very nature of such an establishment, having interests and objects at variance with the prosperity of the people, that it should perpetually encroach; and while it is allowed to stand, it will create so many impediments, as to render a survey quite impracticable. By abolishing the monopoly, private rights will at once be secured by each man looking, as formerly, after his own rights. Public rights may suffer some little invasion from smugglers, but the collector can easily, by the means in his hands, prevent the mischief

from becoming of any importance; and he and the inhabitants will easily adjust their respective rights, when they are freed from the intervening authority of the conservator.

14. Under the Native princes, and under our own Government before the appointment of the conservator, the trade in timber was perfectly free, subject to a duty on exportation: every rayet planted or cut down at pleasure, on his own property. [Part of his property consisted of hills, some near, others remote from his habitation. On these hills he occasionally cleared away spots in succession for cultivation, by felling or burning the trees, without any interference whatever, because they were his property as much as his rice-fields, and were included in the deeds of sale of his estate. They constituted a material part of the property by which he was enabled to pay his revenue, because they furnished all the materials for his buildings and implements of husbandry, and also the manure of his lands; for, as there are no sheep, and few cattle on the Malabar coast, the manure is principally composed of shrubs, leaves, and branches of trees. The rayet had complete control over his wood of every kind, whether on the hills or in the valleys, because it could not be taken from him without a violation of private property, and a diminution both of his income and the revenue. But what is his situation now? He cannot cut down or sell a bit of wood on his own property, for the most ordinary purposes: he cannot even remove the young teak plants which spring up from seeds scattered by the winds, though they are injurious. Though he cannot himself cut down his own trees, the conservator cuts them down at pleasure, both on his hills and in his fields and gardens, and makes him pay duty on the wood; and he not only levies duties, but he confiscates property. A monopoly, or even any restriction on the cutting of wood, is, in Malabar, vexatious and oppressive in the highest degree.

Wood is wanted in large quantities for every purpose—for boats, houses, barns, and granaries. In a country where the fall of rain during the five monsoon months is from a hundred to one hundred and sixty inches, and sometimes nearly fifty inches in one month, it is almost impossible to make any building water-proof. The houses of all the more substantial rayets have a double roof, or two stories: in the lower the family resides; the upper serves as a lumber-room, but its chief use is to defend the lower, and carry off the water. The barns and granaries are necessarily constructed in a still more substantial manner, because a great part of the grain is reaped in the rainy season, during short intervals of sunshine, and, in order to be dried instantly, carried into the barns, which are made large for that purpose. The principal public buildings were formerly covered with copper, as the only means of completely excluding the water. The copper was stripped off, and coined into money by Tippoo Sultan; but we go beyond him; he only deprived them of copper, but we of their roofs, or, what is the same thing, we prevent them, by our restrictions, from replacing them. These harsh measures have had their natural result,—clamour and confirmed aversion and discontent, if not open resistance.

From collector of Malabar, Aug. 20, 1822.

15. Why should we persevere in such conduct, when we have not even the pretence of any great national object to vindicate it? The world is at peace; and even if we were pressed by war, nothing could defend a continuance of such injustice towards the people of Malabar and Canara. The aid of the British navy was the original ground of the monopoly; the weakening of the pirates was a subsequent one. The danger of the pirates has long since passed, and the restriction on the timber trade to the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia been abandoned. But the navy, it may

be said, still requires the forests of Malabar, to build one or two ships annually. If this be the case, the timber should be purchased in the market, without any restrictive system; or, if economy be the sole object—if we can believe that it can be of any great importance to the navy to get the timber of its Indian ships a little cheaper than usual, it may be got as cheap without a conservator as with one, nay much cheaper, if we reckon the expense of his establishment, and the loss which private property and the public revenue sustain from the hindrance of trade and agriculture by the forest laws. Even if the timber under a free trade were a little more expensive, what great matter? better that it should not only be a little more but that not a single ship should be built at the expense of such misgovernment. There is no danger, however, of the want of timber. The course we are now pursuing is most like to cause the want. A system to which a whole country is hostile can never succeed. The inhabitants will neglect or destroy the trees which they cannot gain by. The navy is not indebted to the conservator for a bit of wood. All that has been used springs up without him under the old system, and will, if permitted, continue to grow, and furnish a constant supply. The people of Malabar and Canara are chiefly agriculturists and merchants; a considerable proportion of the rayets are traders, and their country being intersected by rivers and creeks, enables them to bring the produce to the coast in their own boats for sale, and they are too good traders not to cultivate teak, or whatever wood is likely to yield a profit. They are fond of planting: they plant trees for sale, for their private use, and in order to devote to their temples; and to encourage them, no regulation is wanted but a free market. Restore the liberty of trade in private wood. Let the public be guarded by its ancient protector, not a

stranger, but the collector and magistrate of the country, and we shall get all the wood the country can yield, more certainly than by any restrictive measures. Private timber will be increased by good prices, and trade and agriculture will be freed from vexation. If timber cannot be preserved by these means, it will not by any other. Independent of what is due to justice, sound policy should lead us to be cautious in tampering with the feelings of a people often turbulent, and who now submit reluctantly to our monopoly; and we should recollect, that no paltry profit in timber can compensate for the loss of their good-will. It is a mockery to talk of the protection of property under our Government, when we maintain a conservator's establishment, whose chief business it is to invade every man's property; to harass him in his own fields—in his barn—in his house, and in his temple.

16. The system is one which is founded in the direct violation of private property, and sets every man—the landholder, the mechanic and the merchant—against the Government. It may be thought that these evils might be obviated by confining the conservator to the public forests; but this would prove a very inadequate remedy. Endless interruption would still be given to the sale and transit of private wood, on pretence of its being public. Even if it were possible to believe that private timber could be perfectly secured from all interference, the complete preservation of the public forests would of itself be a serious injury to the country. If no part of a hill where teak or poon is now growing is to be cultivated, it would stop the progress of cultivation over all hills belonging to Government. In many places, what is now forest, and covered with teak and other trees, was formerly a cultivated country, and will again be cleared and have villages, if not prevented by the conservator. The system we are following,

and now seeking to legalize by a regulation, is worthy only of the times of the Norman forest laws. It is a system for preserving and augmenting the waste, or, in other words, for discouraging agriculture, and laying waste the country. The only remedy for such evils is its entire abolition.

17. The appointment of the conservator was sanctioned by the Honourable the Court of Directors, only on the condition that there should be no material objection to it. The many strong objections which have since appeared, were probably not then foreseen; but I am persuaded that, whenever they are brought to the notice of the Honourable Court, they will concur in the necessity of putting an end to the system which has produced them. The attainment of this desirable object may perhaps be hastened by an immediate application to the Supreme Government on the subject; because, as that Government was authorized by the Honourable Court to exercise its discretion in permitting the appointment of a conservator, it may deem it expedient to exercise a similar discretion in ordering the abolition of his office. I have already said that no regulation is necessary; but it will be proper, pending our reference to Bengal and England, to direct the collector to levy the duties on timber at the usual rates, and to assist the conservator in protecting the Company's forests, and to order him to publish the exemption of private wood from the conservator's control, and to protect the inhabitants from the interference of his department with what is private property.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort St. George,
26th November, 1822.

XII.

MINUTE ON THE STUDY OF THE NATIVE LANGUAGES.

7th November, 1823.

G. O. 17th March, 1823. Commander-in-chief to Government, 17th October, 1823.

THE orders issued by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief respecting the qualifications required in officers before they can be appointed interpreters to Native corps, will, no doubt, have the effect of inciting young officers to study the Hindoostanee language, and of fulfilling the instructions of the Honourable Court of Directors, as far as is practicable with the means in his Excellency's hands. It is well known, however, that though many officers of the army are sufficiently acquainted with that language for carrying on their ordinary duties, very few of them have such a knowledge of it as would enable them to interpret to a court-martial; and it would therefore, at most stations, be difficult, if not impossible, to find a committee capable of deciding whether an officer was sufficiently versed in Hindoostanee to be eligible to the office of interpreter.

The knowledge which many of our Native troops have of English, and Hindoostanee not being the prevailing language of the Peninsula, are perhaps the chief causes of the superiority of the Madras officers generally to those of Bengal, in the knowledge of Hindoostanee; but, whatever may be the causes, the fact is certain; and if it has not been thought safe to trust to the opinion of a military committee there on the fitness of an interpreter, without the check of the College examiners, it seems to be still more necessary *here* to have recourse to the same precaution. Unless this is done, we do not take

G. O. By the Commander-in-chief in India, 17th February, 1823.

the measures necessary for accomplishing the object proposed by the instructions of the Honourable Court, in which they say, " We rely upon your care and vigilance that no officer be selected for the important situation of interpreter, who is not fully qualified to perform all the duties of it, especially the serious and responsible duties of interpreter to courts-martial." I would therefore suggest that officers, who may be declared by a committee of officers to be fit for the duties of interpreter, shall be eligible to hold the office, but shall not be confirmed in it until they shall have been examined by the College committee, and receive from it a certificate of their competency.

With regard to the furnishing of college-books to the officers engaged in the study of Hindoostanee, as proposed by his Excellency, I am of opinion that a reference should be made to the College to ascertain the names of the books, the number of copies of each that can be furnished, and the prices, and we can then determine whether the books should be lent or issued to the officers, on their paying for them.

The measure recommended by the Commander-in-chief, in his minute, would undoubtedly greatly promote the important object of encouraging the study of the Hindoostanee language among the junior officers of the army; but there is an objection to it which Government cannot remove; namely, that its expense would exceed that of the former system of granting rewards for proficiency, which was abolished by order of the Honourable the Court of Directors, first in 1814, and finally in 1818. It is observed, that though two moonshees to each corps may now be necessary, in consequence of the great number of young officers, one may hereafter be found sufficient.

Court of Directors to Government, 27th July, 1814, and 4th Feb. 1818.

This reduced number would, however, occasion an an-

nual expense of 24,360 rupees, which would still exceed the probable charge under the former system: it would be nearly equal to fourteen donations, which is perhaps a greater number than would be given one year with another; we ought not therefore to revive a charge which has already been discontinued by the Honourable Court, without their previous sanction; but the object in view is so essentially useful to the army, that it may be advisable to bring it again to the notice of the Honourable Court.

It is not necessary to specify all the difficulties which a young officer on this establishment has to overcome in learning the Hindoostanee language; but among them may be mentioned, that of his seldom hearing the language spoken, as his Native servants speak English, and the language of the Carnatic is Tamul; and in none of the provinces under the Madras Government is Hindoostanee the language of the people.

The chance of obtaining the appointment of interpreter is not of itself a sufficient inducement for a young officer to incur the expense and the labour of studying a language which he finds he can do without; but the inducement might be rendered more effectual by carrying into execution the instructions of the Honourable Court,—that a competent knowledge of Hindoostanee shall be an indispensable qualification in every candidate for a staff-appointment.

Court of Directors, 4th Feb. 1815, para. 281.

I would therefore recommend that the paragraph in question should be adopted as a rule, and published to the army.

It is not necessary that the same proficiency should be required from every staff-officer as from the interpreter; but he should have that knowledge of Hindoostanee which may enable him to discharge his duty efficiently.

Some officers have a talent for acquiring languages, who

are in all other respects unfit for a staff employment, and cannot therefore be reckoned in the number of those who are eligible to it. There are other officers who, though they study Hindoostanee, with the hope of obtaining a staff-appointment, would study it without any such object, and would think the expense well compensated by the satisfaction of being able to communicate with the natives, and by the superior advantage it gives them in the discharge of their public duties. But it is notwithstanding certain, that the number of officers who acquire a moderate knowledge even of Hindoostanee is very inadequate to the demand of the service, and that stronger motives than now exist are requisite, in order to procure a sufficient supply. There are two ways of effecting this: one is by providing moonshees and books for the students; the other is by reviving the donation of five hundred pagodas; the donation has this advantage, that while it is the cheapest of the two, it is paid only for proficiency; in the other case, the expense is the same, whether there be proficiency or not.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, November, 1823.

I CONCUR entirely with His Excellency the Commander-in-chief in the observations in the minute regarding the importance to the public service of young officers acquiring a knowledge of the Native language, and that the expense which might be incurred in promoting this object would be a judicious sacrifice; but, as the Honourable the Court of Directors have repeatedly ordered the allowance formerly granted to be discontinued, and have said that the quartermastership and other staff-offices ought to form a sufficient incitement to the study of the Hindoostanee language,

I do not think that the necessity of the case is so urgent as to justify our acting contrary to their orders. We have not, in the present instance, the same causes as in that of the Judge-Advocate, to expect that the Honourable Court would view with indulgence our acting without waiting for their sanction. There was no encouragement whatever for men to qualify themselves for the office of Judge-Advocate, and this most serious inconvenience had been felt from irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings of courts-martial. We cannot say that there is no encouragement to the study of Hindoostanee, when we know that it opens the road to almost every staff-appointment. Some immediate or certain pecuniary aid would no doubt increase the encouragement, and produce a greater number of students; but still we find that, without this aid, it has a very great effect, and of this there can be no better proof than the list brought forward by the Commander-in-chief of fifteen officers examined in the current year, since the beginning of May. I am persuaded that we shall have as great, or even a greater proportion every succeeding year, because, besides the incitement held out by the new office of regimental quartermaster, there is the additional one of knowing that an acquaintance with the Hindoostanee language will now form an essential part of the qualifications for many other staff-employments.

If the Honourable Court authorize any expense on account of the students, it might be done either by restoring the former donation, or by granting such a sum as may be equivalent to the charges incurred by the officers on account of moonshees and books. I cannot recommend the plan of fixed moonshees to corps; it would lead to much inconvenience, and probably to disputes and references. An officer will not do much good with a public moonshee, whom he can have only at a particular hour: if his

wish is to make rapid progress, he must have a moonshee of his own, whose service he can command at all hours.

The Commander-in-chief is undoubtedly the proper authority, by which officers are to be selected for the situation of quartermasters; but Government does not fulfil the instructions of the Honourable Court, if it does not see that these officers have a competent knowledge of the language; and the only way in which it can satisfy itself in this respect, is by the report of men qualified to judge. The officers at this Presidency who conducted the examinations are perfectly qualified, and we may safely trust to their opinion; but this is an accidental circumstance, and their successors may not be equally qualified; but Government should not be satisfied with any authority, however respectable, when it can get a better. That of a permanent body, like the College, is unquestionably to be preferred to that of a committee of officers. Examinations have sometimes been made at the Presidency by a committee composed of one or two members of the College with the Judge-Advocate-General, or some other officers conversant with Hindoostanee; and I see no objection to this mode being still adopted. It is, I believe, well understood, that young officers who must attend to their military duties, as well as to the language, are not expected to undergo the same rigid examination as civil servants, who are excused from all public duty while prosecuting the study of the country languages.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XIII.

MINUTE ON INCREASING THE NUMBER OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS EMPLOYED IN THE ARTILLERY.

21st January, 1823.

I HAVE carefully examined the plan proposed by His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, for augmenting the establishment of the European officers with the corps of artillery; and though the inconveniencies from the present want of officers, pointed out in that document, are in general undeniable, it appears to me that they may be removed by a much smaller increase than that which has been proposed.

2. It is certainly desirable that the artillery corps should always have at its head, in this country, an officer of the rank of major-general, and that when such an officer can be found qualified for the command, it ought not to be left to one of inferior rank; but where all the major-generals may have lost their health from long service, the situation of commandant may sometimes, with more advantage, be confided to a field-officer.

3. Among the evils resulting from the want of officers, it is stated that the horse brigade is the only corps of artillery commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, while two battalions are commanded by majors, and one by a regimental captain; but I do not consider this as any material objection, because captains are usually from fifteen to twenty years, and majors from twenty to thirty years' standing in the service, and must then be just as competent to command a corps as they ever can be at any future period. In the infantry and cavalry, as well as in the artillery, a corps is frequently commanded by a major or a captain, and without any injury to the service; and no reasonable aug-

mentation that could be made could secure to us the actual presence of a lieutenant-colonel with every corps.

4. Another of the inconveniences stated to result from the want of officers is, that twenty-one companies are commanded by subalterns. We cannot say that there is a want of officers, merely because there is not always a captain to each company. The command of a company is not so important or difficult, that it may not with safety be entrusted to a subaltern of from ten to fifteen years standing. An officer must have served to very little purpose, who is not in that time qualified for a higher command than that of a company.

5. The number of officers employed as commissaries of ordnance, is urged in support of the propriety of an augmentation; but the establishment of officers, when full, is so ample, that it may, without impairing the efficiency of the corps, furnish these commissaries. Besides, in cases of emergency, these ordnance officers are always available for service with the artillery, as they may be ordered to deliver over charge of the stores to an assistant-commissary or conductor, and join their corps.

6. In support of the expediency of the proposed augmentation of European officers with the Golundauz corps, it is observed, "that such a corps, being composed of natives, is as much, if not considerably more dependent upon its European officers than any other." This is a principle which has never yet been admitted with regard to our other Native troops, and to the justness of which I cannot assent. I am so far from thinking that the efficiency of Native troops is increased in proportion to the increased number of European officers, that I think that the number of officers may be too great, and that, when this is the case, it injures the discipline of the corps, and lessens the respect of the Natives for their European officers. Native troops are

quiet, orderly, and easily managed. The Native officers are well acquainted with all their duties, and expert in their execution. They conduct almost all the inferior details, and leave but little for the European officer to do. They are, however, apt to grow indolent and careless when left to themselves, and European officers are therefore absolutely necessary to direct them, but not many; one to a company is quite enough for every useful purpose.

7. The only increase of European officers which is really wanted, is to the Golundauz corps, and it should consist of two captains, two first and two second-lieutenants; this, added to the present establishment, would give two European officers to each company, and, allowing for absentees on staff and other duties, would probably always secure the presence of one with each company. Were the corps of Golundauz to remain together in a body, I should consider the present establishment of European officers as quite sufficient. It is only because it is broken into detachments that I recommend an augmentation

8. There seems to be no sufficient cause for increasing the European officers of the foot-artillery. The present establishment is, one captain, two first, and two second-lieutenants to each company, which, if kept complete, would be an adequate allowance both for ordnance and artillery duties, even if the commissaries of ordnance were exempted from acting as regimental officers. But I am satisfied that they ought to act both as ordnance and regimental officers. There is no commissary where there is not a detachment of artillery; and there can be no necessity for employing any other officer than him to command it. I see nothing serious in the objections stated to this measure. I cannot admit that each of the "two situations require the full and undivided attention of one officer;"—any commissary has ample time for them both. There is no difficulty in his leaving "the charge of his stores, and marching with

the artillery, if called upon for service. He has an assistant-commissary, or conductor, competent to the charge, and his making it over to him happens frequently. The check required by the Regulations to be exercised by the commanding-officer of artillery over the commissary is not a material objection, as the issues to the detachment of artillery are very trifling, and their expenditure may, if necessary, be ascertained from his orderly-book, as the issues to all the other troops must be verified by their commanding-officers respectively; and as the commissary is under the check both of the commandant of the station and of the Military Board. The union of the ordnance and artillery has grown out of the experience of its convenience. It is the system best adapted to the nature of the service in this country; and I am convinced that their separation would be attended not only by great expense, but with great detriment to the service.

9. We have, no doubt, too few artillery officers at present; but this has arisen, not from a defective establishment, but from that establishment not having been kept complete from home. There are now thirty-six officers wanting to complete it. Had this number been sent out, it would have supplied, twice over, all the deficiency occasioned by officers being employed in the ordnance, and on duties belonging neither to the ordnance nor artillery.

10. We have here the same proportion of artillery officers with relation to the strength of the corps, as in Bengal; and the inconvenience felt from the detachment of artillery officers on extra duties, is not greater here than there, as appears from the annexed abstract:—

Bengal officers employed in ordnance	8
On other duties, not artillery	13
Total . .	21

Madras officers, ordnance.	11
On the other duties, not artillery	6
Total . .	17

Nothing but the strongest necessity ought to induce us to increase the establishment of European officers with any particular branch of the service, not only because it increases our expense, but because it alters the relative chance of promotion between the different branches of the army, which ought to be kept as equal and as permanent as possible.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XIV.

MINUTE ON THE IMPOLICY OF MIXING EUROPEAN AND NATIVE TROOPS, THROUGH DISTRUST OF THE FIDELITY OF THE LATTER.

Dated 18th February, 1823.

1. HIS Excellency the Commander-in-chief has dissented from my proposal of relieving the European corps at Quilon, by a battalion of sepoys instead of His Majesty's 41st regiment now in Fort St. George, on the following grounds:—1st, The danger from the disturbed state and actual rebellion in which the country has been within these few years. 2dly, The treacherous character of the inhabitants rendering it unsafe to place any confidence in the present apparent tranquillity. 3dly, That it was in Travancore that the most recent attempt was made to alienate the minds of our Native troops, and that, by withdrawing the Europeans, they would again be exposed to similar temptation. 4thly, The expediency of having

European corps with all large bodies of Native troops, not only in order to check incipient discontent, but, in a military point of view, to assimilate discipline, and accustom them to place confidence in each other.

2. These arguments are all entitled to the highest respect; and were I not satisfied that some of them have not the same force which they would have had some years ago, I would not have recommended the present measure. There has been no rebellion, or rather insurrection, in Travancore for above twelve years; and it ought certainly to create no anxiety now. Such disturbances have occurred in many other districts as well as Travancore, without creating any apprehension *now* for their tranquillity.

They are the consequences which, in almost all countries, usually follow, for a time, the establishment of a foreign dominion. Malabar was agitated by rebellion, and is now perfectly quiet; and though one regiment of Europeans is stationed there, it is not entirely for the purpose of keeping the country in subjection, but also for that of more general service, as it can, in case of emergency, be readily moved either to Mysore, or by sea to Bombay and Canara, which, in the early part of our Government, though disturbed by insurrections, and occupied by a large European and Native force, has long since been left to the care of a single battalion of sepoys.

3. With regard to the treacherous character of the natives of Travancore rendering it unsafe to trust them, I can see nothing in all the transactions of that country to justify the opinion that they are more treacherous than the inhabitants of Malabar and Canara, or that they differ materially from them in their general character.

4. As to Travancore having been the place where the most recent attempt to alienate the minds of our Native troops was made, that event took place in 1812, and ought

to excite no apprehension of such attempts being repeated, when the causes which produced them no longer exist. When we advert to these causes, we shall see nothing extraordinary in the attempts, and nothing which might not have happened in any other country as well as Travancore. We had begun, as allies, by furnishing troops for the protection of that province, and we had finished, in a very few years, by reducing it to subjection. In such circumstances, it was not at all extraordinary, but was perfectly natural, that the Dewan should wish to recover his rank and power, and the independence of his country, by the expulsion of the invaders, and that, in order to give him a better chance of success, he should endeavour to seduce our Native troops. He prevailed on a few to join in his projects; and his gaining these few seems to have been occasioned by the guard from one of the battalions being left too long near him without being relieved, which gave him opportunities of tampering with them. It is true that, under the influence of alarm, and the credulity which usually attends it, the conspiracy was by many believed to have been extensive, and to have extended to all the corps in Travancore. But Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the Commander-in-chief at the time, after a full and able investigation of the evidence, has recorded his opinion, that the conspiracy was of the most contemptible kind;—that three, out of four corps, had no share in it; and that in the fourth corps it was confined to one jemadar, and a few non-commissioned officers and sepoys of bad character.

5. With respect to the expediency of keeping one European corps with all large bodies of Native troops, in order to check incipient discontent, I have great

MINUTE, SIR S. AUCHMUTY.
8th Feb. 1813.

"I have now gone through a large mass of evidence, and my opinion is, that the conspiracy was confined to the jemadar and men already executed; to the late

doubt of the policy of the measure, because I think that it would show suspicion, without being efficacious in preventing the danger apprehended; for it is remarkable, that in the only instance in which a conspiracy against the lives of the European officers was carried into execution, a European regiment was present, with only two battalions of sepoys; and yet that regiment was so far from being able to protect the European sepoy officers, that it lost a great part of its own officers and men, and was saved from destruction only by the timely arrival of troops from Arcot. I do not, from this, mean to infer, that European troops may not be useful on such occasions, but that they do not furnish such security as can be entirely depended upon, or as ought to be purchased by any great sacrifice of convenience or economy. I think that the best way of ensuring the fidelity of our Native troops is to show no distrust, but confidence at all times; to treat them well; to keep them occupied; to relieve the different stations regularly; to bring all the corps, at certain fixed periods, back to their respective Native districts; and to take care that none of them be permitted to remain too long in any place where they are likely to be tampered with by any Native chief.

Dewan of Travancore, and the pretended nephew of the Cottiah Rajah, with a few sepoys and peons of very bad characters; and that the fakeer accused the Native officers either from private motives, or in hopes of saving himself."

6. It appears to me, that in all our cantonments our European corps are so situated as to be exposed to great danger, and to be incapable of acting efficiently in the event of any general conspiracy among the Native troops. The European barracks are so near those of the sepoys, as to be always liable to surprise. In order to be secure, they ought to be at some distance from them: this would enable the European corps to guard against surprise, and

more effectually to overawe any combinations of Native troops.

7. It will be obvious, from what has been said, that I do not consider it to be necessary that an European regiment should continue in Travancore? Were it necessary, I should not object to the expense which it would involve; but as it is not, I am unwilling that Government should incur an expense for barracks of not less than rupees 12,100,15,4, more especially when we have barracks for a complete regiment at Wallajabad, Arnee, and Vellore, without a single European soldier in either of them. There are also other reasons for withdrawing the European regiment from Travancore. In that remote situation, it is not easily available for general service, not only on account of the distance, but of the violence of the monsoon rendering all access to Quilon by sea impracticable during several months in the year.

It is likewise desirable, on account of the tranquil state of the country and of the propriety of our gradually relinquishing all interference with its government, that we should, by degrees, reduce our force there, and begin by removing the European part. The force to be permanently stationed at Quilon should not be more than what the Dewan or the Rajah, when he comes of age, many deem sufficient to secure the stability of his power. I shall probably, on some future occasion, state my reasons for thinking that Travancore may, with safety, be left entirely to the management of its own rulers.

8. For the present, I would recommend that the European regiment be replaced by a sepoy corps, which I have no doubt we shall be able to withdraw next year without any inconvenience. As it is believed that the 69th regiment will be ordered home in the course of the year, it ought to halt and remain either at Arnee or Wallajabad, until the time of its embarkation. We shall thus avoid the inconvenience

and expense of marching it into Fort St. George, and then out again, in order to be drafted, and much of the irregularity which always attends the drafting of Europeans so near both to the black town and to the artillery cantonments at the Mount.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XV.

MINUTE ON THE HALF-CASTES.

14. THE allowance to the European wives of soldiers, and to their children, has now become a charge of considerable magnitude in India. It appears to require the attention of the Honourable Court of Directors; and it would be desirable that they should fix the rates, and, if practicable, equalize them at the different Presidencies. They ought not to be more than is absolutely necessary; and upon this principle they are undoubtedly too high at present. The coming out of European women to this country should be restricted as much as possible; for the climate and the way of living are unfavourable to every decent woman who is the wife of a soldier.

15. I have already stated my sentiments on the allowance to half-caste women and children. The measure would in time lead to so much expense, and produce so much distress, and is altogether so extravagant and impolitic, that I should consider myself as wanting in my duty, if I did not recommend to the Honourable Court not to sanction it in any shape, or in any degree, but to reject it entirely. In speaking of the half-caste population, I have chiefly spoken of them as depending on us, not as what they would be if left to themselves, but as what they are made by our injudicious interference. If we limit our care of them to the support of schools, and leave them in every

thing else to their own exertions, they will become a numerous, industrious, and useful race of men; but they must expect, like every other great population, to have among them every gradation of condition, from independence and affluence to poverty and hard labour. They are at present, as far as regards the means of living, in better circumstances than the people of England. Comparing them with an equal number of the people of England, there are among them a smaller proportion subjected to extreme poverty, and a greater who live comfortably. This may last while their number is small, and employment easily found; but it must gradually cease as they become numerous; and they must then, like every other great community, have their full proportion of poor. There is no cause why they should not by their own exertions become a thriving people; they are not at present so well qualified as the Hindoos for hard labour, but they will gradually acquire the habit of labour from necessity; and they have the advantage of having fewer prejudices, and a better education, and this advantage of education will always continue. The influence of the superior schools at the Presidency will extend to those at a distance, and the acquisition of knowledge will no doubt be encouraged, both by the aid and example of the most respectable part of their own community.

16. It is rather from the desire of concurring, in some degree, in the sentiments of the Commander-in-chief, than from any conviction of the expediency of the proposed increase, that I now agree to adopt some part of it, instead of previously referring the whole subject for the orders of the Honourable Court, as suggested in my former minute.

XVI.

MINUTE ON THE PROGRESS OF THE BURMESE WAR.

Fort St. George, 18th June, 1824.

THE fall of Rangoon, of which we received official notification on the 13th instant, will, we have reason to believe, from the tenour of a former dispatch from Calcutta, be immediately followed by an offer of peace to the Burman Government. This circumstance, however, ought not for a moment to interrupt our preparations. The acceptance of peace by the enemy is uncertain; and we ought therefore to continue our measures for giving every possible aid to the war in which we are engaged. It is not enough that we have already detached more troops on foreign service than were ever sent from any Presidency in India; we must send all that we can with safety spare.

The first intimation of there being even any likelihood of a rupture with the Burman state was received here on the 23d of February, 1824, in a letter from the Supreme Government of the 10th of that month. In that letter, though all hope of accommodation was not entirely abandoned, we were directed to prepare for war; we were told that a force of not less than four thousand men would be required from us in April; and we were directed to state what number of troops we could have ready for foreign service in all March or early in April, and what additional force could be got ready in May. These questions were referred to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief for his opinion. The view taken of this important subject by his Excellency, went far beyond the estimate of the Supreme Government, and in this view the Government entirely concurred. His Excellency stated that there would be ready for foreign service, in all March, a force of about fourteen hundred European infantry, and five battalions of sepoys,

with a full proportion of European and Native artillery; and that a second force, similar in all respects, would be ready in May.

The whole therefore of the troops of the two expeditions originally destined for foreign service, with the exception of one regiment of European and one of Native infantry, have sailed. The two last corps were, by a letter from the Bengal Government, under date the 24th of May, ordered to be sent as soon as possible to Calcutta. This destination was, however, soon after countermanded by their letter of the 2d instant, which directs them to be kept in readiness for foreign service. In the letter of the Supreme Government, ordering these two corps to Calcutta, we were directed to state whether, in addition to the force originally intended for the two expeditions, we could, without inconvenience, spare any troops in the course of the next six months. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief was of opinion, that two Native battalions might be spared, but did not think that it would be advisable, without taking time for full consideration, to promise more. The Board adopted his Excellency's sentiments, and they were communicated to the Supreme Government in a letter dated the 8th instant.

It appears therefore that we have still ready for foreign service one regiment of European and one battalion of Native infantry belonging to the second expedition, and two battalions of Native infantry, exclusive of the troops of both divisions. We must be prepared to send them wherever their services may be deemed most necessary by the Supreme Government; and I trust that the state of affairs will admit of their being sent to Rangoon, as their junction with the troops there will make the force under Sir Archibald Campbell no greater than was originally proposed, and, I think, not greater than it ought to be. The operations of that officer, in order to be efficient, must be ex-

tensive, and a great number of men will be required to preserve his communications, which will probably be a much more difficult task than beating or driving the main body of the enemy before him.

It is always dangerous, and often fatal to success, to have a force only barely sufficient to maintain ourselves in a hostile country, and none to spare for detachments on distant offensive operations which it may occasionally be found advisable to undertake. It is a great advantage to begin a campaign with a commanding force, particularly in a country recently conquered. It discourages the enemy, and encourages the people of the country to join and aid us in the hope of regaining their independence. The occupation of Rangoon ought not to make us relax in the smallest degree in our preparations, or to believe that it will bring us any nearer to a peace. Our safest and speediest way of arriving at an honourable peace, is to consider this first success as only the beginning of a general war with the Burman empire, and to engage in it with our whole disposable force.

The Burmans are a new enemy: we know very little of them, of the number and quality of their troops, of the nature of their country, or of the extent of their resources. Our ignorance in all these respects must render it difficult to judge at once what plan of operations would be best; but, whatever plan may be adopted by the Supreme Government, it is our business to support it, by the exertion of all the means in our power.

In the course of our late preparations, no circumstance has, I believe, excited more general admiration than the behaviour of our Native troops. Nine battalions of Native infantry have already embarked, and most of them without a single man being absent. They have not only testified no reluctance, but have shown the greatest ardour to go on foreign service. Journeys of extraordinary length and

rapidity have been made by some sepoys who were absent on leave, in order to join in time to accompany the corps, and two companies of pioneers marched in the hottest month of the year, from the vicinity of Hyderabad, a distance of three hundred and sixty-five miles, at the rate of twenty-four miles per day, during fifteen successive days.

The devotion to the service evinced by the whole of the Native troops, in leaving their families and country, is highly honourable to them and their officers, and cannot fail of being viewed with the greatest approbation by the Honourable the Court of Directors.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 3d August, 1824.

THE Board are aware that I have always considered the force at Rangoon as insufficient for the demands of an extensive campaign.

The arrival of Major Canning's Report of the 19th of June, shows us that the want of troops had been much felt; that it had obliged Sir Archibald Campbell to confine himself within very narrow limits, and had prevented him from occupying at an early period the important position of Yangan Chamya; and that it was only in consequence of the arrival of the reinforcement under Colonel Miles, that he thought himself strong enough to take possession of it. Major Canning also mentions, that it was intended to carry their operations up the river, far beyond this point. The occupation of different places, from Rangoon upwards, will soon find employment for all the addition made to the main force by Colonel Miles's detachment; and the operations will again be brought to a stand for want of troops. This want will every day increase, from sickness occasioned by the rains, and by fatigue from

incessant labour arising from the nature of the service, without the usual aid of draught or carriage cattle.

It is essential to success that the force, if not augmented, should at least not be diminished. I propose, therefore, that the only remaining Native battalion of the second expedition should be immediately sent to Rangoon, as it will not do more than replace the casualties which must have occurred since the date of Major Canning's Report.

We have, it is true, made a reference to the Supreme Government respecting the disposal of all the corps ordered for foreign service. But whatever may be their decision, it cannot alter the necessity that exists of keeping the Rangoon force efficient. I have no doubt that it will be in favour of sending all the disposable Native battalions to Rangoon; should it be otherwise, we can easily give another battalion in the room of that now intended to be dispatched.

It is to be recollected, that all our Native corps on foreign service were, when they embarked, on the peace establishment, and must now be much below it. Although I am averse to every unnecessary increase of our military expenditure, yet I know that nothing is so expensive as war carried on with inadequate means. One campaign drags on after another, and we have then all the expense without any of the advantages of war. With the view of preventing this, it will be advisable to increase all Native corps, either actually employed or ordered on foreign service, to the establishment at which they stood before the reduction in 1821. It will also be advisable to add five men to each company in all the remaining corps, in order to enable them to meet the extra duties they will have to perform during the absence of so large a portion of our force, and to furnish volunteers to the corps on foreign service.

The corps on foreign service may be completed either by volunteers or recruits, or both; but volunteering, if successful, will be both more expeditious and more efficient.

I know, from communications with the Commander-in-chief, that his Excellency concurs in the necessity of augmenting our force. Indeed, what I have stated is little more than the substance of his opinions. I recommend that the subject of the proposed augmentation be referred to his Excellency, and that he be requested to carry it into effect in the way he may think best.

It appears from all our correspondence, that one of the most serious obstacles to the prosecution of military operations from Rangoon, is the want both of salt and fresh provisions for the Europeans. We are now sending from hence to Rangoon all the salt provisions in the public stores, and the Commissary-General has no expectation of being able to purchase any more from the Europe ships this season. The stock of salt provisions is also small at Calcutta, and no more can be prepared until the setting in of the cold weather. It therefore becomes necessary to find something to make up for the deficiency of salt provisions. I supposed that when once the army was fairly established at Rangoon, it would be able to obtain cattle from the country, and from Acheen, sufficient for all its wants. I still think that, whenever it is able to advance, it will find supplies of cattle in the country. But lest there should be any failure in this respect, we ought to adopt every means in our power to furnish some substitute. This might probably be done by supplies of salt or pickled fish.

I recommend that the Commissary-General be directed to state what can be done in this respect by his department.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 29th November, 1824.

THE measure now proposed by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, of raising one hundred supernumerary men for each of the corps on foreign service, has my entire concurrence.

The Board has already authorized the increase of the strength of these corps to the war establishment; but it is necessary that the increase should not only be made, but that it should be constantly kept as complete as possible, during the continuance of the present war; and it is evident that this cannot be done, unless we have always a supply of men ready for embarkation, in order to replace the waste occasioned by the service.

The heavy loss of the European part of the force at Rangoon from sickness, renders it the more indispensable to keep the Native part efficient; and though it is highly satisfactory to learn from the medical reports, that the Native troops have not suffered materially, yet, in a climate of which we know so little, we cannot depend upon their continuing healthy, and we ought therefore to be ready to fill up all casualties which may happen. If we waited until we heard of them, and then began to make our preparations, the new levies would reach their destination too late, and serious inconvenience might arise from the delay. The recent capture of Tavoy and Merguis, and the probable occupation of the whole coast south of Rangoon, must unavoidably require a considerable force of Native troops for its protection, and diminish the main-body with Sir A. Campbell; and we ought therefore to make up to him for the loss of this detachment, by keeping the whole of his Native corps complete.

The country near Rangoon has probably been too long under the Burman dominion, and too well guarded, for the

Natives to venture to aid us in any way. But as Tavoy, a more recent conquest of the Burman empire, has thrown off the yoke, it is probable that, with our help, the insurrection will spread northward from the newer to the older conquests, and will reach Rangoon. The possession of such an extensive tract of country in the rear of the army, capable of furnishing abundant supplies of grain and live stock, will be of such importance in facilitating its operations, that I can have no doubt that it will be found expedient to secure the acquisition of the coast south of Rangoon, even if it should require more troops than Sir A. Campbell can easily spare. Should this be the case, I shall not hesitate to recommend, whenever we receive notice that farther assistance is wanted, that the strength of the corps on foreign service receive a second addition, or that, if possible, another Native battalion be sent to Rangoon. As no farther increase of the Native troops serving within the Presidency seems to be necessary at present, the recruiting parties may be withdrawn.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 31st December, 1824.

IT has been already resolved by the Board to raise each of the regiments of Native infantry on foreign service to one hundred men above the full establishment. Since then the increase of sick, and the detaching of two regiments to Tavoy and Martaban, have diminished the Native force at Rangoon in a greater degree than the authorized augmentation will supply, and as the European force has also suffered from disease in an unprecedented manner, it becomes the more necessary to keep the Native force immediately under Sir A. Campbell, at Rangoon, to its full ori-

ginal strength, either by sending more men to corps, or additional corps.

2. More men can be sent only by sending volunteers or recruits. Volunteers may be found in abundance to go with their own corps on foreign service; but we cannot expect many more to leave their own corps for that purpose; and we should be cautious in calling for them, where there is any chance of failure. Recruits require time to be raised; and after they are got, four months at least are necessary to prepare them for joining. We have now in readiness for embarkation for Rangoon about ——— volunteers, and about ——— recruits; but it will be several months before we can dispatch any more. The most expeditious mode of sending any farther reinforcement would be, by sending a regiment at once. We cannot easily spare one; but should any exigency require it, we ought to be prepared to send one, or even two regiments of sepoys.

3. In order to enable us to meet such a demand in the least expensive and most useful way, it would be advisable to raise a local corps to occupy Seringapatam. By this measure, a regular battalion would be set free, which, from the unhealthiness of the place, is always inefficient while there, and usually for a year at least, after being relieved. The local corps might be about the strength of a regular battalion, and might have an European commandant and adjutant.

4. We cannot send reinforcements to Rangoon, and at the same time keep all our field-forces in India complete. It is not necessary that all, or perhaps any of them should always be so; part, or even the whole, of one may be occasionally withdrawn for a time, when temporary service requires its aid in another quarter.

5. The great force required for the Burman war ought

to cause no apprehension for the safety of India; for, if we reckon the increase made to the Native armies of the three Presidencies, since the conclusion of the late Mahratta war, we shall find that it exceeds the whole force now in Ava, or destined to act against that country. There can therefore be no difficulty in preserving our possessions with a force that was found adequate both to their defence and the overthrow of the Mahratta power. Tranquillity may be occasionally interrupted by turbulent zemindars and other chiefs: but these are contingencies from which India has never been entirely free, and which the ordinary field-forces are amply sufficient to meet.

6. We ought not to regard this war as a mere expedition, which is to terminate in one season, but as an arduous service, which may last for several campaigns; and we should therefore be prepared to support the Supreme Government systematically during a protracted contest, with all our means. It is impossible to judge when such a war may end. It may continue for years, or it may terminate suddenly by some revolution or alarm disposing the Government of Ava to accede to our terms. We should not, however, trust to such chances, but calculate all our preparations for a long struggle, and upon such a scale as to ensure success. In order to facilitate the accomplishment of this object, it is of the utmost importance that every European corps in India be constantly kept up to its full establishment, and that a considerable addition be made to His Majesty's naval force in this country; for, in the operations against Ava, seamen are still more useful than soldiers. These valuable resources of seamen and soldiers are not within our reach; but there can be no doubt that the Supreme Government will apply for them to the authorities at home.

7. In the present case, there are difficulties of a nature which we have never experienced before, not from the

military skill of the natives, for that is far below what we have met with in India, but from our ignorance of the country and the people, the obstacles opposed to an invasion by land, by mountains, rivers, and unhealthy jungles, and the hinderance caused to operations of every kind by the long continuance of the rainy season. In all our Indian wars, we had the advantage of a long previous establishment in the country, and of a perfect knowledge of the people. We had a station that was our own from whence to extend ourselves, and we acted in alliance with some native chief, and, by supporting his title and authority, we secured the submission of the people, and obtained aid, as we advanced, from the resources of the country. The people were not hostile to us, but as willing to be the subjects of our Government, or of our ally, as of their former prince. In Ava, we have none of these advantages; we land at once, as an enemy, in a country to which we are strangers, where we have no ally, and where the whole nation are hostile to us, and where, having no fort, arsenal, or granary, we are dependent for every thing on our shipping. In India, and still more in Europe, the occupation of a principal town or fortress secures the submission of the adjacent country; but in Ava, this will not be the case. The people will abandon the town as our army approaches, because they know that we do not mean to fix ourselves permanently in the country, and because they know that, if they were to remain, they would be punished by their own government. In most countries, the defeat of the enemy's armies in the field, and the capture of his principal places, and above all of the capital, usually compels him to seek peace; but even if we were to reduce Amarapoora, it does not follow that the Burmans would submit to our terms. They might abandon their capital, avoid our main army, and carry on a harassing war against our supplies. The great extent of the country would of

itself be a powerful ally in promoting the success of such a plan; and though our army might march through the country, it could not subdue it, while the people were hostile, and had no expectation of a change of government; for its strength, unless greatly augmented, would be insufficient to retain in obedience so extensive a territory.

8. There are however, no doubt, many considerations by which such an enemy may be induced to submit to our terms; among these are the danger of the revolt of Arracan, and the districts on the north-east frontier of Bengal, and of the provinces south of Rangoon; the temporary loss of the resources of the most fertile part of the empire, the Delta, between Prome and the sea, on the advance of our army from Rangoon; and more than every thing else, the apprehension that we may, if the war be long protracted, change our plan of a temporary occupation of that rich province into one of permanent conquest and establishment. These inducements to peace would be greatly increased by the advance of a force from Bengal into Ava by land, for the districts through which it marched would withhold their tribute under various pretences. Its presence would throw the country into confusion, and its operations would distract and alarm the Burman Government, and render it difficult for it to bring a large force upon any one point, or to keep it together when assembled; for, from all that we have yet heard of the Burman forces on former occasions, and more particularly from their conduct in their attacks on Sir A. Campbell, between the 1st and 10th of this month, it is evident that they are a disorderly multitude, and not half-armed; and I think that it may be inferred, from the Bandoola and his corps having been brought all the way from Ramoo, from their carrying with them the muskets and guns taken there, and from the long period which elapsed between the landing of our force at Rangoon, and the arrival of the Burman army

under the Bandoola, and from other circumstances, that the Burman Government has no standing army of any consequence; that, in order to form an army, they are obliged to draw together men from the most distant parts of the empire, and that such an army cannot be kept together for any long period; and there can be no doubt that, by our having two or three forces in Ava, instead of one, the difficulties of the Burman state, both in assembling, and in keeping together their army, would be greatly augmented.

9. As long, however, as our army remains at Rangoon, the Burmans will easily be able to keep together a force to harass it. They will have no cause for apprehension until it begins to advance; but, in order to advance with effect into the country, it must have the means of moving both by land and water: it must have boats and shipping, draught and carriage-cattle, and troops. As far as I can judge from all the information before us, it appears to me that it can advance only by the river, with its stores and heavy articles in boats, and the troops lightly equipped accompanying the boats by land. We are not required to furnish boats, because it can better be done by the Supreme Government; but we can give material aid in cattle, if tonnage can be found. From two to three thousand draught and carriage-bullocks would greatly facilitate the operations of the army, by enabling it to carry by land a light field-train, tents for the Europeans, and many of the articles most essential for the comfort of the troops. I would therefore recommend that, after providing for the embarkation of the troops and stores now under orders for Rangoon, all the remaining tonnage be employed in conveying draught and carriage-bullocks. We shall perhaps be able to dispatch seven or eight hundred, which, together with those sent from Bengal, and those already with the force, may probably answer the

immediate object of moving up the river to where it divides into the branches which form the Delta. But, in order to act with effect, the force must not only be able to carry on operations near the river, but also in the country at a distance from it; and it could hardly do this with a smaller establishment of bullocks than twelve or fifteen thousand. It may be hoped that, when the army advances, means will be found to purchase buffaloes, bullocks, and horses in the country, so as nearly to supply its wants; or that, if a communication can be opened with the force destined for Arracan, it might, by that route, receive supplies of bullocks and elephants from Bengal. But if the demand cannot be supplied in either of these ways, we must continue, notwithstanding the heavy expense, to send bullocks from this Presidency.

10. With regard to the troops, we can easily supply them, so as to keep up the Native part of the expedition to its original strength, and even considerably beyond it. No corps has been found more useful than the pioneers; and I propose that ——— men be added to the establishment of each company on foreign service. Notwithstanding the privations suffered by the troops at Rangoon, there is no reluctance among those here to follow them. But we ought, by sending every supply in our power to Rangoon, to endeavour to prevent the recurrence of scarcity, and to preserve the good-will and confidence of the troops. If the service there should, by any want of attention to their comfort, become unpopular, not only the Native troops employed on it will lose their zeal, but those here will decline going, and make it impracticable to keep the foreign division complete. Nothing, I believe, would be more satisfactory, both to the Native and European troops, than that all who are disabled by wounds or sickness, and not likely to recover soon, should be sent back to India by the earliest opportu-

nity; and we ought to submit to the Supreme Government the expediency of sending instructions on this head to Sir A. Campbell.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 28th January, 1825.

IN a former minute, I stated to the Board that we ought to be prepared to send one or even two additional regiments to Rangoon, and that for this purpose it would be necessary to raise a local corps for Seringapatam, in order to set free the regular corps employed as the garrison of that place; but as this measure would give us no equivalent for the second corps proposed to be held available for embarkation, and as, from the number of corps already on foreign service, considerable difficulty has been found in carrying on the ordinary duties of the country with those left behind, I propose that another addition of five men to each company be allowed to every regiment of Native infantry not on foreign service.

I have received many complaints of the severity of the duty to which the troops are now unavoidably subjected, from the difficulty of finding men for the various services for which guards, escorts, and detachments, are constantly required; and unless the proposed increase is made, it will be impracticable either to lessen the pressure of duty on the troops at home, or to send any more corps on foreign service. This increase will, besides adding to our strength at home, afford some aid in volunteers for foreign service, because the corps stationed beyond our frontier have not hitherto been allowed to give volunteers for Ava, but may now be allowed to give them.

Every aid from volunteering ought to be resorted to in order to keep the force in Ava complete, lest recruiting

should prove inadequate for that purpose: and when we consider the rapid waste of men in Ava, there is too much reason to apprehend that this may be the case. By the latest returns, it appears that the actual casualties in twelve Native corps on foreign service, including the two regiments left at Chittagong, in seven months, from May to November inclusive, amount to about four hundred. Invalids in the last stage of debility have already sailed from Rangoon for this place: it is understood that there are about eight hundred more nearly in the same state; and if to these we add the ordinary sick, it will appear that, in the space of seven months, the loss of men to the service in Ava, between death and sickness, has amounted to nearly two thousand.

As there can be no doubt that the Supreme Government will direct us to send to Rangoon whatever Native troops can with safety be spared, I recommend that Lieutenant-General Bowser be requested to prepare a regiment of Native infantry for embarkation as soon as possible.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute (without date), June, 1825.

1. THE reports of peace which have been so prevalent since the arrival of the last accounts from Rangoon, should not induce the Board to relax in any degree in its military preparations. Whether negotiations may have been entered into or not, and whether, after having been begun, they may be broken off or brought to a successful conclusion, it is our business to go on as if the war were to continue. There is no time when it is more essentially requisite that an army should be strong, than at the very moment when its commander is treating for peace. It will therefore, in conducting the negotiation, be of the utmost advantage to Sir Archibald Campbell to have his force

kept efficient; and if they break off, it is obvious that it will be no less necessary that he should be strong.*

2. We do not know what are the conditions of peace which the events of the war may enable the Supreme Government to enact, or which they may deem it advisable to require. They may be such as to send home in a few months the greater part of our force, or to retain it a considerable time in Ava. One of the main objects of the war is undoubtedly to prevent future aggression. This may be accomplished in various ways. By retaining the conquests of Assam Cochar and Arracan, and stationing a respectable force on that frontier: by breaking the power of Ava so completely, as to disable it from ever again invading Bengal: by aiding the Pegue nation in again establishing their independence, if they themselves are desirous of the change, and bear the chief part in effecting it, but without committing ourselves to support them beyond a certain period. No measure of mere defence would so effectually guard the eastern frontier of Bengal as the restoration of the Pegue state. As long as Rangoon was in the hands of that people, the Burmans would never venture to disturb Bengal. It must be acknowledged, however, that unless the people of Pegue set up a chief of their own, and support him with all their force in throwing off the yoke, nothing can be done for them.

3. As therefore the continuance of our troops in Ava, for a shorter or a longer period, must depend on the events of the war, and the terms of peace which the Supreme Government may deem it expedient to prescribe, we ought to be prepared for every event, by keeping our force in Ava complete as long as it may be wanted there. But this cannot be done unless we always look forward six or eight

* Sir T. Munro was always of opinion that they would break off, as they did.

months at least, for that time is required in order to collect cattle and drivers, and to raise, discipline, and embark troops for foreign service. It is for this reason that I have already recommended that a hundred supernumerary men be raised for every corps in Ava, to keep them always complete, and that I now recommend that the Commissary-General be directed to provide, in addition to the number already ordered, three thousand bullocks with drivers, for embarkation.

4. The prolongation of the absence of so great a portion of our army in Ava must, it may be thought, by weakening us so much at home, endanger the tranquillity of the country, unless some new corps be raised to supply the deficiency. But I see no ground for any serious apprehension on this head. The troops which still remain are sufficient to maintain order. Those who have gone on foreign service, by having been raised in every part of the country, leave relations every where interested in the preservation of its peace. The ease with which recruits are found in every district, and the cheerfulness with which they embark, are indications that the people are in general well-affected. The very confidence which Government itself shows in the continuance of tranquillity, by the readiness with which it sends fresh troops to Ava, by its raising no new corps in their room, by its adopting no new measures of precaution, must tend to discourage the disaffected wherever they may be, by impressing them with the belief that Government must be conscious of the efficiency of its own resources to repress every attempt to excite disturbance or insurrection.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 23d June, 1825.

It is very satisfactory to observe, from the letters lately transmitted to us by the Supreme Government from Sir Archibald Campbell, that the country about Prome will furnish abundant supplies of draught bullocks, and that he will require no more troops.

This information was not intended to make us suspend our preparations for sending troops and cattle to Ava, or the Bengal Government would have given us instructions to that effect. I am therefore of opinion, that we ought to proceed in the same manner as if no such information had been received.

The cattle we are sending are almost entirely for carriage, and they will still be very useful with the army for many purposes, for which draught cattle, even if found in as great plenty as expected, cannot be employed. The troops we are now sending are not additional corps, but are wanted to complete the corps actually on foreign service, and to keep them efficient.

It is very possible that Sir Archibald Campbell may be able to draw from the conquered provinces a supply of draught bullocks, so ample as to render all aid in this point from India unnecessary. But as even in India, where bullocks abound, we are frequently disappointed in our calculations regarding them, both as to their number, and the time of their being ready, it is not unlikely that similar disappointments may occur in Ava; and it would not therefore be safe to discontinue sending cattle from India, until we learn that Sir Archibald Campbell has actually got the number he requires, and that he will be able to keep it complete.

We have not yet had sufficient experience in Ava to form any correct estimate of the probable number of casual-

ties among the troops and cattle during the next six or twelve months. If the war be continued for another campaign, the waste of cattle, if we may judge from what takes place in this country, must, even under the most favourable circumstances, be very considerable, and probably such as will demand the utmost exertion both in Ava and in India to repair: the extended line of operations which must necessarily be occasioned by advancing towards the capital, must also call for many detachments of troops to serve as escorts, or as garrisons for the various posts which must be occupied in order to cover our lengthened communications. But these detachments cannot be spared without too much weakening the main body of the army, unless it be kept complete by continual reinforcements from this country.

The prospect of peace, or even its actual conclusion, ought to make no change whatever in our exertions to keep the force in Ava complete. Its efficiency is the only thing that can have much weight in making the Burman Government submit to the terms of peace which may be imposed, and carry them into effect without evasion or unnecessary delay. With such an enemy, nothing ought to be left to chance. Sir Archibald Campbell, even after peace has been made, ought at all times to be prepared to renew the contest, if necessary; and, until the very last day that his force may remain in Ava, it should be kept as complete in men, and in every kind of equipment, as if the war were only about to begin; and I think that we ought to keep this principle in view in all our measures, for sending supplies to Ava.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 8th August, 1825.

In the letter of Sir Archibald Campbell, dated the 27th of May last, transmitted to us by the Supreme Government, it is supposed to be a possible case, that the war in Ava may be protracted, even after the fall of the capital, by the flight of the King to a distant part of his dominions. Such an event would have the effect not only of continuing the present expenditure, by detaining our troops in Ava, but of increasing it, by compelling us to raise additional men for all the corps of Native infantry employed in India, in order to release them from the severe duty to which they are now necessarily subjected by the absence of so considerable a part of our force on foreign service. The additional duty which is thrown upon the troops at home by foreign expeditions, is always cheerfully borne, because it is expected that it will be of short duration. But, when this extra duty comes to be extended to a second and even to a third year, the case is altered; the men become exhausted and dispirited, and discipline cannot be strictly maintained. Representations have already been made to me of the severity of the duty at several stations, and of the general deficiency of Native infantry; but, as I know that the troops themselves always make ample allowance for any hardship which may be imposed upon them by the exigency of the public service, and as I think it better that they should suffer some hardship for a time, than that we should augment our army, whenever a part of it is sent on a temporary foreign expedition, I am unwilling to propose any augmentation as long as there is any hope of peace being made, and of some of our corps returning in the course of the present year. Should peace not be made within this period, it will then become my duty to recommend an addition of a certain

number of men to each company in every corps of Native infantry. All our corps of Native infantry not on foreign service, are still five men a company below the lowest war establishment; and from the late success of our recruiting service, there can be no doubt that whatever number of men may be wanted will be easily got. There are many circumstances, however, which induce me to hope that the war may be finished in the ensuing campaign, and render the expense of increasing our military establishment unnecessary.

Our chief object in the present war is, undoubtedly, security from future aggression. Our next objects are peace, and the return of our army. There are two ways of preventing future aggression: one is, by so completely breaking the power and spirit of the enemy, as to deter him from ever renewing hostilities; another is, by dismembering or revolutionizing the kingdom of Ava. The means of effecting these objects are in our hands. The power of the enemy may be broken by advancing to the capital, and showing not only to the Burmans, but to all the tributary nations, the weakness of the military force of Ava. The kingdom may be partially dismembered, by making Assam Cachar, and all the petty states on the north-east frontier of Bengal, independent of Ava,—and by retaining Arracan, and more completely by raising up, if possible, the ancient kingdom of Pegue. Could any enterprising chief of that nation be found to assume the government, he would probably, even without any other aid than some arms, be able to maintain himself against Ava, now broken in force, and fallen in character.

If the King of Ava does not seek peace before the loss of his capital, it is not likely that he would hold out long after that event. He would be deserted by his army, if we may judge from all that we have yet seen of its behaviour; he would become dispirited, and would rather offer

terms than live as a vagabond. It may be said, that he might fly to a distant province, and carry on a long defensive war. But Ava does not seem to be calculated, either from the nature of the country or the character of the people, for this sort of contest. An extensive country and a scanty population are usually great obstacles to invasion, and still more to conquest; because in such countries there are seldom any places the occupation of which can insure the command of the country. To subdue the country, troops must be spread over every part of it; and where the people are hostile, this cannot with safety be done. But Ava, though of very great extent, and very thinly inhabited in proportion to that extent, is, from various causes, more easily subjugated than such countries usually are. The population, as far as we have yet seen, are neither warlike nor hostile to us; they appear to have no particular attachment to their rulers, and to be as willing to live under our protection as theirs. The population, though thin, appears to be chiefly concentrated on the banks of the Irawaddy, where most of the principal towns are. This river therefore, by running like a high road through the fertile and populous part of the kingdom, renders it perfectly vulnerable, and enables a superior army to subdue it; because the invader, by having the command of the river, has in fact the command of the country.

I do not therefore see much reason to apprehend that the King would attempt to protract the war long after the fall of the capital. I know of only one thing likely to induce him to hold out—the idea that we would not keep the country, but would get tired of the war, and withdraw our forces. Whatever may be intended in this respect, it will be advisable to indicate by our whole conduct a fixed design of keeping our conquests. Nothing would so soon bring the King to terms, as the belief that we had such an

intention, or so much encourage his holding out, as a contrary opinion. The most likely means of impressing this belief would be, to appoint a European officer to the charge of the civil government in all the conquered territory, leaving the details in the hands of the Natives, under his general control, and to collect a revenue according to usage,—but much lighter, in order to make it popular. This plan was adopted by Lord Cornwallis in Mysore, and was very useful in procuring supplies of grain and cattle for the army. Such an enemy as we are now engaged with, should always be made to fear the worst. If he thinks that war may incur the loss of his crown, or of a considerable part of his dominions, he will shun it carefully; but if he thinks that there is a chance of gaining an accession of territory from success, and that there is no danger of losing any permanently from defeat, he has no sufficient motive to deter him from aggression.

If, contrary to expectation, the King should, on the advance of Sir Archibald Campbell, fly from his capital, and refuse to treat, we cannot keep our army in Ava for ever, and must, for our own safety, endeavour to establish a government that will treat and enable us to withdraw, and put an end to a war so destructive to our resources. We know, from the past history of Ava, that revolutions have not been unfrequent there; and that members of the royal family have often attempted to supplant the sovereign. There is every reason to believe that this disposition is not in any degree diminished, and that the Prince of Sarawuddi, or some other member of the royal family, might, with our assistance, be encouraged to seize the government. The desertion of the capital, the disgrace attending it, the unpopularity of the King, would all favour the measure. The prince, supported by us, would be readily acknowledged; he would not have to conquer the country; he would receive the possession of it from

us; and he would therefore have the strongest motive for seeking the continuance of our friendship.

As I have endeavoured to show, in the above observations, that there are grounds for hoping that peace may be obtained in the course of the present year, I wish to defer taking any steps for the increase of the strength of our Native infantry regiments, until we can see with more certainty whether this hope is likely to be realized or not.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Minute, 29th December, 1825.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL COTTON has informed us, that besides the new levies which have been sent to Ava, it will be necessary to relieve at least four of the Native regiments (those which have suffered most) by complete regiments; and I am of opinion, that we ought at once to comply with his request, in order to avoid the danger of embarrassing the operations in Ava by any unnecessary delay. The officer commanding the army in chief has stated, that, in order to enable us to meet Brigadier-General Cotton's demand, and to provide for the pressing want of troops occasioned by the absence of so great a part of our army on foreign service, it will be necessary to raise immediately seven extra regiments of Native infantry, and to make an addition of eighty troopers and horses to each regiment of Native cavalry, besides a farther addition of one hundred troopers and horses to the 1st regiment, to replace the casualties which must arise during its service in Ava. I am aware of the difficulty which is felt from the want of troops; but it is a difficulty which must always be borne to a certain extent when we are engaged in foreign war; and I therefore think that somewhat less than the proposed addition will, for the present, be sufficient.

2. By the measure of relieving four regiments in Ava, we shall lose the services of four regiments in India, because two regiments must land at Rangoon before one can embark on its return from thence, and two regiments must either be at Madras, waiting to embark, or on their march from the interior to the coast for embarkation; the arrival of the return corps will make no difference, because, as such relief must probably continue while the war lasts, whenever one corps returns, another must be put in march for the coast.

3. We have now in Ava fourteen Native regiments, in Arracan two, and the proposed reliefs require four; so that we shall have in all twenty withdrawn from our home force. Colonel Fair's brigade may be soon expected from Arracan, but it will be long inefficient; and even when restored, we shall still have eighteen Native regiments appropriated to the service in Ava, and we shall have only thirty-two to cover the territories to which, in ordinary times, fifty regiments, our whole establishment of Native infantry, are allotted. So great a demand upon our regular force can only be replaced by raising extra battalions. Had only twelve or fourteen Native regiments been required for Ava, we might still have gone on a little longer without increasing our force; but with eighteen Native regiments, and the greater part of our European troops, either actually absent on foreign service, or destined for it, to delay any longer the raising of extra battalions would be pushing too far the harassing duties of our sepoys, and risking too much by leaving the country too bare of military force. Even now we are reduced to the lowest point we can be with safety in this respect; but if we allot four more corps for reliefs in Ava, we shall not have the means of effecting the ordinary reliefs of corps at home; we shall be quite unable to assemble, in case of emergency, the smallest disposable force, and we shall exhaust the patience of the Native

troops, and destroy their health and discipline by incessant exertion and want of regular relief or repose.

4. Four is the smallest number of extra battalions that will be required: this number cannot, for a considerable time, make up for the loss of the four relieving regiments; and, even when completed, will very inadequately supply their place. Two of the relieving battalions must reach Rangoon before Sir Archibald Campbell can send one in return; because, while one of them relieves a corps at Rangoon, the other must proceed up the country, in order to relieve the corps which is first intended to come down to Rangoon on its way to Madras. It is not improbable that the state of affairs may induce Sir Archibald Campbell to retain both the relieving corps, without sending back one, and in that case it will be necessary to raise six instead of four extra corps. The demand for troops has grown with the progress of the war; more have always been wanted than was at first thought would be necessary. It is only a few months since Sir Archibald Campbell said that he wanted no more; but we have since sent him His Majesty's 45th regiment, and Colonel Stewart's brigade of Native infantry; and, if the war continue, there is every reason to believe that he will still want more. Should the enemy, after being driven from their present positions, make no farther resistance, he will not stand in need of reinforcements; but we ought not to calculate upon such an event, but rather upon a continuance of resistance; and in that case, however successful he may be, he will require more troops to cover his lengthened communications as he advances. He looked at one time for co-operation from Arracan; but the abandonment of offensive operations from that quarter, which has been found necessary, will relieve the enemy from all apprehension on that side, and enable them to bring their whole force against him, and will compel him to look for additional aid from hence. We ought

therefore to lose no time in taking measures to afford it to the utmost possible extent: it is always safer in war to anticipate wants than to wait for them: if we delay our preparations until another requisition is made upon us, they may be too late, for it is evident that we shall not be able to spare any more of our Native battalions for foreign service, without raising corps to supply their place. If we raise extra corps, we shall be able not only to relieve all the weak corps in Ava, and thus to render the army there more efficient, but to give Sir Archibald Campbell, in case of any emergency, two or even three corps in addition to his present force. If we raise no extra corps, we shall not be able to comply with the demand for reinforcements by Sir A. Campbell, should circumstances compel him to call for them: such a state of things might be attended with the worst consequences; and every precaution ought to be taken to prevent its occurrence.

5. As only two squadrons of Native cavalry have been ordered on foreign service, I do not think it necessary that any addition should be made, except to the 1st regiment, to which the increase of ten troopers and horses a troop, besides the farther addition of one hundred troopers and horses, as proposed by Lieutenant-General Bowser, should be authorized. Should more cavalry be required in Ava, we shall receive information on the subject in time to enable us to include the additional number of horses in the annual requisition upon the Commissary-General in March.

6. I recommend that the establishment of the Native regiments of infantry on the home service be increased to nine hundred and fifty rank and file: this measure though not so convenient as a greater increase of the number of regiments, will lighten considerably the severe duties of the troops, and will enable us, at some stations where a weak

corps is employed, to relieve it by substituting five or six companies of a strong one.

7. As our army is, in my opinion, adequate to the supply of all our subsidiary forces, and to the defence of all our territories in India, the extra corps may be reduced, on the conclusion of the war, in proportion as the regular corps return from Ava; and in the mean time, as one, and possibly two strong relieving regiments may be embarked before an answer to any reference to the Supreme Government could be received on this subject, I think that, anticipating their approbation of the immediate levy of four extra corps, and of the eventual levy of two more, we ought, without delay, to authorize the officer commanding the army in chief, to carry the proposed augmentations into effect; I recommend, therefore, that four regiments of Native infantry be brought to the Presidency, in the course of the ensuing three months, for embarkation for Rangoon; that four extra battalions of Native infantry be raised, and the usual proportion of European officers be allotted to them; that the establishment of all the regiments of Native infantry employed on the home service be augmented to nine hundred and fifty rank and file each, and that ten troopers and horses each troop be added to the 1st regiment of Native cavalry, besides a farther addition of one hundred troopers and horses to replace casualties in Ava.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XVII.

MINUTE ON NATIVE EDUCATION.

10th March, 1826.

THE Board of Revenue were directed by Government, on the 2d July, 1822, to ascertain the number of schools,

and the state of education among the natives in the provinces, and with their letter of the 21st of February last, they transmitted the reports on this subject which they had received from the several collectors. From these reports, it appears that the number of schools, and of what are called colleges, in the territories under this Presidency, amount to 12,498, and the population to 12,850,941; so that there is one school to every thousand of the population. But as only a very few females are taught in schools, we may reckon one school to every five hundred of the population.

2. It is remarked by the Board of Revenue, that of a population of twelve millions and a half, there are only 188,000, or one in sixty-seven, receiving education: this is true of the whole population, but not as regards the male part of it, of which the proportion educated is much greater than is here estimated; for, if we take the whole population, as stated in the Report, at . 12,850,000

And deduct one-half for the females, the remaining main population will be . . 6,425,000

And if we reckon the male population between the ages of five and ten years, which is the period which boys in general remain at school, at one-ninth, it will give 713,000

Which is the number of boys that would be at school, if all the males above ten years of age were educated; but the number actually attending the schools is only 184,110, or little more than one-fourth of that number. I have taken the interval between five and ten years of age as the term of education; because, though many boys continue at school till twelve or fourteen, many leave it under ten. I am however inclined to estimate the portion of the male population who receive school education, to be nearer to one-third than one-fourth of the whole, because we have

no returns from the provinces of the numbers taught at home. In Madras, the number taught at home is 26,963, or above five times greater than that taught in the schools. There is probably some error in this number; and though the number privately taught in the provinces does certainly not approach this rate, it is no doubt considerable; because the practice of boys being taught at home by their relations or private teachers, is not unfrequent in any part of the country. The proportion educated is very different of different classes: in some it is nearly the whole; in others it is hardly one-tenth.

3. The state of education here exhibited, low as it is, compared with that of our own country, is higher than it was in most European countries at no very distant period. It has, no doubt, been better in earlier times; but, for the last century, it does not appear to have undergone any other change than what arose from the number of schools diminishing in one place, and increasing in another, in consequence of the shifting of the population from war and other causes. The great number of schools has been supposed to contribute to the keeping education in a low state, because it does not give a sufficient number of scholars to secure the service of able teachers. The monthly rate paid by each scholar is from four to six or eight annas. Teachers, in general, do not earn more than six or seven rupees monthly, which is not an allowance sufficient to induce men properly qualified to follow the profession. It may also be said, that the general ignorance of the teachers themselves is one cause why none of them draw together a large body of scholars. But the main causes of the low state of education are the little encouragement which it receives from their being but little demand for it, and the poverty of the people.

4. These difficulties may be gradually surmounted. The hindrance which is given to education by the poverty of

the people may, in a great degree, be removed by the endowment of schools throughout the country by Government, and the want of encouragement will be remedied by good education being rendered more easy and general, and by the preference which will naturally be given to well-educated men in all public offices. No progress, however, can be made without a body of better instructed teachers than we have at present. But such a body cannot be had without an income sufficient to afford a comfortable livelihood to each individual belonging to it; a moderate allowance should, therefore, be secured to them by Government, sufficient to place them above want; the rest should be derived from their own industry. If they are superior both in knowledge and diligence to the common village schoolmasters, scholars will flock to them, and augment their income.

5. What is first wanted, therefore, is a school for educating teachers, as proposed by the Committee of the Madras School Book Society, in the letter of the 25th October, 1824, which accompanied the second Report. I think that they should be authorized to draw seven hundred rupees monthly from the treasury, for the purposes which they have stated; namely, for the payment of the interest of money employed in building, and the salaries of teachers, five hundred; and for the expenses of the press, two hundred. I would next propose that Government should establish in each collectorate two principal schools, one for Hindoos, and the other for Mohammedans; and that hereafter, as teachers can be found, the Hindoo schools might be augmented, so as to give one to each tehsildary, or about fifteen to each collectorate. We ought to extend to our Mohammedan the same advantages of education as to our Hindoo subjects, and perhaps even in a greater degree, because a greater proportion of them belong to the middle and higher classes; but

as their number is not more than one-twentieth of that of the Hindoos, it will not be necessary to give more than one Mohammedan school to each collectorate, except in Arcot and a few other collectorates, where the Mohammedan population is considerably above the usual standard.

6. We have twenty collectorates. The number of tehsildaries is liable to change; but it will be sufficient for the present purpose to estimate them at fifteen on an average to each collectorate, or three hundred in all. This would, according to the plan proposed, give about forty collectorate and three hundred tehsildary schools. The monthly salaries of the teachers of the collectorate schools might, on an average, be fifteen rupees to each, and those of the tehsildary nine rupees to each. These allowances may appear small, but the tehsildary schoolmaster, who receives nine rupees monthly from Government, will get at least as much more from his scholars; and, considering all circumstances, his situation will probably be better than that of a parish schoolmaster in Scotland.

7. The total expense of the schools will be as follows:—

Madras School-Book Society, per month .	Rs. 700
Collectorate schools, Mohammedan, 20 a. 15 Rs.	300
Ditto, Hindoo, 20 a. 15 Rs.	300
Tehsildary schools, 300 a. 9 Rs. . . .	2,700
Per month .	4,000
Per ann. Rs.	48,000

This expense will be incurred only by degrees, because it will be long before a sufficient number of qualified teachers can be obtained. The charges for the Madras School Book Society and the collectorate schools are all

that will probably be wanted before the sanction of the Honourable Court can be received. The sum for which we ought to request their sanction, ought not to be less than half a lac of rupees. None of the endowments in the collector's Report are applicable to the present object. They do not exceed twenty thousand rupees in all; and only a small portion of them are public grants, and this small portion belongs chiefly to teachers of theology, law, and astronomy. Whatever expense Government may incur in the education of the people, will be amply repaid by the improvement of the country; for the general diffusion of knowledge is inseparably followed by more orderly habits, by increasing industry, by a taste for the comforts of life, by exertions to acquire them, and by the growing prosperity of the people.

8. It will be advisable to appoint a Committee of Public Instruction, in order to superintend the establishing of the public schools, to fix on the plans most proper for them, and the books to be used in them; to ascertain in what manner the instruction of the natives may be best promoted, and to report to Government the result of their inquiries on this important subject.

9. We must not be too sanguine in expecting any sudden benefit from the labours of the School Book Society. Their disposition to promote the instruction of the people, by educating teachers, will not extend it to more individuals than now attend the schools. It can be extended only by means of an increased demand for it, and this must arise chiefly from its being found to facilitate the acquisition of wealth or rank, and from the improvement in the condition of the people rendering a larger portion of them more able to pay for it. But though they cannot educate those who do not seek, or cannot pay for education, they can, by an improved system, give a better education to those who do receive it; and by creating and

encouraging a taste for knowledge, they will indirectly contribute to extend it. If we resolve to educate the people, if we persevere in our design, and if we do not limit the schools to tehsildaries, but increase their number so as to allow them for smaller districts, I am confident that success will ultimately attend our endeavours. But, at the same time, I entirely concur in the opinion expressed in the Fifth Report of the Calcutta School-Book Society, when speaking of the system, that "its operation must therefore of necessity be slow; years must elapse before the rising generation will exhibit any visible improvement."

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XVIII.

MINUTE ON PUBLIC SERVANTS BEING PERMITTED TO HOLD LANDS.

In Consultation, 11th July, 1826.

1. I HAVE examined with attention the voluminous proceedings of the Board of Revenue, on the question of public servants being landholders, and the sale of Mirasi lands in Tanjore for arrears of revenue, and the purchase of them by public servants and their connections.

August 8, 1825, and June 19, 1826.

2. The report of the sub-collector, Mr. Roberts, points out very distinctly the abuses which this practice has occasioned, and while it is authorized, the ease with which they may be committed, and the difficulty of preventing them.

June 15, 1822.

3. I concur entirely in the sentiments expressed by the Board of Revenue, regarding the possession of lands by public servants, either by inheritance or private purchase, in the district

Board of Revenue, August 8, 1825, par. 10, 11.

in which they are employed, and the sale of lands by public auction for arrears of revenue to them and their connections. There is no prohibition against the possession of private property in land by public servants, in the districts in which they serve. It is however better on the whole, even in districts permanently settled, that a proprietor of land should hold no high office in the district in which his land lies. In districts not permanently settled, the possession of land ought not to cause the removal of a tehsildar or other principal servant; but it ought to be sufficient to prevent the owner from being appointed to any high office in his own district. An influential officer, like a tehsildar, ought not to be permitted to purchase land in his own district, when sold either by private or public sale, without previously resigning his office. Should he purchase without resigning, he should be dismissed from office; and if the purchase be of land sold for arrears of revenue, the sale should be null. It may be thought that there could be no harm in allowing him to purchase land when sold by private sale. But it appears to me to be objectionable on two grounds: first, on that of his becoming a landholder in his own district; and secondly, on that of its leaving an opening for converting into a private, what would otherwise have been a public sale. In all unsettled districts, but especially in Tanjore, where the settlements fluctuate annually according to prices; and in many villages, both according to prices and to produce, the principal revenue servants have many means of causing the sale of lands and villages, without appearing to be concerned in it. They may overrate the produce and the prices. They may prevent remission where it is necessary, by underrating the loss of crop from want of water or other causes; and they may insist on punctual payment of the kist when the delay of a month or two would have saved the land-owner from great loss; and he may, in this manner, often be

obliged to sell his land, in order to avoid a distress by attempting to retain it. I believe that it is generally understood by the revenue servants, that they are not to purchase land in the districts in which they serve, and that this circumstance restrains them; but were this check removed by such purchases being openly authorized by Government, they would soon be carried to an extent which would be extremely injurious both to the landholders and to the public revenue.

4. The question of revenue officers being proprietors of land in their own districts, is, however, of much less consequence than that of they and their relations being the purchasers of land sold by public auction for arrears of revenue. Wherever such a practice is suffered to exist, it must tend to facilitate the oppression of the land-owners, to spread corruption among the revenue servants, and to destroy the confidence of the people in the protection of the Government. The statement given by the Board of Revenue sufficiently proves how rapidly such a mischievous practice increases when it meets with any encouragement, as in Tanjore. It appears that land belonging to nine hundred and fifteen individuals, bearing an assessment of rupees 1,00,523, has been sold on account of arrears amounting to rupees 3,09,544, and produced at sale, rupees 120,384: that these arrears have been accumulating from so old a date as 1801-2, the first year of the Company's undivided administration of the province: that of this land thirty-two lots were purchased by public servants and their relations and connections: that of these lots only four were purchased previous to 1820, and the remaining twenty-eight between 1820 and November 1823. That the assessment upon the land thus sold was rupees 37,571 —the arrears due, rupees 1,23,193—and the purchase-money, rupees 44,101; and that though in general the

Board of Revenue, August 8, 1825, par. 13, 14, &c.

purchase-money was less than the arrears, yet in two cases it was more than five times the amount.

5. The purchases made by the public servants and their connections, from 1820 to November, 1823, show how rapidly the evil was increasing, until it was checked by the petitions of the inhabitants; and the two instances in which land is sold for more than five times the amount of the arrears, would probably not have occurred, had the public servants not been concerned; and farther explanation respecting them ought to be required.

6. The detail given by the Board of Revenue of the circumstances under which the villages of Tenderah and Paruvalunden were sold, exhibits very distinctly the abuses with which the practice of selling lands for arrears of revenue has been attended in Tanjore. The village of Tenderah was sold in April 1823, for arrears to Venkat Row, the late Dewan of Travancore, who is related both to the head serishtadar of Tanjore and to the tehsildar of the district in which Tenderah is situated.

Par. 17, &c.

7. These arrears commenced so early as 1801-2, and amounted, at the time of sale, to chuckrums 63,844, of which more than one-half, or chuckrums 3,73,7 43½, accrued while the village was under sequestration, and managed by sirkar servants. During the period of sequestration, which, with an interval of two years, lasted six, the whole of the proprietor's share of the produce was taken by the sirkar for arrears. The cultivators who had received tuckavi received no part of the cultivator's share, and in three of these years not one individual in the village received any share of the produce of his labour; and yet in each of these six years there is entered a balance against the village, on account of revenue, and in five years of the six on account of tuckavi. The particulars of the arrears and sale of Paravalunden are nearly similar to those of Tenderah.

8. The system followed with regard to these arrears has been unjust and oppressive to the inhabitants, and has, no doubt, been likewise injurious to the revenue. The merassadars ought to have been liable only for such arrears as arose while the villages were in their own hands. The arrears which occurred under sequestration ought to have been borne exclusively by Government. The cultivators who received tuckavi, were no doubt answerable for it; but accidents often happen, which render them unable to pay it; and when this accrues, it should be remitted. A measure so harsh as the seizure of their whole share of the produce for its liquidation, ought never to be resorted to.

Govt. to Bd. of Reven. 9th Aug. 1821.

9. The balances of fuslies 1211 and 1212 are included in their arrears, though they were ordered by Government to be struck off; and no cause is assigned for their having been retained.

Bd. of Rev. 5 Aug. 1816. Ditto, 8 Aug. 1825, para. 32.

The Board of Revenue recommended that after remitting star pagodas 62,467,29,37 on account of fuslies 1218 and 1219 in the province of Tanjore, leaving a balance of star pagodas 10,947,15,15, the collector should exercise his discretion in collecting it. The balance on this account however, notwithstanding the sale of so much land, is still rupees 19,413, which I think ought at once to be remitted. The principle stated by the Board of Revenue, in recommending a remission of star pagodas 59,108 out of a balance of star pagodas 86,597,35,51 on account of the lease from fusly 1220 to 1224, due from villages originally rented, but afterwards assumed and managed by the sirkar servants, namely, "that the deficiency which then occurred could not in fact be regarded in the light of a balance so much as an unavoidable reduction in the settlement," is perfectly correct.

Para. 35.

10. The custom of keeping the accumulating balances of a great number of years standing, against districts, is

productive of many serious evils, and is scarcely ever attended with any real advantage. We see how small a portion of them has been recovered in Tanjore after the lapse of so many years, and the adoption of such rigorous measures; and if we could trace all the effects of this recovery, we should probably find that it had been obtained partly out of the current year's revenue, and partly by disabling the proprietor from carrying on his cultivation to the usual extent, and that Government had, in fact, gained little or nothing by the recovery. We see that these old balances are good for little else than furnishing the means of corrupting the revenue servants, and of oppressing the inhabitants; and I am therefore of opinion that a period ought to be limited beyond which no balance of land revenue should be demanded. It ought perhaps in no case to exceed two years after the close of the year in which the balance became due; but in general it might probably with advantage be confined to the commencement of the kists of the ensuing year, or to the first six months of that year. This rule might be applicable not only to all unsettled districts, but, with some exceptions, to all under temporary leases. The Board of Revenue might be desired to take the subject into consideration, and report their sentiments regarding it; and in the mean time the remissions recommended by them in 1816, on account of the triennial and quinquennial leases in Tanjore, ought to be authorized.

Bd. of Rev. 8 Aug. 1825, para. 38.

11. I entirely agree with the Board of Revenue in their remarks on the conduct of the revenue servants of Tanjore in the sale of lands for arrears of revenue, being injurious to the inhabitants, and calculated to throw discredit on the Government, and on the propriety of annulling, as far as may be practicable under the Regulations, all sales of Merasi land, for arrears of revenue, and particularly

such as have been made to the public servants of the revenue, and their connections.

12. The Board of Revenue, in their proceedings of the 19th June, continue their observations on the sale of lands in Tanjore. It appears that purchases by public servants had begun so far back as 1812. The then collector said that the purchase by public servants of lands exposed for public sale had been repeatedly and publicly prohibited, and he recommended, and the Board directed the servants concerned to be dismissed, and suits to be instituted for annulling the sales. These measures, and the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, which were conveyed to the present collector, and his attention particularly called to the paragraphs which prohibited the sale of Merasi lands, ought to have made him more cautious in authorizing their sale. But he seems to have considered this severe measure rather as the ordinary way of recovering balances, than as one which was to be resorted to only in extreme cases; and I agree with the Board in thinking, that the two villages which he was anxious to sell for arrears, were not such urgent cases as to require an immediate decision, and make them anticipate the full consideration of the general question, as in one of the villages the arrears were very trifling, and in the other, the last item comprising the arrears, had become due seven years ago, and ever since that time the revenue had been punctually realized.

Bd. of Rev. 19th June, 1816, para. 3 and 6.

Board of Revenue, para. 23 and 28.

13. The collector observes, that what is usually termed sequestration in Tanjore, is nothing more than the superintendence of the sirkar servants, as the merassadar continues to manage the land, and to cultivate it with his own people. The Board of Revenue object to such a nominal system of sequestration. It would

Para. 33, 34.

be certainly more complete if the land were taken entirely out of his hands; but this may be often inconvenient; and as the sirkar servants superintend the cultivation, and reaping, and measuring, there is such a degree of interference, or sequestration, as ought to exempt the proprietor, after the delivery of the sirkar share of the produce, from every other demand; and the sale of lands, under such circumstances, on the plea of their not having yielded the amount at which they had been estimated or assessed, is a severe and unjustifiable measure.

14. The collection of old arrears is destructive of exertion and of agricultural enterprise: but it appears that no less than four hundred and seventy-four villages have been sold, either in whole or in part, for arrears of which a very considerable part is of an old date.

The particulars are as follow:—

	Villages.		Merassadars.		Rupees.
Sold entire,	170	belonging to	740	paying a revenue of	135,628
Sold in part,	304	do.	1289	do.	143,824
	474		2029		279,452

Board of Revenue, para. 44 and 49.

The balances for which they were sold amounted to rupees 810,836. The sales yielded rupees 359,188, or considerably less than half the balances. Mr. ——'s sales have not only been much more extensive than those of all his predecessors, but they have been for older arrears, and have been rendered still more objectionable by the great purchases of the public servants. Those of Narhari Row alone pay a revenue of rupees 17,479 : 8:—those of all the other servants, rupees 30,502 : 13,11. The first purchase, with one single exception, was made by the serishtadar Goonda Punt, in August, 1820, and was soon followed by many others, but all small in comparison with those of Narhari Row,

which included the two whole villages of Paravulanden and Tenderah, whose affairs have been so fully investigated by the Board of Revenue. It appears that these villages are held by Kisnah Row, the second son of Goonda Punt; that Kisnah Row was adopted by Narhari Row, who is son-in-law of Venkal Row, the late Dewan of Travancore; that Sreniwas Row, the purchaser, is the son of Venkal Row; and that Goonda Punt endeavoured to get the villages at a low assessment through the application of the Dewan at Madras, who repeatedly urged the subject under the plea that the villages were for himself, while, in fact, they were purchased for the serishtadar's son, Kisnah Row.

Board of Revenue, para. 54, &c.

15. The transactions regarding these two villages show to what an extent the frauds of the public servants may be carried, if not completely put a stop to by adequate measures. The Board of Revenue should be therefore authorized to annul the sales to public servants and their relations; to dismiss the serishtadar and his deputy; to require the collector's report on the other servants; to prohibit private purchase of land, on pain of dismissal from office; and to call on the collectors for a report on old balances, in order that such as cannot be collected may be written off. I concur in the opinion of the Board of Revenue, that the power of sale cannot be relinquished in districts settled rayetwar, without endangering the realization of the revenue, but that it should be cautiously exercised.

Para. 68.

Para. 70.

Para. 73 and 75.

Para. 78.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

XIX.

MINUTE ON PROMOTION OF NATIVES.

27th April, 1827.

1. THE appointment of Mr. Cassmajor to the office of President at Mysore, seems to present a fit occasion for revising the local administration of Seringapatam, which the great changes which the place has undergone have, for some time past, rendered every day more necessary. The great importance of Seringapatam, when it fell into our hands, required that its civil administration should be vested in an European officer; but since that time, from the fall of the Poona States and other causes, it has lost almost all its political and military importance. It is no longer a principal military station; its garrison consists only of a part of a local corps—its numerous population, originally drawn together by its having been the seat of Government, has been for many years dispersing itself over the country, and the portion which is left is still diminishing every day, from the want of employment and the insalubrity of the climate.

2. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that the employment of a civil servant exclusively for the management of the civil duties of Seringapatam is unnecessary. I think that the island of Seringapatam should be annexed to the collectorate of Coimbitore;—that all judicial authority in the island should be entrusted to an intelligent native;—that his jurisdiction should extend over the districts of Kolligall and Sattigall;—that he should exercise all the powers, civil and criminal, of an assistant judge;—and that his court should remain at Seringapatam until it can be conveniently removed to Kolligall.

3. Seringapatam itself is extremely unhealthy; and we

are not sure that Kolligall is favourable to the European constitution. It is therefore desirable, for this cause alone, even if there were no other, that Natives, who are less liable to suffer from the climate, should be employed instead of Europeans. Should the experiment, in the present instance, prove successful, as I am confident it will, the employment of Native judges may then, by degrees, be extended to some other remote and unhealthy districts, such as Soondah, and in time to every place where their services may be useful.

4. At present, the highest Native officers in the judicial department act immediately under the eye of the European judge. The highest Native judicial officer who is intrusted to act for himself at a distance from the judge, is the District Moonsiff; but his situation is a very subordinate one: in criminal matters he has no jurisdiction, and in civil it is limited to suits of rupees five hundred. The District Moonsiffs, by their general good conduct, have become a very important part of our judicial system: they have fully realized all the expectations which were formed of their utility; and the public benefit which has resulted from their employment, ought of itself to be a sufficient motive for our availing ourselves of the services of Natives in a higher judicial station than that of District Moonsiff. That office, though no doubt respectable, is still very subordinate, and ought to be rather the beginning than the limit of Native promotion. We ought to look forward to a time when Natives may be employed in almost every office, however high, and we ought to prepare them gradually for such a change, by entrusting them with higher duties from time to time, in proportion as experience may prove their being qualified to discharge them.

5. The employment of Natives in high offices will be as much for our own advantage as for theirs: it will tend both to the economy and efficiency of the administration of

public affairs. Every time that a Native is raised to a higher office than had before been filled by any of his countrymen, a new impulse will be given to the whole establishment; the hope of attaining the higher office will excite emulation among those who hold the inferior ones, and improve the whole. But this improvement will take place in a much greater degree when the new office is one of a high and independent nature, like that of a judge. The person who is appointed to it will be conscious that he enjoys some share in the administration of the affairs of his country; he will feel that his own rank and character have been elevated by his having been selected for the high office which he holds, and his feelings will pervade every class of the department to which he belongs. I do not mean to say that we are not to expect misconduct in a Native judge; we shall certainly meet with it in him as in all classes of public servants; and when we do, it must be punished by dismissal: but this ought not to discourage us from continuing the office; for I am convinced that the instances of misconduct will not be numerous,—that they will become more rare every day, and that they will weigh nothing in comparison with the advantages to be derived from the employment of Native judges.

6. I think that the Native judge ought to have all the powers of an assistant judge, because to give him less would not answer the purpose either of enabling us to withdraw the European judge from Seringapatam, or to make the experiment of improving the Native branch of the judicial department, by the employment of a Native judge; and because it would lead to unnecessary embarrassment and confusion, by involving the necessity of creating a new office with judicial authority, different from that of any other existing judicial office; whereas, by giving him the same powers as an assistant judge, his office will differ from that of an assistant judge, merely in having jurisdiction over a smaller territory.

As the Native judge will receive no fees, his pay, in order to be suitable to his station, and to render his office an object of ambition to all Native judicial servants, ought not to be less than rupees 300 per month.

The selection for the office of Native judge should be made by the Provincial Court, or by the Sudder Adawlut, from among the District Moonsiffs or the officers of the courts, according as the person best qualified may be found among the one or the other.

It would perhaps be advisable that all prisoners committed for trial by the Native judge should be sent to the gaol of Coimbitore or Salem, because it would greatly extend the distance of the circuit, and prolong its duration, were the court of circuit to visit Kolligall or Seringapatam. It is in fact only the prisoners belonging to Seringapatam who have ever been tried any where else than at Salem, or Coimbitore; and the Seringapatam prisoners would be less liable to sickness in the gaol of either of these places than in their own.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

Fort St. George, 6th April, 1827.

XX.

MINUTE ON THE MODE OF REMUNERATING OLD AND FAITHFUL NATIVE SERVANTS.

In Consultation, 9th March, 1827.

THE Honourable the Court of Directors, in their letter of the 11th June, 1823, have desired, "That should the original Native Pension Fund not have been abolished, it be continued under the regulations submitted to Government on the 25th of March, 1817, subject to such amendments as may be deemed advisable;" but that, in the event

of its having been abolished, Government should "consider and adopt the best means of reinstituting it."

It is the duty of Government to carry into effect the intentions of the Honourable Court, as far as may be now practicable. But after again reading every document connected with the subject, from first to last, I still continue to think that the measure is not only unnecessary, but hurtful to the public service. I think also, that even if the measure were in itself without objection, we have not in this country the means of conducting it properly, or so as that it shall not produce more evil than good.

Paras. 31, 32, 33. The Honourable Court do not think that the Native servants, except in very few instances, have the means of laying up any provision for their families; and they believe that those who have, are more disposed, while in office, to spend the surplus in charity and maintaining poor relations, than in saving. They do not admit that public servants ought to be assimilated to private, in being left to depend upon parsimony and their relations, and think that they have a claim to a certain extent upon the State. I never saw any objection to this claim to a certain extent; but I saw very serious objection to its being, by means of a Pension Fund, artificially augmented to an unmanageable extent, which it has been for some years. Long before the establishment of the Pension Fund, claims of real distress were heard, and, I believe, better satisfied than at present, because they were not overwhelmed with a mass of those of another description; and the claims of long and meritorious service were not less attended to than now. The Pension Fund will not provide better for either of these classes than was done without it. But it will certainly do what was not done before,—it will provide for the families of the thoughtless and improvident, at the expense of the careful and frugal; and I agree with the Committee of 1817 in thinking, that it will, among the

great body of the Native servants, have a bad effect in lessening their provident habits. I cannot concur in the opinion of the Honourable Court, that saving is very rare among our Native servants. I believe that it is very general, even among those whose pay is small; and that there are few who, when old, have not, either from their own savings, or the aid of children or relatives, the means of subsistence, or whose families, after their death, have not, from some helps, the means of maintaining themselves. If we suppose with the Honourable Court, that few servants can save, there would then be few whose families would not require pensions, and pensions could only be given to a few, by withholding them from many, who required them as much as themselves. This is, I believe, what does happen, and what must always in a great degree happen, in the distribution of pensions, founded on our imperfect estimate of the circumstances of our Native servants.

The stoppage for the Pension Fund is said by the Honourable Court to be only the enforcement of a moral obligation. It is a nice point to determine where Government ought to interfere in the enforcement of moral obligations. In many cases, it is best to leave the observances of them to the discretion of the party; and the present appears to me to be one of those cases. Were it certain that Government could discover the objects really entitled to the pension, and grant it accordingly, there might be some ground for interference; but as it has no means of effecting this, there can be none, more especially, as there can be little doubt that it will often add to the distress of some families, by bestowing on others the stoppages made from their salaries, which might otherwise have been saved for their own benefit. One main objection to the Pension Fund is, that after appropriating the whole, whatever may be its amount, we shall not provide for all the families claiming aid, but, on the contrary, we shall have more

families claiming aid, on account of distress, than if no such fund had ever existed. In little more than eight years from the commencement of the payment of the pensions till 1819-20, they had reached the sum of rupees 92,61,26,10; and with the charges (rupees 4,957,15) exceeded the sum originally allotted for their payment, (composed of the whole of the annual interest of the capital, and one-half of the annual subscription,) in the sum of rupees 70,73. There were then two hundred and ninety new claims for decision; and had the payment of pensions not been limited, there can be no doubt that the new claims would, in a very few years, have swallowed up the remaining half of the subscription. We should then have had no means of paying now, except from the lapse of old pensions, while there would have been no sensible abatement of the claims of distress. Much distress has been relieved by the fund; but more, I imagine, has gone unrelieved. The system itself produces and augments distress, by encouraging thousands to depend on the fund, rather than on their own exertions. If we persevere in attempting to carry on such an unmanageable plan, we shall receive no gratitude for what we give, but much censure for what we withhold: and the censure will not be without ground; for we shall, from our ignorance, as often reject as take the real objects of charity.

The Pension Fund, among its disadvantages, has a tendency to prevent the dismissal of bad servants; for, though a servant is found to be unfit for his duty from negligence, incapacity, or other cause, there is often a reluctance on the part of his superior to dismiss him, because it is thought hard to deprive a man of employment after he has paid stoppages for several years. There is also another inconvenience attending the stoppages; namely, that in many instances it is doubtful whether they are real or nominal. The rates of pay are so various and fluc-

tuating in every rank above that of a peon, that there is reason to apprehend that they will be gradually increased, so as, at least, to counterbalance the stoppage. At the Presidency, where the duties are of a more fixed and uniform nature, this is not so easy. But in the provinces the case is different, and the fluctuation in the rates of pay must long continue there; because it will be very long before such an uniform system of order can be introduced as will enable us to fix the rates of pay for any considerable time. Our knowledge of every district is more or less imperfect. Investigations must be carried on to enable us to bring them into better order; and the pay of the Natives employed must be regulated by their qualifications, and not by any invariable scale.

I have hitherto been speaking of the Family Pension Fund. I shall now make a few short remarks on the proposed Superannuation Fund, which was disapproved of by the Committee of 1817. I have strong objections to both funds; but of the two, I have the least to the superannuation, because it is much simpler, much easier in its management, and much less liable to abuse, than the other; as we can always ascertain when a servant is superannuated, though we cannot whether a family be in distress or not. But, notwithstanding these advantages, I am averse to the introduction of this fund; because I am averse to every new establishment whose utility is not obvious. Superannuated servants, having claims upon the State, know that they will always be attended to; and it would be better that they should be defrayed from the treasury, than from a subscription fund. The pension in this way would be more honourable, and more acceptable to the pensioner. If it be given from a fund, however moderately and cautiously given at first, it will soon be given with profusion, and exhaust the fund. The heads of departments and officers who recommend, would be partial to their own servants.

The very circumstance of there being a fund for the purpose would make them more liberal in proposing the reward,—would make them gradually become less severe in their estimate of public merit, and, in time, think it hard to exclude almost any man of a tolerably fair character. It may be said, that Government can prevent any unnecessary expenditure in this respect. It certainly can, if it give sufficient time to the subject; but if we are to judge from experience in all similar matters, it certainly will not, because it could not possibly find time for the requisite inquiry. Were superannuation to be determined solely by length of service, the difficulty would be lessened. But as decay of sight and other infirmities must have a place, the difficulty will continue. There is in the system itself a principle of profusion, in the encouragement which it gives to constant claims. Government cannot be always on its guard, or at leisure to examine them in detail, and they will undoubtedly soon swallow up the fund.

The Family Pension Fund was never thought of until August 1807, when it was first suggested by the Committee of Finance. No inconvenience had ever been felt from the want of it, during the long previous existence of our Native establishments. No recommendation of it, no call for it, had ever come from any quarter. The opinions of every Committee employed upon the fund have been against it. The Committee of 1813 pointed out the great difficulty of deciding upon claims, and how little aid could be derived from the recommendations of heads of offices. The Committee of 1817 expressed great doubts of the utility of the institution. They showed that it occasioned great and continually increasing labour, and that from the lapses annually accruing in a body of thirty-six thousand subscribers, it would in time become a business of immense detail, and that it tended to corrupt the moral feelings of

the natives; and they requested that some other permanent arrangement might be made for the management of the fund, as it occupied too much of the time required for their other duties. When I hear such opinions from a committee composed of men remarkable for their application to public business, I am satisfied that, by establishing a Pension Fund, we are needlessly involving ourselves in a mass of useless and interminable labour, which will waste the time of many public servants, which will lead to expenses which we do not foresee, and which Government will not be able to prevent, or even check, in any degree, without neglecting its more important duties.

As I disapprove entirely both of the Family and Superannuation Pension Funds, I have thought it right to state the grounds of my opinion; but as the Honourable Court have directed their continuance or reinstitution, it only remains for the Board to carry their orders into effect in the way most likely to produce the benefit contemplated, with the least injury to the service, and the least waste of public labour. I am not aware that any better plan can be devised for this purpose, than that which has been already suggested, of excluding the lower classes of servants from the Family Pension Fund, and not admitting any claim to superannuation, until after thirty years' service. It will not be sufficient to exclude peons and servants whose pay is under three pagodas. The exclusion ought to extend to all servants whose pay is less than pagodas eight, or rupees twenty-eight, and to all who do not belong to establishments of a permanent nature, whatever the amount of their pay may be.

XXI.

ON THE ABOLITION OF ZILLAH COURTS.

30th January, 1827.

1. I HAVE considered with attention the letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors in the judicial department, dated the 11th April, 1826. Some of the measures recommended in this letter may be immediately adopted with advantage; but there are some which it would not be advisable to adopt, and others which it may be found useful to introduce hereafter, when the system is more consolidated and better understood, but which it would be inconvenient to carry into effect at present.

2. The Honourable Court, after noticing the abolition of the zillah courts, between February, 1821, and March, 1823, observes, that the local and superior judicial officers should have been required to report their opinion, before measures of such extreme importance were decided on. The abolition was not hastily adopted; it had been frequently discussed among the members of Government, who were unanimous in their opinion regarding its expediency. Had the members of Government been men of little experience, and unacquainted with the operation of the judicial system, I should undoubtedly have thought it necessary to make a reference to the judicial officers; but Messrs. Stratton and Thackeray, the two civil members, were, from their general knowledge of the service, and experience in the judicial line, at least as competent as any of the local officers, to form a just opinion on the subject under consideration; and to have waited, under such circumstances, to collect opinions from every quarter, would have been a mere waste of labour. There are some cases in which it is useful to have the opinion of every local officer. There are others in which that of only one or two of the most intelli-

gent can be of the smallest use; and there are some in which none is necessary. I considered the present to be a case in which Government could have derived no aid from other opinions in forming its own; for it possessed in itself as extensive a knowledge of the localities of every district under this Presidency, and of the character and customs of the inhabitants, as could have been obtained any where else; and as it had before it the periodical returns of the business done in the several courts, it was enabled, by observing what was done in some of the larger and more populous zillahs, to determine how far some of the smaller ones might be united, without detriment to the due administration of justice.

3. It is obvious too, that on such a question as that of the reduction of the number of zillahs, an impartial opinion could hardly have been expected from the judicial officers. They must be supposed to be, like other men, favourable to the branch of service to which they belong; and, however conscientious, they may be liable to be influenced, without being sensible of it, by their wishes and their interests. Had the number of zillah courts been double, or even treble of what it actually was, I am satisfied that not a single reduction would have been recommended.

4. Petitions against the abolition of the courts are in general of little weight. They prove nothing against the measure—they arise out of partial local interests. In whatever town or village a zillah court is established, it is beneficial to the inhabitants, not only for the sake of justice, but because it adds to the value of their houses and other property—gives them additional employment, and a better market for their produce. The removal of the court will of course be a loss to the inhabitants of that place and its neighbourhood, and produce petitions; but the same thing would happen if the court were not reduced, but removed

within the same zillah, from a small town to a larger one, more conveniently situated for the population of the zillah. Or even if, on removing the court, two courts instead of one were established in the same zillah, the inhabitants of the place from which the court had been removed would still complain. Had the courts been originally three times as numerous as they were, the reduction of any one of them would have produced petitions. Government cannot act upon such petitions, but must look to the wants of the whole country, and be guided by them in distributing the courts.

5. On the introduction of the judicial system, the courts were established at once, without any previous knowledge of the number that would be requisite. It was soon discovered that there were too many, and several were reduced. Longer experience showed that the business of some courts was much less than that of others—that the business of all had considerably diminished by the operation of the Regulations of 1816 and subsequent enactments; and that a farther reduction could be made without inconvenience, and without imposing upon the courts more labour than they formerly had. It was upon this ground that the reductions from 1821 to 1823 were made; and it is to be regretted that any expression in the minute proposing them should have led the Honourable Court to think that they were connected with the establishment of sub-collectors. There was no connection between the two measures; the sub-collectors would have been appointed had there been no courts to reduce, and the courts would have been reduced even if there had been no intention of appointing sub-collectors. But it was regarded as a satisfactory circumstance, that while we were increasing the expense of one branch of the service, we could lessen that of another, without impairing its efficiency. If we compare Bengal and Madras with respect to their relative

extent of territory and amount of revenue, property, and population, and if we take into the account the relief which the Madras zillah courts have derived from the regulations of 1816, I believe it will appear that Madras has as large a proportion of zillah courts as Bengal.

Paras. 11, 12, 13, 14.

6. The Honourable Court have quoted some reports of judicial officers, regarding the great distance which witnesses have sometimes to travel. A case is stated in Canara, in which some of the witnesses resided at the distance of two hundred, and others of two hundred and sixty miles from the zillah courts. Mangalore, the Court station, is about fifty miles from the southern extremity, and one hundred and sixty from the northern extremity of Canara, and about two hundred and ten from the most distant part of Soondah. There was a zillah court at Honawur, which was abolished many years ago by a former Government; and had the remaining court been then transferred from Mangalore to Cundapoor or Burroor, where the collector's cutcherry was for some years, though it would have been equally distant from the northern and southern points of Canara, it would have obviated, as far as regards distance, every material inconvenience which has been since experienced. Canara is a long narrow tract of country, not more than twenty or thirty miles in its average width; and Soondah, which is situated above the Ghauts, is almost an entire jungle, thinly peopled, and very unhealthy. In such districts, therefore, as Canara and Soondah, the partial evil of distance cannot be removed without giving to them more courts than the amount of their population and property requires. The pressure of business at Canara is much greater than in any other zillah, and has frequently engaged the attention of the Board; and though I have little doubt that it grew out of the misconduct of the Court at a former period, yet I am convinced that it can now be remedied only by the aid of

an assistant-judge. A case is brought forward as one of great hardship in Chicacole, where some rayets travelled three times from Aska and Gomsoor to the zillah court, making a distance of a thousand miles. These are evidently extreme cases, which seldom happen. Gomsoor is a remote, unhealthy, hill zemindary, over which our courts have a very imperfect authority.

7. Such complaints are not peculiar to this country. In all countries we have the same, or perhaps greater, aversion of prosecutors or witnesses to attend the courts, and leave their homes and business, and the same complaints of distance and detention. In many of our old zillahs, the Court station was not centrical, but at one extremity of the district, like Masulipatam. It would be an useless multiplication of courts to attempt to bring every remote corner of a district within a limited distance of them. The people of India, both from habit and climate, attach much less importance to distance than we do;—they travel at little expense, as they pay nothing on their journey for their accommodation. They would, no doubt, rather travel forty or fifty miles to a court than eighty or a hundred; but it is the leaving their homes, and the time they are to be absent from them and their business, which they think most of. A man who has to go fifty miles knows that he can reach the court in two or three days,—if a hundred, in as many more; but he can form no guess how long he will be detained there;—it may be one, two, or three weeks, or as many months. And it is this which they chiefly complain of, and from which no increase of courts could afford more than a very trifling relief.

Paras. 16, 17. 8. It is observed by the Honourable Court, that as the average of suits instituted in the zillah courts did not exceed the value of one hundred and seventy-five rupees, most of them might have been carried to the district moonsiffs, had the parties

wished it. It is not easy to ascertain the motives which may have led to this preference. In some instances it may have been the belief that the case would have been better examined in the zillah court,—in others, it may have been the contrary. The character of the court, and the case being a plain or intricate one, would often influence the suitor in his choice of a court. In many cases, recourse was no doubt had to the zillah judge, because the suitors resided in the town which was the station of the zillah court: but one thing is clear, that, as all causes coming before the district moonsiffs might have gone to the judge, and as so small a proportion of them did go, that the moonsiffs' court is much more popular than the zillah court. It cannot be denied, that the abolition of the zillah courts was attended with inconvenience from the loss of the services of the sudder ameens. But it was soon remedied by the appointment of additional moonsiffs.

Para. 20. 9. It is apprehended by the Honourable Court, that when, in consequence of the late reduction of the zillah courts, "access to justice becomes very difficult, crimes are winked at or compromised, prosecutions are prevented, information is suppressed, and acts of fraud and violence, scarcely less terrible to the community in their commission than in their discovery and its consequences, must necessarily increase, although the Government may not be aware of the sufferings of the people." There is no cause, I think, for the apprehension here expressed. When, at an earlier period, several zillah courts were reduced, and Cuddapah and Bellari, each more extensive than any of the enlarged zillahs, were left with one zillah court each, no such apprehension was entertained, and no such consequences followed; and there is no reason to believe that they are more likely to follow in the recently enlarged zillahs. Crimes have not increased, they are gradually diminishing, and will continue to dimi-

nish. If the Honourable Court suppose that crimes can be prevalent without the knowledge of Government, or that the sufferings of the people can be concealed from it, they have formed an opinion of the state of things under this Presidency, which is far from being correct; there can hardly be any crime, and there can be no suffering of the people concealed from Government. There may be a very few exceptions in some of the hill zemindaries, where the authority of Government scarcely reaches, but in all other districts the detailed nature of our internal administration, and the innumerable body of rayets who hold their lands immediately of Government, bring us into such universal and direct intercourse with the people, as to preclude the possibility of their sufferings being concealed from us.

Para. 22. 10. It is remarked by the Honourable Court, that the village moonsiffs, estimated to amount to fifty thousand, are vested with much uncontrolled power, and are subject to great temptations, which too many of them are unable to resist; that the fear of prosecution in the zillah courts was an useful check upon them, and that the late reduction of courts will remove this check. This opinion is not supported by any experience we have yet had. The village moonsiffs are so far from abusing their power, that very few of them act at all; their dread of being summoned on some false complaint or other to the zillah court is so great, that most of them avoid exercising the authority intrusted to them. This unwillingness was foreseen at the time the regulation was passed, but not to the extent it has since been found to exist. Had they been left, according to ancient usage, responsible, in the first instance only, to their teshildar, they would, in general, have discharged the duties of the petty jurisdiction assigned to them; but the fear of the court is so great, that only a small portion of the more intelligent venture to act at all; the abolition of the courts has not

made them more confident; and it will yet be a very long time before they acquire confidence sufficient to enable them to become so useful in their subordinate station as they ought to be.

Para. 22. 11. It is stated very justly by the Honourable Court, that in order to form a just estimate of the merit due to the district moonsiffs, from the small proportion of appeals made from their decision, we ought not to compare the number of appeals with the number of decisions, but with the number of suits appealable; and that, if this were done, the result would be less favourable to the moonsiffs. It is also remarked, that many appeals are prevented by expense and other obstacles; but this surely is not peculiar to the moonsiffs, more than to the zillah and provincial courts. Even if we take only the appealable suits, the proportion of appeals will still be so small as to be very creditable to the moonsiffs. The records of the Government-offices do not supply the information required, as they do not distinguish between the suits above and below twenty rupees; and as it would take a considerable time to get it from the provinces, it will suffice, for the present purpose, to exhibit the returns which I have obtained from two of the nearest zillahs, Combaconum, and Cuddapah.

	Number of Suits of 20 rupees and upwards instituted in the District Moonsiffs' Court.	Number of such Suits settled by Razeenamah.	Number of such Suits decided on the merits.	Number of such Suits decided and appealed to the Zillah Courts.
Combaconum	1825 1764	491	640	57
	1826 1620	491	618	137
Cuddapah . .	1825 —	—	—	—
	1826 1357	455	653	83

There is, I think, no sufficient foundation for the supposition that great abuses are practised by the district moonsiffs in the decision of suits under twenty rupees, from their not being appealable. Their proceedings are public, they are known to the whole district; and were they unjust, their courts would soon be deserted, and their fees would be lost. The cause of this would soon be known to the superior court, and they would be dismissed from office. The collectors and magistrates can take up complaints against them; and as they have every facility in learning the conduct of the moonsiffs towards the inhabitants, it is impossible that abuse of authority in giving unjust decisions can long remain undiscovered. Suits under twenty rupees can hardly afford a bribe to corrupt the moonsiff; and it is very improbable that the trifle which could be given should ever, except in very rare cases, tempt him to sacrifice his place and all his prosperity in life. The district moonsiffs are disliked by the servants of the zillah courts, because they carry off much of their former business; and they are still more disliked by the teshildars, because they exercise a new authority in the district superior to theirs, and occasionally summon them before them. It was therefore apprehended, that, unless the moonsiffs were strongly supported, and guarded from all unnecessary interference, as far as it could be safely done, they would meet with so much counteraction and opposition as would render them quite inefficient. It was with the view of giving them weight and character among the people, that it was thought advisable to vest them with authority to decide, without appeal, suits under twenty rupees. This measure has answered the expectations entertained of it. The moonsiffs' courts have now acquired the confidence of the people, and are eagerly resorted to by them; but though they are now so firmly established as not to require the same support as at first, and though

their authority might not be shaken by making suits not exceeding twenty rupees appealable, such a change would, I think, be highly inexpedient, as it would only tend to multiply business without any adequate advantage; and as it is impossible that the present exemption of petty suits from appeal could be materially abused by the moonsiffs, without complaint and discovery; and as no such complaints have yet appeared, I am of opinion that the present system ought not to be disturbed. Should any evil be found to arise from it on future experience, Government has the remedy in its own hands, and ought then to apply it, and not before.

Para. 25. 12. Among the evils supposed to have been occasioned by the consolidation of zillah courts, are the diseases, and even loss of life, to which prisoners are said to be exposed, by being sent from the hilly parts of Rajahmundry to gaol at Masulipatam. I regarded this statement, at the time it was brought forward, as undeserving of attention, and as being founded in prejudice in favour of a favourite medical station, and in a want of due investigation. Government has often had cause to question the correctness of medical theories respecting the health of prisons: they are often at variance with each other. A prison is said to be unhealthy, because it is too little ventilated, or too low, or too much exposed; while, after all, the unhealthiness is merely casual, and originates in causes not known; and perhaps affects the habitations of the people, and the barracks of the military, as much as the prison. I doubt the authority both of the medical officer and the foujdary adawlut, when they tell us that prisoners confined at Rajahmundry cannot be removed to the sea-coast without danger to their lives, more than those apprehended in the neighbouring districts. In every district under this Presidency, except Tanjore and the Jageer, there are unhealthy hilly tracts, as well as in Rajahmundry;

yet it has never been thought necessary to have particular prisons for the offenders from such tracts in these districts. The district of Rajahmundry is in general open, the population among the hills is very small, the great mass of the people, and Rajahmundry itself, are in the open country. Ganjam and Vizagapatam are both more hilly and unhealthy than Rajahmundry; and yet no objection has ever been made to bringing prisoners from the interior of these districts to the coast. The districts of Masulipatam are as unhealthy as those of Rajahmundry. They are mixed with each other: the hill inhabitants of the one are sent without hesitation to Masulipatam on the sea-shore; but the hill inhabitants of the other, it is said, can only, with safety to their lives, be sent to Rajahmundry. The real hill inhabitants, those who actually reside upon the hills, are very few, and they would probably suffer from confinement in any gaol; but the people who fill our gaols are those of the plains, and of the valleys among the hills, and they are so much the same race, that no line could possibly be drawn so as to distinguish which of them should, for the sake of health, be sent to one gaol, and which to another.

Paras. 26, 29. 13. The Honourable Court have adverted at considerable length, and with just severity, upon the conduct of the native police officers in extorting confessions from prisoners, and they specify some very atrocious cases, among which are the murder of a man by a peon, in endeavouring to extort a confession, and the maiming of a prisoner by a potail, in torturing him for the same object. In both these cases, however, it is satisfactory to know that the offenders were convicted and punished, one capitally, and the other with two years' imprisonment and hard labour. The judge who reports, fears that cases of forced confession are too common, even among the officers of Government; but observes, that the proof is difficult. When violence really takes place, the proof cannot be diffi-

cult; but I believe that, in a great proportion of the cases where it is charged, none has been used. It is much more general in Malabar and Canara than in other zillahs, and the difference is probably owing to the people of Malabar and Canara still retaining much of the turbulent and vindictive character which they acquired while divided into petty states, and little restrained by any regular authority from exercising acts of outrage on each other.

14. It is no doubt too certain that many irregularities are used in obtaining confessions, and that, in some instances, atrocious acts are committed; but when we consider the great number of prisoners apprehended, and the habits of the people themselves, always accustomed to compulsion where there is suspicion, how difficult it is to eradicate such habits, and how small the proportion of cases in which violence has been used is to the whole mass, the number of these acts is hardly greater than was to be expected, and is every day diminishing. The prohibition against forced confessions is known to all native police officers; and it seems extraordinary that they should ever employ force, for they know that they have much to lose and nothing to gain by such conduct; but some of them, in spite of every injunction to the contrary, when they believe that a prisoner is guilty, think it right to extort a confession. Police officers in general, however, will not gratuitously expose themselves to loss of place, and their families to ruin, by such conduct. Prisoners are sometimes hurt by attempting to escape, and notorious offenders are sometimes roughly treated by the villagers who assist in securing them; the marks thus caused are sometimes exhibited as evidence of extorted confession. Wherever there is proof of force having been used for such a purpose, the police officer should be invariably punished, and dismissed from the service. But great caution is necessary in believing the accusation of force; it should always be very clearly established,

before it is entitled to credit. Police matters are so public, that the charge of violence, when true, can hardly be concealed. There are two things in which there is constantly very great exaggeration—the number of persons concerned in a robbery, and the number of extorted confessions: only a small part of the alleged cases of extorted confessions are ever substantiated. The circuit court say that the proof is difficult: I believe that, when true, the proof is easy, and that the difficulty lies in by far the greater part being unfounded. The charge is easily made, and the effect of its receiving belief from the court of circuit is so generally known, that offenders very frequently bring it forward in some stage of the trial. It is a point which demands the greatest possible circumspection on the part of the magistrate. If he lets the person escape who has been guilty of extorting confession, he encourages one of the worst offences against the administration of justice. If he punishes the police officer charged with this offence in only a very few instances, on false evidence, he will effectually deter the whole body from the zealous exercise of their duty, and let loose a host of robbers upon the community. No number of zillah courts would prevent the excesses complained of among the native police: were we to double the number, it would have no effect in restraining them. They can only be checked, and effectually put down, by the vigilance of the magistrates,—by never letting them pass unpunished,—by the police officers finding from experience that they never could gain any thing from the use of force, but would certainly suffer disgrace and punishment, and by time working a change in their habits.

15. The irregularities committed by the police are now much more difficult of concealment than when the offices of zillah-judge, and magistrate, were united in one person, confined to a fixed station; and though too many of the police officers are still frequently guilty of such irregulari-

ties, yet the conduct of the great body of them is highly useful and meritorious, and its effects are becoming every day more evident in the increasing tranquillity of the country, and the gradual diminution of organized bands of robbers. The amelioration, though occasionally retarded by the misconduct of local officers, continues to advance, and is gradually diminishing the number of crimes.

Paras. 28, 29. 16. The cruelties reported by the circuit judge to have been inflicted on certain inhabitants by the Parbutti and Holkars, in Malabar, were investigated by the collector, and found to be without proof. The observation quoted from the report of the Board of Revenue, as to the "rayets not being in that state of ease and security in which the justice and liberality of the British Government means to place them," was made by the Board, from perceiving that the courts could give no effectual security to the great mass of rayets from the exactions of the village and district officers. The subject had frequently, during a long course of years, been brought to the notice of Government; and as it was manifest that the evil could only be remedied by empowering the collector to enforce the summary restitution of all such illegal exactions, a special Regulation was enacted for that purpose. It is not more courts that we want for the protection of the rayets from exactions, and of the inhabitants in general from theft and robbery, but more systematic experience, and, consequently, more aptitude among our local officers, both Native and European, for the discharge of their several duties. I therefore entirely agree with the Honourable Court, that a system of training is as necessary in the judicial as in the revenue line; and that an intermediate class of functionaries, similar to that already established in the revenue, should be introduced into the judicial department. I have long thought that some of the senior registers should receive higher allow-

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ances and extended jurisdiction; but the appointment of assistant civil and criminal judges is a much better measure.

17. I think that five assistant judges will be sufficient for every object. Canara is the district in which an assistant judge is most wanted: the pressure there has frequently been the subject of deliberation at the Board, and of correspondence with the Sudder Adawlut. Next to Canara, the want of an assistant judge is greatest in Malabar; and after Malabar, the district which at present most requires help, is Cuddapah; but I imagine that the pressure there is only temporary; that it has arisen, in a great degree, out of the disorders caused by the famine in 1823–4, and that it will soon cease. Salem, both from its great extent and population, ought to have an assistant judge, either at Coimbitore, or any other convenient station. Masulipatam, for the same reasons, should have an assistant judge; but I am not sure that it may be advisable to transfer the zillah judge to Rajahmundry, and station the assistant at Masulipatam. The towns both of Rajahmundry and Masulipatam are situated on the extremity of their respective districts, but Rajahmundry is central to both.

18. I concur also with the Honourable Court, in thinking that the native judicial officers of the assistant judges should, in the first instance, be taken from the officers of the reduced zillah courts, as far as they may be properly qualified, and that the vacancies which may occur afterwards should be filled from the list of district moonsiffs, in order that we may have a gradation of Native as well as European officers. Such gradation is desirable in every department: it encourages good conduct, and secures to the public the services of zealous and experienced servants. It should however be understood, that merit alone can entitle any individual to promotion.

19. Some advantages might result from carrying into effect the suggestions of the Honourable Court, regarding the zillah judges holding alternate sessions at different places within the zillah; but I imagine that they would be at least counterbalanced by the inconveniences which would attend the measure. The visiting and inspecting of the district moonsiffs by the zillah judge might be useful; but, on the other hand, the general progress of business would probably be retarded by his absence from the court station, by the time spent in travelling, and by the partial hindrance of the moonsiffs' proceedings while engaged with him. The same object might perhaps be attained by sending occasionally for such of the moonsiffs as most appeared to require instruction, and employing them for a time under his own eyes at the court station. His travelling for the purpose of learning the state of the police, and hearing complaints against it, and communicating his information to the magistrate and the provincial court, would do no good, and might often lead to inconvenient interference, by diverting his attention from the duties more properly his own, to those which did not belong to him. It will be much safer to leave the supervision of the police to the magistrate and the court of circuit. Before coming, however, to any final resolution on the question of the zillah judge visiting the stations of the district moonsiffs, it may be advisable to refer it for the opinion of the judicial department.

Paras. 38 and 44.

20. The Honourable Court are apprehensive that the allowing fees to the district moonsiffs "may have conduced rather to the quick dispatch, than to the satisfactory adjustment of the business before their courts;" and they observe, that the number of suits appealed should be contrasted with the number appealable, before it can be proved that their proceedings

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are of a satisfactory character. We have not, as already stated, before us the documents required for making this comparison. But it is sufficiently evident, from the continued resort of the people to the courts of the district moonsiffs, that their decisions are in general satisfactory.

21. As the Honourable Court disapprove of the abolition of fees on suits under ten rupees, which was done with the view of leaving no inducements to the district moonsiffs to use any undue means for drawing such petty suits into their own courts, and as the abolition of the fees does not appear to have had any material effect in any way, it seems proper that they should be restored.

Paras. 48 to 50.

22. In order to encourage the district moonsiffs not only to dispose of their business without delay, but also to weigh maturely the merits of each particular case, the Honourable Court recommend that their payment by fees should be abolished, and that they should receive a salary somewhat higher than the average amount of their present salary and fees together; and that "no suit instituted in a district moonsiffs' court should be subjected to a higher fee than two and a half per cent.," which reduction, they expect, will bring a large addition in the district moonsiffs' court. I do not think that the reduction of fee to two and a half per cent. would increase the business in the district moonsiffs' court, because I am convinced that all which now goes there would go even if there were no fees. The business in these courts is more likely to diminish than to increase: some of the moonsiffs already complain of having too little business. It does not appear therefore to be necessary to give them a salary in place of fees, to enable them to weigh cases more maturely. Such a plan may be proper at a future period, but not for many years: it is not suited to the present habits and opinions of the people. The moonsiff system is both popular and efficient far beyond every expectation

that was formed of it, and is becoming more so every day. It is better not to disturb it, but to let it go on as at present, until it shall have acquired more firmness by time, by the improved judicial knowledge of the moonsiffs, and the increased respect of the people. If the fee should have a tendency, in some cases, to stimulate the moonsiff to too hasty decisions, it is to be recollected that it is checked by the fear of suitors not coming to his court. If his decisions were wrong, either from haste, or any other cause, the people would soon discover it, and carry their suits to the zillah court, if they could not be settled in the village. If the business were in any case actually too great for him to get through properly, the inconvenience could always be easily remedied, by appointing an additional moonsiff. But though I would not think it safe to shake the public confidence in the moonsiff system by so great an innovation as the substitution of salary for fees, I highly approve of the recommendation, that the fee in the district moonsiffs' court should not exceed two and a half per cent. I think, however, that it would be more convenient to make the fee half an anna per rupee. The difference is trifling, and the calculation would be more easily understood by the poorer classes of the people. The charge of half an anna is so slight, that it may be adopted for every sum cognizable by the district moonsiff. The decrease of receipt which will be occasioned by the lowering of the fee should be borne by Government, and it should in no way affect the income of the moonsiff, who should continue to receive, as at present, one anna per rupee.

23. I am doubtful of the propriety of leaving to the district moonsiffs a discretion of admitting pauper cases into their courts; but the subject may be referred for the opinion of the judicial department.

Para. 51. 24. The granting rewards to meritorious moonsiffs and to head police officers for

exemplary discharge of their duty, as recommended by the Honourable Court, will no doubt be productive of considerable public benefit, and ought therefore to be carried into effect. It does not appear to be necessary to attach higher allowances to certain districts, in order to reward extraordinary merit in moonsiffs, by appointing them to them. In almost every zillah, there are at present one or two moonsiffs' districts, in which the allowances from fees are considerably higher than in the rest, and to which the more meritorious moonsiffs may be nominated as vacancies occur. It is not so much an addition to the pay of the moonsiffs, as a higher class of native judicial officers, that we want. I have frequently thought, that in each zillah one, or, in some cases, two native judicial officers might be invested not only with civil, but criminal jurisdiction, and be placed over a large district somewhat in the same manner as is now proposed with regard to assistant judges. Such an office would give great respectability to the native judicial department, and would encourage the exertion, and secure the services of men of integrity and talent in the administration of justice. The subject, however, requires too much consideration to be hastily adopted; but I shall endeavour at some future time to submit to the Board some proposition regarding it.

Para. 52. 25. The half-yearly statements of prisoners, noticed by the Honourable Court, do not exhibit a diversity in the administration of the same laws, but merely an error in the mode of preparing the statements, which either the provincial court, or the Sudder Adawlut, might at any time have ordered to be corrected, but which seems to have escaped their attention until it was pointed out to them by Government.

Paras. 53, 54. 26. The Honourable Court are of opinion, that as individuals who may have suffered wrong from the magistrates or the police, have no

means of appeal against their proceedings during the periods when the judges of the provincial courts are not on circuit; that the judges of the provincial court should have the same authority as the judges on circuit now have to receive and pass orders on petitions against the magistrates and police officers; that the magistrate should transmit, monthly, a statement of all petitions against the police officers to the provincial court; and that the control of all the criminal and police proceedings of all the local authorities, should be immediately in the hands of the judges of the provincial courts.—I apprehend that the alterations here proposed would, if carried into effect, produce more harm than good. There is hardly any case, I believe, except that of vagrants, or persons of bad character confined on suspicion, in which the interference of the provincial court could possibly afford any relief. In other cases, the term of imprisonment would have expired, and the prisoner been released before the court could receive the petition, make the necessary inquiry, and communicate their orders to the magistrate. The release of vagrants and suspicious characters would, with more advantage, be left, as it now is, to the magistrate and circuit judge: no possible benefit could in any case be derived from the interference of the provincial court, which could compensate for the inconvenience which it would produce. The magistrate's own character, the reports of his conduct by the circuit judge and the Foujdary Adawlut, and the danger of his being removed from his office by Government, are all securities against his committing any act of oppression in the interval between the departure and arrival of the circuit court. I am therefore of opinion that no change ought to be made; but that if any is made, it ought to be, not by giving any new power to the provincial court, but by authorizing the circuit judge to pass orders on petitions from every zillah within his range,

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during the whole course of his circuit, without any reference to the particular zillah in which he may be at the time.

27. The control of the magistrates and of the police ought not, I think, to be in the hands of the provincial court. The proceedings of both are already sufficiently under check, and to multiply checks would only tend to embarrass the operations of the police, and to divert the provincial court from their proper business, without producing the smallest increase of real control. The magistrates are interested with the direction of the police. All charges against them are cognizable by the court of circuit, and, when necessary, are referred to the Sudder Adawlut and to Government. Government ought to reserve to itself, as much as possible, the immediate control of the magistrates. By delegating it to too many intermediate authorities, it becomes more circuitous and less efficient, and will augment rather than lessen the business of Government.

28. The Honourable Court appear to think that there is a restriction upon receiving complaints against the native heads of police. I know of no restriction: all persons who are punished or injured by the police officers are perfectly free to petition against them.

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29. I have not hesitated, in the course of this minute, to avail myself of the permission of the Honourable Court, to dissent from their opinions where I could not agree with them. The Court do not seem to be acquainted with the change which has taken place, and which is still going on, in the character of the people, and the state of the country from the operation of the courts, of a standing army, and of a strong Government. They reason throughout their dispatch as if the reduction of certain zillah courts had left such zillahs unprotected by

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law, instead of being, as they were when incorporated with other zillahs, from the effects of the moonsiff system, of the magistrates' increased jurisdiction, and of other causes, as much protected by the zillah court, and as completely under its control, as they were in their separate state when first established. It is unquestionably the duty of Government to establish all the judicial courts that may be necessary for the due distribution of justice; but it has also another duty,—not to waste the resources of the country in useless and expensive establishments. The judicial establishments of this Presidency were at one time on a scale of extravagance far beyond that of any other country, or what the resources of any country could maintain. They have since been reduced at different times, and are now at a standard more proportionate to the wants of the people; and any temporary pressure which may arise will be easily relieved by the appointment of an assistant judge, without the necessity of any additional zillah courts. In every country some districts must be far from the principal courts, because no country can afford to maintain expensive judicial courts, merely because some individuals of such remote districts may otherwise have to travel an inconvenient distance once or twice in the course of their lives. Expensive establishments, when once sanctioned, are not easily put down. There is never any difficulty in finding plausible reasons to keep up a lucrative office; and if the office be judicial, the protection of the people can always be brought forward in defence of it; but the people would be much more solidly protected by abolishing the expensive establishment, and remitting the amount in their assessment.

30. I shall now recapitulate the several points which I have in this minute recommended for the approval of the Board.

1st, That assistant judges be appointed to certain districts, and that a regulation be framed defining their duties and relation to the zillah judge.

2nd, That the suggestion in the letter of the Honourable Court, regarding the zillah judges holding sessions with their district moonsiffs, be referred for the opinion of the Sudder Adawlut and subordinate courts.

3rd, That the district moonsiffs be authorized to levy fees on suits under ten rupees.

4th, That all suits in the district moonsiffs' courts shall pay a fee of half an anna per rupee, and no more; and that one anna per rupee shall be paid to the district moonsiff by Government.

5th, That the discretion proposed by the Honourable Court to be allowed to district moonsiffs in admitting pauper suits, be referred to the Sudder Adawlut.

6th, That honorary rewards be granted to meritorious district moonsiffs and native heads of police, at the close of each year.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO.

THE END.

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

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